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R a p h a e l  F o s h a y
What compartmentalized disciplines project on to reality merely reflects 
back what has taken place in reality. False consciousness is also true: 
inner and outer life are torn apart. Only through the articulation of their 
difference, not by stretching concepts, can their relation be adequately 
expressed.
Theodor W. Adorno (quoted in Jameson, Valences of the Dialectic 55)
This collection of essays on interdisciplinarity arises from a 2008 sym-
posium, “The Scope of Interdisciplinarity,” sponsored by Athabasca 
University and its Ma program in Integrated Studies (Ma-is). Athabasca 
University is Canada’s open university, and Ma-is is an interdisciplinary 
program that spans the full range of social science and the humanities 
disciplines.1 The purpose of the symposium was straightforward: to bring 
together leading scholars of interdisciplinary work in order to explore 
the range of ways that interdisciplinarity finds expression in thinking, 
research, and teaching and to measure its valences. It was intended from 
the beginning that the papers presented at the symposium would form 
themselves into the present volume, and I am pleased to present them 
here and to offer a preliminary reflection on the broad, in many respects 
amorphous, but certainly pervasive, issues presented by the decisive 
trend in recent decades toward interdisciplinary research, study, and 
teaching. The Ma-is program is an expression of these trends, and those 
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of us teaching in the program welcome this opportunity to engage in closer 
conversation with the leading edge of thought on interdisciplinarity.
In the following introduction, I attempt to set the debate surround-
ing interdisciplinarity in a certain historical, disciplinary, and theoretical 
context. Such a large and foundational topic does not easily lend itself to 
adequate “introductory” comment. Since general overviews of the situa-
tion that has given rise to intensive reflection on interdisciplinarity are now 
sufficiently numerous (e.g., Klein 1991; Frodeman 2010a, 2010b; Moran 
2010; Stehr and Weingart 2000; Kagan 2009), I have tried to pursue in the 
following a line of reflection on what seem to me the primary concerns 
driving our engagement with interdisciplinarity. In asking what is and 
should be motivating our practice of and reflection on interdisciplinarity 
(“Interdisciplinarity, for what?”), I point out that this question comes to 
us from (at least) two quite different directions, one internal to academic 
life and one external—although my point is that these locations and sets of 
priorities are not simply opposed. They are not even two. The point is that 
they are one and the same, or that until they come into active engagement 
with each other—an engagement fully social, political, and economic, as 
well as intellectual and even personal—the potential and the prerogatives 
of interdisciplinarity will not be fully or adequately plumbed.
i
In 1784, in a short essay for the Berlinische Monatsschrift titled “Answer 
to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?” Kant responds to the question 
posed to him by the editor in what would become, and has especially 
been confirmed in recent decades as, an iconic essay in the context of 
debates surrounding the issues of enlightenment, modernity, authority, 
knowledge/power, and the role of critical reflection in their ramifications 
(see Schmidt 1996). Kant reflects: “If it is asked ‘Do we now live in an 
enlightened age?’ the answer is ‘No, but we do live in an age of enlight-
enment’” (Kant 1996, 62). Kant was at considerable pains in this short 
piece to address the relation between enlightenment’s two dimensions of 
responsibility: toward the citizen himself in the full exercise of his (and, 
in the eventual and inevitable logic of enlightenment, her) freedom and 
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toward the individual’s role in the community, which, in Kant’s case, as 
he explicitly addresses in the essay, means under the rule of the “enlight-
ened” but absolute monarchy of Frederick the Great. Thus, Kant was 
concerned to draw the necessary boundary between what he calls the 
public and the private exercise of enlightened reason—between, on the 
one hand, the free exercise of self-determination and responsibility on the 
part of the individual in the public sphere (as an individual citizen) and, 
on the other, the constraints placed on those in public office to uphold 
state policy under a monarch who, while honouring learning and creative 
expression, had no reservations about the exercise of his absolute author-
ity in social and political life. Thus, Kant’s qualified reply—we do not live 
in an enlightened age, but we do live in an age of enlightenment—has a 
social and political force. Kant dwells on the “almost paradoxical” ten-
sion between civil and spiritual freedom: “A lesser degree of civil free-
dom, in contrast, creates the room for spiritual freedom to spread to its 
full capacity” (63).
This was an especially pointed distinction in Kant’s setting, given 
the issues at stake with regard to enlightenment. If, as Kant emphati-
cally declares in this essay, “Enlightenment is mankind’s exit from its self-
incurred immaturity,” then to be enlightened is, quoting Horace, to “dare 
to know.” “Sapere Aude!” Kant admonishes: “Have the courage to use 
your own understanding! is thus the motto of the enlightenment” (58). 
The spirit of such affirmations of the freedom and rights of the individual, 
of course, underwrote the American and French revolutions, so if enlight-
enment was to be affirmed in the context of Frederick’s absolutist regime, 
then some very clear partitions had to be set up between those realms 
where freedom of expression could safely be exercised and those in which 
the authority of the crown had to be obeyed incontrovertibly. Here, in this 
essay, and later in The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant attempts to establish 
clear parameters for free public speech and debate and, within the uni-
versity, for the right of academic freedom in the context of the university’s 
social responsibility.
With the publication of Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone 
(1793), Kant’s own exercise of free inquiry in the religious sphere incurred 
the anger of Frederick the Great. Threatened with punishment if he wrote 
further on religion, Kant agreed to remain silent on the issue:
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With an oath of loyalty to his sovereign, Kant promised to desist, but 
after the death of this king in 1797 he regarded himself as freed from 
this promise, and the next year issued his most spirited defense of 
intellectual freedom yet, The Conflict of the Faculties. Here Kant argued 
that while the theological faculty might have the obligation to advance 
certain dogmas approved by the state, it was nothing less than the 
official function of the philosophical faculty to subject all views to 
rational scrutiny; and in any case, a government genuinely concerned 
with its people’s welfare would not want them to base their morality 
on fear or dogma but only on the free exercise of their own reason. 
(Guyer [1998] 2004)
It was a disciple of Kant, Wilhelm von Humboldt, who redesigned the 
modern university around his teacher’s call for the enlightened self-
determination of the modern citizen, directing the university toward 
the formation not of a leisured elite but of self-cultivating and socially 
responsible working citizens of a qualifiedly but increasingly democratic 
society. As Steve Fuller points out in The Sociology of the Intellectual Life 
regarding Humboldt’s key role in establishing the pattern of the modern 
university:
Humboldt founded the modern university with the liberally educated 
citizen in mind. From that standpoint, knowledge production was 
presumed to be “always already” interdisciplinary. Disciplines as we cur-
rently know them—corresponding to departments, journals, and dedi-
cated graduate degree programs—only gradually emerged. (2009a, 24)
There are varying narratives of the date of emergence and rate of devel-
opment of the modern disciplines and their expression within the uni-
versity. Fuller, for instance, puts it well into the twentieth century before 
disciplines become clearly defined, autonomous entities, with their pro-
fessional associations:
People who we now so clearly call physicists, chemists, biologists, 
physicians and even engineers were quite hard to distinguish for most 
of the nineteenth century. The same applied even more strongly in 
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the so-called non-natural sciences. Moreover, sophisticated surveys 
of academic knowledge up to the first third of the twentieth century 
presupposed this murky and fractious process of disciplinarization. 
(2009a, 24)
Peter Weingart, however, with an optic focused less on the university 
context, locates this process earlier, in the nineteenth century, with the 
transition from a science generated by observation of the given world to 
one focused on experimentation within controlled settings:
The emergence of disciplines in the modern sense, which took place 
around 1800, implied the shift from occasions arising externally to sci-
ence for the collection of experience and data to problems for research 
generated “within” science itself. This meant that the judgment of 
relevance also became subject to the control by the respective groups 
of scholars. Their language became gradually more specialized and 
removed from everyday language. (Weingart 2010, 6)
For Weingart, “The essence of discipline formation and evolution is self-
referential communication. . . . The evaluation of relevance and quality of 
research is limited to the members of the respective disciplinary commu-
nity” (8). In this sense, he points out, disciplines function very much as 
guilds, engaged in professional self-regulation, promotion, and advocacy 
for research funding (9).
How one periodizes the emergence of disciplinarity depends very 
much on whether one is looking at the disciplines as free-standing pro-
fessional scholarly associations or at their expression in the modern uni-
versity, within their respective faculties and departments—in other words, 
on whether one is examining them in relation to the broader society and 
economy or in relation to the overall mission of the modern university, as 
conceived by Humboldt. In either case, there is a tension between the role 
of the intellectual as representative of the Enlightenment project to foster 
the free exercise of reason in society (the role protected and fostered by 
academic freedom in the university and free speech in society), on the 
one hand, and, on the other, the impulse to form increasingly profession-
alized communities focused on peer-reviewed inquiry along approved or 
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at least internally recognized and authorized lines of investigation. These 
two perspectives are clearly in no way exclusive of one another but are 
rather highly interdependent. In some cases, academic and professional 
associations are closely identified with the university community, as is 
true for most humanities disciplines, while, in the case of the sciences 
and even more so in professional fields such as engineering and law, such 
associations participate more widely in developments across society and 
the economy. The necessary and even inevitable narrowing of the focus of 
research—ever more specialized investigation, expressed in increasingly 
professionalized terminologies designed to enable ever more precise and 
refined observation—leads to a distancing of research from the teaching 
and disseminating function of the university within its institutional voca-
tion in wider society, conceived as it is by Humboldt, after Kant, as a proj-
ect of enlightenment, that is to say, of individual and social emancipation 
and maturation of free and responsible citizens.
The explosion of knowledge over the past century, fostered by the 
growth of expert, highly specialized categories of disciplinary expertise, 
has led the university further and further from its public vocation con-
ceived in enlightened and democratic terms and, in an environment of 
neo-liberal economization, into a service role that is increasingly oriented 
more toward social and political values and concerns than toward eco-
nomic, technical, and indeed technological expansion. Whether amount-
ing to an axial shift or simply constituting a pervasive drift, the focus, 
structure, and vocation of the university as an academic and social insti-
tution is responding, as it must, to the overall forces and patterns of an 
increasingly globalized economization of contemporary life. With two 
such variant agendas contending for the space and future direction of 
the university, raising the question of disciplines and their relation to one 
another calls for attention to the context and intent of the questioning: 
Disciplinarity, for what? Interdisciplinarity, for what? What are the pur-
poses to which academic disciplines in general ought to be directed? And 
what should therefore motivate the impulse toward interdisciplinarity?
Fuller provides an impressive synoptic overview of the context of 
reflection on disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity:
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The ideal governing . . . William von Humboldt’s reinvention of the 
university in early nineteenth-century Germany . . . aspires to a form 
of knowledge that is “universal” in both its potential applications and 
its potential appliers. Over the last half century, this ideal was recast 
as serving the welfare state’s dual economic function of subsidizing 
capitalist production (research) and redistributing its surplus (teach-
ing). Not surprisingly, while the universities magnified in size and 
significance during this period, the welfare state’s recent devolution 
has thrown them into financial and wider institutional uncertainty. . . . 
The recent drive to have universities mimic business firms as generators 
of intellectual property amounts to no less than a campaign of institu-
tional dismemberment, in which the university’s research function is 
severed from its teaching function. (2009a, 4–5)
In such a context of potential “institutional dismemberment,” the ques-
tion of academic disciplines and their interrelations takes on an import 
that calls for careful reflection. That the challenge of interdisciplinar-
ity has been at the forefront in recent decades hardly needs emphasis. 
Sufficient to indicate the full and canonical status of the debate is the 
recent appearance of The Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity (2010).2 
It’s editor-in-chief, Robert Frodeman, in an introduction to the volume of 
modest length (given the almost 600 pages of the volume itself), none-
theless ambitiously asserts the rights of the topic of interdisciplinarity 
to “challenge the academic status quo”: “At its best, interdisciplinarity 
represents an innovation in knowledge production—making knowledge more 
relevant, balancing incommensurable claims and perspectives, and raising 
questions concerning the nature and viability of expertise. (2010a, xxix)”
Such an impulse clearly accords with the teaching function of 
the modern university, and in “challenging the academic status quo” 
Frodeman invokes for interdisciplinarity the foundational critical func-
tion that inheres in the Kantian enterprise. Strikingly, Frodeman describes 
the Handbook as “herald[ing] the centrality of philosophic reflection 
for twenty-first century society,” since “interdisciplinarity is inherently 
philosophical, in the non-professionalized and non-disciplined sense 
of the term” (xxxi), constituting “an implicit philosophy of knowledge—
not an ‘epistemology’ but rather a general reflection on whether and to 
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what degree knowledge can help us achieve the perennial goal of living 
the good life” (xxxii). Frodeman contrasts such a general Enlightenment 
conception of philosophy as overall critique with the narrow, profession-
alized, and highly technical conduct of the discipline of philosophy as 
it has historically evolved. In terms surely now familiar to all humanist 
academics, he reproaches the humanities in general for their adoption of 
an analytic model of disciplinary knowledge that amounts to an abroga-
tion of their historic vocation as bearers and disseminators of enlightened 
knowledge (xxxii).
If indeed, as Fuller affirms, the modern university, in Humboldt’s 
vision, is “‘always already’ interdisciplinary” (2009a, 24), then the call 
to interdisciplinarity might be expected to arise first within the univer-
sity itself. Instead, both Fuller and Frodeman suggest that the contempo-
rary call for interdisciplinarity derives largely from historico-political and 
economic forces arising in the aftermath of World War ii. The impetus, 
Frodeman suggests, “was in the first instance extra-academic in origin. 
As knowledge production expanded, with much of it since World War 
ii funded by public funds, demands for accountability have grown. The 
assumption of a linear or automatic connection between knowledge and 
social benefit has given way to sharp questions about the usefulness of 
knowledge” (2010a, xxxi). While generally agreeing, Fuller gives to this 
narrative a more precise delineation:
As disciplinary boundaries hardened in the twentieth century, intel-
lectual gaps between the disciplines began to emerge as blind spots, 
which interdisciplinary work could then be explicitly dedicated to 
redress. The Cold War motivated much of this thinking, as national 
security issues focused academic minds on both sides of the commu-
nist-capitalist divide to organize themselves as a unified whole. In this 
context, operations research, systems theory, and artificial intelligence 
began to portray the existence of disciplines as obstacles to efficient 
knowledge flows. (2009a, 24)
As both Frodeman and Fuller suggest, the “blind spots” resulting in the 
hermetic intensification of disciplines were identified not within the 
academy, as presenting challenges to its own priorities, but rather from 
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within the social, economic, and political arena, where the question of 
the value of knowledge is subject to more pragmatic and frankly ideologi-
cal criteria.
That the push against disciplinary autonomy and discreteness should 
have come, in Fuller’s view, largely from Cold War–driven “operations 
research, systems theory, and artificial intelligence” indicates that inter-
disciplinarity is caught up in broader developments in computerization, 
the transformation of communications networks, and their current stage 
of digitalization, all of which have transformed the context of early twenty-
first-century society, politics, and economics in the direction of what can 
in shorthand be termed “globalization.” At the heart of this transfor-
mation is Information Technology (it)—what operations research, the 
former cybernetics, and artificial intelligence have largely enabled. When 
we talk about being “caught up” in these transformative developments, 
Carl Mitcham suggests why that feeling is not illusory:
A related phenomenology of human engagement would observe how 
the being of it differs from tools and machines. Unlike tools (which do 
not function without human energy input and guidance) or machines 
(which derive energy from nonhuman sources but still require human 
guidance), information technologies are in distinctive ways indepen-
dent of the human with regard to energy and immediate guidance; they 
are self-regulating (cybernetic). . . . Insofar as the operation of more 
electronically advanced it is subject to human guidance, guidance 
ceases to be direct or mechanical and is mediated by humanly con-
structed programs (electronically coded plans). What is the ontological 
status of programs? What are their relations to intentions? (2004, 331)
Mitcham makes the point more sharply in summarizing the reflections on 
it of Albert Borgmann: “Borgmann insightfully distinguishes between 
information about reality (science), information for reality (engineering 
design), and information as reality (the high-definition representations 
and creations emerging from it)—and further the increasing prominence, 
glamour, and malleability of information as reality is having the effect of 
diminishing human engagement with more fundamental realities” (331).
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Unquestionably, although all institutions of society are in a process 
of transformation resulting from the impact of it, it might be said that, 
because of its direct concern with knowledge and information, the uni-
versity is in some respects more caught up and transformed by it than 
some others. In another sense, because the university is necessarily 
directly involved with aspects of the development and application of 
it, it is perhaps so close to these developments as to persist in a certain 
state of distraction or delayed reaction in relation to it. The globalized 
and globalizing proliferation of it is sweeping everyone willy-nilly into 
an entirely transformed social and political matrix, one that is clearly in 
mid-process and the results of which are not yet possible to foresee. What 
we can see is that the process raises fundamental questions as to what 
we are about in the university. As Mitcham asks: What are the relations 
between computer programs and our intentions, our aims, our purposes? 
And, as we are asking here: Disciplinarity/interdisciplinarity—for what? 
Frodeman probes the philosophical principles upon which we should 
base interdisciplinary inquiry, arguing that fundamental critical reflec-
tion is implicit in the interdisciplinary enterprise. If we are all being car-
ried rapidly toward an unforeseeable future driven by an it that raises 
fundamental questions about our individual and social control and the 
direction in which this control is moving, then Kant’s concerns for our 
autonomy and independence of judgment are troubled by the sweeping 
embrace of our own technological power and ingenuity. “Immaturity,” 
Kant writes, “is the inability to make use of one’s own self-understanding 
without the guidance of another. Self-incurred is this inability if its cause 
lies not in the lack of understanding but rather in the lack of the reso-
lution and the courage to use it without the guidance of another” (Kant 
1996, 58).
A striking instance of the manner in which technology is driv-
ing new interdisciplinary configurations is the converging technolo-
gies initiative, the key document for which is Mihail Roco and William 
Bainbridge’s Converging Technologies for Improving Human Performance: 
Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information Technology, and Cognitive 
Science (2003). As Steve Fuller points out in his report on this movement, 
“There is an ongoing struggle between the us and eu to define the direc-
tion given to the idea of ‘converging technologies (ct) for improving 
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human performance,’” the above report constituting what he thinks is an 
indication that the “the us is winning this struggle, at least at the level 
of ideology” (2009b, 1). Fuller points out that the agenda for ct is not 
new but rather is continuous with the commitment to genetic engineering 
driven by such funding agencies as the Rockefeller Foundation as early 
as the 1930s. However, the emergence of nano- and info-technologies has 
opened up new vectors of research that have fundamentally shifted the 
dominant model of the practice of science from a physical to a chemical 
world view, entailing what Fuller considers to be “profound metaphysical 
implications.”
The dominant model of physics revolved, Fuller says, around the dis-
tinction between “natural” and “nominal” kinds, that is, between the 
actual existence of things in nature and, alternatively, our predilection for 
naming them in ways useful to us. With the turn to a micro-biologically 
influenced chemical world view, however,
it may be more appropriate to distinguish between virtual and real 
kinds, the latter understood as multiple realizations of the former. 
This marks a radical shift in the ontological focus of scientific inquiry. 
In particular, “nature” is cast as only a subset of all possible realiza-
tions (i.e., only part of the “real”), as opposed to something inher-
ently “other” or “independent” of whatever humans might name or 
construct. Once again this perspective is familiar from the chemical 
world-view, in which, say, the difference between “natural” and “syn-
thetic” fibres lies entirely in the history of their production and their 
functional properties, but not in terms of the metaphysical priority of 
one to the other, since both the “natural” and “synthetic” are composed 
of the same fundamental stuff—and the latter may indeed count as an 
improvement over the former. By extension, “mind” and “life” lose the 
metaphysical mystique associated with their natural origins and come 
to be assessed simply in terms of the properties possessed by their 
realizations—be they human, carbon-based, silicon-based, or some 
cyborgian mixture. (2009b, 18)
Fuller points out the eugenic force of the ct Initiative “for improving 
human performance.” Such a turn away from a clear distinction between 
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“natural” and “artificial’ or “humanly made” enables human beings to 
be seen “not as ends in themselves but as means for the production of 
benefits, be it to the economy or to ‘society’ more diffusely understood” 
(2009b, 22). As Fuller observes, the ideological struggles to define the 
direction of ct “are less over the desirability of enhancement per se than 
the form it takes” (2009b, 20), with the us taking a “proactionary” and 
the eu a more “precautionary” approach. Both approaches, he warns, 
entail some significant ambiguities. In the case of us, these bear on the 
supposed “benefits” and also the unforeseeable longer-term effects of 
genetic or cyborgian enhancement of performance. In the case of the eu, 
the ambiguities revolve around the emphasis on the effective “marketiza-
tion” of research for economic benefit, that is to say, on the improvement 
of performance on a socio-economic front. Fuller glosses the ct agenda 
“as a ‘technological fix’ for the second of two fiscal crises of the welfare 
state that has affected both sides of the Atlantic.” The first crisis, of the 
1970s, emerged in response to the increasing tax burden posed by post-
war social welfare policy. The second arose in the 1990s in connection 
with the “anticipated financial burden on the pension system of people 
living longer after retirement. ct is relevant to this development, as it 
promises—in both its us and eu guises—a longer period of labour pro-
ductivity, expanding the economy in general and deferring the need for 
individuals to draw on pensions” (2009b, 7–8).
I cite these details of Fuller’s interpretation to underline the socio-
economic policy imperatives that are driving aggressive state support 
of interdisciplinary initiatives. “Aggressive” is not too strong a word. As 
Fuller points out, “technological convergence” is not understood as mere 
interdisciplinary co-operation:
For technologies to converge, they must do something more than simply 
engage in “synergy” or “multi-,” “inter,” or even “transdisciplinarity.” . . 
. Convergence implies that formerly distinct lineages come to lose some, 
if not all, their differences in a moment of synthesis. This is much stron-
ger than the simple idea that different disciplines share some things in 
common. For convergence, such commonality must also cause the disci-
plines to see their interests as more closely aligned, so that they come to 
orient their patterns of work to each other. (2009b, 8–9)
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As Fuller suggests, especially when genetic, or eugenic, experimenta-
tion is overdetermined by a perceived sense of economic, social, and (of 
course) political urgency, when it comes to responding to the philosophi-
cal and ethical implications of these research initiatives, ethical values 
are placed in a distinctly reactionary posture. As he observes: “The 
Abrahamic or Kantian idea of humanity as a species-being in possession 
of its own integrity and autonomy (aka ‘dignity’) is largely relegated to 
ethical ‘side constraints’ for the conduct of research” (2009b, 22).
How, in the face of such technological, ideological, and economic 
pressure and momentum, does one mount a sufficiently forceful, pen-
etrating, and (necessarily) interdisciplinary research and teaching effort 
in the university, one able to address the gravity of the issues inherent 
in such unquestionably important—not to mention inevitable—research 
and public policy issues as are represented by the likes of the converging 
technologies initiative? That would be the question, it seems to me, for 
research projects and conference gatherings like the one that produced 
the essays gathered in this volume. But before I turn to a discussion of the 
individual contributions to the interdisciplinary debate collected here, I 
would like to return for a moment to my initial departure point in Kant’s 
concern with the question, “What is Enlightenment?” I do so in light of 
Robert Frodeman’s call for a more thoroughgoing theoretical and philo-
sophical reflection on interdisciplinarity and also in light of Steve Fuller’s 
observation about the embattled position of ethic values, at least on the 
pragmatic, genomic-technological end of the spectrum of forces currently 
driving the embrace of interdisciplinarity within and across the university 
and society at large. However fraught with problematic rationalism one 
may consider Enlightenment principles to be, and no matter what simi-
larly fraught and ambiguous ethical perspectives (whether sacred or secu-
lar) one may bring to bear, the fact remains that Enlightenment values are 
being accorded a distinctly subordinate place in the primary debates.
I would like to suggest that, in light of Jonathan Israel’s groundbreak-
ing work on the history of the Enlightenment, we need to take to heart his 
forceful argument that we have misunderstood the sources of the most 
critical and commanding Enlightenment values and their trajectory in 
the course of historical developments down to and including our own 
time. Regardless of whether one considers oneself an advocate or a critic 
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of Enlightenment principles and values, Israel’s argument needs to be 
absorbed and evaluated, not least in relation to the issues of the acad-
emy and of interdisciplinarity engaged in the present volume. In three 
penetrating studies in European intellectual history (2001, 2006, 2010), 
Israel makes a persuasive argument, supported by a detailed and wide-
ranging examination of the debates and social movements contributing to 
the Enlightenment tradition, to the effect that there are two main strains 
of Enlightenment thinking, a radical and a moderate, or conservative 
(in addition, of course, to the obvious third, the counter-Enlightenment 
strains of outright resistance).Regarding the former, he observes:
In recent years historians and philosophers have made rapid strides 
in uncovering the main stages and the general history of the Radical 
Enlightenment. An originally clandestine movement of ideas, almost 
entirely hidden from public view during the earliest phase (the late 
seventeenth century), and maturing in opposition to the moderate 
mainstream Enlightenment dominant in Europe and America in the 
eighteenth century, radical thought burst into the open in the 1770s, 
1780s, and 1790s during the revolutionary era in America, France, 
Britain, Ireland, and the Netherlands, as well as in underground demo-
cratic circles in Germany, Scandinavia, Latin America, and elsewhere. 
Radical Enlightenment is now widely seen as the current of thought 
(and eventually political action) that played the primary role in ground-
ing the egalitarian and democratic core values and ideals of the modern 
world. Radical Enlightenment is a set of basic principles that can be 
summed up concisely as: democracy; racial and sexual equality; indi-
vidual liberty of lifestyle; full freedom of thought, expression, and the 
press; eradication of religious authority from the legislative process and 
education; and full separation of church and state. (2010, vii–viii)
The moderate Enlightenment is represented by thinkers like Voltaire, 
Locke, Hume, and Kant who opposed the radical implications of the above 
principles in the work of Spinoza, Bayle, Diderot, and d’Holbach, adopt-
ing instead an ameliorationist position in relation to tradition and author-
ity (as represented by the argument we observed Kant making in “Answer 
to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?”). Radical Enlightenment 
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resisted the kind of dualism that runs through the thought of Descartes 
and Kant—a position that enables Kant to advocate such a fatally com-
promised principle as Frederick’s “Argue as much as you want and about 
whatever you want, only obey!” (Kant 1996, 63). As Israel underlines:
Throughout the Enlightenment’s history it is this irresolvable dual-
ity—the metaphysical dichotomy of one-substance doctrine (Spinozistic 
monism) and two-substance dualism, the latter as upheld by John 
Locke . . . and Voltaire, as well as other providential Deists and (most) 
Christians and Jews—that was always the principal and overriding 
factor shaping its course. (2010, 18)
Although my necessarily compressed summation of Israel’s argument 
may make it appear that he is a practitioner of an entirely abstract and 
outmoded history of ideas, he in fact mounts a considered counter-argu-
ment to the materialist direction of leading trends in intellectual history 
over the past few decades (see Israel 2006, 15–26). Indeed, as Frodeman 
does for interdisciplinarity and Fuller for science and technology studies, 
Israel does for intellectual history, and in a manner that returns us to the 
core debate over the nature and significance of the Enlightenment—its 
historical shape and its social ramifications. As he points outs, “where 
the radical thinker Condorcet, looking back on the Enlightenment’s 
achievements from the standpoint of 1793, deemed it certain not just that 
‘philosophy’ caused the French Revolution but that only philosophy can 
cause a true ‘revolution’. . . —this challenging and important proposition 
remains for most contemporary readers a remote and deeply puzzling 
idea” (Israel 2006, 13).
In framing the question of the purpose and intention of interdisci-
plinarity (“Interdisciplinarity, for what?”), I have argued, in line with 
Frodeman and Fuller, that interdisciplinarity necessarily returns us to 
fundamental questions of priority and value in social and intellectual life. 
As Frodeman suggests, interdisciplinarity is “the newest expression of a 
very old question,” the one regarding “the perennial goal of living the 
good life” (2010a, xxxii). By beginning with Kant and ending with Israel, 
I will suggest that the pressing call for interdisciplinarity within the acad-
emy (Frodeman) and in the economy (Fuller) calls for a fundamental 
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revaluation of Enlightenment values. In a passage worth quoting at 
length, Israel clearly and summarily launches all of the issues, intellec-
tual and historical, social and political, that seem to me to be entailed in 
our questioning of the direction of the academy at present:
Due to the leanings of much recent historiography, as well as the 
anti-historical orientation of twentieth-century Anglo-American 
philosophy, the modern reader investigating the rise of “modernity” 
as a system of democratic values and individual liberties in the 
Enlightenment encounters a bewildering and curious paradox. For the 
crucible in which those values originated and developed—the Radical 
Enlightenment—has not only, until recently, been very little studied by 
scholars but at the same time confronts us with a major philosophical 
challenge in that its prime feature is a conception of “philosophy” (and 
indeed of “revolution”) from which, during the course of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, western liberal thought and historiography, 
especially in the English-speaking world, managed to become pro-
foundly estranged. Part of the difficulty, in contemporary Britain and 
America, is that philosophy’s proper zone of activity has come to be so 
narrowly conceived to be a marginal, technical discipline which nei-
ther does, nor should, affect anything very much, let alone define the 
whole of the reality in which we live, an approach which firmly places 
“philosophy” at the very opposite end of the spectrum from the Radical 
Enlightenment’s (and indeed Marx’s and Nietzsche’s) conception of 
“philosophy” as discussion of the human and cosmic condition in its 
entirety, the quest for a coherent picture, the basic architecture, so to 
speak, of everything we know. (2006, 13)
I cannot quite end with Israel, however, in his invocation of a “human 
and cosmic” unity as the goal of a philosophically informed grasp of 
radical Enlightenment values and interdisciplinary interdependencies. 
We are beyond resting easy in such unities, and, with Fredric Jameson, 
I am more comfortable in engaging the question, “Interdisciplinarity, 
for what?” as a theoretical rather than a philosophical one. As Jameson 
importantly reminds us:
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This is why the dialectic belongs to theory rather than philosophy: the 
latter is always haunted by the dream of some foolproof, self-sufficient, 
autonomous system, a set of interlocking concepts which are their 
own cause. This mirage is of course the afterimage of philosophy as 
an institution in the world, as a profession complicit with everything 
else in the status quo, in the fallen ontic realm of “what is.” Theory, on 
the other hand, has no vested interests inasmuch as it never lays claim 
to an absolute system, a non-ideological formulation of itself and its 
“truths”; indeed, always itself complicit in the being of current lan-
guage, it has only the never-ending, never-finished task of undermining 
philosophy as such, of unraveling affirmative statements and proposi-
tions of all kinds. (2009, 59)
ii
This collection of essays organizes itself in accordance with the three 
main arenas of interdisciplinary scholarship: theory, practice, and teach-
ing. It is no accident, of course, in light of the reflections in section i of 
this introduction, that the opening section on interdisciplinary theory is 
the longest of the three. Attempting to grasp the parameters of a changed 
orientation to so fundamental and constitutive an institution of academic 
and societal intellectual life as disciplines requires basic reflection on the 
historical, institutional, and theoretical rationales that shape and govern 
them. Change in the structures and approaches to disciplinarity con-
stitutes change in the university and the wider intellectual community, 
and the question of how, and on what suppositions, that change should 
be measured is preliminary to accurate assessment of its significance, 
implications, and valuations. Reflection on what we do as academics 
and public intellectuals is one of the attractions and benefits of the rise 
of interdisciplinarity in that it brings new perspectives and energies to 
bear on reflective efforts that too easily remain shaped by established pat-
terns of thinking and criticism. The essays in this collection are intended 
to keep that necessary reflection alive on what we do as intellectuals, 
researchers, and teachers.
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Part One: Theory
As if to round off the foregoing discussion of the work of the intellectual 
historian Jonathan Israel and the critical theoretical corrective of Fredric 
Jameson, we begin with another intellectual historian, Martin Jay, whose 
seminal study of the Frankfurt School early in his career heralded the 
interdisciplinary focus of his many important ensuing studies of modern 
culture, a flow of scholarship that has shown no signs of abating. In keep-
ing with some of the concerns expressed above regarding the source and 
nature of certain of the prevailing pressures toward interdisciplinarity, in 
“The Menace of Consilience” Jay pursues a corrective emphasis on the 
nature of disciplinarity and a cautionary attitude toward specific strains 
of the current pursuit of interdisciplinarity within the academy. He begins 
by reminding us that, while we recognize that academic disciplines are 
historical and social constructions, at the same time “the weakening 
of disciplinarity . . . may lead us down a slippery slope into intellectual 
incoherence—or perhaps what is worse, an extorted and sterile super-
coherence.” It is such a coercive or even facile “super-coherence” that Jay 
sees exemplified in Edward O. Wilson’s model of “consilience.” Rather, 
Jay suggests, we need a more nuanced and historically and institution-
ally informed understanding of disciplines, their formation and their 
formative influence—an influence that, precisely because of its historical 
and social range, is neither univocal nor so simply and easily turned to 
transdisciplinary purposes as conceptual categories and apparent logical 
consequences may lead us to assume. Against the rationalizing of trans-
disciplinary univocity, Jay recommends the multivocity of metaphorical 
models and analogical patterns as more appropriate ways to do justice 
to the complexity of disciplinary formation and ongoing formative influ-
ence, aiding us in “the drama of negotiating and renegotiating the some-
times fragile, sometimes resilient boundaries of those cultural practices 
we call disciplines.”
In “The Telos of the Good Life: Reflections on Interdisciplinarity and 
Models of Knowledge,” Ian Angus continues an ongoing reflection on 
interdisciplinarity, emphasizing in this essay the institutional inertia 
that makes interdisciplinary change much less pervasive than the wide 
expression of interdisciplinary intentions. Like Jay, Angus has roots in the 
Frankfurt School, and he writes here from his experience in conducting 
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interdisciplinary research in a climate then resistant to such non-discipline-
specific work. He, too, cautions against the dangers of uncritical interdisci-
plinarity, citing the twin pitfalls of superficial eclecticism, on the one hand, 
and, on the other (a point also implicit in Jay’s critique of consilience-style 
models of transdisciplinarity), the reversion to pre-modern models of a 
unity of knowledge that “would re-establish in a modern form the totality 
of knowledge that pre-modern science accomplished under the umbrella 
of religion. To anticipate, my defence of interdisciplinarity will not rest 
upon such a figure of unification.” Angus displays an insight into the work-
ings of disciplinarity wrought by first-hand experience in interdisciplin-
ary research. He points to the ways in which disciplinary formations guide 
research questions and are in turn challenged by the findings that emerge, 
reminding us that those disciplinary formations themselves emerged 
from challenges to earlier traditions of inquiry. The key point of reference 
in Angus’s exploration of interdisciplinarity is the centrality of the mix of, 
and tension between, rational and rhetorical elements in interdisciplinary 
argumentation, that is, between disciplinary academic and non-disciplinary 
life experience—between concern with the truth, on the one hand, and with 
the social good, on the other, the latter an inherently qualified and qual-
ity-related concern with a lifeworld that does not lend itself to determinate 
expression in truths. With a balance and subtlety characteristic of his work, 
Angus echoes the concerns expressed earlier in this introduction, empha-
sizing that “the radical potential of interdisciplinary studies revealed by its 
contact with non-disciplinary knowledges is the revival in contemporary 
form of the classical role of knowledge as enlightenment, thinking for one-
self, as a component of a good life.”
In “Interdisciplinary Models and Dialectical Integration: A Proposed 
Model of Integrated Interdisciplinarity,” Wendell Kisner offers two models 
for conceptually framing the integration of diverse academic disciplines 
within a context of interdisciplinarity and, in keeping with his pursuit of 
integration, goes on to argue that these two models can themselves con-
figure an “integrated interdisciplinarity.” As he reminds his reader, Kisner 
pursues interdisciplinarity very much as a disciplinary philosopher, and 
his two models are broadly Heideggerian and Hegelian in type. He argues, 
however, that interdisciplinary integration occurs at the level of practice. 
In his view, the actual work of integrating different disciplines has to be 
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carried out in a pragmatic field rather than a purely theoretical one: it is 
not a task that can be exhaustively prescribed in advance by any theory. 
In an integration of theory and critical practice, Kisner pursues his inte-
gration of Heideggerian interdisciplinary ensembles and Hegelian dialec-
tical integration through a further development of the work of Gregory 
Schufreider on the artist Piet Mondrian, proposing a suggestive model of 
“reciprocal hierarchy” that infuses structure with sets of dynamic rather 
than static relations.
In “Globalization and Higher Education: Working Toward Cognitive 
Justice,” Diana Brydon resituates Angus’s Enlightenment-tradition con-
cerns with the “good life” in the context of twenty-first-century realities 
of globalization and its postcolonial and “decolonizing” reconfiguration 
of the contemporary lifeworld. Bringing academic research into relation 
to the life experience of those caught up in globalization, Brydon empha-
sizes the inherent politicization of research in the context of globalizing 
processes and transformations in economic, social, technological, and 
communicational patterns that cross traditional disciplinary, social, and 
national frontiers. The role of knowledge and research in the technologi-
cally driven developments associated with globalization results in an 
intensification and proliferation of knowledge-types and their imbrica-
tion with global economic expansion. Noting that, as knowledge becomes 
increasingly economized, it necessarily becomes increasingly politicized 
and ethicized as well, Brydon invokes Bonaventura de Sousa Santos’s 
concern with “cognitive justice” as a key issue of globalization. As she 
explains, “I use ‘cognitive justice’ to refer to the goals of reciprocal knowl-
edge production based on dialogues across differences and attempts to 
compensate for power differentials in the interests of promoting social 
justice.” Having herself been led from her disciplinary base in English 
studies to postcolonial studies and now to concerns with globalization, 
Brydon remains driven by Enlightenment concerns as logically implicated 
in globalization: “As an educator, I am especially interested in determin-
ing what kinds of pedagogies and curricula are needed to educate citizens 
about globalization, citizenship, and culture and increasingly convinced 
of the value, indeed necessity, of international partnerships to achieve 
these goals.” In reconfiguring notions of “citizenship” and the role of 
education in the context of globalization, Brydon has progressed from a 
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concern with academic disciplines to an engagement with “the dialogues 
developing across various knowledge networks within the social, politi-
cal, and cognitive justice movements.” Like “cognitive justice,” “knowl-
edge networks” is a term that reveals the ways in which the relation 
between academic, technical, and lifeworld knowledges are being actively 
transformed by the globalization process, with the result that existing 
disciplinary formations prove to be inadequately equipped to handle the 
complexity of emerging technologically and economically driven devel-
opments. Brydon helpfully situates us within the ethical and political 
implications and debates unfolding with the exponential restructurations 
associated with globalization.
In my own contribution to this collection, I focus on one of the 
root principles of inquiry in the Western tradition, the Law of Non-
Contradiction (lnc) and its central role in the logic of disciplinary iden-
tity formation and maintenance. In providing a necessarily brief overview 
of this very large issue, I point to the significant challenges posed to the 
lnc by modern theory. Such challenges have arisen, I suggest, for many 
of the same reasons that we find it increasingly necessary to think not 
only within but also between, across, and in some realms quite beyond 
disciplinary canons.
Julie Thompson Klein is a leading voice in the debates surrounding 
interdisciplinarity. In contribution to this volume, she brings her thorough 
knowledge of the field to bear on the challenges of orienting ourselves 
within the categorical and disciplinary semantics of humanistic disciplin-
ary transformation, on the one hand, and of the new impulses toward 
an integration of disciplines overall and the direct accession to unitary 
forms of transdisciplinarity, on the other. Klein guides us through both 
humanistic and transdisciplinary developments over recent decades. She 
points to the strengths and weaknesses of interdisciplinary developments 
in humanities fields such as cultural studies, which have brought with 
them a valued synthesis of perspective in some areas and a dangerous 
elision of crucial cultural and artistic specificity in others. In turning to 
the more encompassing concerns of movements of unification associated 
with transdisciplinarity, Klein charts the developments in this domain, 
providing a helpful taxonomy of its broader forms and again pointing to 
strengths and dangers that accompany such unifying ambitions.
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Rick Szostak, a fellow member, with Julie Klein, of the Association for 
Integrative Studies (http://www.units.muohio.edu/aisorg/index.shtml), 
takes up several of the challenges identified by Klein in pointing to the 
availability of a much greater integrative potential across the humanities 
and social sciences than appears in the current debates in these domains. 
Szostak argues that we have remained too bound by disciplinary vocabu-
laries, methodologies, and problematics and that, beneath apparent het-
erogeneities of thought and practice, a much greater similarity exists than 
has hitherto been recognized. He offers constructive clarifications of com-
peting discursive and analytic approaches, arguing that, when observed 
from a more inclusive perspective, the methods, research strategies, and 
analytic terminology characteristic of the humanities and social sciences 
reveal a certain uniformity that suggests possibilities for integration..
Part Two: Practice
Lorraine Code’s “Ecological Thinking as Interdisciplinary Practice: 
Situation, Silence, and Skepticism” appropriately opens the section on 
interdisciplinary practice with a philosopher’s attention to the theoreti-
cal and epistemological ramifications of interdisciplinary work. With her 
emphasis on the epistemological implications of embodied and gendered 
thinking, embedded as she sees them within their natural and social life-
worlds, ecological thinking becomes a logical extension of the life of the 
mind and thereby an expression of the inherently synergistic relationship 
of disciplinary and research traditions. As with Brydon’s concern with “cog-
nitive justice,” Code emphasizes the necessity of “doing epistemic justice” 
and the concomitant need to depart from traditions of thought that rein-
force invidious hierarchies and power relations across species that share 
natural and social environments. Her “ecological naturalism,” rooted in 
pragmatic realism and a skepticism regarding the infallibility of empirical 
method—exemplified in the work of Rachel Carson—is a source of an inte-
grative inquiry into the common lifeworld, in its co-inhabitation by all races 
and species. Code explores an illustrative instance of the restorative and 
constructive effects of such ecological thinking in her example of a health 
services project in Tanzania in the 1990s, demonstrating how ecological 
interdisciplinary thought and method work in practice to generate epis-
temic justice.
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In his study of Michael Haneke’s films, jan jagodzinski adopts a cul-
tural practice of critique diametrically opposed to Code’s ecological 
thinking. Rather than reflect, as do Brydon and Code, on a changed inter-
disciplinary context of inquiry, jagodzinski offers a terminologically and 
conceptually innovative analytical category from which to view Haneke’s 
genre-elusive film corpus. “Self-refleXivity” marks a departure from what 
jagodzinski terms the cynical nature of postmodernist constructs of ironi-
cal self-reflexivity, in the work of Giddens, Latour, Foucault, Butler, and 
others. With the capital “X” he marks the way in which representation in 
Haneke’s cinema shifts the audience perspective toward a denaturalized, 
non-participatory witness position, holding the viewer in an uncomfort-
able suspension between representational pleasure and distanciation. In 
this way, jagodzinski brings issues usually pursued in several disciplin-
ary lexicons into a practice of criticism that crosses them—drawing on, 
while also critically examining and extending them—in a way analogous 
to Haneke’s cinematography.
In “Transdisciplinarity and Journal Publishing,” Gary Genosko 
explores the impact of “planetary computerization” on the transdis-
ciplinary collaborations characteristic of the self-constituting micro-
institutions associated with journal publishing. Given the increasingly 
distributed collaborative effort that such publishing entails, journals 
become for Genosko privileged sites of transdisciplinary work, work that, 
in having to achieve synergetic approaches to problems and opportu-
nities raised by new media technologies, must in his view go one step 
beyond interdisciplinarity to a extra-disciplinary kind of collaboration. 
After a discussion of several French journal collaborations, he examines 
in some detail two salient Canadian journal communities, Arthur and 
Marie Kroker’s Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory and Paul 
Piccone’s Telos.
We continue the exploration of specific nodes of interdisciplinary 
configuration in the form of two critical and historical “case studies,” as 
Morny Joy puts it, of two composite academic disciplines, religious stud-
ies and literacy studies. Joy sees religious studies as a “field” rather than 
a discipline because of its very constitution out of multiple disciplines 
(she names history, anthropology, philosophy, literary studies, sociology, 
and psychology as the most prominent). In “Gender, Women’s Rights, 
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and Religion,” she focuses especially on the vexed issue of religious and 
human rights in the context of their inveterate sacred/secular dissocia-
tion both in everyday thinking and in disciplinary tradition. Choosing two 
contemporary Canadian examples, the national problem of Aboriginal 
women’s rights and a provincial one of conflicts around the reception of 
Shari‘a law in Ontario, Joy is particularly concerned with the binarism in 
modernity between the public and the private spheres in the configura-
tion of political and social rights and religious freedom of choice. Then, 
in his gaze through the prism of literacy studies at the history of interdis-
ciplinary studies, Harvey Graff brings a thoroughgoing historical perspec-
tive to the ways in which a necessarily composite field such as literacy 
studies offers us an added perspective on the demands and institutional 
protocols of interdisciplinarity. In the course of a valuable overview of the 
historical development of interdisciplinary theory, Graff demonstrates 
how critical, comparative, and historical methodologies are required to 
ensure sufficiently nuanced approaches to interdisciplinarity.
Part Three: Pedagogy
Part Three of this collection turns to teaching and the roles of interdisci-
plinary studies in the classroom, with three examples from educational 
studies that reflect on the practice of pedagogy in the context of changed 
modes of expression and communication in the wider culture and, to open 
the section, a fourth that examines the interdisciplinary contribution of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis to the teaching relationship. Psychoanalysis is 
interdisciplinary in a particular sense, in combining theoretical reflection 
with a primary concern with treatment rather than pedagogy. In its need 
to remain grounded in clinical practice, psychoanalysis makes a vital 
contribution, particularly in the Freudian/Lacanian traditions, to cultural 
and theoretical exploration across the humanities and social sciences. My 
late colleague Paul Nonnekes, to whom this volume is dedicated, brings a 
Lacanian approach to the act of teaching itself, specifically, to the teach-
ing of theory and the marked ways in which students tend to respond to 
works of theory in the classroom. He finds resources in the Lacanian con-
struct of the synthome to help teachers turn students in the direction of 
the enjoyments—which, for Nonnekes, is to say the challenges—of theo-
retical reflection.
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Both Suzanne de Castell and Roxana Ng, in their disciplinary concern 
with pedagogy, address the ways that changes in the structures of com-
munication in the culture at large pose new challenges and opportuni-
ties both in the classroom and for research. In bringing a multimodal 
sensibility into play, the shift from print to digital culture raises issues 
of the senses and the body in their contribution to thinking, learning, 
and, therefore, teaching. As in Nonnekes’ exploration of the pedagogical 
resources of Lacanian enjoyment, Suzanne de Castell explores a pedagogy 
of play in developing video games for research and teaching purposes. 
Digitalization, she argues, “afford[s] us ways of doing interdisciplinary 
work that promise to bridge qualitative and quantitative methods, human 
and physical sciences, philosophy, art and mathematics, work and play, 
leisure and learning, and even, I sincerely believe, what we have come to 
understand as ‘body’ and ‘mind.’” De Castell takes us through two of her 
digital learning projects, Arundo donax, a baroque music learning game, 
and The Gigue Is Up, a baroque dance game, showing how they allow 
for a multimodal analysis of player responses and thus enable a “digital 
hermeneutics,” in which the goal is “not simply to integrate new media 
into conventional approaches to knowledge building but to actually chal-
lenge our commonly received notions of what counts as ‘knowledge,’ 
‘facts,’ and ‘evidence.’”
Roxana Ng moves in the other direction, seeing in current multimedia 
culture an opportunity to bring forward a more integrated mind-body sen-
sibility, one rooted in traditional Chinese culture, into a classroom domi-
nated by the disembodied dualist characteristics associated with the era 
of print culture. Ng describes her experience in the classroom of using 
practical methods drawn from traditional Chinese medicine, and in par-
ticular the meditative practice of Qi Gong, to achieve an “embodied learn-
ing” that is interdisciplinary in both an experiential and an experimental 
sense, facilitating a potential “personal as well social transformation,” 
inside and outside the classroom.
Finally, Derek Briton, my collaborator on the symposium that gave 
rise to this volume, reflects on the experiment in interdisciplinary gradu-
ate programming that constitutes Athabasca University’s Ma program in 
Integrated Studies. He examines the tension between a logocentric model 
of integration that might appear to assume self-evident merits and a more 
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differential and critical attention to the interstices of disciplines and 
interdisciplines.
notes
1 Ma-is combines the disciplines in a range of configurations under twelve focus areas, 
for instance, “Global Studies” and “Work, Organization, and Leadership” (http://mais.
athabascau.ca/specialization/).
2 An anecdotal confirmation of this occurred recently for me in the streets of Cambridge, 
the mention of which allows me to acknowledge the academic hospitality of Clare 
Hall during the writing of this introduction. In passing, a student, by appearance 
an undergraduate, audibly declared his intention to resist what he called “the 
interdisciplinary bandwagon.”
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The Menace of Consilience
Keeping the Disciplines Unreconciled
M a R t I n  J a y
Over the years, I have been given many opportunities to present my 
research to audiences across the waters in a number of different institu-
tional settings. Invariably, two responses have been forthcoming, in addi-
tion, that is, to whatever howls of disbelief greeted the arguments of the 
talks themselves. First, someone would express surprise at how much 
younger I was than they imagined; and second, someone else would pro-
fess bafflement at my being a historian. Of late, I have noticed, alas, for 
not very mysterious reasons, a palpable decline in the frequency of the 
first of these reactions; the second, however, remains stubbornly con-
stant. In Europe, Asia, Latin America, or Australia, what I do, whatever 
that may be, is still not normally done by scholars housed in departments 
of History. As a result, I usually find myself classified as a social theorist 
or cultural critic or visual arts expert or even, dare I say it, a philosopher. I 
won’t deny that this kind of misidentification produces a certain frisson of 
pleasure, as if I have somehow broken free of my earthly ties and emerged 
as one of Mannheim’s free-floating intellectuals, able to soar over the 
walls of my disciplinary cage. But, at the same time, I can’t quite shake a 
nagging anxiety that my impersonation of a non-historian will be revealed 
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for what it is, a fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of someone who 
has foolishly allowed himself to graze in someone else’s field.
I impose these confessional remarks on you to make three initial 
points. First, any discussion of the construction and demolition of inter-
disciplinary boundaries and identities has to take into account the radi-
cally distinct contexts in which they exist. Even in the age of travelling 
theory, turboprofs, and internet globalization, local variations are still 
very meaningful. No general pronouncements about the state of the 
humanities tout court can hope to do justice to the regional, national, and 
cultural anomalies that defeat homogenization. However powerful the 
Americanization of international culture may be, it is wrong to assume 
that our ways of mapping the intellectual and scholarly world are fully 
hegemonic. The expectations of audiences count as much as the self-
labelling of those who stand in front of them.
The second point I want to make is that the metamorphosis in which 
I am obliged to engage when I stray into other contexts is not entirely 
successful. That is, no matter how I try to meet those audience expec-
tations, I cannot entirely jettison the professional formation—or perhaps 
deformation—produced by my training and socialization as a historian 
and reinforced by more than three decades of squatting with members 
of the same tribe. Although my sub-field of intellectual history can often 
serve as an excuse for forays into interdisciplinary no man’s land or even 
alien disciplinary territory, I always feel the obligation to keep my papers 
in order in case my cover is blown. If challenged, in other words, I can 
always fall back on the identity of a professional historian, whose role is 
merely to chronicle the intellectual triumphs and follies of others rather 
than commit some of his own. Don’t expect me, I can defensively protest, 
to solve your philosophical or political dilemmas; I only need tell you 
where they came from and what may explain their curious evolution.
My third initial point is that contrary to the implication that might be 
drawn from this reticence, which may suggest to some an excessive mod-
esty about the role intellectual historians can and should play in plunging 
into the discourses whose history they reconstruct, I think it is essentially 
a healthy reaction to the pressure to efface disciplinary boundaries that 
is coming at us from so many directions. In what follows, in fact, I want 
to mount a modest defence of the need to keep the walls up or at least 
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to dispel the idea that knocking them down is somehow a self-evidently 
good thing. Perhaps the most insistent recent voice arguing for this out-
come is that of Edward O. Wilson, the Harvard sociobiologist whose 
bestselling plea for what he calls “consilience,” not only among the 
humanities but among the natural and social sciences as well, attracted 
considerable recent attention when it appeared more than a decade ago.1 
Borrowed from the nineteenth-century philosopher William Whewell, the 
term denotes a “jumping together” of facts and theories from different 
levels to form a single grand theory uniting them all. Although Wilson’s 
frankly reductionist and often naïve version of the unification argument, 
which is little more than a hostile takeover bid from the natural sciences, 
need not detain us in its details, it at least gives us a useful name for the 
most extreme expression of the hostility to disciplinary boundaries. By 
calling this essay “The Menace of Consilience,” I want to suggest that the 
weakening of disciplinarity, within the humanities let alone in a larger 
arena, may lead us down a slippery slope into intellectual incoherence—
or perhaps what is worse, an extorted and sterile super-coherence.
The inclination to efface boundaries separating disciplines has come, 
of course, not only from attempts, such as Wilson’s, to find a master key to 
unlock the mysteries of human culture and society by reducing conscious 
mind to physiological brain, but also from some of the most reflexive work 
done by people resolutely still on the mind side of the dichotomy. The past 
few decades have seen the emergence of a kind of superdiscipline that 
we might call, following the lead of a recent collection of essays by many 
of its most notable practitioners, “historical and critical studies in disci-
plinarity.”2 In a slew of books, special journals issues, and conferences—
such as the one that gave rise to this volume—the formation, dissolution, 
collapse, and crossbreeding of disciplines has been put under the micro-
scope. What Clifford Geertz, in a celebrated essay of 1980, called “blurred 
genres” has become as much a normative goal as descriptive statement.3 
Since 1988, there has even been a successful journal called History of the 
Human Sciences explicitly devoted to the following aim: “To promote 
linkages between the different human sciences, encourage the exchange 
of ideas and the establishment of interdisciplinary projects.” The rise of 
what my colleague David Hollinger calls new “transdisciplinary journals,” 
such as Critical Inquiry, Salmagundi, October, Representations, Social Text, 
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Raritan, Daedalus, and Common Knowledge, further exemplifies this 
trend, which is evident as well in the late lamented Lingua Franca, whose 
purview was the professional academic world as a boundaried whole.4 
And what was once a scattering of isolated Humanities Centres, serving 
as oases of interdisciplinarity in a desert of departmental sand dunes, has 
developed into a dense network of interlocking channels through which 
nimble scholars can navigate their careers with scarcely ever a need to 
retreat to dry land.
As a result, we have learned to be acutely aware of the ways in which 
dubious origin myths, reconstructed teleological narratives, rhetorical 
demarcation strategies, institutional consolidations, and professional 
credentialing mechanisms all conspire to lend the aura of naturalness to 
what has been in fact only historically constructed. To cite one represen-
tative formulation, that of the historian of science Timothy Lenoir, “disci-
plines are political institutions that demarcate areas of academic territory, 
allocate privileges and responsibilities of expertise, and structure claims 
on resources . . . disciplines are embedded in market relationships regu-
lating the flow of social and technical practices; they are creatures of his-
tory reflecting human habits and preferences rather than a fixed order of 
nature” (1993, 82).
No one can deny the advance produced by this kind of reflexivity about 
the enabling—or perhaps disabling—conditions of our work. A genealogi-
cal rather than teleological historical consciousness, one that disdains tri-
umphalist narratives of disciplinary consolidation, usefully undermines 
any residual Whiggishness in the legitimating stories we tell ourselves 
(and use against our rivals in the struggle for the scarce resources of aca-
demic life). Vigilance against canonical accounts that culminate in a pre-
sentist celebration of the status quo is a valuable lesson for all historical 
reconstructions, especially when they are so blatantly in the service of 
maintaining existing hierarchies of power and influence. After the work 
of Pierre Bourdieu in particular, we cannot ignore the continuities and 
homologies between academic fields and their counterparts elsewhere in 
the social order or deny that struggles over cultural capital and the dis-
tinctions it subtends can be as fierce as those over its economic or social 
counterparts. The realization, moreover, that active research programs 
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are not necessarily congruent with given disciplinary boundaries, indeed 
may thrive when they cross them, can only be considered an advance.
But in all of this, one can also hear the echo of the connotational shift 
produced by Foucault’s fateful linking of discipline with punishment, 
undermining its earlier and more neutral implication of following rules. 
That is, the realization that knowledge is significantly determined by 
power and that disciplines are artificial constructs in the service of power 
maintenance lends an aura of heroic resistance to attempts to transgress 
boundaries, disrupt settled ideologies, and dereify what has congealed 
through the oblivion or mythical rewriting of origins. Our conventional 
wisdom, in fact, now routinely favours hybridity over purity, pollution 
over abjection, marginalization over centralization, and fragmentation 
over wholeness, so that it has been easy to infuse the blurring of genres 
with an almost moral value. The rhetoric of crisis, which once might have 
suggested pain and distress, now seems to imply the well-deserved top-
pling of brittle and antiquated residues of a benighted past. That frisson 
of naughty pleasure to which I confessed at the outset is the result, and we 
all seem to share some of it these days.
There is, however, an important distinction that has to be drawn 
between modes of blurring genres and effacing boundaries. The one I 
have identified with Wilson’s universalizing and objectivizing concept of 
consilience has its tacit counterpart in certain tendencies in the humani-
ties and social sciences. The most boldly totalizing enterprises, such as 
the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research’s ambitious collaborative pro-
gram of the 1930s, whose rise and decline I have discussed elsewhere (see 
Jay 1986), may no longer seem very compelling. But there are still at least 
tacitly holistic tendencies in certain contemporary trends. Perhaps the 
most obvious is the recent inflation of the idea of culture to encompass 
virtually everything that is traditionally compartmentalized in discrete 
sub-spheres. Raymond Williams’s celebrated plea to extend the concept 
from its elite usage to an anthropological “whole way of life” has been 
answered by the vigorous growth of “cultural studies” as an omnivorous 
leviathan that threatens to swallow up everything else. Understood in the 
light of this approach, academic disciplines themselves are conceptual-
ized as cultural practices rather than epistemological categories that open 
up vistas on the real world outside. Although there have been rumblings 
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of discontent about the hypertrophy of the culture concept—see, for 
example, Geoffrey Hartman’s The Fateful Question of Culture (1997) and 
at least some of the essays collected by John Carlos Rowe as “Culture” and 
the Problem of the Disciplines (1998)—the homogenizing force of cultural 
studies, at least in certain of its guises, is not yet spent.
A similar effect has been produced by the succession of so-called 
“turns” that have made discrete disciplines seem more like fields of obe-
dient flowers straining to face the same sun than settled scholarly tradi-
tions. The “linguistic turn” was only the first of many that have recently 
produced this contagious tropism; we now have interpretive, rhetorical, 
and pictorial or visual turns, and perhaps are on the cusp of performative 
and ethical ones as well. With so many suns to turn to, the homogeniz-
ing is by no means uniform, but the weakening of received disciplinary 
identities is abetted nonetheless. We may therefore be moving toward yet 
another “post” moment, that of postdisciplinarity.
Or so it might seem, if we neglect the second mode of blurring genres 
in the humanities, which cannot be analogized from Wilson’s imperial 
notion of consilience and disdains any hegemonizing concept like criti-
cal theory, culture, or the rhetoric of collective turns. Here we encounter 
what might be called the anti-foundationalist, anti-universalizing variant 
of blurring genres, which resists seeking any master key to subtend all of 
them. Instead, it rests content with the realization that disciplines them-
selves, for all of their homogenizing pressures, have often been tense and 
fragile agglomerations of competing methods, interests, and focal points 
with elusive essences, if there are essences at all. It knows as well that the 
demarcations separating them have always been porous and shifting with 
no impermeable walls keeping out intruders. But rather than bemoaning 
this condition, it celebrates it. It knows that no amount of policing has 
ever prevented subdisciplines from rising to challenge the hegemony of 
the mainstream definitions of what a discipline really is. And, perhaps 
most important of all, it recognizes that the pressures to dissolve, frag-
ment, and hybridize what may seem solid at one moment are met by 
counterpressures to form affinity groups and new collective identities 
around nascent research programs or innovative methodologies or chal-
lenges from the world outside of the academy.
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This version of postdisciplinarity turns out to be just as much predisci-
plinarity, insofar as new configurations and alliances are on the horizon. 
Unlike the consilience model of universal coordination, it embraces a 
pluralist welter of fresh agglomerations, which resist being synchronized 
and hierarchized in a grand system. Some of these may well supplant 
older models, although others may create palimpsests in which the older 
order is not so much effaced as partly covered over. Or, to employ yet 
another metaphor, the ruins of old disciplinary boundaries are not so 
much levelled in order to remap the world anew as recombined to form 
what begin as fragile and eclectic juxtapositions and soon congeal into 
pseudo-natural discursive edifices.
One way to account for, or at least conceptualize, the dynamism of 
disciplinary reinvention is, in fact, to rethink some of the metaphorical 
assumptions that often underlie our traditional ways of approaching the 
issue. Often we borrow our terminology from planar geometry, in which 
fields are taken to be boundaried spaces with explicit borders and homo-
geneous interiors. We talk, as indeed I have at various earlier points in 
this essay, about “walls” around disciplines or “turf wars” for control of 
contested territory. The implied perspective on such a field is that of a 
distant observer with a God’s eye view—or at least that of an omniscient 
dean—above the surveyed landscape. Disciplines become like so many 
nations on a two-dimensional map. If one gains, the implication is that 
others are diminished; if two merge, the resulting territory is assumed to 
be so much greater than before; if one retreats, others will fill the vacuum 
left behind.
But what if a different metaphoric were evoked, one in which fields are 
of force or energy and the dimensions at least three in number? What if, 
with Bourdieu and Wacquant, we acknowledged that “to think in terms 
of field is to think relationally?” (1992, 119). The force field model, which 
was advanced as well by Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno, is one 
I have often evoked in the past, and I do not want to rehearse all of the 
arguments in its favour now.5 But with reference to the question of dis-
ciplinarity, the following points are worth underlining. Like the familiar 
trope of “family resemblances” advanced by Wittgenstein, but with the 
added virtue of alerting us to the multiplicity of pushes and pulls that 
go beyond the duality of matrilineal and patrilineal descent, a force field 
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resists the logic of subsumption. That is, every discipline is a juxtaposed 
set of elements that cohere for at least a certain period of time because of 
the energies that tie them together rather than a smoothly homogeneous 
body of practices, methods, and subject matters subsumed under and 
governed by shared rules. Within constituted disciplines, there is thus no 
privileged location from which the whole can be seen and controlled. As 
Julie Thompson Klein has noted, “unidisciplinary competence is a myth, 
because the degree of specialization and the volume of information that 
fall within the boundaries of a named academic discipline are larger than 
any single individual can master” (1993, 188).
If we treat disciplines as relational networks of elements, tensely kept 
together by the discursive equivalent of gravitational or electromagnetic 
energy, rather than coherent, two-dimensional territories with explicit 
boundaries, we can, moreover, better understand the ways in which their 
internal workings and external environments may seem roughly con-
tinuous rather than radically divided. For disciplines themselves can, 
of course, be the elements in higher-order force fields, which allow us to 
place them in such categories as the humanities, social sciences, and nat-
ural sciences. Because they are dynamic and relational rather than static 
and saturated fields, their elements are often simultaneously involved in 
other juxtapositions with elements from other disciplines. Because the 
forces that tie them together may be weaker, at least at certain moments, 
they can seem more firmly located in one disciplinary network than 
another. However, the constellation of forces can shift for a variety of rea-
sons, so that identities may be transformed. The field of economic history, 
for example, may move from history to economics departments and back 
again, or new fields like visual culture or theory may set up shop on their 
own.
These are all pretty self-evident observations, but they may help us 
to understand that the so-called fracturing or dissolution of disciplines 
is not as unusual as it may seem and certainly need not be a cause for 
alarmist talk of disciplinary “crisis” or “collapse.” But how do they sup-
port the point I sought to make at the beginning of the talk: the need to 
mount a modest defence of the relative independence and coherence of 
disciplines? If, as I have just said, the internal and external dynamics of 
fields are roughly homologous, doesn’t this undermine the very solidity of 
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discrete disciplines I seem to be defending? Doesn’t it provide ammuni-
tion for a non-foundationalist variant of the universalization argument 
by positing a meta-network of energies and forces in which disciplines 
are merely fragile constellations of ephemeral juxtapositions? Aren’t I just 
advancing another version of the meta-discipline of disciplinarity, which 
seeks a vantage point above the fray?
Although I would concede the plausibility of these readings, let me 
suggest three reasons why I think they are not fully adequate. First, to 
make a familiar point that nonetheless bears rehearsing, the fact that a 
temporal constellation of elements can be seen as ultimately imperma-
nent and open to future adjustment or even dissolution does not under-
mine the fact that for a certain, albeit finite period of time, the forces that 
keep it in order do prevail. Our solar system will not last forever, but I 
wouldn’t bet on it spinning out of control in the near future. Or, to put 
it in the terms of another discourse, which harkens back to the Western 
Marxism of a Lukács, to realize that fixed structures are reifications, sus-
tained in part by the oblivion of their origins in human practice, is not 
sufficient to undo their effects. Successful dereification is a much more 
onerous and time-consuming effort, which goes beyond mere conscious-
ness raising. We may, in other words, know that knowledge is an effect of 
power, that disciplines are in the service of hierarchy, that the world they 
depict can be described in very different ways, but we can’t then immedi-
ately reverse their power over us. Disciplines, in short, are institutions as 
well as discourses, and changing institutions is not as quick or easy as it 
may seem to radical constructivists.
Second, if we take seriously the three-dimensionality of the force field 
model, we can appreciate the inertial staying power of the constellations 
that have come to exist. Rather than assuming fields are flat, planar, two-
dimensional spaces, we have to acknowledge the bisecting axes of the 
subjects who enter the disciplines and the objects that are assumed to 
be their external points of reference. Rather, that is, than seeing disci-
plinary discourses as self-sufficient and entirely immanent, constructing 
both their subjects and objects with no remainder, we need to be alert to 
the ways in which practitioners and worlds exceed their discursive inter-
face. To take the former first, we have to recognize that even if we accept 
the discipline-as-cultural-practice model, we must leave some leeway for 
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the agency of those who engage in the practices. This helps us to account 
for the very reflexivity that allows us to see outside the discursive field in 
which we are situated, and thus perhaps challenge some of its character-
istics. But conversely, we should also understand that included in that 
agency is the formation of the practitioner within specific historical con-
stellations whose inertial power remains powerful over time, no matter 
how radical his or her attempt to leave it behind and remake the disciplin-
ary world anew. That is, the sense of fraudulent interloping I mentioned at 
the outset of this talk when discussing my own forays beyond the bound-
aries of history is an almost inevitable result of the baggage I bring with 
me. The same might be said of unapologetic universalizers like Edward O. 
Wilson, whose allegedly neutral call for consilience turns out, to no one’s 
surprise, to be a plea for the power of evolutionary biology and cognitive 
science to explain everything. No one, in short, is socialized into a fully 
transcendental, transdisciplinary identity, at least not since Leibniz, who 
is frequently taken to be the last intellectual to claim universal mastery. 
Even the most versatile polymath has his or her limitations in a context in 
which the intellectual division of labor has become irreversible. For this 
reason, interdisciplinarity must be at best a collaborative project, but one 
which cannot fully overcome the individual prejudices of the participants 
in the game, who cannot fully leave behind their idiosyncratic forma-
tions. No collapse of disciplines is thus possible when we recognize the 
subjective role of the actual people, none of whom is beyond particularity, 
who engage in and sustain cultural practices.
A similar conclusion follows if we think closely about the objects of 
inquiry that are the substantive focus of disciplinary investigation. A real-
ist epistemology will, of course, contend that the different areas of inquiry 
correspond to natural kinds, which are not merely the effects of discursive 
construction. We cut into nature at the joints, so the familiar metaphor 
goes, and need to make sense of its parts through different approaches 
that will best reveal its separate workings. There are, for example, individ-
uals and there are societies which allow psychology and sociology to carve 
out their respective disciplinary domains. Both have their ontological, or 
at least historically congealed truths, which make any attempt to privilege 
one over the other by dogmatic adherents of methodological individual-
ism or methodological holism an exercise in misplaced concreteness. As 
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Adorno once put it with reference to the project of a social psychology: 
“The separation of sociology and psychology is both correct and false. 
False because it encourages the specialists to relinquish the attempt to 
know the totality which even the separation of the two demands; and cor-
rect insofar as it registers more intransigently the split that has actually 
taken place in reality than does the premature unification at the level of 
theory” (1967, 78).
Such an argument may not convince many in these days of strong con-
structivist and culturalist critiques of naturalization, but even a historicist 
version of the objects of disciplinary inquiry must take into account the 
stubborn effects of disciplinary constellations in the past. Training in a 
discipline, after all, involves more than mastering its methods and know-
ing how to apply them; it also entails becoming fully conversant with 
what we call the “literature” in the field, that is, its canon. Although we 
may work to go beyond it, a struggle that ironically often involves acquir-
ing knowledge of the canonical literature in another field, we cannot 
construct the objects of our inquiry ex nihilo. They come to us already 
filtered through their prior constitution, which more or less tenaciously 
determines their current and future status. Even if we can question the 
legitimating narratives of disciplinary identity and show that power and 
the scramble for cultural capital rather than disinterested knowledge 
subtends the hierarchical division of the pie, we cannot simply undo the 
effects of prior consolidations and demarcations. In short, a relational and 
three-dimensional notion of a force field will allow us to understand that 
both the subject of disciplinary inquiry and the object carry with them the 
residues of past configurations, which cannot be jettisoned at will in the 
name of universalizing consilience.
Perhaps these considerations make my plea for preserving distinctions 
a bit too defensively. Perhaps they suggest only why it will be unlikely that 
disciplines will collapse, not why it is a good thing that they won’t. One 
final thought will, I hope, help to provide a more positive answer. It will be 
evident in how I have been arguing that I think it imperative to foreground 
the metaphorical assumptions underlying any discussion of disciplinar-
ity: consilience as a jumping together, disciplines as either boundaried, 
two-dimensional fields or relational networks of forces in three dimen-
sions, even the word “discipline” itself as carrying connotational baggage 
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from its placement in a Foucauldian universe of normalization and coer-
cion. What, we might ask, is the more fundamental role of metaphor in the 
relations between or among disciplines? Here the efforts of the German 
philosopher and historian of ideas Hans Blumenberg to defend what he 
calls the value of “nonconceptuality” (see Blumenberg 1997) may give us 
some guidance.
According to Blumenberg’s “metaphorology,” metaphor is more than 
a mere ornament of speech, more than a mere linguistic expression that 
can be improved by the imposition of a precise, conceptually rigorous 
terminology, such as that often sought by science and analytic philoso-
phy. It shows instead that often sedimented in seemingly univocal terms 
are the corpses of dead and forgotten metaphors, an argument famously 
made by Nietzsche. These metaphors arise out of a pre-scientific lifeworld 
in which attempts to master reality depended on analogizing from the 
known to the unknown, the familiar to the unfamiliar, what is present 
to what is not. “Analogy is the realism of metaphor,” Blumenberg writes 
(1997, 95). It even appears in modern natural science, where, for exam-
ple, the macrosystem of the solar system was analogized to explain the 
workings of the microsystem of the molecule, at least for a while. What 
metaphors preserve, even when they seem to imply homologous relations 
and symbolic integration, is the inevitable heterogeneity of the two terms 
metaphorized. Napoleon may be like an eagle in his courage, nobility, 
and predatory guile, but one of them has feathers and the other does not. 
Even in non-aesthetic contexts, therefore, metaphors should not be seen 
as weak anticipations of carefully defined concepts, preliminary approxi-
mations of what a more rigorous linguistic univocality can more precisely 
provide. They are rather salutary checks to the homogenizing power of 
conceptual subsumption or, in the words of Husserl cited by Blumenberg, 
“resistances to harmony” (Blumenberg 1997, 83). As a form of nonconcep-
tual knowledge—and Blumenberg wants to emphasize that they are legiti-
mate forms of knowledge—they are akin to the ineffable understanding 
we derive from reading a face, something that is closer to an art than a 
science, but meaningful nonetheless.
Blumenberg does not, to be sure, extend his analysis to the relations 
among disciplines. In fact, at one point in his argument he says that 
“the homelessness of metaphor in a world determined by disciplined 
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experience can be seen in the uneasiness encountered by everything that 
does not meet the standard of language that tends toward objective uni-
vocity” (1997, 89). Here it seems that disciplining once again connotes a 
repressive Foucauldian world of normalization and control. But if we allow 
ourselves to think of disciplines in the ways I have suggested above, as 
relational force fields with internal heterogeneities and three-dimensional 
configurations, then their proximity to nonconceptuality in Blumenberg’s 
sense becomes clearer. That is, the analogical rather than subsumptive 
logic of moving from one discipline to another should be recalled in order 
to resist the homogenizing danger latent in dreams of universal consil-
ience. When, for example, advocates of the linguistic turn suggest that we 
understand kinship structures, the syntagmatic structures of films, or the 
unconscious as if they followed the semiotic and grammatical protocols 
of a language, what needs to be remembered is that although something is 
gained by the simile “like a language,” something is inevitably lost. When 
we talk, to take another example, of reading images as if they were texts, 
we may be stimulated to ask questions of them that would be ignored oth-
erwise, but we have to stop short before concluding that they are nothing 
but texts with no remainders that make them specifically visual. Likewise, 
borrowing the idea of capital from economics and applying it to culture 
is a healthy check to idealist illusions of cultural autonomy, but applied 
too literally and reductively, it can preclude in advance any acknowledge-
ment of those aspects of culture that transcend all economic modes of 
behaviour. And when we enrich our understanding of historical narra-
tives by placing them in the context of more general theories of narra-
tology, we must also acknowledge that the differences between historical 
and fictional narration are sufficiently meaningful to prohibit our turn-
ing an analogy into an identity. If within what has temporarily congealed 
into a disciplinary force field the elements in the field are themselves not 
subsumable under a single conceptual logic, even if they form meaning-
ful configurations, in an interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary force field 
the prohibition against forcing such a subsumption should be even more 
powerfully in effect.
With these warnings in mind, one might be tempted to go the oppo-
site extreme from the defenders of consilience and endorse the call of 
Bill Readings (1997) and J. Hillis Miller (1998, 64) for “a new university 
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of dissensus, of the copresence of irreconcilable and to some degree 
mutually opaque goods,” or what they both have termed “a university of 
respect, rather than knowledge.” Such a university, they tell us, would 
be so fearful of the coerced reconciliations and technological impera-
tives that motivate the project of consilience—or weaker versions of con-
vergence that, according to Readings and Miller, hide behind the vapid 
slogan of “excellence”—that it would actively seek to short-circuit any dia-
logue between or among different fields. The old university model of inte-
grated Bildung, the liberal arts dream of a humanist well-roundedness, 
is now only a dilapidated ruin, they argue, which cannot, indeed should 
not, be reconstructed.
I am not sure, however, that so radical a hostility to projects of rec-
onciliation and even consensus need be the only implication that one 
can draw from a resistance to the menace of consilience. For although 
analogical and metaphorical relationality are not equivalent to identitar-
ian homogenization, they do provide meaningful and suggestive ways 
to overcome, or at least work pragmatically within, the limits of human 
cognitive power. Dissensus as a normative goal does not seem to me any 
more self-evidently liberating than consensus or always jumping apart 
necessarily healthier than trying to jump together. Force fields, after all, 
work through attraction as well as repulsion, and disciplines can surely 
learn from their permeability to energies from without, which help create 
new productive constellations. The antidote to the implosion of collapse 
and the blurring of genres is not the explosion of incommensurability, 
even accompanied by respect for difference. For as Dominick LaCapra has 
noted with reference to Readings’s evocation of Lyotard’s notion of a radi-
cally incommensurable “differend,”
it suppresses an internal distinction within that very category: the 
differend as nonnegotiable difference that marks a total standoff or an 
aporia and the differend as a difference for which there is no metalan-
guage or higher order normative system but that still allows for transla-
tion between positions in a manner analogous to the process, involving 
both losses and gains, that takes place between natural languages like 
English and French (1998, 43).
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There is, in fact, no sweeping formula that will capture the state of 
disciplinarity today, let alone one that will serve as a normative model 
for the disciplines or interdisciplinarity of the future. Prophets of consil-
ience may come and go and devotees of radical dissensus will arise to 
put them in their place, but the drama of negotiating and renegotiating 
the sometimes fragile, sometimes resilient boundaries of those cultural 
practices we call disciplines will continue as long as finite, creaturely 
human beings struggle both to make and to make sense of their bewilder-
ing world. Even those of us who wander into no man’s land have to retire 
to the home front every so often to replenish our supplies. Even those of 
us who yearn to fly above the fray have every so often to land on familiar 
territory. And perhaps most pertinent of all at this moment, even those of 
us who dive into the sea of infinite metaphoricity have to put an end to 
their analogizing and allow the author of the next essay a chance to start 
his or her own chain.
notes
1 See Wilson 1998. For a particularly insightful response, see H. Allen Orr, “The Big 
Picture,” Boston Review, 23, no. 5 (October–November 1998), http://bostonreview.net/
BR23.5/Orr.html.
2 See Messer-Davidow, Shumway, and Sylvan 1993. Knowledges: Historical and Critical 
Studies in Disciplinarity was the first in a series devoted to “Disciplinarity and Beyond.”
3 Geertz’s essay, “Blurred Genres: The Reconfiguration of Social Thought,” focused 
primarily on the penetration of discursive analogies from the humanities into the social 
sciences.
4 See Hollinger 1997. His essay—“The Disciplines and the Identity Debates, 1970–1995”—
appeared in a special issue of Daedalus, “American Academic Culture in Transition: Fifty 
Years, Four Disciplines,” which focused on philosophy, literary studies, political science, 
and economics. Daedalus, the journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 
is, of course, itself an older transdisciplinary journal, matched only by The American 
Scholar, published by Phi Beta Kappa.
5 See the introduction to Force Fields: Between Intellectual History and Cultural Critique 
(Jay 1992) for my most sustained attempt to discuss this model.
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The Telos of the Good Life
Reflections on Interdisciplinarity and 
Models of Knowledge
I a n  a n g u s
Given that the question of interdisciplinarity refers us back to disciplines, 
and that the disciplinary organization of knowledge is an institutional 
phenomenon, it seems evident that one’s approach to interdisciplinarity 
is cogently related to one’s institutional position. Not to say that it is a 
simple reflection of that position, or that one’s position is solely deter-
mined by one’s ideas about disciplines, but that thinking about interdis-
ciplinarity centrally pertains to current institutional priorities and the 
possibilities for alternative forms of production of knowledge.
While the question of interdisciplinarity puts into question one’s insti-
tutional position, it may do so in several ways. Interdisciplinarity may 
refer to individual work of an interdisciplinary investigative character, col-
laborative work between members of different disciplines, or an analysis 
of the university as an institution—its normally disciplinary character and 
the potential of interdisciplinary institutional initiatives. There are two 
main barriers to individual interdisciplinary work. The first is that hiring 
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is done in universities almost exclusively by departments organized along 
disciplinary lines. All that the faculty have in common is their disciplinary 
education, which is reinforced by their departmental practice, such that 
they tend to hire new faculty in a way that continues in much the same 
fashion. This hiring practice has not altered in many years and shows no 
sign of doing so. The second barrier is based on the method for enforcing 
the disciplinary character of individual research through the recognition 
of valid publication only if it occurs in established disciplinary journals 
(often reinforced by ranking journals). This practice seems to be lessening 
over time alongside a growing recognition of the value of interdisciplin-
ary and public contributions by university faculty. But, however this actu-
ally may be in practice, it can be fairly estimated by the degree to which 
publication in disciplinary venues is mandated for tenure, promotion, 
and merit awards. Collaborative work between members of disciplines is 
on the rise, though, and as I will outline, it can take several forms. My 
approach will primarily take the form of an institutional analysis, though 
it is nevertheless the case that these different meanings of interdisciplin-
arity do overlap, not least since changing institutional structures allow 
the recognition of new forms of collaboration and publication. An impor-
tant institutional issue is the impact of new structures on students and 
teachers, particularly on what they can expect from the learning process 
and what it demands of them.
Pertinent to the institutional position from which I speak, perhaps 
I may begin with a confession. After finishing a master’s degree in phi-
losophy, I was drawn to undertake my phd studies in an interdisciplin-
ary program, because of both the limitations of analytically dominated 
departments of philosophy and the positive allure of roaming beyond 
boundaries that seemed artificially imposed.1 The attraction to interdis-
ciplinary studies was entwined with my interest in phenomenology and 
Marxism, especially the Frankfurt School—two approaches that attempted 
the coordination of knowledge in the fragmented conditions of the twen-
tieth century—and a political orientation toward the relevance of knowl-
edge to a project of self-emancipation that goes beyond the university. As 
the expectation of far-reaching social change that underlay this orienta-
tion began to recede, the practical consequences of obtaining an interdis-
ciplinary phd while the university environment remained dominated by 
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disciplinary organization were driven home to me through the difficulties 
encountered in finding work. Then as now, universities talk a better game 
of interdisciplinarity than they support organizationally and financially. 
Thus, my position on disciplines tends to be that of a child in front of a 
candy store window. I see all the sweets laid out in front of me but they 
seem forever beyond my reach. While others have turned to interdiscipli-
narity as a way to transgress boundaries and overstep limitations, I have 
tended to focus on the keys with which the disciplines lock up the goodies. 
Similarly, my work is often assumed to belong elsewhere, no one seems 
to know where exactly, but it certainly isn’t here because no one does that 
sort of thing here . . . thus, my interest in the institutional determinants 
that recognize certain forms of research to the detriment of others. I have 
found that interdisciplinary institutional formations have been most 
receptive to the interdisciplinary writing in which I have engaged.
Approximately a decade ago I wrote a book on Canada called A Border 
Within. To address issues of identity and difference, English Canada, glo-
balization, and the nation-state, I needed to venture into areas of history, 
political science, political economy, and literary theory, among others, 
where I was often less than sure of the conventional maps.2 In such a situ-
ation one has to navigate on a case-by-case basis in determining what 
is enough contextual knowledge and specific information to ground 
one’s argument sufficiently. One is in the realm of judgments and not of 
rules, and thus it is impossible to give a general account of when enough 
is enough.3 When one chooses to write about a problem that does not 
have a definite location within a discipline, one has to recontextualize 
the knowledge upon which one draws within the integrity of the develop-
ing inquiry. One has to risk a defence of that inquiry on grounds that one 
shares with others outside the institutional division of knowledge—with 
fellow citizens, activists, neighbours, or friends—and thereby enter the 
terrain where the system of knowledge production scrapes up against the 
traditional or emergent non-disciplinary knowledges imbedded in every-
day life.4 In this case, I wanted to sum up, rethink and extend the project 
of left-nationalism that had been a significant emancipatory tendency 
specific to English Canada and national politics coming from the 1970s. 
Strangely enough, this is not too far from what I had meant by philosophy, 
based on my own engagement with that practice, when I had succumbed 
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to the allure of interdisciplinarity—thinking that perhaps genuine phi-
losophy could be found there. Interdisciplinarity refers us to the plural-
ity of disciplines and the institution that enforces them, but it refers the 
practitioner also to the socio-historical lifeworld outside the university. 
The construction of knowledge and its social role becomes an unavoid-
able issue.
If the question of interdisciplinarity implies this complex of problems, 
it is difficult to formulate an approach that is neither too narrow nor too 
general. I will attempt to track a path from the institutional determinants 
of the social role of knowledge, to the modern form of knowledge, and 
thus to the structure of disciplinary, topical, and interdisciplinary stud-
ies. This investigation is based primarily on my experience in universities 
structured in this fashion. I am trying to think through what I have been 
doing in the hope that it might aid those who are doing something similar. 
It is intended that this path will ground sufficiently the final two sections, 
in which I will address the question of interdisciplinarity through its con-
temporaneity—why now?—and its method—how?
univeRsit y stRuc tuRe and inteRdisciplinaRit y
We live in a society that is structurally committed to scientific and tech-
nological development and the perpetual introduction of new scientific-
technical innovations into social life. The role of knowledge in such a 
society is not a peripheral question but pertains to its basic organization 
and possibilities. Questioning the social construction and organization of 
knowledge refers us to the university, which is the major institution of 
advanced learning and research in contemporary society. It is not, how-
ever, the only such institution. There are also corporate and government 
research and development institutions. In these sites, multidisciplinary 
co-operation is driven by a fairly definite purpose, which is based upon 
the exigencies of profit or policy. The fight against the Nazis in World 
War ii was a watershed for organized science in this respect. One may 
think of the research work on German institutions and people under-
taken by the Office of Strategic Services (the forerunner of the cia) or the 
Manhattan Project that constructed the first atomic bombs. Coordination 
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of multidisciplinary research toward a definite goal, whether by corporate 
or government interests, poses many practical issues, no doubt. However, 
because the goal of such research and development is decided prior to 
and apart from its organization and execution, the social, historical, 
and natural environment enters only minimally into multidisciplinary 
research through this goal or set of goals.5 University-based interdisci-
plinary research is more complex in this sense owing to the heteroge-
neous, incipient, and conflicting social goals that enter into its formation. 
Moreover, the impact of such social goals is mediated by the university 
structure itself. Most important are the disciplinary structure of the uni-
versity and the freedom of university-based researchers to choose the sub-
ject of their research themselves (see Angus 2007). This is a major reason 
why both corporate and government research institutions do not attempt 
to replace universities but instead rely on them for teaching and basic 
research. Even in the current environment in which corporate forces have 
invaded the university to an unprecedented extent, they do not attempt to 
replace non-profitable teaching and basic research functions but rather to 
influence and monopolize, through the allocation of research funds, the 
profitable technological applications that derive from the basic functions 
specific to the university.
The university occupies a crucial location in the changing constel-
lation of industry, government, and social interests or goals. The ques-
tion of interdisciplinarity invokes a position toward that organization 
of the university oriented toward its specific functions of teaching and 
basic research. This question also requires that the university’s disci-
plinary division of knowledge be examined in relation to the traditional 
and emergent non-disciplinary knowledges in the extra-university envi-
ronment. The question of interdisciplinarity takes us to the centre of the 
mutations in the social construction and organization of knowledge in the 
contemporary lifeworld.
There are many reasons to suppose that the practical issues in such 
a mutation have become widely perceived in recent years. For example, 
there is a permanent tendency for disciplinary research to replace the 
questions that students and faculty bring to the university themselves 
with issues already recognized within a discipline or to cut and massage 
the original questions into a partial, domesticated form in which they can 
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be addressed within the prevailing assumptions of the discipline. This 
leads to disaffection with the learning that the university proffers as its 
main virtue. The experiments in interdisciplinary research and organiza-
tion over the past forty years or so give us reason to believe that there is 
already established a certain dissatisfaction with disciplinary structure. 
Moreover, overlaps have emerged through the subdivisions within dis-
ciplines that mitigate the original division. Does it matter, for example, 
whether contemporary social movements are studied under the rubric 
of democratic politics in political science or political sociology? Can the 
political theory, sociological theory, and social and political philosophy 
sections of their departments be effectively sealed off from each other? 
Conferences and journals have sprung up in which specific issues are dis-
cussed by researchers from different disciplines. Such common interests 
often make for stronger affiliation than the traditional annual meetings 
of the disciplines. They often allow discussion more genuinely and effec-
tively related to the extra-university knowledges and practices with which 
they interact. Moreover, new approaches such as cultural studies and 
complexity theory transgress disciplinary boundaries and suggest a pos-
sible reunification of knowledge in a manner reminiscent of phenomenol-
ogy and Frankfurt School critical theory. Nevertheless, there are dangers 
of interdisciplinarity: the lack of a canon often leaves one without clear, 
or sufficiently theoretically developed, points of orientation, leading to 
the permanent temptation of mere eclecticism. The lack of a broad dis-
ciplinary intellectual formation often leads interdisciplinary research to 
become narrower in focus despite its rhetoric of widening by “crossing 
arbitrary boundaries and limits.”
Accumulation of these experiences leads us now to approach the ques-
tion of interdisciplinarity in the basic sense of the formation of knowledge 
and the challenges that it faces in our contemporary world. We must ask 
about the destiny of thought, and its institutional formation in the uni-
versity, within the changing temper of corporate and government forces 
and the challenges posed by social movements in proposing non-disci-
plinary traditional and emergent knowledges. To address this question 
I will reflect on three models of knowledge practised in the contempo-
rary university—disciplinary, topical, and interdisciplinary—against the 
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background of the modern form of knowledge that has enabled them and 
whose limits they test.
the FoRM oF ModeRn KnoWledge
Explication of the form of modern knowledge is a task well beyond the 
present essay. Nonetheless, some of its key features need to be recalled 
in order to address the challenge of contemporary interdisciplinarity. 
Galileo can be taken as exemplary for the modern form of knowledge that 
was instituted in the seventeenth century. The new physical science was 
at once mathematical and experimental. Its mathematical aspect involved 
abstraction from experienced objects toward a teleology of formal syste-
maticity. Its experimental aspect re-established the pertinence of a for-
mal-mathematical system of knowledge to a material domain of objects 
through a correlative abstracting, and therefore standardizing, of experi-
mental conditions from ordinary experience.6 The new science was at 
once formally systematic and inherently tied to technological develop-
ment through its experimental dimension. As a consequence, the ground 
plan of the new science could be applied to an increasing number of new 
domains. This “infinite task” of progressive scientific development pro-
jected the unprecedented idea of “the idea of a rational infinite totality of 
being with a rational science systematically mastering it” (Husserl 1970, 
21–22). The architectonic of modern knowledge thus required specializa-
tion of domains in order for scientific knowledge to divide the totality of 
being into specific domains amenable to methodical research. Cumulative 
research within domains could be expected to add up to general scientific 
progress toward infinity. Owing to the necessity of specialization in the 
modern form of knowledge, we encounter here one of the most basic and 
influential rhetorical figures of interdisciplinarity: that the numerous spe-
cialized domains of knowledge must be synthesized. Such a new unity of 
knowledge would re-establish in a modern form the totality of knowledge 
that pre-modern science accomplished under the umbrella of religion. 
To anticipate, my defence of interdisciplinarity will not rest upon such a 
figure of unification.
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The progress of modern knowledge could be obtained by the human 
subject only insofar as it stood apart from nature and applied its intel-
ligence to the domination of nature. To this extent, modern knowledge 
is based upon a Cartesian separation between mind and matter, or unex-
tended spirit and extended nature. The value-laden issues of the good 
and the beautiful in the domain of spirit were thus separated from sci-
entific research. The human subject was similarly split within itself 
insofar as it inhabits both of these domains. Domination of nature thus 
requires the domination of the extended, material part of the human by 
its unextended, spiritual part. This division is also written onto social 
classes, since the labouring classes function as material to be “spiritu-
ally” directed by the ruling class.
The social dimension of the modern form of knowledge involved the 
separation of a class of scientists practising scientific methodology from 
the church authorities that based themselves on religious postulations 
of the structure of nature and spirit. It is the specific contribution of the 
eighteenth-century Enlightenment to draw the conclusion that ameliora-
tion of human suffering could be achieved by the technological capacity 
inherent in modern science if it were applied in the social realm without 
restriction by religion. Thus a social science built on the same theoreti-
cal and methodological foundation as the earlier natural science could 
be expected to contribute to social enlightenment. Note that this exten-
sion of modern science carries forward within itself the two fundamental 
separations that characterize the earlier formation of modern knowledge: 
first, the separation between scientific knowledge and ordinary experi-
ence which, when socially applied, means the separation between the 
class of scientists and the unschooled population; second, the separation 
between value-laden domains of the spirit—which were left aside to the 
discredited form of knowledge entwined with religion—and the search for 
truth understood as distinct from the value judgments inherent in practi-
cal action. It is these two lingering issues that have come intensely into 
question in our time and that have posed irrevocable problems for the 
model of social enlightenment dominant since the eighteenth century.
How to connect the search for truth to the value-laden searches for 
the good and the beautiful? How to pursue this combined goodness and 
truth, if it is possible, in a way that promotes social enlightenment? Or, in 
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more contemporary terms, what is the relation between the methodical 
inquiry into empirical knowledge and the hermeneutical interpretation of 
meaningful texts? What is the relation between the pursuit of knowledge 
and values such as democracy? My all-too-brief recollection of the institu-
tion of modern knowledge is intended to show that these issues, which 
are generally perceived as real and pressing issues today, are not passing 
ones but are rooted in a fundamental questioning of the theoretical and 
social form of modern knowledge.7 The role of disciplines, as the form 
that the necessary specialization of research in modern knowledge takes 
within the university, indicates the continuing institutional weight of this 
form. The question of interdisciplinarity indicates the extent to which it 
has already come under criticism and is undergoing transformation.
disciplinaRy KnoWledge
A discipline enables new knowledge to be fitted into the ground plan, 
or conceptual field, laid out as a domain of objects open to systematic 
investigation.8 This ground plan is prior to current research since it pro-
vides the framework in which the questions that guide such research are 
meaningful. But it is also reformed by the cumulative effect of current 
researches such that the ground plan at any given point is the product 
of a previous history of specialized inquiry. I do not mean to suggest that 
a clear and consistent ground plan commands assent by all researchers 
working in a given field. Indeed, that much clarity and consistency would 
demand a ground plan of such simplicity that it would be unlikely to gen-
erate anything interesting in the way of new problems or perspectives. 
A ground plan of a discipline allows for sufficient disagreement over its 
major features and sufficient ‘unclarity’ of certain problem-areas that 
there remains much to argue and to do. This flexibility is kept within man-
ageable limits by the narration of the history of the science—an account 
that selects certain heroes, sketches their contribution to the field as a 
whole, and sets out certain traditions of inquiry within the discipline. The 
narration describes a canon, and debates about the classic texts occur at 
fundamental turning points in the history of a discipline. Marx, Weber, 
and Durkheim constitute the classic texts of sociology, and it is hard to 
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claim as respectable a department of sociology in ignorance of them. Even 
a specialized empirical science has recourse to narration in communicat-
ing its ground plan sufficiently to provoke new research within its domain.
The historical interplay between ground plan and research is what allows 
a discipline to distinguish and define itself by three exclusions.
One, for reasons inherent in modern knowledge itself, as explained 
above, a discipline distinguishes itself from the non-disciplinary accounts 
of the general population. The off-hand social observations of non-spe-
cialists are at most the subject-matter of sociology, never generalizations 
worthy of scientific testing, nor are their proponents interlocutors of equal 
credibility.
Two, the historical account of the development of a specialized science 
will draw upon precursors in philosophy, religion, and myth, but it will 
necessarily draw a distinction between scientific research and the gen-
eralized thinking that defines precursors as precursors: such precursors 
operated the totalizing framework within which individual observations 
and claims were linked to a total world view incorporating conceptions of 
the true, the good, and the beautiful that define a form of life. The onset of 
science in the disciplinary sense is defined precisely through this distinc-
tion.9 Even if it remains controversial where to draw this line within the 
discipline, some such line will have to be drawn by every scientific tradi-
tion. The distinction of religion from the sociology of religion is a case in 
point. Sociology of religion requires that research exclude the question of 
what is the true, good, and beautiful religion precisely in order to open up 
the domain of the social consequences of belief in a given religion. Yet it 
is precisely the evaluative question that draws most people to the study of 
religion in the first place.
Three, certain questions are defined as outside the methodological 
inquiry of the specialized science because they do not conform to the 
domain of objects that it investigates. In principle, they have or could 
become the topics of neighbouring specialized sciences. Physics concerns 
itself with simply material objects, whereas biology focuses on material 
objects that are internally unified to constitute life. Psychology concerns 
itself with the structure of the mind considered individually, whereas 
sociology deals with the institutions that mould and reflect the mental 
character of humans as social beings. The productivity of research within 
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a discipline is made possible by this double exclusion—of pre-scientific, 
totalizing precursors and of other specialized sciences. After all, a special-
ized science of the whole of reality is a contradiction in terms.
This model of a discipline could be fleshed out considerably with 
proper attention to the issue of combined and uneven development. 
Social science disciplines, because of the claim to scientific status, insist 
on the rupture with non-specialists and precursors to a greater degree. 
For humanities disciplines, however, this insistence is less strident. 
History, philosophy, and literatures tend to claim some continuity with 
precursors, even while noting the break that university studies introduce. 
Thucydides, Socrates, and Shakespeare are not only the subject matter of 
these disciplines but still, in a muted sense, carry forward a content into 
what the discipline itself is. Often this is a way of capturing the prestige 
of reflected glory. How many milquetoast philosophy professors have pro-
claimed the dangerousness of philosophy with reference to Socrates’ fate? 
Even so, the break is still there: the polemical side of classical, predisci-
plinary historical writing, the existential and combative side of philoso-
phy, the focus of predisciplinary literatures on the subject of their writing 
to the detriment of its textuality, all indicate the difference in practice 
of the disciplinary versions such as analytic or philological philosophy, 
history as other than the narrative of victors, and literary theory, which 
provide examples of scientific status entering the humanities. One has 
only to look at the mingled disdain and envy directed by professional 
historians at Pierre Berton, for example, or by professional philosophers 
at Ayn Rand. The separation of a discipline from its precursors and non-
specialists is a historical phenomenon that is in its specifics distinct from 
that of other disciplines, that occurs with a distinct accent on the rela-
tion between break and continuity which defines the discipline’s claim to 
relevance to the socio-historical lifeworld but, despite these specific fea-
tures, aims at a model of disciplinary closure rooted in the modern form 
of knowledge.
One meaning of interdisciplinarity emerges directly in relation to the 
constitution of disciplines. At any given stage of inquiry, the totality of 
being is divided into various specialized sciences that, taken together, 
do not exhaust that totality. It is this current insufficiency that motivates 
both further research within specialized domains and the telos of rational 
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knowledge of the whole. The incompleteness of scientific knowledge 
when it is considered at any actual historical stage means that the map 
of knowledge contains certain blank spots not covered by any existing 
methodical inquiry. Interdisciplinary inquiry can enter at this point to 
open up these blind spots through collaborative research that may even-
tually lead to the fixing of a new domain within the totality of scientific 
knowledge.10 Disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity in this sense are co-
constituted; one is not prior to the other—though I want to push on to 
a conception of interdisciplinarity that is more fundamental than both 
owing to its reference beyond university-based knowledge structures to 
those based in the socio-historical lifeworld.
Even so, again, a qualification regarding this “blind-spot” conception 
of interdisciplinarity is in order. Issues from the wider world do make 
their way into specialized disciplines and often contribute to the interplay 
of research and ground plan. The persistent and worsening environmen-
tal crisis has had its effect in almost all the disciplines, but notice that 
however one might address that crisis as an engaged citizen or simply 
as a human being, it is not taken up into disciplines in this form but in a 
revised form consistent with the disciplinary ground plan. We now have 
environmental sociology, the politics of the environmental movement, 
environmental economics, environmental ethics, and environmental phi-
losophy, and so on, but in each case the lifeworld situation that gave rise 
to this development is sliced up and addressed piecemeal through the 
creation of new subdisciplines. There seems to be something necessary in 
this development. First, this seems to be the only fashion in which a per-
vasive problem can influence disciplinary research. Moreover, one cannot 
address an issue, however crucial, without making some divisions, sepa-
rations, and simplifications. Nonetheless, this necessity is not the same 
as the reconfiguration of lifeworld issues within disciplines based on their 
inherited sense of valid research issues, and we can begin to glimpse here 
that things could be divided up differently altogether.
Perhaps this account of a discipline seems somewhat antiquated 
and inadequate to contemporary practice. If so, it is because belief in 
the unquestioned viability of disciplinary research has been waning for 
at least a generation and several other forms of knowledge have come 
into being that not only challenge the disciplinary past but also propose 
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alternatives for the future. It is to these that I now turn. As in the previ-
ous case, I will draw upon two forms of knowledge and study with which 
I have experience: communication, which I would call a topic of study, 
and the humanities, which I would call an interdisciplinary study. A topi-
cal study is unified by its thematic focus and draws widely upon what-
ever literature or research pertains to that topic. While studies within 
humanities are often topical—one can study communication, friendship, 
or power—in an interdisciplinary study the topic must itself be justified, 
which means that it takes its unity from certain classical questions about 
“the good life.” The unity of humanities is in the tradition of the humani-
ties, and it is within this tradition, including its critique and reformation, 
that the validity of a topic is addressed.
topical and inteRdisciplinaRy studies
Communications studies has been constructed as a contemporary form 
of inquiry by means of a synthesis among studies in the social sciences 
provoked by the growing influence of mass media on society, the classical 
tradition of rhetoric, and studies of interpersonal communication that, 
for reasons both endemic and ideological, are pervasive in contemporary 
liberal-democratic capitalism. (See, for example, Pearce 1989, chap. 1; 
Peters 1999, introduction.) It is topical in the classical Greek sense, that 
is, it focuses on a “place” that allows debate, disagreement, or agree-
ment about “the same thing.” For instance, one may ask, “Is advertising 
propaganda?” Such a question allows one to define various standpoints 
toward the contemporary role of advertising and to argue for a developed 
perspective that is one’s own. The advantage of organizing inquiry in this 
way is that the questions that motivate it are widely perceived as impor-
tant social questions so that the inquiry retains a relevance to social action 
and may even be a form of social action itself. The perspective of agenda 
setting in media studies, for example, explores the way in which social 
issues are framed and organized by the media such that certain perspec-
tives on social issues are preferred. This is illustrated in the well-known 
tag, “The media do not tell the public what to think but what to think 
about.” Insofar as communication studies take this general form, they 
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constitute a contemporary reinvention of classical rhetoric. As Aristotle 
claimed, rhetoric is concerned with “the means of persuasion on almost 
any subject presented to us” (1984, 22, 1355b), a practice that is not sci-
ence but is nevertheless indispensible to science. A doctor needs not only 
medical knowledge but also what used to be called “a bedside manner,” 
that is to say, a capacity to interact adequately with human beings, in 
order to be a good doctor. To repeat a classical example, the best medi-
cine in the world is no good if the patient can’t be persuaded to take it. 
Understood in this way, the contemporary rediscovery and reinvention of 
rhetoric corresponds to the need of a scientific and technological civiliza-
tion for a thoughtful interface between specialized knowledge and public 
belief. In addition to scientific knowledge of whether 770 parts per million 
of symfonisticus whatsoeveride has this-or-that effect on a lake, there is 
the issue of persuading the public that such a level is safe, or not safe, 
a problem or not a problem. For this reason, rhetorical issues and stud-
ies, both theoretical and practical, while they are fundamentally distinct 
from science, are called forth to an increasing degree by a society perme-
ated by specialized knowledges. They inhabit the realm where politics, 
argument, and decision about the good life are recovered and reinvented. 
Truth can never displace opinion entirely, not even as an object of study, 
since scientific knowledge is limited to that which has already been stud-
ied, whereas the layperson must make judgments that necessarily impli-
cate new, not-yet-studied issues. The question of what needs to be studied 
is not primarily a scientific, but rather a political question, in which the 
rhetoric of science and technology plays a key role—even though it is not 
divorced from truth—that surpasses science and incorporates this rhetori-
cal dimension.
In stressing the rhetorical vocation of communication studies, I am 
suggesting that the larger optic of the topical studies selected—such as 
advertising, political speeches, expert discourses, etc.—is that of the 
humanities. Rhetoric is one of the classical approaches to the study of 
the humanities, and when one raises the question of why a topical study 
is important or useful, it is necessary to engage the classical tradition of 
the humanities in which one of the central defining questions is: What 
is the good life for humans? Humanities is an interdiscipline because it 
takes as its common field of inquiry the outstanding texts, which puts it 
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into dialogue with the totalizing philosophical, religious, and mythical 
approaches, as well as the formation of founding scientific texts that have 
emerged from these traditions. It is perhaps nothing other than a name 
for the Western intellectual tradition as such, with an emphasis on those 
texts that have played a formative role within it. For that reason, humani-
ties studies are drawn toward a very classical canon, but this tendency is 
not uncontested. Insofar as the classical tradition is centrally organized 
around the question of the good life, when properly understood it pro-
vokes and allows contemporary questions about the adequacy of the 
received tradition and opens to new and non-canonical texts that speak 
to this question in our own time.
The tradition of great humanities texts is not a tradition containing the 
truth but is a tradition in which the search for truth is centrally organiz-
ing. Some texts in the tradition claim religious, metaphysical, or scientific 
truth, but the tradition as a whole asks us to analyze how these claims are 
constructed and to whom they speak, and to put them alongside other 
such claims. The model of rhetoric is thus a key approach to the humani-
ties tradition, and it has only one real competitor—philosophy. Human 
passions and will permeate persuasion at least as much as the search for 
truth. Whether the dominating pole in the study of the humanities is rhet-
oric or philosophy depends on whether human passion and will should 
be yoked fundamentally to the search for truth about the way for humans 
to live or can be justly pursued without such a yoke. If one judges for phi-
losophy, there is still a place for a subordinated rhetoric to reach the pas-
sions, to form them to serve the exorbitant desire for truth. This approach 
to the humanities can be called Socratic. The debate between philosophy 
and rhetoric reaches back into the foundation of the humanities and is 
rediscovered daily within interdisciplinary studies through the manner 
in which one justifies one’s topics in relation to what the demands of 
the good life are now. This debate provides a central locus for interdisci-
plinary studies that does not rest on an expectation of the unification of 
knowledge. Modern knowledge could not be thus unified without shed-
ding precisely those features that distinguish it from the all-embracing 
totality dominated by religion that characterizes pre-modern forms.
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Why inteRdisciplinaRit y noW?
After sketching the institutional determinants of the question of inter-
disciplinarity, it was suggested that we must ask about the destiny of 
thought, and its institutional formation in the university, within the 
changing temper of corporate and government forces and the challenges 
posed by social movements in proposing non-disciplinary traditional and 
emergent knowledges. With the previous reflections on forms of knowl-
edge within the contemporary university in mind, I will attempt to track 
the tensions involved in the now of the question of interdisciplinarity.
Let us begin by acknowledging that the previous stage of the inter-
disciplinary project, which we might associate with the great attempts 
of phenomenology and the Frankfurt School to unify knowledge under 
the banner of “critique,” is finished. The grand attempts to synthesize 
specialized knowledges under an encompassing architectonic are over. 
Similarly, the correlative attempt to decide the role of knowledge in social 
enlightenment directly through an inquiry into the structure of knowledge 
itself is finished. Any knowledge that an individual, or a group of indi-
viduals, might possess in our contemporary context is both partial and 
political. I mean that we have become aware of the limits of the knowledge 
that we possess and sensitive to the complex role that it might play in 
social conflicts. This does not mean, as some have extravagantly claimed, 
that there is no knowledge. It means rather that we are drawn in our time 
toward an awareness of both the limits and the social pertinence of any 
inquiry. Insofar as interdisciplinarity is constructed through its rhetoric of 
“overcoming arbitrary boundaries,” it signifies that the edges, or bound-
aries, of knowledge have now become essential to the ongoing inquiry 
itself. Disciplinary studies could hope to accumulate results in a manner 
that postponed the question of social relevance and conflict by justifying 
an individual inquiry within the accumulation of disciplinary knowledge 
rather than directly with reference to its practical import. No longer. These 
questions now arise in the course of each specific inquiry. Each inquiry 
must address within itself the question of how its particular results are 
relevant to the good life.
I think that there are two issues here that every researcher must con-
front: one to do with the larger constellation of government, corporate 
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economic forces, and the university and another within the practice of 
inquiry itself. Both of these are in turn crucially confronted with the 
changed, and changing, relation between specific inquiry and the larger 
context of the good life that has become visible with the unsettling of 
disciplinary boundaries. These two issues can be focused with reference 
to two leading questions: Knowledge for what, and whom? How much is 
enough knowledge?
Industry and government will continue to promote multidisciplinary 
co-operation on topics in which they take an interest. This will often pro-
vide the context and opportunity for interdisciplinary studies in the sense 
in which I am discussing them here. While it is in principle possible that 
such studies could coalesce into new disciplines such as cybernetics, sys-
tems theory, complexity theory, or cultural studies, it is more likely that 
their interdisciplinary focus will remain restrained by the prior definition 
of the goals of research within these institutions. As long as the goals of 
inquiry are defined outside the process of inquiry itself, not subject to 
radical revision, then the prior institutional definition of the topic and 
the reasons for interest in it remain fundamentally static. The “what” 
and “for whom” of knowledge remain statically defined by these insti-
tutions. The question of how much knowledge is sufficient is essentially 
answered by whether further funding is forthcoming, and this question is 
answered by the exigencies of profit and political legitimacy (in Weber’s 
sense). University-based researchers will have to take into account this 
poor cousin of interdisciplinary studies, especially since the corporate 
model of research and its attempt to reorganize the university through 
funding priorities may be expected to continue apace. It is here that the 
remaining freedom of university-based researchers to choose their topics 
and methods of study is a crucial element of realizing the radical potential 
of interdisciplinary studies.
It seems to me that this radical potential is most evident when uni-
versity studies, especially in their interdisciplinary form, come into con-
tact with non-disciplinary knowledges. By non-disciplinary knowledges 
I mean those knowledges active in the lifeworld that contain a totalizing 
character comparable to those of religion, myth, and philosophy that 
preceded the modern form of knowledge and its disciplinary specifica-
tion. Traditional Aboriginal knowledges and the emergent knowledges 
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motivated by critical social movements are most important here. Linking 
interdisciplinary research to such lifeworld knowledges is the most impor-
tant nexus through which the potential of interdisciplinary research might 
be realized. To call such knowledges “non-disciplinary” is to define them 
negatively through comparison to university disciplines and is therefore 
not, in the final analysis, sufficient. Their salient critical characteristic is 
that they are knowledges constitutive of a way of life, not simply ideas that 
one may take or leave without measuring them, and being measured by 
them, by reference to the standard of “what is the good life for humans?”
Here, “knowledge for whom” must mean for those who are engaged in 
the way of life within which this non-disciplinary form of knowledge oper-
ates. The “of what” and “when is enough?’ questions must be answered 
by the participants themselves. Students inevitably confront these ques-
tions and seek to understand the reasoned but provisional answers that 
teachers have come to in their own practice. Interdisciplinary inquiry is 
thus “existential” in the sense that it engages with and educates the life-
practice of those who undertake it. For this reason, the radical potential 
of interdisciplinary studies revealed by its contact with non-disciplinary 
knowledges is the revival in contemporary form of the classical role of 
knowledge as enlightenment, thinking for oneself, as a component of a 
good life. It must encounter the classical debate between rhetoric and phi-
losophy in grounding the practice of enlightenment. There will always be 
a tension with university-based knowledge, but, especially in the inten-
tions and practices of learners, university-based knowledge is pulled 
toward its true root in thinking as an essential activity of humans insofar 
as they are humans. Knowledge is not, and cannot be, unified under a 
grand value-laden umbrella such as predominated in pre-modern reli-
gious forms, nor in the architectonic through which German Idealism 
attempted to synthesize modern knowledge, but is focused through the 
life decisions made by learners, recalling that teachers remain learners, 
as they reflect on the “for whom” and “how much” issues in a practical 
context.
Self-reflection in the construction of a good way of life is the telos of 
interdisciplinary studies. The fundamental division between rhetoric and 
philosophy in defining this telos can be illustrated with a reference to 
Plato. In the Apology, after Socrates has been found guilty as charged, but 
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prior to his proposal that he be punished, or rather rewarded, by being 
given free maintenance by the state for his services, he explains his lack 
of interest in politics and the other activities recognized in Athens in order 
to remark that
I set myself to do you individually in private what I hold to be the great-
est possible service: I tried to persuade each one of you not to think 
more of practical advantages than of his mental and moral well-being, 
or in general to think more of advantage than of well-being, in the case 
of the state or anything else (1993, 61, 36c).
The key phrase here, I think, is “each one.” Philosophy persuades each 
one through appeal to the recognition of logos by the individual soul. It is 
not limited to the persuasion of one, of course, but persuades as many as 
it persuades one by one. Philosophy thus eventually may affect the politi-
cal order, may even be the most needful thing for the political order, but 
it does not aim at affecting the political order directly. To directly aim at 
the political order one must persuade all, ideally, or as many as possible, 
to do what one thinks is best. It is in the difference between persuading 
one and all that the difference between philosophy and rhetoric consists. 
The telos of interdisciplinary studies, understood to be self-reflection in 
the construction of the good life for humans, encounters and incorpo-
rates this difference in its teaching practice. I will not here attempt to 
resolve this issue. I argue only that our teaching encounters it, students 
encounter it, and thus clarity about this issue is crucial to interdisciplin-
ary education.
ReFlec tions on Method
After sketching the form of modern knowledge, we asked about the rela-
tion between the methodical inquiry that produces empirical knowledge 
and the hermeneutical interpretation of meaningful texts. Or, what is the 
relation between the pursuit of knowledge and values such as democracy?
Empirical science produces data and information that is potentially 
useful, but it does not necessarily inquire into the uses to which it might be 
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put. It does not enter the discourse of justification of ends. It is thus a form 
of persuasion pertinent to a scientific-technological society cut off from 
the question of the good life—intrinsically, though its best researchers may 
enter the discourse on their own responsibility. Hermeneutical interpreta-
tion of texts must encounter the question of the good life, though it is also 
possible that this question be tamed by considering it “objectively,” that 
is to say, by considering only what the text says and not what the reader 
says and lives. Such a tendency is a crucial consequence of the develop-
ment of hermeneutic method within the modern form of knowledge. The 
crucial difference here is that for empirical inquiry the text is assumed to 
be transparent in order that knowledge can speak directly of the states of 
the world. For hermeneutic inquiry the text requires interpretation, as the 
world is present, insofar as it is present, within the text as the inscription 
of a way of life in the world. The transparency or non-transparency of the 
text thus condenses the issue of the relation between text and world.
I take it that we have learned not to counterpose these two as if they 
were simple opposites, but neither are they identical. Let me thus propose 
a way of understanding textual (non)transparency as the key linchpin 
between hermeneutical and empirical sciences. A fundamental either-or 
relationship, rather like a gestalt picture in which figure and background 
are reversible, underlies all interdisciplinary knowledge that attempts to 
fulfill its potential: the tendency to convert the value-laden inquiry into 
the true, the good, and the beautiful into empirical data and the counter-
vailing tendency to interrogate empirical data regarding their usefulness 
for the good life. Each one appears insofar as the text is superseded by 
the world or the world is figured within a text. (Non)transparency defines 
an inquiry as either hermeneutic or empirical. This is not a matter of dis-
ciplines, as the pluralism and eclecticism of methodologies of the past 
several decades should show us, but of fundamental tendencies in con-
temporary interdisciplinary studies. These fundamental tendencies are 
rooted in the debate between rhetoric and philosophy, a debate that is 
classical but which has taken on new and more radical forms today.
Humanities, understood as the history of texts recognized within the 
tradition of the humanities, converts the founding texts of empirical tradi-
tions back into classic texts of the humanistic tradition. One reads Freud 
not as the founder of psychoanalysis but as crafting new approaches and 
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responses to questions that also animated Plato and Hegel. One reads 
Marx, Durkheim, or Weber as classic commentators on the social condi-
tion and not as founders of research traditions. But, given some provi-
sional answers to these classic issues, one can read these, and indeed any, 
of the classic texts as founders of traditions of empirical inquiry. It is not 
fundamentally a question of disciplines but of forms of reading, of inquiry 
in which any text can be read either way. To the extent that one animates 
this either-or relationship of entry/exit from value-laden hermeneutic 
reading to research domains, one enters into dialogue with the forms of 
the good life proposed by non-disciplinary knowledges.
Research domains provide resources for rhetorical argument that 
seek to reach all, or nearly all, actors in the political order. Value-laden 
hermeneutic readings provide orientation for the individual soul. 
Interdisciplinary education provides the means both for public argument 
and for each one to tend to the proper organization of his, or her, own life. 
These are somehow related, of course, but how? Again, we should not 
design the curriculum, or the method, to produce an answer to this ques-
tion, but rather to provide the resources from out of which the learner will 
come to an answer sufficient for his or her practice—such that this prac-
tice will define when the text is sufficiently transparent to found an empir-
ical inquiry or sufficiently opaque to demand hermeneutic interpretation.
Final WoRd
Interdisciplinary studies require us to situate our university studies in rela-
tion to the government and corporate forces that promote monopolies of 
knowledge in the neo-liberal political and economic climate. They entail a 
critique of university structure that poses basic questions for the modern 
form of knowledge. They require that we encounter non-disciplinary, 
extra-university knowledges—either the emergent knowledges based in 
social movements or the traditional knowledges based in forms of life—
without beginning from their in-principle denigration. In so doing, we 
encounter the classical question of the good life for humans. We must be 
able to discuss this question intelligently in a contemporary context. Such 
discussion will encounter, in a contemporary form, the classic opposition 
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between rhetoric and philosophy, between the “all” of the political order 
and the “one-by-one” of philosophy. Interdisciplinary learners often feel 
adrift because they cannot locate their studies within contemporary recog-
nized forms. One remains adrift but garners essential points of orientation 
through this classical debate. This debate must be re-encountered through 
contemporary materials and issues, but it also gains clarity from sufficient 
exposure to classic texts. The focus, or “unity,” if one wishes, of interdis-
ciplinary studies is in the learner’s grappling with living the good life. The 
teacher only properly teaches when this grappling is made evident to the 
student not as model but as example. What one needs to live well is not 
available by prescription.
notes
1 I do not mean to imply by recounting this story that my understanding of the issues was 
at that time sufficient or that I had adequately investigated existing possibilities within 
the discipline. Nonetheless, thought is often usefully provoked by such decisions taken 
without complete, or even sufficient, knowledge.
2 Later, I was asked to write an essay on interdisciplinarity based on my experience in 
writing that book. I was surprised and chastened to find that I had nothing to say on the 
matter. Filling this absence was a large motive in not declining a second time when I 
was asked to give a lecture on the topic by Richard Ericson at Green College, University 
of British Columbia. I have used that lecture—“Models of Knowledge in a Disciplinary 
World: Research, Rhetoric, Socratism,” delivered on 6 November 2001—as a starting 
point in this essay and remain grateful to Richard for provoking me to say something on 
the topic. It is not easy to say what one does, as opposed to what one hopes or expects 
to do, but it is a failure not to be able to do so. I hope that my response to the current 
invitation by Raphael Foshay has taken me further in this direction.
3 The need for judgment, rather than the application of a rule, puts the matter within 
the realm of rhetoric, according to Aristotle: “The duty of rhetoric is to deal with such 
matters as we deliberate upon without arts or systems to guide us” (1984, 27, 1357a). 
This realm was also what Hannah Arendt thought was central to politics. Her concept 
of judgment was derived from a reading of Kant’s Critique of Judgment. See Arendt 1968, 
esp. 219–23; and Arendt 1982. See also Angus 1984, chap. 5.
4 I have extended Harold Innis’s concept of monopolies of knowledge to describe the 
conflict between knowledges and the emergent knowledges of social movements in 
Angus 1997, 68–71, and in Angus 2001, esp. chap. 3.
5 This additive concept of interdisciplinarity—which is more descriptively called 
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multidisciplinarity—assumes the distinct validity of each specialized discipline. See 
Wallerstein 1999b, 246.
6 Before one jumps to the common conclusion that the new physics was Platonic, in 
distinction from the Aristotelian science of the Middle Ages, it must be noted that 
mathematics had undergone a significant reformation since late antiquity such that it 
was based on a “symbol-generating abstraction” without direct reference to experienced 
objects. Unlike the ancient arithmos, which referred to “a definite number of definite 
things,” the mathematics taken over by Galileo “intends another concept and not a 
being” (Klein 1968, 46, 174). The severing of concept from intention of experienced 
objects grounds the two other major characteristics of this form of knowledge. It is only 
the symbol-system as a whole that can be brought to refer to a domain of objects, and the 
symbol-system, by virtue of its abstraction from experience, becomes systematic in the 
sense of postulating an internally consistent and transparent relation between concepts.
7 Though his historical reconstruction differs somewhat from mine, this evaluation is 
shared by Immanuel Wallerstein: “I believe we are living in a moment in which the 
Cartesian schema that has undergirded our entire university system, and therefore our 
entire edifice of specialization, is being challenged seriously for the first time since the 
late eighteenth century” (Wallerstein 1999a, 163).
8 The notion of a ground plan (Grundriss) is taken from Martin Heidegger, “The Age of 
the World Picture.” Heidegger brings out the manner in which “through the projecting 
of the ground plan and the prescribing of rigor, procedure makes secure for itself its 
sphere of objects within the realm of Being” (1977, 118). But Heidegger’s conception of 
the ground plan severs this clearing from the ongoing research that it makes possible, 
missing the “interplay” between the two which I describe in the text, and therefore also 
missing the disagreement that occurs within scientific debates within the ground plan, 
and the narration of the history of the discipline that recovers disciplinary unity despite 
debates. Heidegger’s failing in this regard is based on his more fundamental severing of 
ontological from ontic dimensions of the ontological difference. See Angus 2004.
9 Characteristically, one author dates the onset of the scientific study of society to 
the 1860s and 1870s and defines it precisely through its break with common-sense 
observation. See Mazlish 1989, 130, 243. However, according to the Gulbenkian 
Commission, institutionalization of the separated social sciences occurred mainly 
between the 1880s and 1945 and was fully implemented in many places only in the 1950s 
and 1960s. See Gulbenkian Commission 1996, esp. chaps. 1 and 2.
10 This is the meaning of interdisciplinarity used by Ivan Havel and distinguished from 
multidisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity. Havel cites cybernetics as an example of a 
new science emerging from the interdisciplinary combination of established disciplines. 
He reserves the term multidisciplinary for the study of a common theme with a plurality 
of methods drawn from different disciplines. Transdisciplinarity, in Havel’s terminology, 
refers to the study of a concrete idea or phenomenon that occurs in a plurality of 
different sciences—such as catastrophe, chaos, co-operation, etc. See Havel 2008, 
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as well as his paper “Artificial Intelligence and Connectionism: Some Philosophical 
Implications,” available at http://www.cts.cuni.cz/~havel/work/ai-cvut.html. My 
characterization of his views is also based on his talk “The Universe of Knowledge: On 
Interdisciplinarity and Transdisciplinarity,” given at the founding conference of the 
IDEAZ Institute in Vienna on 2 October 2005.
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3
Interdisciplinary Ensembles and 
Dialectical Integration
A Proposed Model of Integrated Interdisciplinarity
W e n d e l l  K I s n e R 
non-dialec tical enseMbles
Unification Through Differential Tension
The kind of model I call a “non-dialectical ensemble” can be aligned, at 
least initially, with a Heraclitean/Heideggerian conception of unity in 
difference. Its justifications will have to be worked out on a phenomeno-
logical basis, and its specifically Heideggerian implications will have to 
be spelled out with respect to a phenomenology of culture that can be 
articulated through Heidegger’s philosophy of art. But first let’s look at 
the relevant Heraclitean passages:
That which is in opposition is in concert, and from things that differ 
comes the most beautiful harmony.
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They do not understand how that which differs with itself is in agree-
ment: harmony consists of opposing tension, like that of the bow and 
the lyre.
War (polemos) is both king of all and father of all, and it has revealed 
some as gods, others as men; some it has made slaves, others free.
Things taken together are whole and not whole, something which is 
being brought together and brought apart, which is in tune and out of 
tune; out of all things there comes a unity, and out of a unity all things.1
The model is that of an ensemble in which the tension between the vari-
ous elements within it, in their interplay, bring about a unity that is noth-
ing other than the differences that make it up. Hence Heraclitus says, “Out 
of all things there comes a unity”—that is, out of and across the differen-
tial elements gathered together in the ensemble, a unity emerges or is 
produced—and “out of a unity all things”—that is, each element becomes 
what it is through its differential tension with respect to the others, and 
hence the identity of each emerges or is produced through that tension. 
Relation is not something produced between objects already constituted; 
rather the relation is primary, and the elements come into their own, as 
it were, in and through that relation. Conversely, the relation is nothing 
without the elements that mutually engage in bringing it about.
The key here is that the elements making up the unity are held together 
in being held apart—they don’t lose their mutual differences but rather 
those differences are precisely the unity—hence the necessity of struggle 
(polemos). This polemos is not necessarily the aggression associated 
with the valorization of war in the conventional sense. Rather, it empha-
sizes the fact that the difference between elements is essential. It is not a 
neutral melting pot that collapses the differences between the elements, 
but rather a dynamic unity of polemos that is unified in and through the 
tension across differences. The elements don’t precede the unity as self-
subsistent atoms that then, subsequently, come into relation. Rather, they 
first emerge as what they are in and through the dynamic unity of strug-
gle. At the same time, the “unity” here is nothing other than the interplay 
among the elements that make it up.
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In Heidegger’s appropriation of this Heraclitean paradigm, the unity 
of a given historical world is brought about through the dynamic tension 
of the creative works contributed within it. A historical world determines 
how things are manifest—for example, as creatures before a Creator in the 
Middle Ages, as objects observed by consciousness in modernity, or as a 
reservoir of constantly available resources and raw data in postmodernity. 
The specific determinacy of these various modes of appearance consti-
tutes a unified “world” that is only brought about and established in and 
through the assembly of divergent works. The unique character belong-
ing to each of those works is in turn only manifest in and through the 
context of that unity. In Heraclitean terms, across the ensemble of works 
a unity emerges, and that unity is nothing other than the differential ten-
sion operative among and across the works themselves—out of all things 
there comes a unity and a unity out of all things. “Truth,” understood in 
its ancient Greek sense of disclosure or unconcealment (a more or less 
literal translation of the Greek word for truth, aletheia), is the measure or 
set of limits that determines the specific way beings as a whole are mani-
fest in a given historical era, and it is a measure that is neither eternal nor 
given in advance of human achievement. Rather, it is a measure that has 
to be established through and across creative human works—works such 
as those of architecture, visual arts, music, poetry, politics, philosophy, 
science—the whole range of human works with no advance determina-
tion about how these works might be hierarchically arranged with respect 
to each other. The unity of “culture” can be understood as precisely such a 
measure established across an ensemble of works in this fashion.2
The kind of philosophical thinking Heidegger engages in calls into 
question the objectivistic stance of a reflective consciousness set over and 
against a subject matter or object that is to be theorized about or observed. 
This setup, he argues, belongs to an ontological framework that not only 
fails to uncover more basic levels of experience but does so in a way that 
overlooks the primary phenomenon of human existence as something 
inherently belonging to a world. In short, according to Heidegger such 
an ontology overlooks the world and replaces it with a worldless ahis-
torical subject set over and against a realm of objects. Hence rather than 
beginning with the assumption of a subject-thinker and an objective real-
ity, Heidegger proposes to initiate a different beginning—one that begins 
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with a unified being-in-the-world as a basic feature of what it means to 
be human. We might borrow from Merleau-Ponty and call this a “pre-
objective” level of being that is prior, ontologically speaking, to the rep-
resentation of the world as an assortment of objects whose empirical or 
theoretical properties can be specified by an observing consciousness.
Following his mentor Husserl, Heidegger initially proposes to gain 
access to this pre-objective level of being through phenomenological 
inquiry. That is, by carefully attending to the way beings are manifest, 
we may thereby bring to light ontological determinacies that make pos-
sible the specific way in which these beings appear. To put it another way, 
“being” for Heidegger names the “phenomenality of phenomena” or the 
manner of appearance, and “beings” name what appears. Appropriating 
Husserl’s phenomenological methodology in such a way as to clarify 
ontological inquiry, and reviving the ancient Greek understanding of 
truth as “unconcealment,” Heidegger determines truth to be, not a corre-
spondence of a proposition to a fact (as in “true” statements about things) 
but the most fundamental way in which beings are manifest. Thus the 
assembly of creative works in their differential tension brings about truth, 
the manifestation of what is (“all things”) in and through the specific his-
torical character of a unified world (“unity”). Truth itself is not an eter-
nal verity; it is nothing other than the way in which beings are manifest. 
Heidegger thereby proposes a historically immanent understanding of 
truth with respect to which the diversity of creative works is crucial.
Heidegger’s thinking is particularly attractive from an interdisciplinary 
perspective because he does not privilege the philosopher or even ideas per 
se (as the Western philosophical tradition from Plato to Hegel tends to do). 
If, as Heidegger argues, the measure of truth gets established historically 
across the entire ensemble of works, then it will be the ensemble, not the 
philosopher (including Heidegger himself), that determines what is hier-
archically ordered, if indeed anything is to be. A model for interdisciplinar-
ity derived from this account might be called a non-dialectical ensemble 
of unification through differential tension. Under this model, integration 
is not imposed from the top by an overarching unity, nor is it something 
merely added to elements conceived as already present and complete. 
Rather, it is something that emerges in and across the differential tension 
between the various disciplinary approaches that enter into the arena of 
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polemos. It’s not that there are no pre-existent elements already present in 
any way at all, but rather that through the interrelations these elements are 
in the process of becoming, such that what emerges through the process is 
an identity and integrity of each that was not simply present in advance. 
In an interdisciplinarity brought about in this way, the mutually interact-
ing disciplines are not hermetically sealed enclosures persisting in mutual 
indifference but rather are elements in dynamic tension with the other ele-
ments in the field. Furthermore, the unique character of each discipline is 
manifest as such through its interaction with those other elements. This 
model then is more than one of mere communication in which isolated par-
ticipants are understood to communicate across the disciplinary gulf that 
separates them while remaining unaltered themselves.
Limit Conditions: Polemos as Dramatic Script or Musical Score
The arena of polemos consists of the limit conditions within which inter-
play can take place, much as the script of a play or a musical score can 
specify the limit conditions within which a dramatic production or a 
musical performance can occur. These conditions can be more or less 
predetermined, but they never exhaust the possibilities in advance. For 
instance, a classical-period musical composition can overdetermine these 
limits in advance but still not exhaust all the possibilities of performance; 
on the other hand, a more improvisational composition can set up a space 
within which the flexibility of performative variation can occur.
Relying on the work of Charles Bigger (2004), we might say that this 
notion of a set of limit conditions that mark out a space within which 
creative variation can occur and differential unity can emerge is close to 
Plato’s late conception of the “form”—the eidos or idea stands to varia-
tional becoming as a plot does to a play or as a score does to musical 
performance: “Form is to a process as a plot is to a play that could have 
been played in many different times and places, languages, societies, and 
the like. Each is the play; none are its clones” (2004, 89). Furthermore, 
these limit conditions are not themselves fixed and established once and 
for all—what constitutes the play or the musical piece in this case can 
change with the performative interpretations (a possibility of change 
within the “form” itself that Plato acknowledges in the Sophist, 249a–b). 
Thus the limit conditions themselves are always open to reinterpretation 
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and challenge. The only constancy is the necessity that there be limit con-
ditions. In Plato’s late theory of the forms, the constant necessity of limit 
conditions might be taken to be the “eternal” aspect of the form, and the 
transcendence of possibility over the actuality of any given state of affairs, 
a possibility opened up by those limit conditions, is the chorismos or gap 
between “being” and “becoming,” a gap whose terms are always contest-
able and open to reinterpretation.
Similarly, possible limit conditions faced in an academic context might 
be the external standards and expectations imposed by the state, the pre-
dispositions and disciplinary proclivities each person brings to the table, 
the overall vision of the specific identity and character of one’s academic 
community as a collectively negotiated project, and exactly who and what 
will be involved in the whole process. Some of these are predetermined, 
but we can also specify what limits might better enable us to engage in 
something productive and interesting. To invoke the musical analogy 
again, in composing a piece of music for performance, I will encounter 
certain predetermined limit conditions—my natural abilities as well as 
those I may have achieved up to that point in time, the level of musician-
ship required by the piece vis-à-vis what is actually available or practically 
achievable, the desires/tastes of the target audience, perhaps externally 
imposed expectations (e.g., if the work is commissioned), and finally the 
overall historical context within which certain musical structures are seen 
as being more acceptable or palatable than others. The score itself there-
fore already results from a set of limit conditions and the creativity (or 
lack thereof) that can emerge within them. Among these latter limit con-
ditions I also find my own biases and predilections. Perhaps I am bound 
by my socially ingrained habits of hearing such that I expect certain kinds 
of harmonies and only recognize those as “musical.” The score might be 
innovative or tedious depending upon these limits. These limits can be 
critically examined and thereby either overcome or modified. They will 
nevertheless in some sense form a generalized image or model of what I 
envision as the musical piece whose coming into being I want to facilitate. 
In this sense one might understand the model of interdisciplinarity pre-
sented here as a set of possible limit conditions that could be adopted in 
negotiating together with one’s peers the score of the musical piece that is 
to become interdisciplinarity.
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The Deficiency of Non-dialectical Ensembles
The kind of non-dialectical ensemble of unification through differential 
tension articulated by Heidegger boils down to whatever comes out in the 
wash. There is no inner necessity that such a non-dialectical unity pos-
sess one kind of character over another, nor are the elements of such an 
ensemble—beyond the common response to the call to make something 
happen—each inherently related to others by virtue of their own integ-
rity or specificity. Indeed, even if a unique identity of each element were 
to become manifest through its differential tension with others within 
the field circumscribed by its limit conditions, any emergent unity may 
well nonetheless remain a matter of indifference to the elements them-
selves in their preoccupation with their own respective identities. As we 
will see below, an indifference like this can reassert itself in a still more 
entrenched fashion as a result of such emergent identity—even when that 
identity is only gained through interrelations.
dialec tical unit y
Following the general contours of Hegel's dialectical logic, we might for-
mally articulate differential unity in terms of a logic immanent within 
various forms or shapes of unity, each of which shows itself to be self-
defeating owing to inherent contradictions within it. The unsustainability 
of each in turn implies a new variation that in a way responds to the self-
defeating character of its predecessor. The immanent logic that moves 
us from one shape to the next is what differentiates this model from the 
previous one, which articulated a given unity-in-difference through phe-
nomenological analysis without being able thereby to posit any necessity 
to the specific shape that unity may take.
Leaving aside a detailed treatment of that immanent logic for now—a 
treatment which would require considerable analysis and justifica-
tion—we can specify several of these forms or shapes of differential unity 
(keeping in mind that the appearance of mere juxtaposition can only be 
dispelled with the demonstration of the immanent logic they each imply).3 
To put it another way, we can conceive of several variations on the dialec-
tic between relation or relational unity, on the one hand, and the unique 
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character or integrity of each element within such relational unity, on the 
other, spelled out in terms of a critique of the category of “identity.” The 
deficiencies present in each variation imply a further development into or 
replacement by another more adequate version, and thereby can begin 
to provide an answer as to why integration should be regarded as better 
than fragmentation in the first place, thereby also suggesting a normative 
dimension lacking in the Heideggerian account.
Abstract Identity, or the “Melting Pot” Model
In this model, difference collapses into an indifferent sameness. Difference 
counts as a negative to be dissolved into the unity of an indifferent neu-
trality. The negativity is implicit insofar as difference is either barely 
allowed to emerge at all or is immediately subsumed under an overarch-
ing unity with respect to which it counts as something to be devalued. To 
put it another way, the unity appears explicitly as something positive and 
purely affirmative (e.g., “I’m an American before all else”), but is implic-
itly negative insofar as it must in addition negate the differences that are 
nonetheless present in order to reduce them to a subordinate status (“I’m 
also gay, female, Latina,” etc.). This is the unity of indifferent neutrality 
that collapses all differences into a primal soup—the “melting pot” model.
However, because of the character of the unity as indifferent neutrality, 
it lacks both identity as well as unity and is thereby self-defeating. The spe-
cific identity of any element present is due to its difference from the other 
elements. Without such difference the elements would be indistinguish-
able from one another. But that difference is precisely what is negated 
in favour of its unification with the others in the melting pot. Unity itself 
becomes seen as the “grand narrative” that erases or submerges differ-
ence. To the degree that such negation of difference provokes the reasser-
tion of that difference against the overarching unity we get something like 
“identity politics.” But the identity thereby reasserted is in turn achieved 
at the expense of the overarching unity rather than through that unity. 
Although it may at first look as if the very idea of a grand narrative or 
overarching unity has been decisively rejected, such identity politics risks 
replicating the same melting pot model at the micro level—members of 
the group are identified as such in their unity under that group, but their 
specific differences from each other again fall outside their unity in the 
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group. The “identity” asserted becomes a mini-melting pot. The logic of 
this reversal may well facilitate the situation noted by Will Kymlicka (2001, 
76) in which “traditional elites” within such groups exercise oppressive 
practices and rights violations over member of their own communities.
Needless to say, this model of unity does not appear to hold much 
promise for an integrated model of interdisciplinarity. Rather, we are left 
with the alternatives of fragmentation without unity or unification with-
out difference, both of which alternatives are negative in their exclusion 
of their own other (difference excludes unity and vice versa). At best such 
a model might perhaps lead to an assembly of various disciplines under 
the umbrella of collectively promoted goals—an “additive and encyclope-
dic” form of multidisciplinarity, according to Julie Klein’s definition (Klein 
2006), rather than interdisciplinarity proper. At worst it might merely col-
lapse into an institutionally imposed mandate requiring compliance. In 
either case there is no “inter” in such an interdisciplinarity, still less an 
integration.
Unlike the usual assertion of identity politics, however, the problem 
highlighted by a Hegelian analysis is not a moral or ethical one. Rather, 
it is a logical one: such an abstract identity in the melting pot does not 
actually achieve identity, and the unity fails to unify insofar as differences 
fall outside it and must be reasserted against it if they are to count in their 
own right. The melting pot is a semblance of unity concealing its own 
inherent fracture.
Such abstract identity logically implies a transition to a subsequent 
stage. Insofar as the differences that the melting pot excludes must then 
be devalued relative to the indifferent neutrality of the melting pot itself, 
the latter can now only assert its own value by means of such exclusion. 
In other words, the movement is double: first the assertion of a neutral 
unity that subsumes differences, an assertion which remains naïve so 
long as the subsumed differences disappear from its view (e.g., the notion 
of liberal equality implicitly based on the model of the white male prop-
erty owner, such as the assertion that “all men are created equal” in the 
American Declaration of Independence, initially fails to notice its exclu-
sion of women and non-white races). But insofar as the unity here is a uni-
fication of those elements that are mutually different, that difference has 
to appear in an assertion against unity. The reassertion of the latter unity 
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now in turn must be asserted against those differences—the first naïve 
unity can no longer be taken for granted. This then generates a unity 
whose character is explicitly negative. The melting pot was indeed nega-
tive, but only implicitly. It had to wait for the assertion of its implicitly 
excluded differences to show itself to be the negativity that it is. Hence, 
now the identity asserted against unity, as well as the unity asserted 
against difference, both become explicitly negative.
We might conceive of such a unity as being forced to cast its net of 
inclusion wider, as has indeed happened historically in liberal democratic 
societies. For example, those who were previously excluded from the 
net—women, minorities, etc.—are now included under a wider umbrella.4 
But nonetheless the assertion of those various identities as different—as 
women, as gay, etc.—is still negated in favour of a universality that does 
not include within itself the particularity of those identities. Such univer-
sality remains just as abstract as the identity asserted against it—it is a 
universality that subsumes particulars under it, but those particulars in 
their specific mutual differences still fall outside the overarching unity. 
And once again, when those differences are asserted against their implicit 
exclusion we get the same alternatives where each side only achieves 
its identity through a negation of the other: an identity asserted against 
unity as well as a unity asserted against difference. This mutual assertion 
against leads us to a notion of negative identity.
Negative Identity
This model is that of an identity whose unity with the other is negative. It 
is what it is by not being the other. This “not-other” is constitutive of its 
identity. However, its very negative relation to the other undermines any 
identity it might have in its own right. It only has an “apparent” or illusory 
identity that evaporates when its presuppositions are made explicit: “I 
know what I’m against, but I don’t know what I’m for,” or “You’re either 
with us or you’re with the terrorists.” In such a negative identity, any 
identity I have actually lies in the other. Insofar as that other is explicitly 
devalued, my own identity is implicitly devalued. If the other is likewise 
defined by such a negative identity, then we have a situation in which 
identity is always pushed outside oneself to the other. Any “identity” 
present is a semblance that conceals thoroughgoing dependence.
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In a purely formal way this is where the two previously mentioned melt-
ing pot alternatives lead us: to assert difference against unity is to assert 
the identity of “difference” and hence also to implicitly negate difference 
in favour of identity (e.g., identity politics becomes a mini-melting pot). At 
the same time, to assert unity against difference is to set up such unity as 
something different from “difference,” and hence it is to implicitly assert 
difference rather than unity. Since each side can assert itself against the 
other—difference against neutral unity and neutral unity against differ-
ence—and since the negativity of that “asserting against” can remain 
under the radar at a merely implicit or covert level, each side can focus 
only on the unity or identity and simply ignore the implicit negative rela-
tion upon which such unity or identity is predicated. This leads us to a 
notion of a unity that is achieved through an indifference to difference. 
In other words, we can assert “our” identity as not x (we’re not terrorists, 
we’re not capitalists, we’re not socialists, etc.—we’re “us” because we’re 
not “them”) and then forget the “not.” Because of its prevailing indiffer-
ence, it might be termed “mechanistic” insofar as the working parts of a 
machine are mutually external and indifferent to their operation within 
the mechanical process.
Mechanistic Identity
This model is that of a kind of identity that is only achieved through a rela-
tion of indifference and externality to others. Each element in a mechanis-
tic system is external to the other elements and is indifferent to any action 
exerted upon it from the outside—even when such action from the outside 
determines what it is. Rather than achieving identity through negation of 
the other, identity is achieved through indifference to the other. Rather 
than “I am what I am because I’m not one of them,” it’s more like “I am 
what I am regardless of them.” This indifference lends a sense of self-suf-
ficiency that remains unaffected by relations—regardless of what happens 
out there, I still am what I am. In this sense one might characterize the 
status quo in academia to be a mechanistic relation among the various 
disciplines: “You do your thing, I will do mine; maybe we’ll run into each 
other once in a while in the hallway.” Ayn Rand’s “ethical egoism” (an 
oxymoron) fits in here as well: “I’m under no obligation to do anything 
that’s not in my self-interest.”5 Or Milton Friedman’s “fiduciary duty” that 
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is indifferent to how it may affect stakeholders outside the contractual 
relationship.6 Such identity gains its self-sufficiency at the price of col-
lapsing relations into one of mutual externality and indifference.
But insofar as such mechanistic identity even on its own terms is still 
implicitly negative in its very indifference—that is, insofar as unity here 
is achieved through the negativity of mutual indifference—such unity 
still needs the difference from others in order to be indifferent to them 
and thereby to gain the self-sufficient character of its identity. Once that 
very self-sufficient character—an identity that is more than a mere formal 
difference from others—is itself seen to require relations to others none-
theless, we are led to a conception of “integrated unity” in which the dif-
fering elements are unified through their specific differences rather than 
in spite of them.
Integrated Identity
This model is that of a positive identity, but, rather than being maintained 
through an indifference to others, it is an identity that is produced in and 
through its relations to others. Relations don’t undermine the self-suffi-
cient character of its identity but rather establish it. Each identity is what 
it is in relation to the others, and in such a way that neither the self-suffi-
cient character of each element nor the interdependent relations between 
them are compromised. The “Jewel Net of Indra,” a Buddhist image, 
comes to mind here: a vast net of jewels in which each jewel contains the 
reflection of the others. This also suggests Rousseau’s political paradigm, 
later developed by Hegel in a way, in which I gain self-determining free-
dom and thereby first truly become who and what I am in and through my 
association with other citizens in a common deliberative political space, a 
unity in which the multiplicity of actors and the unity of participation are 
one and the same thing. Difference is no longer compromised nor merely 
opposed to unity. Identities establish real self-subsistent integrity in their 
mutual differences not at the cost of relations but through them. On the 
other hand, the self-sufficient character of each identity is not lost in rela-
tions but is only thereby established.7
This kind of unity through the interrelations of integrated identities 
I will call an “integrated unity,” and is the preferred model of unity I 
take from Hegel. Applied to interdisciplinarity, I will call it “integrated 
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interdisciplinarity.” Here we might conceive of the various disciplines not 
just coming into an aggregated assembly in which their mutual relations 
would remain external to the inner identity of each, nor where each would 
maintain its identity either in a merely negative or indifferent relation to 
others, but rather an integration in which each discipline becomes more 
than what it might otherwise be independently of its relations and thereby 
gains a singular identity it would lack without those relations. If the kind 
of unifications possible with abstract, negative, and mechanistic identi-
ties are ultimately self-defeating, we are left having to come to grips with 
the kind of integrated unity we want.
Pragmatics
Exactly what the specific character of integrated interdisciplinarity will 
look like cannot be specified in advance. That is, exactly how the gap 
between the “being” of limit conditions and the “becoming” of differen-
tial interplay gets negotiated has to be worked out empirically, as does 
the character of the integrated identity that emerges through mutual 
participation. Any presumption to determine this in advance beyond the 
formal indications given here risks asserting a hegemony of the specifi-
cally philosophical discipline over the others in the playing field. From 
a philosophical perspective I can say what I think it might look like in 
general/universal terms, but this has to be fleshed out in the actual inter-
play between all of the players through the integrity of their respective 
work. Only through such work, in working together to determine what 
integrated interdisciplinarity means concretely, can it be ultimately 
de termined whether the model presented here is an abstract or a concrete 
universal.
That model itself integrates the two models just presented. On the one 
hand, it preserves the Heideggerian/Heraclitean model of unity in and 
through the assembly of difference in its facilitation of creativity, a mutual 
interplay that is not presided over by a predetermined hierarchy of dis-
ciplines but which will always be responding to a set of limit conditions 
that can facilitate such creativity in varying degrees. On the other hand, 
it preserves the Hegelian model of integrated unity in which the specific 
character of the identity of the elements entering into the unity are them-
selves established and further developed through their interrelation with 
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the other elements present. The latter provides the normative dimension 
for the former, preventing it from collapsing into a melting pot as well 
as from becoming either merely negative or mechanistic. In view of the 
pragmatic work that remains to be done and the open future of interdis-
ciplinary studies, I suggest the model as itself a possible paradigmatic 
limit condition that might better enable the articulation of the collabora-
tive space within which something like an “integrated interdisciplinarity” 
might flourish and define itself.
At this point I would like to look at some examples of how specific 
disciplines have interrelated in an integrated way. These examples will 
serve not only to provide possible instances of integrated interdisciplinar-
ity, but will also themselves suggest further developments to the model. 
The model is therefore fluid in that it invites its own development through 
the practice of integration.
integRative unit y,  aRt WoRKs,  and philosophy
Since I am most familiar with philosophy—and with certain philosophers 
at that—I will draw from that field some of what I take to be a salient 
moment promising a direction toward the kind of integrated unity in 
which more than one discipline mutually interacts and is each enhanced 
and further developed through that interaction. Because I am not an 
expert in more than one field, however, and because I am not collaborat-
ing with anyone in this essay, my examples do stem from the philosophi-
cal side of that engagement and may thereby inadvertently emphasize 
the kinds of implications that are more interesting to philosophers over 
other kinds of implications that might become prominent with a dif-
ferent disciplinary point of departure. This may indicate a need for the 
kind of collaborative work in which individuals from various disciplines 
actively take part in mutually engaged inquiries that are not mediated 
by the temporal distance that prevents inquirers from various disciplin-
ary perspectives from being co-present in their inquiries, a problem that 
affects the examples cited below.8 We should also note that the various 
schools of thought found within any given discipline may either facilitate 
or hinder integrated interdisciplinarity to differing degrees. Some may be 
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more amenable than others to such integrated work. Insofar as any choice 
of examples will necessarily be limited, we also must acknowledge the 
possibility that not all kinds of disciplines may be amenable to mutual 
integration in the same ways. The specific character of each discipline 
may call for a particular kind of integration, and this specificity may well 
exceed the level of detail indicated in the model presented here. My pro-
posed model may be able to accommodate those specificities, however, 
without necessarily articulating them in advance. I will conclude with the 
examination of a study that follows the spirit of Heideggerian practice just 
mentioned in integrating philosophical reflection with non-discursive 
works of art in such a way that not only wards off the hegemonization of 
one over the other, but which also demonstrates their mutual develop-
ment through the interchange.
heideggeR:  philosophy and poetRy
As previously mentioned, in that Heideggerian thought does not privilege 
philosophy over other academic disciplines it looks promising from an 
interdisciplinary perspective. Heidegger’s understanding of history in 
fact brings us to ask how non-discursive works might contribute to truth 
(i.e., to the way beings as a whole are manifest in a given historical era). 
Since access to the unconcealment of being is not exclusively or indeed 
even primarily philosophical, this drives philosophical thinking outward 
to seek neighbourhoods in which other modes of disclosure can mutu-
ally commune. Heidegger himself sought such communion with poetry, 
verbalizing the noun “neighbour” (Nachbar) to signify how philosophical 
thinking and poetry might “neighbour” together in such a way that the 
space of unconcealment—the space of truth—is opened.9
If the objectivistic stance of the modern subject is a superficial onto-
logical horizon that conceals more fundamental modes of unconceal-
ment, suspending that horizon in order to render those more fundamental 
modes more explicit also opens the door to other kinds of works that may 
not only reveal things at that pre-objective level but which might even 
contribute to establishing the very horizon that reveals them in that way. 
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In this way the theoretical stance of thought is no longer privileged, and 
thinking is brought into a neighbourhood over which it no longer presides.
In attempting to clarify the essential way that language shows itself, for 
instance, Heidegger claims that rather than randomly picking examples of 
language, one should look at what is spoken “purely.” That is, one should 
look at something that is spoken in a way that establishes or renegoti-
ates the essential limits of the disclosive power of speech. Furthermore, 
this establishing of limits must be preserved in what is spoken in such a 
way that it is accessible to the phenomenological thinking that Heidegger 
engages in. What kind of speech is this purely spoken word? In “Die 
Sprache,” an essay explicitly devoted to language, Heidegger writes, 
“What is spoken purely is the poem” (1971, 194). For Heidegger, it is in the 
poetic utterance that language most clearly reveals itself according to its 
own ontological character.
Hence philosophy can only clarify itself as a discursive enterprise that 
attempts to get at the truth by dwelling in the same neighbourhood with 
poetry insofar as the latter makes a decisive contribution to determining 
where the limits of language’s disclosive power lie. Similarly, Heidegger’s 
attempt to clarify the way human spatiality is set up and articulated by 
works of art prior to the Cartesian representation of space as homogeneous 
extension begins with reference to an architectural work—a Greek temple. 
It is no accident that Heidegger’s primary example of how a work of art 
establishes a space of unconcealment within which other beings are co-
disclosed is a work of architecture that resists curatorial isolation as much 
as it resists the interpretation of art as a representation of something. The 
Greek temple, in opening up a region of unconcealment, simultaneously 
assembles and gathers within that region the beings that surround it—
”tree and grass, eagle and bull, snake and cricket,” the storm (Poseidon) 
that only “rages” when the temple opens up the space in which it can be 
manifest in its violence (Heidegger 1971, 42).
The affinity between philosophy and poetry might be facilitated by the 
fact that they both, after all, deal with language. Heidegger does point 
in the direction of non-discursive arts when he examines the Van Gogh 
painting and the Greek temple, but these examples themselves are left 
rather indeterminate and generic in his account (we are told neither which 
Greek temple nor which particular Van Gogh painting is being discussed), 
Valences of Interdisciplinarity.indd   88 28/02/2012   4:31:22 PM
 Interdisciplinary Models and Dialectical Integration 89
and the analysis thereby remains at a very general, if not removed, level. 
At this point I would like to turn to an example of the intersection of phi-
losophy and the plastic arts that develops in greater detail several specific 
instances of the latter.
schuFReideR:  a phenoMenology oF unit y and space 
thRough MondRian’s paintings 10
In Gregory Schufreider’s analysis of Mondrian’s work, he is able to clarify 
the model of unity as a decentred assembly of differing elements, each of 
which appears in its difference only in and through that assembly. Indeed, 
in his essay “Overpowering the Center: Three Compositions by Mondrian” 
(1985), the paintings of Mondrian are presented as graphic embodiments 
in a non-discursive format of precisely the kind of Heideggerian ensemble 
previously described. According to Schufreider, Mondrian appropriates 
the grid, which is often taken to be the quintessential representation of 
modern Cartesian space, and transforms it into something that opens out 
onto other kinds of spaces that are brought about through the paintings 
themselves. Through a phenomenological analysis of Mondrian’s work, 
he shows that the colour planes of the painting frustrate attempts to 
organize the elements of the painting around a centre. Rather, unifica-
tion is brought about in the work through the interrelations of the ele-
ments themselves without reference to either an underlying homogeneity 
or a central focus. Much like Heidegger’s notion of how historical worlds 
get established, it is a groundless non-hierarchical ensemble of relations 
whose unity is nothing other than the differential mutual tension sus-
tained between its various elements.
In a later essay, “Mondrian’s Opening: The Space of Painting” (1997), 
Schufreider further develops this direction of philosophical reflection 
opened up by Mondrian’s work. Although one might look to an artist like 
Mondrian in particular for integrating philosophical inquiry and artistic 
endeavor because Mondrian himself engaged in philosophical writing, 
Schufreider rejects the kind of approach that would look to paintings for 
mere illustrations of what has already been conceived in philosophy. If 
we were to follow this route, we would remain firmly entrenched within 
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the discursive dimension of aesthetics and therefore would not actually 
be straying far from the disciplinary enclosure of academic philosophy. 
However, Schufreider’s own reason for avoiding this approach is that he 
sees in Mondrian’s painting the possibility of a genuinely non-discursive 
thinking that is initiated in and through the work itself, and not by a prior 
theoretical discourse. He thus emphasizes the necessity of “exploring that 
other space of thinking which is his painting” (Schufreider 1997).
Although it may not be explicitly related to Schufreider’s own interest 
in Mondrian, the latter nonetheless suggests a fruitful direction for inter-
disciplinarity insofar as the kind of integrated unity proposed in the model 
is one in which each element becomes more than what it was prior to or 
independently of its integration with others within the limit conditions of 
the field. This is the strength of Schufreider’s later analysis of Mondrian 
for our purposes here. Whereas the earlier analysis might merely see in 
Mondrian’s work an exemplification of the kind of unification discursively 
articulated in the Heideggerian text, thereby leaving both philosophy and 
artwork relatively unaltered in a meta-level analysis that demonstrates 
their mutual consistency, the later analysis begins to conceive of a unique 
kind of space and a unique kind of unification brought about by the paint-
ing itself, a space and unification that perhaps would not have come to 
philosophical awareness at all without the artwork. In this way we might 
say that what is brought about implicitly through the work is thematized 
explicitly in philosophy, and thereby the two, philosophy and artwork, 
mutually engage in an integrated unity through which they each become 
more than what they were independently of that integration. Schufreider 
even argues that Mondrian’s work provides a possible resolution to a 
long-standing philosophical problem:
The point is that Mondrian ultimately found another way to resolve 
the traditional dualism between the individuality of the part and the 
universality of the whole, neither by abandoning hierarchy in a mere 
coordination of elements nor by submitting to hierarchical stabiliza-
tion through the permanent dominance of some single element, but by 
working with the phenomenological appearance of the components of 
a visual composition to create a dynamic relation of interdependence 
between them. (Schufreider 1997)
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Such a “mere coordination of elements” would indeed be the case if a 
Mondrian painting were compositionally unified by an underlying grid 
whose homogeneity of spatial extension coordinated the plotting of ele-
ments within its uniform space. On the other hand, a “hierarchical stabili-
zation through the permanent dominance of some single element” could 
be achieved if there were a central focus to the work. But what Mondrian’s 
work actually achieves, according to Schufreider, is something quite dif-
ferent from these traditional, not to say metaphysical, solutions:
His neoplastic order requires the achievement of a constantly shift-
ing equilibrium between the elements of a composition, a kind of 
reciprocating hierarchy of mutual subordination that allows each 
compositional component to emerge in its own complex identity as it is 
codetermined within a whole that is itself constituted in the interplay 
between those elements that are codefined within it. (Schufreider 1997)
Let’s make explicit some crucial characteristics of the kind of unification 
here attributed to Mondrian’s work. The unity is not static, but rather is 
dynamic in character. This means that there is neither a centre nor even a 
hegemonic element that can get stabilized within it. This might be taken 
to be a non-hierarchical egalitarianism of elements in which none are 
elevated over the others—a kind of bland uniform equality, itself its own 
kind of homogenization, or as one critic, Rudolf Arnheim, puts it, “a 
swarm of anonymous equals populating the picture plane” (quoted in 
Schufreider 1997). However, according to Schufreider, this is not the case. 
Rather than such egalitarian uniformity, the dynamism operative in the 
work produces a “reciprocating hierarchy” in which each element rises to 
the top when it is the focus of attention. Attending to each element in turn 
brings about this result, the overall effect of which is to prevent hierarchy 
from stabilizing. Thus rather than non-hierarchy being imposed from the 
outside or by some kind of external reflection, it is immanently produced 
within the dynamic interplay of reciprocating hierarchy itself.
A similar concept of unification through reciprocal hierarchy is elabo-
rated in an unlikely place, namely, in one of the science fiction novels of 
C. S. Lewis, whose protagonist’s vision of the “Great Dance” of creation 
could well be taken as a description of Mondrian’s work:
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In the plan of the Great Dance plans without number interlock, and 
each movement becomes in its season the breaking into flower of the 
whole design to which all else had been directed. Thus each is equally 
at the centre and none are there by being equals, but some by giving 
place and some by receiving it. . . . He thought he saw the Great Dance. 
It seemed to be woven out of the intertwining undulation of many cords 
or bands of light, leaping over and under one another and mutually 
embraced in arabesques and flower-like subtleties. Each figure as he 
looked at it became the master-figure or focus of the whole spectacle, 
by means of which his eye disentangled all else and brought it into 
unity—only to be itself entangled when he looked to what he had taken 
for mere marginal decorations and found that there also the same hege-
mony was claimed, and the claim made good, yet the former pattern 
not thereby dispossessed but finding in its new subordination a signifi-
cance greater than that which it had abdicated. (Lewis 2005, 276–78)
The claim that Mondrian’s unification is non-hierarchical and non-hege-
monic, then, has to be qualified. It is both hierarchical and hegemonic, 
but, insofar as the unification is dynamic rather than static, any such 
hierarchy or hegemony is temporary and subject to immediate displace-
ment as soon as another element is attended to. Thus, beyond merely 
serving as an example of integration, Mondrian’s work, when its possi-
bilities are made explicit through philosophical reflection, itself suggests 
(along with Lewis’s vision of the "Great Dance") a further development of 
our model of integration. Namely, rather than merely abandoning hege-
mony or hierarchy in the kind of uniform equality that Nietzsche found 
repugnant (and which makes him into an enemy of democracy for some), 
it allows us to recognize a real hegemony within every discipline insofar 
as, from the perspective of any given discipline, it will tend to appear as 
“the master-figure or focus of the whole spectacle.” But at the same time, 
when one looks at what one “had taken for mere marginal decorations” 
one finds “that there also the same hegemony” is claimed—and the claim 
made good. Every discipline tends to regard itself as hegemon—the kinds 
of questions it raises and the kinds of inquiries it fosters are seen to be the 
most important. Why else would any of us enter a particular discipline in 
the first place?
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But it’s not a matter of countering this claim by asserting that the 
kinds of questions it raises and the kinds of inquiries it fosters are not 
the most important, or that they need to be “contextualized” and thereby 
deflated. Rather than attempting to eliminate this desire for hegemony—
which itself would be a questionable assertion of hegemony on the part 
of the advocate of interdisciplinarity—that desire is granted free space in 
the mutual interplay of elements within the integrated unity that itself is 
nothing outside that interplay. Each element in turn asserts hegemony 
and a reciprocal hegemony unifies the whole. Such unity, then, is neither 
imposed externally nor asserted as ground (as in an underlying grid), but 
rather is produced in and through the dynamic interrelations of the ele-
ments themselves.
This underlines the necessity of polemos—struggle, dynamic tension: 
a quiescent neutrality cannot be assumed. As Schufreider (1997) puts it, 
“only in mutually defeating the dominance of one another can the parts 
appear, and in differing ways, in relation to a whole that is itself shown 
to be composed, not in accord with a preestablished order but in the 
complex of relationships that are on-going between the elements them-
selves.” Any such imposition of an overarching umbrella under which all 
disciplines are knocked down to the same level is itself a form of con-
cealed hegemony, and would merely institute the “melting pot” model of 
unity criticized above.
Not only does Schufreider’s account of Mondrian serve well as an 
instance of the kind of integration proposed in our model, but it also 
suggests the more determinate structure of reciprocal hierarchy as an 
improvement in the model itself. From the concrete example of such a 
unification having been achieved, we can derive a vision that might in 
turn serve as a set of limit conditions within which interdisciplinarity 
could be accomplished in ever more integrated ways. However, it might 
behoove us to recall the caveat mentioned earlier, namely, that different 
disciplines may call for different kinds of integration. Thus the integration 
of philosophy with empirical science may look rather different from that 
of philosophy with the fine arts. And insofar as my focus here is limited 
to philosophy we have only scratched the surface. Nonetheless, given the 
fact that we cannot specify in advance the wealth of empirical contingen-
cies that will no doubt be encountered, the model proposed here, a model 
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which we may now tentatively designate as an integrated interdisciplinar-
ity through reciprocal hierarchy, may prove both disclosive and useful as a 
set of self-imposed limit conditions within which interdisciplinarity might 
fruitfully thrive, and which itself requires the “inner readiness for mutual 
participation” Heidegger called for.
notes
1 The first three translations are from Freeman 1971, 25 and 28. The fourth is from Kirk and 
Raven 1957, 191.
2 For an argument defending a similar interpretation of Heideggerian thought and a more 
extensive explication of it, see Schufreider 1986.
3  The shapes of identity and unity presented here are generalizations presented in a 
meta-level analysis drawn from Hegel’s treatment of categories in the greater Science of 
Logic. My intent is to articulate these shapes in general terms and roughly indicate some 
features of a logic implicit within them that suggests a development from one to another 
above and beyond the static juxtaposition of given conceptions. However, a detailed 
treatment of the ontological account from which they are drawn is not only outside the 
scope of this essay but would also entail a considerable succession of transitions and 
categories not directly relevant to this inquiry.
4 See Slavoj Žižek’s account of this kind of universality, as well as his own attempt to 
articulate a concrete universal, in Žižek 1999, 100–103 and passim. For my response to 
Žižek, see Kisner 2008.
5 This formulation is a paraphrase of James Rachel’s attempt to interpret Rand’s 
“confusing doctrine.” See Rachel 2004, 337–38.
6 See Milton Friedman’s (in)famous article, “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to 
Increase Its Profits” (1970). It was Friedman’s valorization of fiduciary duty, with its 
concomitant indifference, that led to the notion of “stakeholders” above and beyond 
mere shareholders.
7 In Hegel’s treatment, this development cannot come about through a relation of 
universality to particularity alone but requires the mediation of “singularity,” or the 
individual. This individual character, however, is far from the atomistic Hobbesian/
Lockean conception of individuality, often criticized as belonging to the model of the 
white male property owner, insofar as it is in turn only established through relation to 
the universal, on the one hand, and the other particulars, on the other. Hence it is an 
individuality—a singular identity—that is achieved through relations rather than in spite 
of or against them.
8 There are other possible examples not discussed but which may be developed along 
lines similar to those engaged here—for instance, the integration of philosophy and 
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psychoanalysis, along with other disciplines not directly represented by the theorists 
themselves, in the collaborative work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (e.g., Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987).
9 See, for instance, Heidegger 1996. See also “. . . Poetically Man Dwells . . . ,” in Heidegger 
1971, 211–29.
10 Chronologically ordered images of Mondrian’s work can be viewed in “Olga’s Gallery” at 
http://www.abcgallery.com/M/mondrian/mondrian.html.
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Globalization and Higher Education
Working Toward Cognitive Justice
d I a n a  B R y d o n
“There is no global social justice without global cognitive justice.”
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Joao Arriscado Nunes, and Maria 
Paula Meneses, “Opening Up the Canon of Knowledge and 
Recognition of Difference” (2007), ix
This essay works within the context of three major challenges facing 
higher education today.1 I phrase them as questions:
1. How can educators in the global north and global south devise 
better ways of sharing our knowledge and our sense of the 
obstacles that stand in the way of solving global problems?
2. How can humanists and social scientists communicate across 
our divisions and learn to benefit from the strengths of our 
differently focused research?
3. How can those of us situated within universities learn to 
share our research and teaching functions with the increasing 
number of private and public civil society organizations that 
also claim knowledge production and research rights?
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In asking these questions, this essay intervenes in current knowledge 
politics debates to advocate goal-oriented forms of interdisciplinar-
ity structured around contextualized problem solving within ethically 
self-conscious frameworks.2 My argument here is that interdisciplinar-
ity, internationalization, globalization, and cognitive justice need to 
be thought of—and addressed—together. Exactly how these will be 
addressed is one of the major issues facing higher education today. This 
volume presents a range of approaches to what Ian Angus, in his essay, 
calls “the ‘what’ and ‘for whom’ of knowledge.” I come to these ques-
tions from the contentious interdiscipline of postcolonial studies as it 
seeks to ask what David Slater terms “postcolonial questions for global 
times” (1998).3 In seeking to negotiate between what Santos, Nunes, and 
Meneses term “knowledge-as-regulation” and “knowledge-as-emancipa-
tion” (2007, li; emphasis in the original),4 I begin with the premise that 
universities are not well designed to address global problems or respond 
to the changing conditions brought about by globalization. As Fred Riggs 
argues in his “Global Studies Manifesto,” “Far-reaching transformations 
in the contemporary world system make a new paradigm for academic 
teaching and research necessary, but deeply entrenched traditional ways 
of thinking block the needed changes” (2004, 344). At this high level of 
generality, such an argument for transformation may be used to remodel 
the university according to market values or to critique those models from 
a position that queries both market values and traditional defences of 
the liberal university. This essay aligns itself with the latter approach. 
Universities need a new form of globally involved interdisciplinarity 
advocating for the university as a forum where values may be debated 
and where previously excluded modes of knowing may enter the discus-
sions. In that respect, this essay aligns itself with arguments made by Ian 
Angus, Lorraine Code, Len Findlay, Harvey Graff, and Morny Joy in other 
essays in this volume.
Sandra Harding puts the case for such a position in language that viv-
idly suggests the limitations of current forms of knowledge production 
across the disciplines. “Western sciences and politics, and their philoso-
phies,” she argues, “need an exorcism if they are to contribute at all to 
social progress for the vast majority of the globe’s citizens!” (2008, 3).5 
Lorraine Code’s essay in this volume explores more fully what such an 
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interrogation into the politics of science might mean. My focus here falls 
more centrally on the implications of such an argument for work within 
and across the humanities and social sciences. While Harding’s social 
progress argument may superficially appear to share instrumentalist 
assumptions with those who argue for increased marketization of knowl-
edge and technological transfer, the first position operates according to an 
unquestioned market logic while the second asserts an alternative value 
system, which respects human creativity, including its capacity to ques-
tion and transform its thinking on an ongoing basis. In its commitment to 
what Bonnie Honig terms an “agonistic cosmopolitics” (2006, 117) such 
an approach is more affirmatively complex, open-ended and ultimately 
unpredictable than that adopted by market logic.
In Globalization of Education, Joel Spring links postcolonial approaches 
to the globalization of education with world system theories, contrasting 
what he sees as this combined approach to that provided by world edu-
cation culture on the one hand and culturalist approaches on the other 
(2009, 17). This essay challenges his classificatory system by presenting 
a more nuanced approach to cultural and political questions of knowl-
edge production in global contexts, drawing on insights from Indigenous 
research, globalization theory, and postcolonial cultural work in dialogue 
with the kind of work within interdisciplinary studies discussed by Julie 
Thompson Klein and within cross-disciplinary literacy studies discussed 
by Harvey Graff, elsewhere in this volume.
Beyond these debates within the academic community, there is often 
also a lack of fit between what many students and employers think a uni-
versity education should provide and what university professors tend to 
think our role should be. These issues are coming to a head around the 
“competency provisions” that the European Bologna Process is designed 
to deliver.6 Universities today no longer hold a monopoly on knowledge 
production, the training of citizens, the provision of skills for the contem-
porary workplace, or the certification of professionals. Challenges to uni-
versity authority and legitimacy come from many quarters. Furthermore, 
higher education institutions are undergoing reforms that may be shifting 
balances of power in ways that potentially offer space for the develop-
ment of alternative educational alliances.7
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My interest lies primarily in the implications of such shifts for research 
questions of design, process, adjudication, and dissemination as they 
feed into curricular and pedagogical reform, and as they are challenged 
by decolonization and feminism. These need to be worked through in rela-
tion to questions of education for global citizenship, global governance, 
and the renewal of democratic practices at local, national, and global 
levels. Calls for market-oriented reforms are drowning out calls from 
feminist and postcolonial perspectives and in many cases encouraging 
a retrenchment of established positions instead of serious rethinking for 
cognitive justice. I see no necessary contradiction between education for 
the workplace, if broadly conceived, and education for societal participa-
tion. Similar skill sets, breadth of knowledge, and aptitude for innovation 
will be required for both. Each requires nourishment of the capacity to 
learn and to unlearn and to grow through experience. At the same time, it 
is important to resist a narrowing of educational functions to meet either 
restricted notions of workplace needs or new enthusiasms for the internet 
as an alternative to current educational systems.
The ongoing global crisis within the financial system is pushing North 
American universities toward what Lloyd Armstrong (2008)—one of the 
bloggers whose work I follow—suggests may be a tipping point in the glo-
balization of higher education. That tipping point represents new dangers 
and opportunities in two related areas: the institutional and the epistemo-
logical/philosophical. Whereas Lorraine Code addresses these challenges 
in relation to science and ecology elsewhere in this volume, my approach 
focuses more centrally on the challenges posed to public university sys-
tems and humanities and social science research.
First, universities will need to adjust to these economic changes, 
which include challenges to the hegemony of northern universities from 
universities located within the global south and challenges to universi-
ties outside the European Union from a reformed European system. Many 
of the assumptions built into current institutional structures and prac-
tices are now being questioned from different angles. Second, challenges 
to the very assumptions about what constitutes knowledge, how it may 
best be generated, assessed, conveyed, and utilized, and how it contrib-
utes to contested ideas of the true and the good are emerging in more 
urgent forms as the global system reorients itself away from the imperial 
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legacies of the past. It is in this sense that I am employing the shorthand 
term “cognitive justice,” coined by Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007b) to 
refer to what he describes, in the subtitle of his book Cognitive Justice in 
a Global World, as “prudent knowledges for a decent life.” In this essay, 
I use “cognitive justice” to refer to the goals of reciprocal knowledge pro-
duction based on dialogues across differences and attempts to compen-
sate for power differentials in the interests of promoting social justice. Part 
of achieving cognitive justice will involve understanding and challenging 
the ways in which different kinds of “epistemologies of ignorance” (Alcoff 
2007; Sullivan and Tuana 2007) are built into and produced by current 
modes of knowing. In postcolonial theory, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has 
spoken of various kinds of “sanctioned ignorance” (1999, 279), by which 
she means ignorance that is actually socially encouraged, as calling for 
a process she had earlier described as “unlearning our privilege as our 
loss” (1990, 9).
The pre-eminence of universities in the global north is being chal-
lenged by other knowledge producers in the north and global south, 
ranging from the rise of public and private universities to local, regional, 
and global networks of Indigenous and social activist groups. As a result, 
conventional disciplinary categories of knowledge preserves, constructed 
around imperial knowledge formations and the territory of the nation-
state, are now being challenged by potent combinations of demands for 
interdisciplinarity and internationalization.
In this emerging situation, interdisciplinarity and internationaliza-
tion mean different things to different people. I come to interdisciplinar-
ity through trial and error. By interdisciplinarity, I mean the developing 
practices emerging out of dialogue between people working within and 
out of different disciplinary structures on topics of mutual interest, such 
as the complex connectivity involved in understanding globalization and 
autonomy, the focus of my own collaborative research over the past eight 
years. Now I am working within a new team project, “Building Global 
Democracy.” This project is linking academic, civil society, and policy 
communities, in a multi-faceted exercise built around a set of sub-proj-
ects, each of which demands interdisciplinary, international attention.8 
Out of such dialogue, newly appropriate ways of making meaning might 
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emerge, with a potential for understanding and addressing some of the 
problems the globe, as an emergent community, now faces.
For the purposes of this essay, I am using globalization to refer largely 
to the spread, growth, and speed of transplanetary social connections, 
which are leading to changes in transworld interconnectivity that cannot 
be limited to neo-liberalism alone. With globalization, there is a growing 
awareness that many of the most pressing issues facing the world today 
now require concerted attention at a transnational level. If a full under-
standing of these issues is to be achieved, interdisciplinary attention must 
be brought to bear upon them. Yet those interdisciplinary approaches 
are difficult to develop and even harder to institutionalize within a uni-
versity system where disciplinary brands still carry the most weight. 
Internationalization is different from globalization, since it still relies on 
interstate relations that many aspects of globalization challenge. By argu-
ing for internationalization in the contexts of university reform, I mean 
something different from those who argue for this process on the basis of 
commercial opportunities alone. Instead, I refer to the dialogue that post-
colonial scholars insist must be begun on more equitable terms between 
different parts of the world and the cultural logics they have developed to 
address their changing circumstances.9
Jan Aart Scholte notes, “Most accounts of globalization have been silent 
on its consequences for knowledge frameworks” (2005, 27). Postcolonial 
theory marks an exception to this conclusion that merits closer attention, 
not only because it will be important for achieving cognitive justice but 
also because it enables scholars to get a better grasp on what is happening 
in the world today. Postcolonial work has always focused on what Anna 
Lowenhaupt Tsing calls those “zones of awkward engagement, where 
words mean something different across a divide even as people agree to 
speak” (2005, xi). Like Tsing, postcolonial theorists recognize that these 
zones are complexly located and shift over time, requiring the negotia-
tion of alternative meaning-making systems to achieve a fuller sense of 
the options before us.
I stress the “zones of awkward engagement” and the dialogue between 
different and evolving cultural logics as an alternative to two dimensions 
of culturalism, which currently distort attempts to communicate across 
systems of cultural difference. Christoph Brumann provides a preliminary 
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definition of culturalism as denoting a form of “cultural fundamental-
ism . . . [which] posits the existence of a finite number of distinct cul-
tural heritages in the world, each tied to a specific place of origin” (2005, 
68). Such a notion fails to take sufficient account of the multiple ways 
in which cultural systems are situated and continually renegotiating 
their understandings. Two problematic derivatives of culturalist ways of 
thinking may be observed, first of all, in the clash of civilizations thesis, 
advocated by Samuel Huntington and ably critiqued by Edward Said and 
others, and, second, in the current tendency to force scholars born in the 
global south and educated within Western scholarly traditions to perform 
as native informants within a Western logic of identity politics, which is 
overdetermined in many cases by us experiences of racism and multicul-
turalism and habits of culturalist thinking derived from imperial systems 
of representation.
The blockages to cross-cultural dialogue thrown up by culturalist 
thinking and practices are too major a topic to address in this essay.10 
For now, my point is a simpler one. In attempting to create more equi-
table exchanges between the global south and the global north, notions 
of absolute and incommensurable difference, which tend by implication 
to deny full humanity and autonomy to Western others are not helpful. 
Neither is it sufficient to assume that any scholar, simply by virtue of birth 
and workplace location within an area of the global south, will necessar-
ily be committed to bringing subaltern and subjugated forms of knowl-
edge into dialogue with the status quo. The opposite also holds. Much 
criticism has been directed at expatriate postcolonial theorists working 
within the global north, as if their very expatriation makes them inau-
thentic comprador intellectuals automatically performing as complicit 
native informants. Attention must be paid, then, less to the identity or 
physical location of these intellectuals and more to the substance of the 
analysis they offer and its relevance to the context they address.
These are issues research teams I am involved in are confronting 
in concrete ways as we attempt to reconceptualize democracy and re-
establish more equitable forms of exchange with our colleagues in dif-
ferent parts of the global south. In setting up the steering committee for 
the “Building Global Democracy” project, Jan Aart Scholte was careful 
to establish gender parity within a context of ensuring that a variety of 
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ideological orientations and geopolitical locations be represented, with 
the weighting skewed toward locations in the global south. The principle 
of gender parity works efficiently to counter the token woman problem. 
Efforts are also being made to reduce the dominance of English, by ensur-
ing that translation is available for those more comfortable working in 
a different language. Another team project, “Collaborative Globalization 
Research Across Cultures and Disciplines,” has held two workshops led 
by W. D. Coleman, focusing on emerging issues in regionalization and 
multiple literacies or meaning-making systems while seeking to bridge 
the digital divide through turning to the promise of new technologies.11
I come to these projects as an English professor specializing in post-
colonial cultural studies who has been morphing into a particular type 
of globalization studies scholar concerned with the conditions necessary 
for renegotiating community and building local and global democracy. 
As an educator, I am especially interested in determining what kinds of 
pedagogies and curricula are needed to educate citizens about globaliza-
tion, citizenship, and culture and am increasingly convinced of the value, 
indeed necessity, of international partnerships to achieve these goals. I 
am finding my greatest inspiration in working with colleagues (teach-
ers and students) based in Brazil, each of whom is grappling with the 
expanded range of literacies that globalizing processes are requiring.12 As 
part of that process, we are reframing our understanding of the potential 
of the Americas as a region within the evolving global system.13
As a Canadian, I am concerned that Canada suffers from the lack 
of a national educational policy. Canada is in danger of falling behind 
in an increasingly competitive and rapidly changing field. Canadians 
need to work more efficiently across provincial boundaries within the 
Canadian nation-state while also forming more robust partnerships 
with colleagues globally if we are to continue to create research and 
learning opportunities for thinking and working in our changing times. 
The Bologna Process, as it is developing in Europe, and shifting priori-
ties around the globe represent a major challenge as well as opportu-
nity.14 The Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada (aucc) 
has taken steps to address the Bologna Process and its implications for 
Canada’s universities, but primarily within the context of seeking means 
to enhance Canada-Europe co-operation.15 I am arguing here that the 
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Bologna Process carries larger global implications, which require atten-
tion to Canada’s place within the global system. There is also a danger 
that the mobility, exchange, transparency, and quality controls that this 
process could enable will come at the expense of diversity and flexibil-
ity in program offerings, pedagogical innovation, and research design, 
conduct, and evaluation. This is a real fear.
Still, the kinds of global integration that may come with internation-
alization need not involve the choices usually posed by anti-globalization 
activists: either relativist celebrations of multiplicity or imposed cultural 
homogenization and rigid standardization on Western terms.16 Indeed, 
thinking in terms of these kinds of dichotomies is part of the problem 
in the way globalization debates are currently conducted. Possibly, with 
creative design, the integration of governance arrangements can be 
arranged to enable greater appreciation of local divergences and cross-
cultural understanding. Support for diversity is in theory at the heart of 
the Bologna Process. Bilingualism and multilingualism, increased trans-
lation across different linguistic spheres, and increased attention to criti-
cal, multimodal, and global literacies should all be encouraged in order to 
enable the responsible exercise of local, national, regional, and global or 
“planetary” (Spivak 2003, 97) forms of citizenship. Extended and layered 
forms of citizenship can strengthen democracy across the nested scales of 
engagement that are beginning to characterize our world.
Such renewed forms of citizenship require highly developed critical 
thinking skills. Faculty often agree that critical thinking is the main goal of 
university instruction, but there is as yet little recognition that such think-
ing is best learned through experiencing interdisciplinary approaches to 
a problem that is shared across many different fields of expertise and 
experience. Research on globalization and globalized research, that is, 
research conducted through internationally based teams, can help us 
appreciate the potential of evolving approaches.
Part of that interdisciplinarity will need to involve participation from 
the full range of global knowledge producers, neither limiting itself to 
the ethnocentrism of Western approaches alone nor relying on forms 
of interculturalism that exoticize Western others.17 Such an expanded 
involvement cannot be approached in an ad hoc or additive fashion, how-
ever. The old coverage model cannot simply be expanded to take in new 
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forms of thinking. Instead, the ideal of coverage needs to be abandoned 
in favour of reorienting knowledge production toward modes of think-
ing and imagining that can recontextualize problems across a range of 
scales, within contexts geared toward recognizing the changing demands 
of lifelong learning. This argument is importantly made by Arturo Escobar 
(2007), who explains that the knowledge produced by what he terms the 
“meshworks” of anti-globalization social movements (agsMs) “should be 
an important part of academics’ own theorizing and research agendas. It 
is no longer the case that some produce knowledge (academics, intellec-
tuals) that others apply (social movements).” Such boundaries “are com-
pletely disrupted at present, as movements become knowledge producers 
and intellectuals are called upon to engage more and more in activism” 
(2007, 282–83).
There are at least two cautions I would add to Escobar’s argument. 
First, in questioning the theory/practice divide between theorists and 
activists, it is also necessary to question the implied divide structuring 
modernity, which separates the global north as knowledge producer from 
the global south as knowledge user.18 Escobar’s argument emerges from 
utopian beliefs that another, better world is possible. However, its articu-
lation relies on privileging pragmatism over scholarship (as he notes), 
with all this implies, including a tendency toward anti-intellectualism 
with a potential bias toward thinking in terms of the moment. Therefore, 
my second caution is this: Attempts of these agsMs to open the hierar-
chical knowledge systems developed in the (Western) university to inputs 
from below can easily be partnered with those disturbing developments 
that Martin Jay has analyzed so well in “Educating the Educators.” The 
“unsettling mix of inchoate forces that emerged ‘from below,’” as Jay 
describes them, “include everything from computer hackers to body 
piercers, postmodern performers to underground ‘zine’ cartoonists, 
skater dudes to cyberpunk bands, gangsta rappers to queer activists” and 
may be extended to include “kooks who think Darwin is the Anti-Christ” 
(1998, 107–8). All derive their newfound legitimacy through participat-
ing in what Jay cites Peter Sloterdijk as calling “‘cynical reason,’ which 
Sloterdijk defines as ‘enlightened false consciousness’” (1998, 107). How 
to distinguish among these varieties of critique to achieve new forms of 
knowledge production that might advance “cognitive justice in a global 
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world” (Santos 2007b) is the challenge before us. It would be wrong to 
throw the baby of postcolonial and subaltern critiques out with the bath-
water of cynical reason. But any reformer must “proceed with caution” (as 
Doris Sommer [1999] reminds us).
This essay finds its sense of direction from the range of inspiring work 
emerging from within the dialogues developing across various knowledge 
networks within the social, political, and cognitive justice movements. 
While many universities have added the fostering of global citizenship to 
their vision statements, insufficient attention has been given to how this 
goal might best be achieved. The lack of curiosity about and respect for 
the wisdom of other cultures within North America can be discouraging, 
but our growing awareness of the interdependence of our world, environ-
mentally, economically, and politically, can be recruited to encourage a 
new openness to difference, a receptivity to change, and a willingness 
to experiment with internationally based forms of interdisciplinarity. To 
turn such openness into action, university rewards systems will need to 
be changed and current institutional structures loosened.
To make this argument, this essay raises some of the questions that 
necessarily precede curricular reform, pedagogical innovation, and 
revised and enlarged definitions of research, if educators are to move 
closer to enacting “cognitive justice,” de Sousa’s term for equitable ven-
tures in knowledge production. We university educators now share the 
world of advanced knowledge production with many rivals, not just pri-
vate providers and think tanks, government and non-government agen-
cies, but also business and civil society groups who no longer necessarily 
accept our authority. I don’t think that universities will disappear, but I 
do expect that they will change, and possibly quite rapidly, over the next 
few years. How will those of us in universities direct that change so as to 
promote “cognitive justice”?
I approach this question as a feminist and postcolonial scholar who 
is only too well aware of the inequities defended in the name of tradi-
tion and social cohesion. My work responds to that of the many scholars 
who are rethinking assumed dichotomies between tradition and innova-
tion, individual and community, to stretch our imaginations (Code 1998) 
toward alternative modes of sociality and continuity, modes better suited 
to recognizing the ways in which preservation of a culture’s governing 
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logic may well depend on continual renewal rather than freezing certain 
practices in time.19 To “preserve” what is best about universities, then, 
we need to redesign an institution built for the needs of one historical 
moment to better meet the needs of very different times.20
Concepts linked to “cognitive justice” that lie behind the arguments 
of this essay include ideas about the operations of the “instituted and 
instituting imagination” developed by Cornelius Castoriadis (1991); val-
orizations of the “grassroots imagination” and “the right to research” 
developed by Arjun Appadurai (2000, 2006); the principled insistence on 
challenging what Spivak calls the “sanctioned ignorance” (1999, 279) that 
operates within established forms of knowledge by developing “transna-
tional literacy” (1996, 295) and cross-disciplinary “interruptions” (2003) 
as theorized by Spivak; and the continuing need to “decolonize the imagi-
nation,” as argued by thinkers from Fanon to Ngugi to successive genera-
tions of Indigenous thinkers such as Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999), Marie 
Battiste and James (Sákéj) Youngblood Henderson (2000), and Aileen 
Moreton-Robinson (2004, 2007), as well as in the collectively authored 
Reasoning Together (Acoose et al., 2008).21 Len Findlay’s call to “Always 
Indigenize!” (2000) is part of this movement, as is Dipesh Chakrabarty’s 
to “provincialize Europe” (2001), along with the now extensive efforts 
of Walter Mignolo and Arturo Escobar to theorize a “decolonial option” 
to globalization, presented in their anthology Globalization and the 
Decolonial Option (2010). In thinking through the complex connectivities 
and disjunctions running through these trajectories, each with its own 
differently situated starting points and vectors of analysis, it will be help-
ful to learn from Tsing’s nuanced investigations into the enabling and 
blocking dimensions of global “friction.”
This essay accepts as background to its position Immanuel Wallerstein’s 
(2007) argument that the modern “divorce” between philosophy and sci-
ence separated the search for what was true from the search for what was 
good, leading to many further problems. Several essays in this volume 
address this history and its legacy in more detail than I can venture 
here. Briefly, as Wallerstein explains it, “however hard scholars worked 
to establish a strict segregation of the two activities it ran against the 
psychological grain.” As a result, attempts “to reunify the two searches 
returned clandestinely, in the work of both scientists and philosophers, 
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even while they were busy denying its desirability, or even possibility.” 
But because this reunification happened secretly, “it impaired our col-
lective ability to appraise it, to criticize it, and to improve it” (2007, 130). 
These are some of the difficulties that led Bruno Latour to conclude, in the 
title of one of his books, that “we have never been modern” (1993). While 
these contradictions, which Latour argued comprised a “hidden constitu-
tion,” have haunted modernity since its genesis, they have emerged with 
a new urgency now.
At the most general level, then, there is a growing sense that knowl-
edge producers need to rethink how they approach the big questions of 
how we know what is true and what is good and how we can think these 
questions together—if we can. The implications for universities are two-
fold: first, the re-emergence of these questions throws the university’s 
previous monopoly of knowledge production into question; and, second, 
these questions require a re-examination of how research is organized, 
evaluated, communicated, and implemented, both within the university 
and beyond.
The goal of “cognitive justice” challenges the hierarchy of knowledges 
that has come to characterize our current system, and it recognizes that 
many of the challenges confronting the world now are too complex for any 
single person or discipline to comprehend. Universities have been strug-
gling with the challenge of interdisciplinarity since at least the 1970s. This 
essay argues that the rise of globalizing pressures is now reaching a tip-
ping point where institutional and intellectual pressures are converging 
in a quest for genuine change. Older notions of academic community are 
breaking down; how might they be reconstituted in more equitable and 
effective forms? Community always needs to be negotiated, but right now 
it needs to be fundamentally rethought.22 How might disciplinary loyalties 
be opened to alternative modes of thinking and meaning making? How 
might we learn to think, with Appadurai, of the “right to research” as a 
right that belongs to everyone? How follow Santos’s lead in asking what 
“cognitive justice” requires in a global world?
In moving from postcolonial to globalization studies, I have been struck 
by the prominence of what James Scott terms, in the title of an influential 
book, “seeing like a state” (1998) in political, international, and globaliza-
tion studies.23 Humanist studies can interrupt those assumptions, as Julie 
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Cruikshank does, by asking surprising questions that shift the frames of 
reference, such as “Do glaciers listen?”—the question she uses to title her 
2005 book. Fictive imaginings can reaffirm Giorgio Agamben’s challenge 
to imagine a “nonstatist politics” that derives from a form of thought that 
“has as its object the potential character of life and of human intelligence” 
(2000, 8–9). Agamben argues that “it is necessary that the nation-states 
find the courage to question the very principle of the inscription of nativ-
ity as well as the trinity of state-nation-territory that is founded on that 
principle” (2000, 24). In other words, while the nation and the state can 
be thought of as self-reinforcing structures, they can also be employed to 
productively interrupt one another.
Despite their differences, the humanities and the social sciences have 
to a large extent built themselves around Agamben’s trinity of nation-
state-territory, which has authorized two assumptions whose given-
ness is now being brought into question. First, there is the primacy of 
the nation-state as a unit of analysis, leading to what Ulrich Beck calls 
“methodological nationalism” (2006, 24–27). This naming prompts the 
question as to what methodological alternatives might prove superior 
for understanding globalization today. Several critics, for example, have 
suggested models of “planetarity” (Gilroy 2005; Spivak 2003), cosmopoli-
tanism (Appiah 2006; Beck 2006; Benhabib 2006; Cheah 2006) or critical 
humanism (Said 2004). Others advocate new forms of regionalism, poly-
centrism, or multiculturalism. Second, there is the stubborn persistence 
of culturalism or the “culturalization of politics” (Brown 2006, 19–24, 151, 
167). Culturalism, as noted earlier, is a habit of thought assuming that 
the West and its habits of knowing exist outside and beyond culture, in 
opposition to its civilizational or barbarous others, who remain in thrall to 
their communal cultures. While a large body of work now exists to contest 
these assumptions, they remain influential within both disciplinary and 
common-sense knowledge formations today, helping account for what 
Catherine Dauvergne, in Making People Illegal, terms “fact resistance” 
(2008, 99–100). When confronted with counter-intuitive information that 
challenges their preconceptions, she argues, policy makers often resist 
the facts as academics present them.24 At the same time, facts themselves, 
as representational constructs arising from certain moments in history 
and reflecting its emergent and now dominant ideological assumptions, 
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are coming under increasing examination as the fact itself is historicized 
and therefore problematized as one way of knowing among others. In 
other words, while the fact may once have enjoyed a certain status as 
above and beyond interpretation, it is now being reconceived as itself an 
interpretive construct (Poovey 1998). Recourse to facts and a discourse 
of fact denial, therefore, cannot serve to resolve disputes in favour of 
unquestioned reason but only to shift the terrain to another field of inter-
pretative engagement. This renewed reflexivity of rationalism cannot be 
wished away by attacking postmodernism. Rather, it is another sign of the 
emergent discursive formations encouraged by globalization.
Much has been written on the limitations of methodological nation-
alism and culturalism, and the need for newly imagined forms of inter-
disciplinarity. Yet the summary conclusions put forward in Globalization: 
A Critical Introduction, Jan Aart Scholte’s influential introduction to the 
topic, suggest that the impact of globalizing processes on the produc-
tion of knowledge have not yet substantially changed the status quo. He 
notes that “global (as distinct from international) data continue to be in 
short supply. Most statistics are still calculated in relation to state-country 
units.” Furthermore, “interdisciplinarity generally remains more aspira-
tion than actuality in globalization studies” and “the widely recognized 
need for more intercultural approaches to the subject has gone largely 
unanswered. Most writings remain heavily west-centric—and many 
are more narrowly Anglo-centric or us-centric to boot” (xiv). Given this 
situation, more sustained cross-cultural, south-south, and south-north 
engagements with interdisciplinary globalization studies seems called 
for. Scholte’s chapter “Globalization and Knowledge: From Rationalism 
to Reflexivity” argues three main points:
1. “Contemporary globalization has not substantially weakened 
the hold of rationalism on the social construction of 
knowledge, although some rationality has become more 
reflexive”;
2. “The rise of transplanetary connectivity has encouraged some 
growth in anti-rationalist knowledges like religious revivalism, 
ecocentrism and postmodernism”; and
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3. “The growth of transworld relations has promoted some shifts 
in ontology, methodology and aesthetics.” (2005, 256)
As generalizations, and within the terms of his survey, Scholte’s conclu-
sions strike me as fair descriptions of the current scene; yet, from the per-
spectives I am employing in this essay, they are insufficient. Interestingly, 
Scholte does not mention epistemology in his summary, yet this essay 
argues that it is understandings of epistemology that are at stake. The 
problem lies with the assumptions behind the terms employed. Both 
sides of his dichotomy become invidious: a too-narrow, dogmatic adher-
ence to reason (rationalism) versus a dogmatic resistance to it (anti-ratio-
nalism). Perhaps what is desirable is a rational, as opposed to rationalist, 
use of reason, which would necessarily (rationally) always be open to 
what demonstrates itself to be reasonable within an expanded under-
standing of reason’s scope. Such expanded understandings would likely 
need to find scope for understanding questions of affect and spiritual-
ity as in some of their manifestations within, rather than beyond, the 
domain of reason’s judgments.25 Scholte’s summary, in its use of estab-
lished Eurocentric binaries, misses the genuine excitement of alternative 
approaches to knowledge production emerging from marginalized and 
misunderstood locations, and the very real sense of urgency that many 
of us now feel about the need to engage these alternatives in much more 
substantive fashion, if cognitive justice is to be advanced.
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Chairs program. I am grateful to doctoral student Sandy Annett for her invaluable 
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2 For an argument about the different kinds of knowledge politics and the 
interdisciplinarity they require, see Jan C. Schmidt (2007).
3 The project Phillip Darby calls “postcolonizing the international” (2006), might more 
appropriately be thought of as decolonizing the international. Part of that process, as 
Couze Venn (2006) notes, involves challenging various forms of violence at the symbolic 
heart of colonialism: “epistemic violence, that is, the denial of the authority and validity 
of the knowledge of the colonized; ontological violence, namely, the refusal to recognize 
the (non-assimilated) colonized subject as a fellow human being; and symbolic and 
psychic violence, the silencing of the voice of the colonized, the denial of the latter’s 
ability to tell his or her story” (11).
4 See also Mario Novelli (2006) for an elaboration of this distinction.
5 The metaphor of exorcism, implying that Western forms of knowing, when mistakenly 
taken as universal, operate as a bad spell or spirit possession, is common to much 
postcolonial literature. In a similar vein, an article that describes itself as “written within 
the spirit of the Theory of the South,” describes its authors’ model of popular education 
as “an antidote to neo-liberalism” in educational policy and “a struggle for the soul of 
Latin America” (Jones and Torres 2010, 568).
6 See, for example, Eva Hartmann’s 2008 neo-Gramscian analysis of the implications of 
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(2009).
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together that is emerging with the advance of globalization.
12 I am grateful to the Canadian Bureau for International Education scholarships funded by 
the Canadian Department of Foreign and International Trade for enabling phd students 
to travel from Brazil to work with me in Winnipeg on different dimensions of literacy 
education projects and to the Brazilian government for funding the travel of colleagues 
coming here for their sabbaticals in this area. I am especially grateful to Professor 
Lynn Mario T. Menezes de Souza and Professor Walkyria Monte Mor for their research 
collaboration and for encouraging their graduate students to participate in this program. 
Such redefined literacies include critical, creative, cultural, emotional, ethical, and 
multimodal forms of literacy. In 2011, we were granted funding from the Social Sciences 
and Humanities Research Council of Canada for a partnership development project, 
“Brazil/Canada Knowledge Exchange: Developing Transnational Literacies,” which has 
enabled us to pursue this research.
13 I find parallels to my thinking on these matters in Kurasawa (2008).
14 The Bologna Process derives from the Bologna Declaration of June 1999, which put 
in motion a series of reforms designed to make European higher education more 
compatible and competitive, modernizing the system, encouraging mobility within it, 
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18 For an extension of this argument to the vexed relation between African-American 
women critics and migrant scholars of Indian origin, an argument that attributes a 
version of this problem to contemporary postcolonial theory as practised by Spivak and 
Bhabha, see Namita Goswami, who asks: “What form of colonial-postcolonial—neo-
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does not avoid some problematic identity politics of its own, it does pose important 
questions about continuing hierarchies of valuation, assumptions about race and 
difference, and unconscious bias that plague even well-intentioned attempts to 
circumvent such systems. In thinking about the moment when postcolonial discourse 
entered the academy, she wonders why “an historical moment that could have created 
alliances caused segregation, competition, and exclusion” (2008, 85). To answer such 
a complex question is beyond her essay’s capacities. Its implication that somehow the 
(mostly migrant, in her view) practitioners of postcolonial critique might be exclusively 
responsible for such failure seems simplistic. Nonetheless, questions about complicity 
and unintended consequences must always be asked of any efforts to shift knowledge 
production toward ideals of “cognitive justice.”
19 See the volume I co-edited with William D. Coleman, Renegotiating Community: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Global Contexts (2008). My thinking has been advanced 
on this topic by reading Lynn Mario T. Menezes de Souza and Vanessa Andreotti, 
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Sciences”: “While we may have had social sciences for modernizing and emancipating 
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Earthlings” (2007, 3).
21 This literature is too extensive to cite in full, but see DePasquale, Eigenbrod, and 
LaRocque (2010) and Blaser, de Costa, McGregor, and Coleman (2010) for two recent 
contributions.
22 See Brydon and Coleman (2008) for an elaboration of this argument.
23 See also James Tully’s discussion of this problem and everything it overlooks and 
misrecognizes (2008, 265).
24 See Pinch (1999) for a similar argument.
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5
The Law of Non-contradiction 
Dialectic and the Possibility 
of Non-propositional Knowledge
R a p h a e l  F o s h a y
Disciplines have proliferated in the modern university as a natural and 
inevitable consequence of the inexorable extension—both macro- and 
microscopically, qualitatively and quantitatively—of the boundaries of 
knowledge: that is to say, as a consequence of the logic of inquiry and 
research themselves. What is this underlying logic of inquiry? Despite the 
unwieldy scope of such a question, it is curious to observe the ostensible 
unity that underwrites it, a unity provided by the central role of the Law 
of Non-contradiction (lnc) in the over twenty-five hundred years of its 
history. In his Metaphysics, Aristotle asserts the lnc to be so certain as to 
defy the need for rational defence. He nevertheless goes on to present a 
series of seven, at least according to some (Priest 2006a, 120), less-than-
convincing arguments. The curious dogmatic reign of the lnc has over-
seen the period in which the university and the disciplines have arisen. 
And in addition, the relatively recent emergence of serious challenges 
to the lnc in the past century is likewise the era in which the spread 
and range of the disciplines has begun to be countered with a pervasive 
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interest in and concern for their interrelation, giving rise to competing 
models of inter-, multi-, and transdisciplinarity and the proliferation on 
all campuses of interdisciplinary programs and research institutes. Such 
an obvious large-scale similarity of historical pattern between the logic 
of inquiry and the structure of disciplines seems too obvious or too vague 
to be of significance, and yet I will explore in this essay some of the roots 
of this pattern in the intellectual tradition and the reasons why I think it 
worthy of closer investigation and deeper reflection.
i
For Aristotle, the first principle of all inquiry is what came to be called the 
Law of Non-contradiction—that most simple of propositions to the effect 
that no contradiction can be true (Beall 2004, 2–3). As an incontrovertible 
principle, the lnc extends in its scope from the genus philosophy, with its 
primary study of being qua being, through the species of the sciences, with 
their focus on specific beings and aspects of being. The lnc is, as Aristotle 
(1984) claims in Book Γ of the Metaphysics, “the most certain principle of all 
. . . that regarding which it is impossible to be mistaken.” He continues:
Such a principle must be both the best known . . . and non-hypothetical. 
For a principle which everyone must have who knows anything about 
being, is not a hypothesis; and that which everyone must know who 
knows anything, he must already have when he comes to a special study. 
(1005b 11–17)
The lnc went largely unchallenged in the Western philosophical tradi-
tion for most of the ensuing two thousand years. It “formed a part of all 
articulated formal logics” and has “been a part of all logical theories” 
(Priest 2006b, 208), holding virtually unchallenged sway in Western 
thinking in all disciplines until the early twentieth century, with the 
exception of some strains of Neoplatonism and, closer to our own time, 
of Hegelianism. Even those like Jan Lukasiewicz, among the very few 
who have taken issue with his specific arguments in support of it, con-
clude that Aristotle was right to preach what he calls an “ultimate belief” 
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(1005b, 32) and what Lukasiewicz himself refers to as the “unassailable 
dogma” of the lnc (quoted in Beall 2004, 3). The canonical status of the 
lnc has imbued it with the force of a desire, in which dispassionate con-
viction and passionate investment are suspended in an unresolved ten-
sion. This internal residue of contradiction—an ambivalence reflected 
in the fact that the principle is referred to both affirmatively and nega-
tively, as the Law of Contradiction and the Law of Non-contradiction—
has given rise to the deep uneasiness in modernity regarding rationality, 
the Enlightenment, philosophical discourse, and their ambivalent rela-
tion to myth (Horkheimer and Adorno), ideology (Marx), the unconscious 
(Freud), and our prevailing understanding of language itself (Derrida). 
Since, as Aristotle emphasizes, the absence of contradictions is the very 
condition of possibility for knowledge, anyone who attacks such a foun-
dational provision threatens the underpinnings of rationality and know-
ability themselves. The most consistent opposing logic to that of the lnc, 
as Aristotle is particularly aware in relation to the Pre-Socratics and Plato, 
is the tradition of dialectical reasoning, with its legacy down to our own 
times of Neoplatonic and Hegelian attempts to find positive significance 
in contradictions, in their ability to push inquiry into speculative modes 
of exploration and reflection. Aristotle steered philosophy firmly onto the 
road of discursive and syllogistic sequentiality, setting it squarely against 
Pre-Socratic, Sophistic, and in some respects Platonic tolerances for con-
tradiction. Picking up the above passage, Aristotle continues:
Evidently then such a principle [as the lnc] is the most certain of all; 
which principle this is, we proceed to say. It is, that the same attribute 
cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject in 
the same respect; we must presuppose, in the face of dialectical objec-
tions, any further qualifications which might be added. This, then, is 
the most certain of all principles. . . . For it is impossible for anyone to 
believe the same thing to be and not to be, as some think Heraclitus 
says. . . . It is for this reason that all who are carrying out a demonstra-
tion refer it to this as an ultimate belief; for this is naturally the starting-
point even for all the other axioms. (1005b, 17–33)
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For both Plato and Aristotle, the Eleatic paradoxes like those of Zeno 
were continuous in their ambivalency and instability, with the promotion 
nearer to their own time of the Sophists’ pursuit of the political expedi-
ency of being able to argue with equal persuasiveness on either side of a 
question. Such deployment of dialectic in the service of the indetermi-
nacy of truth, so readily manipulable in the pursuit of personal gain and 
political influence, was a major provocation for Plato and for the Socrates 
of the Platonic dialogues, in their concern for an articulation of a form of 
truth that would underwrite a stable law and governance in the city and 
a stable virtue and sense of value and felicity in the internal polity of the 
individual citizen. As Socrates reminds his interlocutors at a concluding 
moment in Book x of the Republic: “Yes, for the struggle to be good rather 
than bad is important, Glaucon, much more important than people think. 
Therefore we mustn’t be tempted by honor, money, rule, or even poetry 
into neglecting justice and the rest of virtue” (Plato 1997, 608b, 3–6). The 
occurrence of poetry as the ultimate term of such a list of ethical, politi-
cal, and epistemological threats rings oddly in our twenty-first–century 
ears, so aesthetic has poetry become as a social or political force. Not so 
for Plato, for reasons that bear directly on the delineation of the lnc and 
therefore of philosophy as the discourse of truth and of science in the 
Western tradition. In its material role in the articulation of philosophy as 
primary discourse of reason, I make the very sweeping observation that 
the lnc has underwritten the manner in which the genus of rational dis-
course has distributed itself in the ever-increasing evolution of species of 
academic disciplines in this tradition; one could say that the lnc is a key 
material condition for the rational articulation of disciplines, insofar as 
they are rationally and not merely historically and empirically defended. 
I will attempt to give general observation a degree of specificity by locat-
ing the lnc in what Jean-Pierre Vernant (1988) refers to (in relation to 
Greek tragedy) as its historical moment, a moment which occurs first in 
the work of Plato, and specifically in the argument of the Republic, that 
most sustained and unified of Plato’s dialogues, one that a Plato scholar 
of our own time, Richard Kraut, has called with clear justification, “the 
centerpiece of Plato’s philosophy” (1992, 10).
The strictures against poetry that Plato has Socrates elicit in the 
Republic occupy the greater part of three of the ten books of the dialogue. 
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What I would like to illustrate here is that the sustained arguments 
against the ethical and political value of poetry in the Republic are cen-
trally implicated in the articulation in the dialogue of the lnc. Likewise, 
the hierarchy of discourses which Aristotle articulates, for instance in the 
Poetics, placing poetry in a mediate relation between philosophy and his-
tory, follows from Aristotle’s “faith” in the lnc. Such a hierarchy of dis-
courses has been the orthodoxy all through that historical phase in which 
the modern disciplines have articulated and organized into faculties. As 
Allan Bloom points out in his 1968 translation of the Republic, it is in a 
passage in Book iv in which we find what Bloom describes as “the earliest 
known explicit statement of the principle of contradiction—the premise 
of philosophy and the foundation of rational discourse” (1991, 457). The 
passage reads in the voice of Socrates:
It is obvious that the same thing will not be willing to do or to undergo 
opposites in the same part of itself, in relation to the same thing, at the 
same time. So, if we ever find this happening in the soul, we’ll know 
that we aren’t dealing with one thing but many. (436b)
Socrates arrives at this observation following the important discussion 
in Books ii and iii of the role of poetry and of Homer in particular in 
the youthful education of potential philosopher-rulers (on the role of 
poetry in Greek paideia see Havelock 1963), which is to say in the educa-
tion of anyone who is able to achieve through philosophy the unity of 
an undivided mind informed by an awakening to the form and principle 
of “the good.” For Socrates such a formation in philosophy and toward 
ideal leadership necessarily entails a revision of the poetic-mythic tradi-
tion with respect to the inconsistent, inconstant, and amoral image that 
it conveys regarding the gods. As Socrates says to Adeimantus in Book ii: 
“You and I . . . are not poets but we are founding a city. And it is appro-
priate for the founders to know the patterns on which poets must base 
their stories” (379a). The idea that philosophers, rather than the gods or 
muses, could or should dictate to poets the pattern for their portrayal 
of the gods shows how fundamental a departure from tradition occurs 
in Plato’s work (and how profoundly continuous and compatible are the 
Greek and later European Enlightenments). The pattern Socrates argues 
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for is the one articulated in the passage Bloom observes to be the first 
formal articulation of the lnc: namely, that “a god must always be rep-
resented as he is” and that a divine nature is always necessarily good 
and also unchangeably so, two principles that Socrates demonstrates, by 
quotations from Homer, Hesiod, and Aeschylus, to be consistently over-
thrown by the portraits given of the gods and their actions in the poetic 
tradition of Greece. Socrates goes on to quote a key passage from the 
final book of The Iliad, in which the narrator reflects on the sources of 
human destiny in the will of the gods: “There are two urns at the thresh-
old of Zeus,/One filled with good fates, the other with bad ones” (379d). 
Socrates’ comment on the passage is unequivocal: “We won’t accept from 
anyone the foolish mistake Homer makes about the gods” (379c–d). In 
the context of Books ii and iii, not only are youth too impressionable 
to be exposed to such views of the arbitrariness and instability of an 
apparently passive, divinely ordained destiny, but by Book x Homer is 
presented as the figurehead of the paideutic tradition, a tradition that is 
best characterized, Socrates argues, as tragic in a quite primary and per-
vasive sense, and which as such is capable of carrying even the strongest, 
best, and most mature minds into a mimetic identification with states 
of feeling that are emotionally conflicted, contradictory, and inherently 
unable to sustain a hold on the unchanging qualities of truths that, in the 
argument of the Republic, find their ground and origin in the unitive Form 
of the Good. In the concluding argument for the exclusion of the poets 
from the ideal polis in Book x, Homer is cast as figurehead for the whole 
prior tradition of Greece, leading up to and making necessary the central 
argument of the Republic itself for the primacy of philosophical thought 
and understanding (Books vi and vii in particular). In Book x, Socrates 
admonishes his interlocutors thus:
And so, Glaucon, when you happen to meet those who praise Homer 
and say he’s the poet who educated Greece, that it’s worth taking up his 
works in order to learn how to manage and educate people, and that 
one should arrange one’s whole life in accordance with his teachings, 
you should welcome these people and treat them as friends, since 
they’re as good as they’re capable of being, and you should agree that 
Homer is the most poetic of the tragedians and the first among them. 
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But you should know that hymns to the gods and eulogies to good 
people are the only poetry we can admit into our city. If you admit the 
pleasure-giving Muse, whether in lyric or epic poetry, pleasure and 
pain will be kings in your city instead of law or the thing everyone has 
always believed to be best, namely, reason. (606e–607a)
The kind of dialectical instability Aristotle attributes to Heraclitean prin-
ciples of change and the coincidence of opposites, and to Pre-Socratic dia-
lectical thinking generally, Plato finds to govern the whole of the poetic 
tradition, presided over by a Homer who is the “first” and “most poetic” 
of the tragedians. The generic distinctions between lyric, epic, and dra-
matic are set aside here by Socrates in favour of a notion of tragedy that 
characterizes the heroic and mythic phase of Greek culture that in some 
way culminates in the generation before Plato with the tragic poets. He 
finds there a contradictory and fundamentally unstable and destabilizing 
image of truth, divided within and against itself, and therefore unable to 
provide a pattern for understanding, for justice, or for virtue. As Vernant 
(1988) poses the question regarding the historical moment of Greek trag-
edy proper: “[Tragedy] is born, flourishes, and degenerates in Athens, 
and all within the space of a hundred years. Why? It is not enough to note 
that tragedy is an expression of a torn consciousness, an awareness of 
the contradictions that divide [human beings] against [themselves]. We 
must seek to discover on what levels, in Greece, these tragic oppositions 
lie, of what they are composed and in what conditions they emerged” 
(25). For Vernant, the root of the conflict is the gap between a dying 
mythic and heroic tradition and an emerging social and political commit-
ment to the rule of a law. In relation to what Vernant calls “the historical 
moment of tragedy,” such a gap between dying and dawning traditions 
is clearly visible and yet “narrow enough for the conflict in values still to 
be a painful one.” “The tragic consciousness of responsibility,” he says, 
“appears when the human and divine levels are sufficiently distinct for 
them to be opposed while still appearing to be inseparable” (1988, 27). 
The historical moment of tragedy for Vernant, in being defined by this 
living stage of an emerging and still painful tension between divinely and 
humanly attributed interpretations of human agency and responsibility, 
is followed immediately by the Athens of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. 
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In the Republic Plato has Socrates conduct a sustained argument against 
a poetic tradition steeped in what he argues is a destabilizing agonistic 
conflict between sacred and secular world views, an argument which by 
the end of the dialogue issues in a still uneasy and nervous rejection of 
the poets and the long tradition for which they stand. The poets and their 
defenders, Socrates recommends, should be offered a chance to argue for 
why they should be allowed to remain in the city. “But,” says Socrates, 
“if it isn’t able to produce such a defense, then, whenever we listen to it, 
we’ll repeat the argument we have just now put forward like an incanta-
tion so as to preserve ourselves from slipping back into that childish pas-
sion for poetry that most people have” (607e). The clear insistence on the 
sole criterion of reasoned argumentation is mixed with a perhaps con-
sciously ironic recognition that the poetic resources of incantation must 
still be invoked against a passionate, less than rational love for an out-
grown tradition. Turning the incantatory resources of the religio-poetic 
tradition against it, Socrates affirms that lovers of reason “are well aware 
of the charm [poetry and all it stands for] exercises. But, be that as it may, 
to betray what one believes to be the truth is impious” (607c). This strong 
affirmation of belief in reason is echoed in Aristotle’s promotion of the 
lnc, and surfaces again, as already mentioned, in the uneasiness within 
modernity of the relation between reason and its others.
i i
The characteristic difference between Plato and Aristotle in relation to the 
lnc is apparent in the use to which each puts it and in particular the role 
each gives to dialectic in relation to it. Plato’s view is economically config-
ured in the analogy of the line that forms the concluding argument to Book 
vi of the Republic, preparing as it does for the allegory of the cave, which 
forms the opening passage of Book vii. Socrates resorts to the analogy 
as a means to visually sum up and configure his accumulating argument 
regarding the graded types of knowing, constituted by understanding, 
thought, belief, and opinion. Including the analogy between the Republic 
and the soul around which the whole of the dialogue is organized, the 
analogy of the line is one of four great allegorical figures in the Republic, 
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along with the allegory of the cave and the Myth of Er. The role of images, 
similes, analogies, allegories, and myths in Plato’s thinking is a highly 
self-conscious and deliberate one; it occupies a central position in the 
Republic with regard to issues of mimesis and the relation between image 
and original, and is accented in a jocular exchange earlier in Book vi just 
prior to Socrates’ explication of the analogy of the line. To the question 
of how it is that, given the apparent general derision in which philoso-
phers are held in contemporary Athens, Socrates can argue that the ideal 
city should be ruled by philosophers, Socrates responds: “The question 
you ask must be answered by means of an image or a simile” (487e). This 
receives an ironical reception from Adeimantus that has Socrates freely 
admit to how “greedy” he is for images (488a). In the light of the persis-
tent argument in the dialogue against the poets as mimetic artists, such 
an admission has a very pointed resonance and indeed bears on the vital 
question of the mimetic, imagistic character of the dialogue form itself 
as a mode of philosophical writing and on Plato’s systematic use of and 
rationale for it.
My concern with the analogy of the line and of its relevance to the 
question of dialectic and contradiction in relation to the lnc will focus on 
the role images play in the key difference the analogy configures between 
rational thought and dialectical understanding (dianoia and noesis). In 
Book vii, Socrates speaks at some length about what he terms “summon-
ers.” Summoners are the kind of contradictory perceptions that, like a 
stick in water, in appearing to possess two directly opposing qualities at 
the same time, summon thought to reach beyond sensible appearances 
to intelligible relations. In the analogy of the line, the line is divided first 
between sensible and intelligible forms of knowing, and then again into 
two forms of each: opinion and belief as sensible forms of knowing and 
thought and understanding as intelligible forms. At the intelligible level 
Socrates cites geometry as an example of the difference between thought 
and true understanding. Geometers, Socrates says, are interested only in 
the functionality of their axioms rather than their theoretical import. As 
he explains, geometers “make their claims for the sake of the square itself 
and the diagonal itself, not the diagonal they draw . . . they now in turn 
use images, in seeking to see those others themselves that one cannot see 
except by means of thought” (510d–e). That is to say, geometers exploit the 
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difference between the sensible and the intelligible without responding to 
the difference, even opposition, that persists between them; they ignore 
their dependence on the imperfect sensible image they draw in order to 
illustrate the ideal intelligible form about which they hypothesize.
Because they are not concerned with such a contradiction—it does not 
intrude on geometrical calculation—geometers do not find in it a sum-
moning to that inquiry which Socrates terms dialectic and which draws 
the inquirer from hypothesis to the principles which geometers, and all 
those concerned with knowledge as distinct from opinion, must neces-
sarily assume. Such a further level of inquiry forms, as it were, the truly 
intelligible relation to the intelligible realm, constituted, as Socrates 
speculates, by the principles that he here calls “forms,” which themselves 
find their principle in the Form of the Good. Without engaging the fraught 
question of the Platonic forms, our interest here is in the differentiation 
Socrates establishes between a use of hypotheses which ignores contra-
dictions in favour of useful applications and one that finds in contradic-
tions a summons to the further and more properly philosophical level of 
inquiry Socrates terms “dialectic.” It is a use of the notion of contradiction 
and dialectic quite unlike that which both Plato and Aristotle find so prob-
lematic and inadequate in the Eleatics, the Sophists, and the tragic poets. 
Socrates explains the difference between the two forms of the intelligible—
the philosophical and the mathematical use of hypotheses—which are con-
figured in the analogy of the line as the difference between understanding 
and thought: “Then also understand,” says Socrates, “that, by the other 
subsection of the intelligible, I mean that which reason itself grasps by the 
power of the dialectic. It does not consider these hypotheses [such as geo-
metrical axioms] as first principles but truly as hypotheses— . . . as step-
ping stones to take off from, enabling it to reach the unhypothetical first 
principle of everything” (513b).
The analogy of the line plays a key role in the overall argument of the 
Republic regarding the nature of our relationship to the founding prin-
ciple of the good and its expression in personal, social, and political life: 
that is to say, to the nature of justice. It follows directly on that central 
treatment in the dialogue of the sublime nature of the good as such, a pas-
sage indistinguishably ethical, epistemological, and ontological:
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When [the soul] focuses on something illuminated by truth and what 
is, it understands, knows, and apparently possesses understanding, 
but when it focuses on what is mixed with obscurity, on what comes to 
be and passes away, it opines and is dimmed, changes its opinions this 
way and that, and seems bereft of understanding.
So that what gives truth to the things known and the power to know 
to the knower is the form of the good. And though it is the cause of 
knowledge and truth, it is also an object of knowledge. (508d–e)
The nature and character of knowledge, in other words, is derived from 
the nature of its source in that stable principle of principles, or rather 
principle beyond principles, which is the good: “Therefore, you should 
also say that not only do the objects of knowledge owe their own being 
known to the good, but their being is also due to it, although the good is 
not being, but superior to it in rank and power” (509b; emphasis mine). 
Thus, in the analogy of the line, hypotheses are not considered “as first 
principles” but rather “as stepping stones to reach the unhypothetical 
first principle of everything” (511b), which is the good. Hypotheses and 
their propositions are both necessary in the dialectical process and insuf-
ficient in themselves. As Francisco Gonzales puts it: “Even once we have 
gained access to a truth that transcends the hypotheses, we must never-
theless return to them in our discourse and in our further inquiry’” (1998, 
240). This contradiction at the heart of inquiry itself is, thus, for Plato 
motivated by that which is ultimately necessary to knowledge and which 
is by its very nature beyond the realm of determinate, propositional, 
subject-object, and subject-predicate logical and linguistic determina-
tions. That is to say, it is beyond them but is reached by means of them 
and must be expressed within their constraining and, with respect to the 
demands of knowledge as distinct from belief, necessarily contradictory 
relations. It is thus for Plato reasonable and necessary that reason know 
and understand its relation to that from which it draws its rationale.
In Socrates’ distinction between thought and understanding, 
between hypothesis taken as authoritative principle and hypothesis 
taken as summons to further inquiry, we find two applications of the law 
of non-contradiction that are broadly Aristotelian and Platonic respec-
tively. Aristotle’s insistence that the lnc is non-hypothetical follows 
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from apparent rational necessity, that it is unreasonable that it could be 
inconsistent with itself. Plato, on the other hand, has Socrates take very 
pointed interest in the opportunity presented by some kinds of contradic-
tion to push inquiry further. Without making too much of this analogy 
between Plato’s and Aristotle’s attitudes to contradiction and hypothesis, 
I would suggest that the relatively unchallenged status of Aristotle’s pro-
motion of the lnc into a long-time shibboleth of Western epistemology is 
reflected in our greater concern with proof and demonstration than with 
the dynamism of inquiry represented by the body of work of his teacher, 
Plato, the first philosopher of this tradition: the centuries of debate over 
proofs for the existence of God is certainly symptomatic of such aspira-
tion to rational demonstration of what for Plato lies beyond the realm of 
beings susceptible to propositional definition. As Graham Priest views it:
It is fair to say that, at least since the Middle Ages, Aristotle’s views 
concerning contradiction have been orthodoxy. (This is so obvious, 
that it is hardly worth documenting.) They are taken for granted so 
much that, as far as I know, there is no sustained defence of the lnc 
in Western philosophy other than Aristotle’s. Why? I really don’t know. 
It is certainly not because of the rational persuasiveness of Aristotle’s 
arguments. I suspect (unhappily) that the view was accepted simply on 
the basis of the magisterial authority of Aristotle’s texts in the Middle 
Ages. In general, that authority disappeared long ago, of course. In 
logic it hung on till the twentieth century; most of it there has been 
swept out since then, but the views about contradiction have hung on 
doggedly. (2006a, 121)
The dialogical and dialectical expression of his thought is deliberately 
chosen by Plato for philosophical reasons, reasons that Gonzalez (1998) 
styles Plato’s philosophical mimesis (see his chapter 5 on the Republic, 
entitled “Philosophical Imitation”). The preoccupation with literary and 
generally aesthetic questions in the Republic has a very specific pur-
pose for Plato in distinguishing what is the crucial, but decidedly subtle 
and—most importantly for my purposes here—contradictory relationship 
between literary and philosophical forms of mimesis: both draw on images 
to represent their meaning, but like geometry, poetry does not inquire into 
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those apparent contradictions that arise in its process of giving linguistic 
and imagistic expression to its representations: contradictions, to use an 
example of Plato’s, such as the flagrantly immoral behaviour of the gods 
by which we as human beings are supposed to measure and interpret our 
own existence. Instead of finding in such contradictions a summons to 
dialectical inquiry into the perplexity and ambiguity of our conception 
of the gods and of what we mean by morality, poetry, Plato argues, draws 
us into passionate identification with rather than a querying of the ele-
ments of such a relationship and of such moral imperatives. It is dialec-
tical inquiry that we need, not passionate identification, argues Plato, 
dramatizing such inquiry in his peculiarly undramatic dialogues, texts 
that must be read and pondered and would offer little satisfaction were 
they performed on a stage.
ii i
If there is, as Vernant (1988) suggests, a historical moment of high Greek 
tragedy that flourished in Athens in the fifth century bce, it might be per-
tinent to see in the currently pervasive concern with interdisciplinarity a 
historical moment of a certain exhaustion of autonomous disciplines, a 
moment marked by a globalizing and converging experience that makes it 
palpably necessary for us to think in more highly integrative terms regard-
ing the aggravated challenges that a historic disciplinary atomism has 
generated. By similar extension, there could be argued to be, in the gen-
eration following tragedy, a historical moment of philosophy that is viv-
idly instanced in the articulation of the lnc by both Plato and Aristotle. 
However, it could just as well be observed that, insofar as we are still and 
perhaps more explicitly than ever occupied with the question of what con-
stitutes and characterizes rational inquiry as such, there is no historical 
moment, or rather that we are in the orbit of an overall condition that 
is history as such, a condition that is at least not without structure, one 
marked quite definitively by Plato, and that receives a determining, and 
arguably a narrowing, in Aristotle, a structure with whose entelechy we 
have been ourselves historically, rationally, and dialectically engaged. 
There is an inherent circularity in our relation to the logic of inquiry, our 
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inquiry into inquiry, which, as Heidegger observes, we must resist seeing 
as a circulus vitiosus:
But even in the opinion of the historian himself, it would admittedly be 
more ideal if the circle could be avoided and if there remained the hope 
of creating some time a historiology which would be as independent of 
the standpoint of the observer as our knowledge of Nature is supposed to 
be. But if we see this circle as a vicious one and look out for ways of avoid-
ing it, even if we just ‘sense’ it as an inevitable imperfection, then the act of 
understanding has been misunderstood from the ground up. . . . What is 
decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way. 
(1962 , 194–95)
With Plato, Heidegger argues that a “definitive ideal of knowledge” (more 
geometrico, as with the lnc) is “not the issue.” Rather: “Such an ideal 
is itself only a subspecies of the understanding—a subspecies which 
has strayed into the legitimate task of grasping the present-at-hand in 
its essential unintelligibility” (194). An intelligible unintelligibility that 
is not a vicious circle . . . this is the very non-ideal ideal that has to be 
kept in mind in thinking through the challenges of interdisciplinarity. 
An attempt to rationalize the interdisciplines with a traditional applica-
tion of the principle of non-contradiction will founder and distort rather 
than engage the full complexity of the question of knowledge and its 
languages.
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and the Terministic Screens of Definition
J u l I e  t h o M p s o n  K l e I n
Inter-disciplinarity is problematised, as it abounds and proliferates.
Richard Marsden, “Aphorisms on Disciplines”
Richard Marsden’s aphorism is a fitting epigraph for an essay on the scope 
of interdisciplinarity.1 It frames the debate on the meaning of a concept 
that proliferated over the course of the twentieth century. As the concept 
proliferated, its practice pluralized. To echo another conference partici-
pant, Harvey Graff, interdisciplinarity now varies by field, time, place, 
relationships, and circumstances. Inevitably, too, differing claims arose. 
Graff called the spectrum “wide but not straight,” and fellow participant 
Ian Angus argued that definitions are cogently related to an individual’s 
position, current institutional priorities, and possibilities for alternative 
forms of knowledge production. Some participants treated interdiscipli-
narity as an epistemological question, while others focused on institu-
tional structure. Some focused on pedagogy, while others highlighted the 
situated practices of new fields, Theory, and “non-academic” knowledge. 
This essay addresses the task of defining interdisciplinarity in two ways. 
Part I begins with an overview of key developments in the humanities, 
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then turns to the ways they have been remaking the subject, the object, 
and scholarship within three disciplines—literary studies, art history, 
and music studies. Part ii analyzes the rhetorical boundary work of spe-
cialized terminology in taxonomic classification, then turns to current 
heightened interest in transdisciplinarity.
the changing huManities
When the modern disciplines formed in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the term “humanities” designated a range of culture-
based studies, including literature, philosophy, art history, and often gen-
eral history (Veysey 1979, 58, 64). Although interdisciplinarity was not yet 
a recognized movement, the historical warrants in the humanities were 
the generalist model of culture, a synoptic view of subjects, and interart 
comparison within synchronic eras. Period style was the most powerful 
basis of relationship, grounded in common motifs, themes, and genres 
within a particular era. Historical empiricism and positivist philology 
dominated the scholarly practices of the new disciplinary specialists. 
However, over the course of the twentieth century increasing attention 
was paid to the social contexts of aesthetic works and the responses of 
readers, viewers, and listeners. The concept of culture expanded from an 
aesthetic focus on elite forms to a broader anthropological notion, and 
once discrete objects were reimagined as forces that circulate in a net-
work of forms and actions. New theoretical and critical approaches also 
emerged. The importation of European philosophy and new literary theo-
ries began in the 1950s, with existentialism and phenomenology. In the 
1960s, the impact of the Saussurean theory of language gave rise to struc-
turalist influences across the humanities and social sciences, including 
the anthropology of Lévi-Strauss, the psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan, 
the Marxist theory of Althusser, and the philosophical-literary movement 
of deconstruction of Jacques Derrida. All made significant inroads into 
North American academies. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, interest 
in feminism and semiotics widened and, further into the 1980s, a number 
of practices lumped under the label “poststructuralism.” In addition to 
deconstruction, feminism, and Lacanian analysis, they included a form 
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of French post-structuralist theory, new historicism, Foucauldian-style 
studies of knowledge and power, and cultural and postcolonial critique. 
By the 1990s, many discourses were also positioning themselves under 
the rubric “multiculturalism” (Bender 1997b, 43–45; Bender and Schorske 
1997, 9; Kellner 1995, 20–24; Klein 2005, 34–54).
The changes associated with these developments have been described 
in many ways. Thomas Bender grouped a number of trends in the human-
ities and social sciences under the label “cultural turn.” Together they 
fostered a wider and more critical perspective on the study of culture 
(Bender 1997b, 41–42). The changes have also been stylized as historical, 
sociological, and political “turns.” The historical turn that occurred in the 
late twentieth century stood in stark contrast to disciplinary relations at 
mid-century. In the 1950s, the cutting of ties with history was so wide-
spread that Carl Schorske (1997) called it a generalized paradigm shift in 
academic culture. Social scientists turned to behaviourism and natural-
scientific modes, while humanists turned to self-referential formalistic 
criticism. During the 1960s and 1970s, a variety of “new histories” opened 
new space for interdisciplinary contextualizations.
Peter Burke (1991) identified six points of comparison between the Old 
and the New within the discipline of history and its uses in other disci-
plines and fields. Four are particularly relevant to the changing relation-
ships of the humanities and social sciences. The first distinction lies in 
subject and object. The traditional paradigm of historical study accentu-
ated politics of the state in national and international contexts. The new 
history embraced virtually all human activities. The second distinction 
is method and approach. The traditional paradigm privileged narration 
of events while focusing on regimes and administrations, legislation and 
politics, diplomacy and foreign policy, wars and revolutions. Today’s 
practices tend to be analytic and thematic, and some of the most influ-
ential new work is emanating from efforts to recast intellectual history 
as cultural history. The third distinction lies in the difference between 
the traditional “history from above” and the new “history from below,” 
taking into account the everyday experience of ordinary people. The 
fourth distinction follows from the third. Instead of prioritizing archival 
documents, records, and treatises, new scholarship draws on a greater 
variety of evidence, using statistics, oral history, visual images, material 
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culture, sociological models, and psychological theories. Official records 
are also being read in new ways.
The re-engagement with sociology and politics differed. It was linked 
more closely to the 1960s and 1970s, especially new social movements 
that challenged established forms of society and culture, produced coun-
tercultures, and stimulated interest in all social classes. Douglas Kellner 
cautions, though, that renewal of social and political interests was more 
than simple nostalgia. The new subfield of social history fostered greater 
space for popular histories and popular culture in multiple disciplines 
and fields. The momentum created by postmodern discourses in the 1970s 
and 1980s also reinvigorated sociological and political scholarship. In 
addition, the problems of the contemporary world and new technological 
and economic systems called for new theoretical and political modes of 
understanding linked with struggles for human rights, the civil liberties 
of oppressed people, peace and justice, ecology, and the search for a more 
humane organization of society on a global scale (Kellner 1995, 1, 17, 19). 
Rick Szostak remarked during the symposium in Edmonton that interdis-
ciplinary humanists are more likely to focus on theory than on a problem 
or issue more typical of interdisciplinarity in the social sciences. Yet prob-
lem- and issue-focus heightened as a result of the historical, social, and 
political turns, fostering greater interest in contexts framed by questions 
of cause and effect, motive, social structure, and power and authority.
For their part, social scientists looked increasingly toward the human-
ities. In 1980, anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1980) called attention to 
a shift within intellectual life in general and within the social sciences 
in particular. The model of physical sciences and a laws-and-instances 
ideal of explanation, Geertz contended, was being supplanted by a case-
and-interpretation model and symbolic form analogies. Social scientists 
were increasingly representing society as a game, a drama, a discourse, 
or a text, rather than a machine or a quasi-organism, and they were bor-
rowing methods of speech-act analysis, discourse models, and cognitive 
aesthetics. This shift crossed the traditional boundary of explanation 
and interpretation, replacing former keywords of “cause,” “variable,” 
“force,” or “function” with a new vocabulary of “rules,” “representation,” 
“attitude,” and “intention.” They began talking of ‘“actors,” “scenes,” 
“plots,” “performance,” and “personae.” Not all social scientists took the 
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turn that Geertz described. All the same, the stress on empirical research 
and logical positivism of the 1950s and 1960s eased, giving way to a grow-
ing interest in how people make and communicate meaning. Increasing 
frustration with methodological purism and naïve empiricism, coupled 
with critical debates on methodology, also encouraged a “third method-
ological movement.” Mixed methods draw from both quantitative and 
qualitative traditions, combining them in unique ways to solve practical 
research problems and to answer research questions (Tashakkori and 
Teddlie 2003).
Humanists responded to new developments by moving in two direc-
tions. Some, Bender recalls, expanded the domain of the humanities. 
Others assumed an increasingly defensive posture. A new ideology also 
emerged in forms of cultural studies aligned with the vision of a postdis-
ciplinary academy. The postmodern hope of greater cosmopolitanism is 
belied by increased fractionality, and discipline-based departments con-
tinue to be the dominant organizational unit of the academy. Yet they no 
longer clearly or fully represent the intellectual work carried out within 
traditional structures. Moreover, “culture” is no longer the sole province 
of language departments and disciplines such as history and literature. 
Traditionally, the study of less familiar cultures was located in area stud-
ies, international relations, and anthropology. Today, more interactive 
definitions of culture and cultural relationships are appearing across the 
humanities and social sciences. Moreover, exclusive control of culture as 
it relates to mass communications, social issues, the family, and the cul-
tural text is being challenged (Bender 1997a, 3; 1997b, 35, 44–47).
The cumulative effect of new developments also fostered the notion 
that interdisciplinarity is increasingly important to the conduct of 
humanistic inquiry. This notion was affirmed by the president of the 
American Council of Learned Societies, an umbrella organization in the 
United States for professional groups representing both the humanities 
and social sciences. Stanley Katz (1996) highlighted two mounting pres-
sures on academic organizations: the weakening of disciplinary bound-
aries and the emergence of new organizational structures of knowledge. 
Since the mid-1960s, this twofold pressure has led to the creation of new 
fields such as African-American studies, women’s studies, and ethnic 
studies. Such fields marked the possibility of a more flexible design with 
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the potential to transform the paradigm of the disciplinary department. 
The radicalism of the 1960s, alternative definitions of culture and politics, 
and challenges to the existing structure of higher education also encour-
aged methodological creativity and experiments with new approaches. 
Many academics today, Katz found, are by inclination or training “multi-
,” “inter-,” or “non-”disciplinary. Not surprisingly, then, changes took 
root within disciplines.
Subject, Object, and Scholarship
As new developments took root, the nature of the subject, the object, and 
scholarly practices changed. In literary studies, Richard Ohmann recalls, 
the success of Theory justified including “literally everything” from film, 
romances, and hip-hop to museums and sexuality. The canon also broad-
ened as greater attention was paid to national literature beyond the his-
torical foundation of British literature (e.g., American and Canadian) 
and works by once-excluded groups (e.g., women, African-Americans, 
Latinos). Echoing the pattern in the discipline of history, interest in 
popular culture also eroded the traditional boundaries of “high” and 
“low” forms of cultural expression, and new media became the focus of 
increased research and teaching (2002, 216–18). Reflecting on expansion 
of the discipline’s objects of study and subject field, John Carlos Rowe 
concluded: “Literature as it was can’t be saved.” It now encompasses 
older texts and “extraliterary” materials such as letters, diaries, films, 
paintings, manifestos, and philosophical, political, psychological, reli-
gious, and medical treatises (1992, 204).
Scholarship changed in turn. From roughly 1860 to 1915, philology 
and literary history were the dominant practices. The new disciplinary 
science of literary study emphasized editing and annotating texts; com-
piling bibliographies, dictionaries, and concordances; conducting source 
and etymology studies; discovering facts; and writing biographies and 
literary and intellectual histories (Miller 1991, 119–20). In the 1930s and 
1940s, criticism became the dominant practice, though it was not a mono-
lithic one. One strain, led by the New Critics, emphasized aesthetic for-
malism in close readings of poems treated as organically unified objects. 
The other, led by the Chicago Critics, emphasized theory and argued for a 
pluralist approach and humanist moralism focusing on the qualities that 
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literature shares with philosophy, ethics, and general ideas (Leitch 1998, 
62; Shumway and Dionne 2002a, 8–9; Graff 1987, 148). By 1981, when the 
Modern Language Association’s authoritative Introduction to Scholarship 
in Modern Languages and Literatures appeared, both of the trends noted 
in the opening account of new developments were apparent: one moving 
toward the speculative and abstruse world usually dubbed “Theory,” 
and the other toward the complex relationship between scholarship 
and the “real world.” The 1992 update introduced a new category, Cross-
Disciplinary and Cultural Studies, with separate sections on interdisci-
plinary, feminist and gender, ethnic and minority, border, and cultural 
studies (Gibaldi 1992). The category did not appear in the 2007 update, but 
gender, sexuality, race, and migrations are now treated as interdisciplin-
ary “topics” within the discipline (Nicholls 2007).
New developments compound the task of mapping interdisciplinary 
studies. Giles Gunn identified four approaches in literary studies. The 
traditional critical coordinates are author, reader, material or linguistic 
components of a text, and the world. The map changes depending on 
which coordinate is the axis. If text is the axis, a number of developments 
appear, including structuralist, formalist, and generic interests; herme-
neutics, or interpretation theory; and certain forms of Marxist criticism. 
If reader, others appear, such as audience-oriented criticism. The most 
conventional strategy of mapping is tracing the relationship of one dis-
cipline to another. Mapping literature and anthropology, for instance, 
reveals practices of structuralism, ethnography, or “thick description,” 
folklore and folklife studies, and myth criticism. Mapping literature and 
politics reveals sociological criticism, cultural studies, ideological criti-
cism, materialist studies. The map changes, however, when asking a 
different question. What new subjects and topics have emerged? Other 
examples appear, including materialism of the body, psychoanalysis of 
the reader, the sociology of conventions, and the ideology of gender, race, 
and class. The final and most difficult approach is rarely acknowledged. 
Correlate fields such as anthropology, philosophy, religious studies, and 
psychology have changed. “The threading of disciplinary principles and 
procedures,” Gunn concluded, “is frequently doubled, tripled, and qua-
drupled in ways that are not only mixed but, from a conventional disci-
plinary perspective, somewhat off center.” They do not develop in a linear 
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fashion, nor are they traceable in all their effects. They are characterized 
by overlapping, underlayered, interlaced, crosshatched affiliations, colla-
tions, and alliances that have ill-understood and unpredictable feedbacks 
(1992a, 248–49).
The object, the subject, and scholarship also changed in art history. 
New stylistic movements such as pure form, colour field painting, and 
minimal art had little in common visually with earlier traditions. The 
canon of art expanded to include the works of women and different cul-
tural groups. The boundary between high and low or popular art eroded, 
legitimating the artistry of once-excluded objects such as furniture and 
quilts, cartoons and graffiti, commercial illustrations, and tattooing. The 
repertoire of works expanded on a global scale with large exhibits on 
Chinese painting and excavations, African art, and the art of the Mamluks 
and the Mughals. And new hybrid genres emerged. Performance art com-
bined music, visual art, literary expression, and theatrical performance 
(Kraft 1989, 64–65). Interart forms crafted from new media and digital 
technology also began appearing, and multi-genre forms emanated from 
cultural movements for identity and equality, such as the Black Arts 
movement and the Chicano Performing and Graphic Arts.
Scholarship changed in kind. During the late 1980s, historical empiri-
cism and traditional-style analysis dominated the mainstream, but talk of 
“new art history” grew. Selma Kraft identified two general directions of 
change. One—from the social sciences—accentuated production and use, 
focusing on political, cultural, social, and economic conditions under 
which art is made and on subjects such as patronage, the art public, and 
workshop practices. The other—closer to the humanities—drew on criti-
cal, semiotic, and deconstructionist approaches, especially from literary 
theory and philosophy. The new art history critiqued assumptions about 
self-evident meaning and uniformities of interpretation that ignore differ-
ences of ethnicity, race, gender, and class. Scholars also began treating 
artworks as texts and structures of signification whose meaning depends 
on the interpretation that is applied. They weighed the relative merits of 
disciplinary methods and protocols, examined origins of the discipline, 
and explored processes of professionalization. They expanded the disci-
pline’s relationship with art criticism, aesthetic philosophy, markets, exhi-
bitions, and museology. They used insights from Marxism to understand 
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social and economic determinations. They imported explanations of 
repressed instincts from psychoanalysis, power relationships from politi-
cal theory, institutions from sociology, and structures from anthropology 
(Kraft 1989, 65–66). The new art history is not focused solely on the pres-
ent. Scholars are returning to earlier periods to understand, for instance, 
paleolithic imagery and marking and palimpsesting through the lens of 
alternative critical approaches. They are also bringing new insights to 
bear on iconography, attribution of works, and genre definition (Preziosi 
1989, 155).
New developments also made inroads within the discipline of music, 
though more slowly. Arnold Schoenberg’s first non-triadic, non-tonal 
compositions in 1907 were a symbolic turning point. Schoenberg’s twelve-
tone system was the starting point for contemporary avant-garde com-
positional theory (Kerman 1985, 69). Over the course of the century, the 
nature of “music” continued to change. Artists such as John Cage sought 
a unique sound corpus for each composition and allowed the indeter-
minacy of chance and randomness to determine musical materials and 
order. Noise, and even silence, gained a place in the definition of music. 
In the 1960s, borrowing also became a major compositional practice, ini-
tially in quotations of established Western tonal forms, then early histori-
cal styles and popular, folk, and non-Western music. New hybrid genres 
such as performance art further challenged the traditional boundaries 
of discipline, and orchestras and opera houses began to combine recent 
and older music and to play secondary composers. The current pluralism, 
Robert Morgan concluded, has rendered music a “melange of conflicting 
subcultures” that interact in complex ways, challenging the notion of a 
dominant musical mainstream (1992, 57).
Scholarship expanded in kind. Initially, Levy and Tischler (1990) 
recall, aesthetic and antiquarian interests dominated. Three approaches 
prevailed well into the twentieth century: biographies, sentimental local 
studies, and compendia of music groups, performers, and institutions. 
Concert or art traditions were privileged, though some early composers 
drew on vernacular sources. Over time, music histories broadened to 
include historical and cultural contexts, the social and political role of 
music, popular genres, women and other cultural groups, and oral and 
regional traditions. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, empirically grounded 
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facts and historicism were prioritized (Shepherd 1991, 190). New scholar-
ship redefined meaning as an interplay of musical texts, cultural contexts, 
dynamics of performance, and the experience of listeners. Marxists cri-
tiqued essentialist binaries, especially separations of serious and popular 
music and the individual and the social. Poststructuralist criticism linked 
notions of truth with systems of power, interrogating the master narra-
tive of tonality. Postmodernist critique of global universalizing stimulated 
interest in local, everyday, variable, and contingent aspects of music 
making. Deconstructive analysis unveiled operations of power related 
to gender, race, and class. Feminist, gay, lesbian, and Black scholars 
uncovered the history of lesser-known composers. Heightened interest in 
popular and folk cultures also stimulated studies of contemporary genres, 
communication-centred folklorists began examining the social organiza-
tion of community music making, and musicologists borrowed ethnomu-
sicological methods and fieldwork techniques from anthropology to study 
the distant past (Allen 2001, 185; for fuller accounts of the changes in this 
section, see Klein 2005, 83–150).
Discipline and Method
Inevitably, fears about disciplinary purity arose. Disciplinarity is defined 
in various ways: as a subject matter, a system of control, and a process 
of knowledge production. Likewise, its relationship with interdisciplinar-
ity is defined differently: as a corrective or counterforce and as a comple-
mentary partner in the process of knowledge production. In his opening 
keynote address at the symposium in Edmonton, Martin Jay treated disci-
plines as “relational networks,” highlighting their dynamic properties in 
the larger force field of knowledge formations. The metaphors of “force 
field” and “network” acknowledge the boundary work of claims making 
while calling attention to the porosity of boundaries that shift, fracture, 
dissolve, and reformulate. Speaking from the vantage point of art history, 
Donald Preziosi observed that disciplinarians also position themselves 
differently: as interventionists working from outside traditional disci-
plines, as integrationists striving to create a larger field, and as agents of 
a critical return to an original conceptual foundation. The salient issues 
in debates on the discipline hinge in no small part on boundaries and the 
proper domain or object of study (1989, xiii, 2, 7, 18, 157–58).
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In literary studies, opponents of change revalidated the Renaissance 
ideal of literae humaniores, rejected the arcane language of Theory, and 
resisted the distractions of politics. In art history, the tension between tra-
ditional connoisseurship and a new social history of art reinvigorated ear-
lier debate on the ground of an expanding canon and critical approaches, 
amplified by tensions between modernist and poststructuralist semi-
ologies. In music, a similar debate on intrinsic versus extrinsic meaning 
gained momentum, driven by the expanding plurality of objects, greater 
attention to contexts of aesthetic production and reception, and widen-
ing interest in ethnomethodology and popular culture. Inevitably, too, 
talk of a “new interdisciplinarity” arose in the humanities. E. Ann Kaplan 
and George Levine aligned it directly with increased recognition of the 
arbitrary nature of disciplinary boundaries (1997, 3–4). In a widely cited 
polemic, though, Stanley Fish (1985) challenged the underlying logic of 
new interdisciplinarity. As an agenda, interdisciplinarity seems to flow 
naturally from the imperatives of left culturalist theory. Yet, Fish argued, 
any strategy that calls into question the foundations of disciplines theo-
retically negates itself if it becomes institutionalized.
Others weighed in when the Modern Language Association (Mla) 
published results of a call for responses to the question of whether 
interdisciplinarity is actually being achieved. Alan Rauch replied that 
the profession’s sense of the idea had not changed much. The figure of 
the eclectic polymath remained predominant, validating disciplinary 
boundaries and suggesting that interdisciplinarity is about capacity and 
retention more than synthesis and analysis. Yet the popular image of 
interdisciplinary programs disguises the more complex cultural matrix of 
inquiries, including Rauch’s own field of science, technology, and society 
studies, where a more sophisticated dissolution of disciplinary boundar-
ies has occurred in research and curriculum. Derek Attridge concurred. 
Attridge distinguished feminism, deconstruction, and cultural studies 
from the absorptive process and called the creation of new disciplines an 
“inherent” function of interdisciplinarity, though it runs the risk of pro-
ducing inhibiting codes and cultures (“Forum” 1996).
Changes are also apparent in the methodological tool kits of dis-
ciplines. Borrowing has increased across boundaries, and a greater 
hybridity of method has challenged the long-held assumption that 
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theoretical-textual modes are the business of humanists and data-driven 
modes are the lot of social scientists. In the rapidly growing field of digi-
tal humanities, for instance, the shift from page to screen is marked by 
greater use of technological methodologies in computational linguistics 
and text editing, as well as intersections with the social sciences in stud-
ies of networked identity and subjectivity. Angus also called attention to a 
new synthesis in communication studies formed by intersections of social 
science research on mass media’s impact on society, the classical tradi-
tion of rhetoric, and investigations of interpersonal communication. In 
the field of cultural studies, traditional humanistic approaches are also 
being combined with cultural anthropology and new ethnography, oral 
history, social history and the study of material culture, reader-response 
criticism, and transnational perspectives. Sometimes methods are com-
bined, meshing survey research with ethnography, information from mar-
keting research with utopian conceptions of empowered consumers, and 
textual or ethnographic analysis with social, political, and cultural com-
mentary. Methods usually reflect original disciplinary training, amplified 
by situational borrowings (Nelson, Treichler, and Grossberg 1992, 2–3, 
10–11). At the same time, traditional approaches continue. Archival work 
has been crucial to establishing accurate editions, taxonomies, bibliog-
raphies, discographies, and authentic performances. Traditional skills of 
textual analysis, narratology, iconography, and musicology are also being 
redeployed in the study of new objects (Goodwin and Woolf 1987, 135).
Nonetheless, limits persist. In popular music studies, John Shepherd 
reported, contexts are often isolated and individuals are still influenced 
by the problematics of their own disciplines and fields. Neither of the 
two principal disciplines that have contributed to popular music stud-
ies—sociology and musicology—has adequate theoretical protocols 
for understanding the meaning of popular music. Sociologists tend to 
believe answers to the question of meaning are found in contextual pro-
cesses—social, historical, cultural, economic, political, psychological, 
and biographical in nature—that are extrinsic to an event but imbue it 
with meaning and significance. Musicologists tend to believe answers 
lie in textual processes—oriented to sonic, motional, verbal, and visual 
properties (1991, 197, 204–8). In English studies, Linda Pratt (2002) 
reported, research still tends to be solitary, incorporating fragments of 
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history, sociology, ethnography, and psychology as contexts for a broad 
definition of texts. The surface evidence of publication, Jacqueline Henkel 
commented in the Mla Forum, suggests that scholars and teachers are 
invested in interdisciplinary research. Yet models and modes of discourse 
in other fields are not regularly examined. Sara Van den Berg also cited 
the crossfire of legitimation. Some psychoanalysts smirk at literary crit-
ics’ assumption that psychoanalytic theory stopped with Freud (or Jung, 
Winnicott, or Lacan). Literary critics smile back at psychoanalysts’ 
assumption that literary theory stopped with New Criticism. Sociologists 
criticize literary critics for pirating odd bits of sociological thinking, but 
come under attack themselves for “content analysis” of literature without 
regard for interpretation or aesthetic qualities (“Forum” 1996).
Claims for cultural studies are checked by limits as well. Cultural stud-
ies, Jo-Ann Wallace (1995) warns, holds the potential for collaborative 
work, more flexible exchanges and groupings, and new questions and 
knowledge. Yet the “easy slippage” into cultural studies poses a serious 
threat to small disciplines, such as art history, film studies, classics, and 
philosophy. Joining a modern languages department or a comparative 
cultural studies department might result in productive collaboration, but 
the integrity of subjects does not follow naturally when faculty members 
are moved around. Even if faculty in English studies can “do” cultural 
studies, Wallace cautions, they cannot necessarily teach art history, film, 
philosophy, or other disciplines. The utopic promise of new interdiscipli-
narity collapses in a superficial eclecticism promoted under the banner 
of a dubious fusion of literature, art, music, and other humanities. The 
renewal of the cultural function of literature (and other humanities dis-
ciplines) also collapses. It is no longer waged on the ground of liberal 
humanism but a polyglot specialization in a field crowded with compet-
ing subspecialities.
the teRMinistic scReens oF inteRdisciplinaRit y
The meaning of interdisciplinarity was implicated at every turn in the 
changes described in the first section of this essay. Proponents distin-
guished their individual projects, but new discourses fostered a new 
Valences of Interdisciplinarity.indd   149 28/02/2012   4:31:27 PM
150 Julie thoMpson Klein
generalism that countered both the traditional unified vision of culture in 
the humanities and the modern system of disciplinarity. The new general-
ism was not a unified paradigm. It was a cross-fertilizing synergism in the 
form of common methods, concepts, theories, and a shared metalanguage. 
A new rhetoric of interdisciplinarity developed in kind. “Plurality” and 
“heterogeneity” replaced “unity” and “universality.” “Interrogation” and 
“intervention” supplanted “synthesis” and “holism,” and older forms of 
“interdisciplinarity” were challenged by new “anti,” “ post,” “non,” and 
“de-disciplinary” formulations. A host of other terms also appear in the 
discourse on interdisciplinarity, from “indiscriminate” and “auxiliary” to 
“free-range” and “cosmological” forms. Harvey Graff, elsewhere in this 
volume, has criticized “the swamp of confusing, conflicting, and contra-
dictory definitions,” branding the proliferation of hyphenated coinages 
“silly, even funny.” Yet comparative analysis of nomenclature is crucial to 
understanding overlapping and differing claims, patterns of practice, and 
institutional priorities.
Kenneth Burke’s notion of “terministic screens” is particularly help-
ful for thinking about nomenclature. We must use terministic screens, 
Kenneth Burke admonished, since we can’t say anything without using 
terms. Furthermore, labels screen, filter, direct, and redirect attention 
in certain directions rather than others. Burke distinguished two basic 
types: terms that put things together and terms that take them apart. “The 
choices we make,” he added, “constitute an additional kind of screen that 
directs attention to one field or another, and even within a single field 
further screens direct attention while shaping the range of observations 
implicit in particular words.” Nomenclature, therefore, is not simply a 
“reflection” of reality, it is also a “selection” and a “deflection” of real-
ity (1966, 45–46, 49–50). The earliest uses of the keyword “interdisciplin-
ary” have been traced to the opening decades of the twentieth century, in 
social science research and the general education movement. The most 
prominent terminology, though, derives from a typology presented at the 
first international conference on interdisciplinary research and teaching, 
sponsored in part by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (oecd) in 1970 (oecd 1972). The three most widely cited 
labels in the typology are “multidisciplinary,” “interdisciplinary,” and 
“transdisciplinary.” Figure 6.1 groups a number of prominent terms from 
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the discourse and Graff’s litany of examples in order to help us under-
stand the patterns of meaning they screen. (For more extensive consider-
ations of terminology, see Klein 2009, 2010.)
The Interdisciplinary Spectrum
   Multidisciplinary Interdisciplinary Transdisciplinary
     juxtaposing  integrating  transcending
      sequencing   interacting  transgressing
      coordinating  linking   transforming 
      focusing 
      blending
      intermeshing
Degrees of Integration and Disciplinary Interaction
   
  Partial integration           Full integration
  Bridge building            Restructuring
  Encyclopedic            Contextualizing            Auxiliary                    Generalizing 
  Indiscriminate           Composite            Supplementary       Integrative
  Pseudo               Structural       Conceptual
               Unifying
Degrees of Scope and Team-Based Collaboration
     Narrow    Broad or wide
     Shared    Cooperative
Other Key Distinctions
     
         Methodological versus theoretical
         Instrumental versus critical
         Endogenous versus exogenous
Figure 6.1. Typologies of interdisciplinarity  
(adapted from Klein, “The Taxonomy of Interdisciplinarity” [2010])
The groupings depict two major sets of differences: (1) of integra-
tion and interaction of disciplines, and (2) goals and purposes. At the 
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Multidisciplinary end of the spectrum, juxtaposing and sequencing dis-
ciplines fosters greater breadth of knowledge, information, and methods. 
Yet the relationship of disciplines is loose and restricted, their elements 
retain an original identity, and the existing structure of knowledge is not 
questioned. The descriptors encyclopedic, indiscriminate, and pseudo 
signal the widespread belief that these are “weak” forms or even “false” 
forms. In Contextualizing Interdisciplinarity (ID), Margaret Boden stipu-
lates that disciplines are taken into account for informative context or 
background but without active co-operation. In Composite ID, when com-
plementary skills are applied to address complex problems or to achieve 
a shared goal, production of knowledge also retains a strong disciplin-
ary thrust, even when results are integrated within a common framework 
(1999, 15–16). In the biosciences, for instance, technical knowledge from 
many fields and expensive instruments are often shared.
When integration and interaction become more substantial and proac-
tive, the line between Multidisciplinary and Interdisciplinary is crossed. 
The major actions are focusing, blending, and linking. Scope still differs, 
though. The degree of integration varies on a spectrum from Partial to Full, 
and the relationship of disciplines varies from Narrow to Broad or Wide 
depending on the compatibility of their methods, paradigms, and episte-
mologies as well as the number of disciplines involved in any particular 
field or project. Many believe that interdisciplinarity is also synonymous 
with collaboration. It is not, and degrees of interaction also vary, from 
Shared interest in a common problem or question to Co-operative team-
work. Two further distinctions are also important, between Methodological 
and Theoretical ID. The typical motivation in Methodological forms is to 
improve the quality of results, usually through borrowing a method or 
concept in order to test a hypothesis, to answer a research question, or 
to help develop a theory. In a typology of interdisciplinary approaches to 
the social sciences, Raymond Miller (1982) identified two major sources: 
Shared Components (such as research methods of statistical inference) 
and Cross-Cutting Organizing Principles (focal concepts such as “role” 
and “exchange”). In addition, the roster of examples includes techniques 
of surveying and interviewing and the conceptual principles of systems 
theory, information theory, and communication theory. Here too, degree 
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of integration and interactions differ, from Auxiliary to Supplementary to 
more fully interdependent Structural relationships.
Theoretical ID entails a more comprehensive general view, conceptual 
framework or synthesis that is associated with a number of other distinc-
tions as well, including Transdisciplinarity. Its Generalizing function is not 
a lower-level encyclopedic embrace but a focused theoretical perspective 
applied across wide range of disciplines, such as cybernetics or complex-
ity theory. At this level it is not unusual to hear talk of “true” or “genu-
ine” interdisciplinarity. Boden (1999) deemed Integrated ID “the only 
true interdisciplinarity,” achieved when new conceptual categories and 
methodological unification emerge. Comparably, Lisa Lattuca considers 
Conceptual ID to be a “true or full” form, because core issues and ques-
tions lack a compelling disciplinary basis, and a critique of disciplinary 
understanding is often implied (2001, 117). Theoretical ID also illustrates 
the difference between two fundamental metaphors of interdisciplinarity 
identified in a report by the Nuffield Foundation (1975)—Bridge building 
and Restructuring. Bridge building occurs between complete and firm dis-
ciplines. Restructuring detaches parts of several disciplines to form a new 
coherent whole, illustrated by the search for alternative methodological 
and conceptual categories within the behavioural science movement and 
the formation of new fields such as area studies. Miller also identified four 
categories of new fields and hybrid specializations in his typology: Topics 
(e.g., crime, labor, urban, and environment), Life Experience (e.g., ethnic 
studies and women’s studies), Hybrids (e.g., social psychology, political 
sociology), and Professional Preparation (e.g., social work and nursing).
Figure 6.1 contains another important distinction that has become a 
fault line in the political economy of interdisciplinarity—instrumental-
ity versus critique. The keywords of the new rhetoric in the humanities 
signalled the evolution of a form of “critical interdisciplinarity” that 
countered “instrumental” goals aligned with “strategic,” “pragmatic,” 
and “opportunistic” motivations. Instrumental goals are prominent in 
economic, technological, and scientific problem solving, especially in 
science-based areas of international economic competition such as com-
puters, biotechnology, manufacturing, and industry. In this instance, 
interdisciplinarity serves the needs of the market and national priorities 
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without regard for questions of epistemology or institutional structure. In 
contrast, “critical interdisciplinarity” interrogates the existing structure 
of knowledge and education, raising questions of value and purpose that 
are silent in instrumental forms lacking reflexivity. Critical forms interro-
gate disciplines and institutional structures with the aim of transforming 
them and, in the strongest version of this argument, posit the collapse 
of disciplines in a “postdisciplinary” transformation in thinking about 
knowledge and culture.
Bryan Turner (1990) drew a parallel distinction between two trends in 
the medical curriculum. When interdisciplinarity is conceived as a short-
term solution to economic and technological problems, pragmatic ques-
tions of reliability, efficiency, and commercial value take centre stage. 
On the contrary, interdisciplinarity emerged as an epistemological goal 
within social medicine and the sociology of health. Researchers focused 
on the complex causality of illness and disease, factoring in psychologi-
cal, social, and ethical factors within a holistic biosocial or biopsycho-
social model that were missing from the hierarchical biomedical model. 
The distinction between instrumental and critical forms is not absolute. 
Research and education on problems of the environment and health often 
combine critique and problem solving. The objects of critique in criti-
cal interdisciplinarity also vary. The most prominent targets have been 
the absorptive tendency noted in the Mla Forum and the prioritizing of 
research funding for strategic problem solving. Mark Kann’s typology of 
forms of interdisciplinary explanation captures the conflicting positions. 
Conservative elites want to solve social and economic problems, with-
out concern for epistemological questions. Liberal academics demand 
accommodation but maintain a base in the existing structure, in the 
middle ground of harmonious interaction. Radical dissidents challenge 
the existing structure of knowledge, demanding that interdisciplinarity 
respond to the needs and problems of oppressed and marginalized groups 
in order to achieve greater equality (1979, 197–98).
Ultimately, W.J.T. Mitchell argues, everything depends on what sort of 
interdisciplinarity is being practised. Mitchell distinguished three major 
types that have been prominent in the humanities:
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(1) top-down: comparative, structural formations that aim to 
know an overarching system or conceptual totality within 
which all disciplines are related;
(2) bottom-up: a compulsive and compulsory interdisciplinarity 
that is dictated by a specific problem or event;
(3) inside-out: the indisciplined or anarchist moment, a site of 
convergence and turbulence. (1995, 541)
The top-down model hearkens back to a Kantian architectonic of learn-
ing, in a pyramidal or corporate organization of knowledge production 
capable of regulating flows of information from one part of the structure 
to another. It appears in philosophy and in critical theory, in claims for a 
utopian convergence of theory and practice and in the promotion of semi-
otics as a universal metalanguage for studying culture. Mitchell’s bottom-
up model emerges “on the shop floor,” in response to emergencies and 
opportunities. Cultural studies is a general form of the bottom-up model. 
The inside-out form is aligned with the “indiscipline” of breakage or rup-
ture. It disturbs continuity and practice, though ruptures can become 
routinized, as the rapid transformation of deconstruction into an insti-
tutionalized method of interpretation demonstrated. The “anarchist” 
moment, Mitchell maintains, may well be the most important event. It is 
the moment when routine or ritual is reasserted (1995, 541). Comparably, 
Salter and Hearn (1996) highlight interdisciplinarity’s role as the “churn 
in the system,” and Gunn argues that the result of much of interdisciplin-
ary study, if not its ostensible purpose, is “to dispute and disorder con-
ventional understandings of relations between such things as origin and 
terminus, center and periphery, focus and margin, inside and outside.” 
Ultimately, interdisciplinarity is a double-sided question. Relational 
studies of the conjunctive kind proceed from the question of what dis-
ciplines have to do with each other. “Genuine” interdisciplinarity, Gunn 
maintains, alters the constitutive question that generates interdisciplin-
ary inquiry in the first place, asking how insights and methods of another 
field or structure can remodel understanding of what literature is, for 
instance, and the ways literary conceptions and approaches remodel 
allied fields and subject materials. Ethical criticism and American studies 
exemplify this aim too. The radical project exposes the political nature of 
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the distinction, with the aim of transforming not only academic structure 
but the larger structure of social articulation ( 1992a, 241–43, 249; 1992b, 
187–88, 193–97; see also Klein 1996, 173–208).
All terminology embodies principles of continuity or discontinuity, 
and even continuing terms assume new meanings in new applications 
(McKeon 1971, 50). Transdisciplinarity is a compelling case. Graff, in his 
essay in this volume, associates the term with the “evangelical chapel of 
transdisciplinarity,” aligning it with a particular vision advanced at the 
First World Congress and subsequent charter by the Centre International 
de Recherches et Études Transdisciplinaire (ciRet). The term, though, has 
a complex history, and its recent heightened importance is a significant 
benchmark of new ways of thinking about interdisciplinarity. The term 
is traced conventionally to the oecd typology, where it connoted a set of 
common axioms that transcend the narrow scope of disciplinary world 
views through an overarching synthesis such as anthropology conceived 
as a comprehensive science of humans (oecd 1972, 26). Characteristic of 
the time, the prominent conceptual vocabularies were general systems 
theory, structuralism, and cybernetics. The term had limited circulation at 
first but proliferated in the closing decades of the century. It now appears 
as a descriptor of broad fields and synoptic disciplines, a team-based 
holistic approach to health care, a general ethos, and a comprehensive 
integrative curriculum design. At present, there are four major trend lines 
of definition.
The first trend line is an extension of the original connotation. Miller 
defined transdisciplinarity as conceptual frameworks that transcend the 
narrow scope of disciplinary world views. Holistic in intent, they pro-
pose to reorganize the structure of knowledge (1982, 21). General systems 
theory, structuralism, semiotics, Marxism, feminism, ecology, sociobiol-
ogy, and cultural theory have been leading examples. The assertion of 
new transcendent paradigms led to criticism, even when their proponents 
opposed the totalizing intent of grand narratives. Yet, Kellner advises, 
lumping all grand narratives together ignores the diversity of theoretical 
narratives that operate in culture and in the name of interdisciplinarity. 
Kellner contrasts Lyotard’s generalized critique of “master narratives” 
that attempt to subsume every particular viewpoint into one totalizing 
theory—such as science, liberal humanism, some versions of Marxism, 
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or feminism—with “grand narratives” that attempt to tell a particular Big 
Story—such as the rise of capitalism, patriarchy, or the colonial subject. 
Within grand narratives, metanarratives that tell a story about the foun-
dation of knowledge can also be distinguished from macro social theory 
that attempts to conceptualize and to interpret a complex diversity of phe-
nomena. Synchronic narratives that tell a story about a given society at a 
given point in history are further distinct from diachronic narratives that 
analyze historical change, accounting for discontinuities and ruptures 
(1988, 252–53).
More recently, a parallel development has appeared in the emergence 
of transdisciplinary team science in broad areas such as cancer research, 
where shared conceptual and methodological frameworks not only inte-
grate but transcend their respective disciplinary perspectives. This emer-
gence of transdisciplinary team science embodies Patricia Rosenfield’s 
(1992) notion of a “transcendent interdisciplinary research” that fosters 
systematic theoretical frameworks for analyzing social, economic, politi-
cal, environmental, and institutional factors in human health and well-
being. Team members representing different fields work together over 
extended periods, and their collaborations are fostering new forms of col-
laborative research, methodologies, training programs, and career devel-
opment outcomes legitimated by efforts to institutionalize the concept in 
the us National Cancer Institute. Collaborations of this kind, though, are 
more difficult to achieve and sustain owing to their greater complexity 
and aspirations for transcendent, supra-disciplinary integrations (Stokols 
et al. 2008).
A second trend line appears in the contemporary version of the ancient 
quest for systematic integration of knowledge. This quest spans ancient 
Greek philosophy, the medieval Christian summa, the Enlightenment 
ambition of universal reason, Transcendentalism, Umberto Eco’s specula-
tion on a perfect language, the Unity of Science movement, the search for 
unification theories in physics, and E. O. Wilson’s theory of consilience. 
Reviewing the history of this particular terministic screen, philosopher 
Joseph Kockelmans (1979) found that it has tended to centre on educa-
tional and philosophical dimensions of sciences. In contrast to the past, 
however, the search for unity today does not follow automatically from a 
pre-given, presupposed order of things. It must be continually “brought 
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about” through critical, philosophical, and supra-scientific reflection. 
It also accepts plurality and diversity. This value is prominent in ciRet, 
where a new universality of thought and type of education is being devel-
oped informed by the world view of complexity in science. This form of 
transdisciplinary vision replaces reduction with a new principle of relativ-
ity that is transcultural, transnational, and encompasses ethics, spiritual-
ity, and creativity (http://perso.club-internet.fr/nicol/ciret).
A third trend line is apparent in the transgressive operations of criti-
cal interdisciplinarity. In the 1990s, “transdisciplinarity” began appear-
ing more often as a label for knowledge formations imbued with a critical 
imperative. Michael Peters associated the term with creating new theo-
retical paradigms, questions, and knowledge that cannot be taken up 
within the boundaries of existing disciplines (1999, xn3). Ronald Schleifer 
(2002) linked “the new interdisciplinarity” with theory and transdisci-
plinary or cultural study of large social and intellectual formations that 
have breached canons of wholeness and the simplicity of the Kantian 
architecture of knowledge and art. The transdisciplinary operation of 
cultural studies, Kellner noted, draws on a range of fields to theorize 
the complexity and contradictions of media/culture/communications. It 
moves from text to contexts, pushing boundaries of class, gender, race, 
ethnicity, and other identities (1995, 27–28). In women’s and gender stud-
ies, Dölling and Hark aligned transdisciplinarity with critical evaluation 
of terms, concepts, and methods that transgress disciplinary boundaries 
(2000, 1196–97). And, in Canadian studies, Jill Vickers (1997) aligned the 
transgressive connotative of critical interdisciplinarity with “trans-” and 
“anti-disciplinarity” with movements that rejected disciplinarity in whole 
or in part while raising questions of socio-political justice.
Some fields, Vickers elaborated, were problem-driven. Environmental 
studies is an oft-cited example. Others were part of broad societal move-
ment for change, including the women’s movement and the Quebec 
and First Nations’ movements for self-determination. Asserting “anti-
disciplinary” positions, they tend to use materials in ways dictated by 
their own transdisciplinary theories, cultural traditions, and lived expe-
rience. A greater number of graduate students now have interdisciplin-
ary undergraduate degrees and experience in inter- or transdisciplinary 
fields or a combination of interdisciplines (such as art, history, political 
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economy) mixed with transdisciplinary fields (such as women’s or Native/
Aboriginal studies). Two forces are apparent: an “integrative” tendency, 
evident in Canadian studies as area studies, and a self-asserting “disinte-
grating tendency” that draws the focus away from the centre of existing 
knowledge systems, evident in critical, oppositional, or self-studies. In 
transdisciplinary or anti-disciplinary movements, Vickers adds, students 
may reject epistemological claims of disciplines altogether, preferring 
alternative understandings of “knowledge” and “evidence” that incorpo-
rate notions of “non-disciplinary knowledge” embedded in everyday life, 
including traditional Aboriginal knowledges and emergent knowledges 
motivated by critical social movements. Both Angus and Lorraine Code 
have called attention to the latter in their contributions to this volume.
A fourth trend line has become prominent in Europe and North-
South partnerships. The core premise is that problems in the lifeworld 
need to frame research questions and practice in new trans-sector col-
laboration, not problems in the disciplines. The growing prominence of 
problem-focused interdisciplinarity was signalled in 1982 by a distinction 
that appears in figure 6.1. Based on a conference and recent reports, the 
oecd declared that Exogenous Interdisciplinarity now has priority over 
Endogenous University that originates within science. The Exogenous 
originates in “real problems of the community” and the demand that 
universities perform their pragmatic social mission (oecd 1982, 130). The 
trend was further evident in the late 1980s and early 1990s in German and 
Swiss contexts of environmental research that involved the participation 
of stakeholders in society. By 2000, at a major international conference 
on transdisciplinarity, case studies were reported in all fields of human 
interaction with natural systems and technical innovations as well as the 
development context (Klein et al. 2001).
Not all problems are the same, however, underscoring the importance 
of comparative study of terministic screens. Transdisciplinary collabora-
tions between academic researchers and members of the private sector 
for the purpose of product development promote very different goals 
than projects focused on democratic solutions to social, environmental, 
and political problems. Both, though, are being advanced today under 
the label of transdisciplinarity. The escalation of this keyword signals a 
new phase in the history of the keyword “interdisciplinarity.” Framed 
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historically by ancient warrants of unity and universality, the underlying 
concept evolved over the course of a century to serve multiple purposes, 
pluralizing the discourse and introducing new thematics of critique, 
complexity, collaboration, and problem solving. The rhetorical bound-
ary work of terministic screens continues to create, legitimate, maintain, 
challenge, and reformulate meaning and practice (Klein 2009).
note
1 Richard Marsden, aphorism no. 26, from “Aphorisms on Disciplines,” paper presented at 
“The Scope of Interdisciplinarity.” http://cis.athabascau.ca/conferences/archive/docs/
richard_marsden.pdf.
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7
Integrating Interdisciplinary Studies 
Across the Humanities and Social Sciences
R I c K  s z o s t a K 
What is interdisciplinarity, and what is the best way of doing it? There 
are many ways of approaching these questions. This essay will start from 
some suggested differences in how interdisciplinarity is (and should 
be) pursued in the humanities as opposed to the social sciences. It will 
be argued that these differences are exaggerated. In the best interdisci-
plinary tradition we will instead suggest that these allegedly conflicting 
visions can be integrated in order to generate a more holistic understand-
ing of interdisciplinarity.
The first and longest section of the essay focuses upon history, a field 
that spans the humanities and social sciences. Apollonian and Dionysian 
approaches to the study of history are developed and integrated. The 
arguments made regarding how these can be integrated can generally 
be applied far beyond the confines of historical research. Later sections 
address, in turn: a distinction between philosophical and scientific 
interdisciplinarities; a distinction between grand theory and integrat-
ing theories; a similar distinction between grand method and integrating 
methods; a focus on flexible concepts versus stable concepts; and revolu-
tionary versus normal science.
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t Wo appRoaches to the study oF histoRy
Two broadly distinct approaches to the study of history can be identi-
fied. These might be distinguished in terms of a “social science” versus 
a “humanities” perspective. Yet such appellations would not only legiti-
mate this distinction but would suggest that it is immutable (though the 
distinction between social sciences and humanities is itself weakening). 
It is better to borrow from many fields the appellations Apollonian and 
Dionysian, drawn from ancient Greek mythology, to describe these two 
approaches.1 The Apollonian approach emphasizes order, while the 
Dionysian approach emphasizes freedom. History, like civilization in 
general, should not choose one of these but strive for the best balance 
between order and freedom. Needless to say, the core precepts of each 
approach must be defined as central tendencies: few historians may agree 
entirely with either list. Importantly, this observation suggests that these 
approaches are not monolithic but can be altered.
The Apollonian discourse can be identified by the following precepts:
 • Historians should specify the phenomena they are 
investigating, how these influence each other, and 
the particular data, theories, and methods used in the 
investigation.
 • The community of historians should strive to compare the 
results of investigations across historical cases: individual 
historians need not always be explicitly comparative, though 
they should be aware of how the arguments they make have 
fared in other circumstances.
 • Comparisons should be made foremost in terms of the causes 
(or results) of certain historical processes (though comparisons 
at the level of theory and method may also be valuable).
 • Formal and often quantitative methods are thus preferred.
In the Dionysian perspective:
 • It is important to study the meaning individuals attach to the 
events and processes in which they participate.
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 • Reality is “created” linguistically. And language is inherently 
ambiguous, both in historical sources and in the work of 
historians.
 • Style of presentation is important.
 • Historical events and processes are unique and complex. 
Comparison across historical cases is thus likely impractical.
 • Likewise, theoretical generalizations will only be made 
possible by ignoring much that is central to historical 
processes.
These two approaches can be adjusted so as to become complementary. 
With respect to the Apollonian discourse, the key adjustment involves 
relaxing methodological and theoretical preferences: any careful theo-
retical argument and any scholarly method should be seen as legitimate.2 
It will thus be useful in what follows to argue that comparative research 
does not presume a particular theoretical or methodological preference. 
A second adjustment to the Apollonian perspective involves equal flex-
ibility with regard to the meaning of “cause”: any sort of influence of one 
phenomenon or agent on another should be accepted.
The Dionysian interest in “interpretivist” theories and methods is no 
challenge to complementarity as long as this is not an exclusive interest. 
Nor is the postmodern concern with ambiguity of language, so long as 
extreme versions of this critique are avoided that suggest that different 
scholarly communities are simply unable to comprehend each other. If 
language ambiguity is taken as a challenge, then scholars are guided to 
seek strategies for enhancing clarity. Style must in such an approach be 
considered as subsidiary to content.
Some elements of a “combined” view of the historical enterprise 
deserve emphasis both here and in what follows:
 • Historians should be open to exploring all causal links and 
employing all types of theory, method, and data.
 • In order for comparative work to be facilitated, historians 
should strive toward a common vocabulary of phenomena, 
data, theories, and methods.
 • While this “combined” approach does not arbitrarily prohibit 
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valuable forms of historical research, it is not so broad as to 
embrace everything: it clearly rejects works that are unclear 
about the phenomena, causal arguments, theory, and method 
employed.
Clarity
Clarity is often especially elusive in studies of culture (and not just in his-
torical scholarship), but this need not be so.3 Arnold (2000) celebrates the 
fact that historians have often investigated the mentalité of a particular 
time and place but raises two key concerns: that individuals and groups 
within a society will differ in terms of mentalité, and if it is assumed (as is 
often the case) that the mentalité of past societies is totally different from 
our own then such societies may be unfathomable. Burke suggests that it 
is best to assume that other cultures differ from our own in some but not 
all ways, and thus understanding will be possible. Goody is more critical 
than Arnold, suggesting that the study of mentalités reflects intellectual 
laziness; historians must instead identify particular elements of mentalité 
of causal importance, appreciate that all cultures involve internal contra-
dictions, and recognize that cultures evolve. Mahoney and Rueuschemeyer 
(2003, 23) concur that culture can play an important explanatory role, but 
that unless causal relationships are carefully specified these arguments 
are hard to evaluate. Alternatively, Daunton argues that since each culture 
is unique, historians cannot compare one element in isolation.4 Yet when 
he proceeds to describe his own comparative research on censorship he 
identifies just a few related phenomena (such as literary styles) that he 
needed to take into account.
Our consideration of clarity has already suggested the importance of 
the analysis of carefully defined causal links. More generally, the com-
parative method is only useful if scholars believe in causality (broadly 
defined), for comparisons show how differences in terms of some phe-
nomena affect outcomes in terms of others.
Labour historians, economic historians, social historians, and cul-
tural historians may all care about how workers viewed the earliest fac-
tories. African historians, British historians, and Indian historians may 
all care about the impact of the British Empire. But they will put different 
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emphases on these questions, attend different conferences, and publish 
in different journals. A focus on causal links makes it much clearer when 
different scholars are talking about the same thing—or not. Economic 
historians may view the factory favourably because they emphasize its 
eventual impact on average incomes, while cultural historians bemoan 
the apparent loss of artisanal independence. They are talking about dif-
ferent links, and an appraisal of the role of the factory in human history 
should embrace but not confuse these.
Abbott (1994) has worried that any historical event is too compli-
cated to be broken into constituent causal links. To say this is to say that 
explanation is impossible, for any explanation of a complex event must 
involve a series of more precise arguments.5 These arguments will neces-
sarily be specific to a particular causal link. The causal link approach is 
thus not only consistent with the study of complex “big picture” events 
and processes, but essential to this. To be sure, different causal links will 
interact (as food shortages and elite disharmony interacted in the French 
Revolution), and the historian must be careful of oversimplification. Part 
of Abbot’s concern stems from a fear that theory-driven historians will 
ignore the importance of particular personalities. It is thus crucial that the 
community of historians embrace phenomena, theories, and methods at 
both the individual (personality dimensions, abilities, mental schemas) 
and societal level.
Skepticism of the very possibility of comparison across historical cases 
generally rests on at least one of two misconceptions. The first is that his-
torians should search for recurring patterns in history. It is quite unlikely 
that similar realizations of a large number of phenomena will be observed 
across quite distinct historical episodes. In this simple sense, history 
rarely if ever repeats itself. Scholars can, though, reasonably expect to 
observe a particular realization of any one phenomenon across a wide 
array of historical cases (say, a shortage of food, defined by some crite-
rion). They can then ask what effects this is observed to have on another 
phenomenon (say the stability of government). Here, the second objec-
tion may be that alternative outcomes will depend on the realizations of a 
host of other phenomena. This conjecture should be established empiri-
cally rather than assumed. More importantly, this objection simply means 
that the rules scholars seek will be complex: food shortages encourage 
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revolutions, but only in concert with certain (combinations of) realiza-
tions of other phenomena. The common but mistaken belief that “causal 
arguments” must involve an “If A then always B” (that is, a “covering 
law”) statement has understandably discouraged the use of causal argu-
ments in historical research. Since comparisons across a handful of cases 
cannot be expected to identify every relevant realization of other phenom-
ena, it is important that the community of historians compare across as 
wide a range of cases as possible. Nevertheless, individual historians can 
usefully compare across a small number of cases with which they are very 
familiar; as long as they are clear in their arguments and definitions, their 
research can feed into yet broader comparisons.
Lloyd (1993, 7) is critical of “a humanistic form of inquiry into social 
life that is akin to artistic or literary interpretation.” He accepts, however, 
the basic insight of this approach: that historians must grapple with the 
“meaning” attached to events and circumstances by actors, and that 
those different actors may perceive the same situation in different ways. 
He objects only to a conclusion often drawn from these precepts that 
explanation is impossible. Rather, he sees interpretation and explanation 
as complementary. By attempting to understand how actors perceived 
events, scholars can try to explain why they acted as they did. Whether a 
scholar pursues interpretation or explanation will depend on which type 
of causal link they study: scholars will often want to pursue both within 
one study.
Like many others, Burke (in Pallares-Burke, 2002, 146–47) celebrates 
the breadth of modern historical research but worries about fragmenta-
tion, and urges the profession to find some way to tie the pieces together. 
Gilderhus (2002, 126–27) worries not just about the “cacophony of voices” 
but about the fact that history no longer serves to unify knowledge; he 
sees no resolution to this problem. An emphasis on causal links estab-
lishes that each historical subfield has a place, but also that historians 
should study the links between these: in other words, do interdisciplin-
ary history.6 And this is critical for comparative purposes: as noted above, 
the history of an event or process involves the interaction of many causal 
links and will thus be misunderstood if the set of links any historian 
embraces is needlessly truncated. While a particular comparative study 
may necessarily focus on a subset of relevant links, it should ideally both 
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be performed in cognizance of the existence of others and written clearly 
so that it can be incorporated into further research.
Is History Inherently Idiographic?
Since the dawn of the past century philosophers have distinguished two 
types of scholarly effort: a nomothetic approach that seeks generalizations 
and an idiographic approach focused upon particularities. Historians, it 
is argued, must delve into details that are unique to a particular time and 
place, and are thus inherently idiographic. As has been seen, this need 
not and should not limit generalization. Even the traditional explanation 
of historical events in terms of the personality of kings, which must seem 
entirely idiographic given the uniqueness of each individual, can lend 
itself to comparisons and generalizations: about the role of particular per-
sonality types in history, or about how environment shapes personality.7
In fact, the stark dichotomy often drawn between idiographic and 
nomothetic research is itself a chimera. All scholarly activities necessarily 
mix the two, though the relative balance varies across fields. Moreover, 
one can imagine a continuum between nomothetic and idiographic 
argument, depending on how carefully the realizations of each relevant 
phenomenon need to be specified in a causal argument (Szostak 2004, 
chap. 3). Different historical works will occupy different points along this 
continuum.
Must History Be About Artificial Entities?
Ankersmit (2001) argues that historians need concepts such as “labour 
movement” to make sense of history, but “labour movement” is not a 
real thing “out there.” However, while “labour movement” is indeed an 
artificial construct, this essay references several of the hundreds of real 
phenomena “out there” which could and should be the focus of histori-
cal narratives and comparisons. Historians should be urged to eschew 
artificial concepts in favour of the study of causal links between real 
phenomena.
Ankersmit also raises a philosophical question: What changes in his-
tory, since all change presupposes an immutable subject of change? His 
answer is that reality cannot change but only human representations of it. 
Thus historians can only seek multiple representations of an unchanging 
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reality. This conclusion is critiqued below. A superior answer to the origi-
nal question can be provided here. The phenomena to be studied are 
immutable, but historians study the changes in realizations of these phe-
nomena. Economic output is an immutable phenomenon, but the actual 
output of a society changes through time.8
These two related arguments flow in turn from Ankersmit’s emphasis 
on the use of metaphor. Only by increasing the range of metaphor used 
to describe a particular period, Ankersmit argues, can historians arrive 
at a more nuanced appreciation of that period. The reality of the fifteenth 
century does not change, but historical understanding of whether to view 
the century as one of continuity or change does, if historians move from 
thinking of it as “late Middle Ages” to “early Renaissance.” This essay sug-
gests instead that historians should investigate each causal link in turn, 
finding change here and continuity there, and understanding in detail 
how and why realizations of various phenomena changed (or did not) 
over the period of the fifteenth century. In this way, historians are guided 
(among other things) to define the essence of “the Middle Ages” or “the 
Renaissance” in terms of realizations of particular phenomena, and to 
understand why each transformation occurred as it did.
Exploring All Types of Causation
Phenomena can exert influences of many different types on other phe-
nomena. Sometimes a particular realization of one phenomenon may be 
necessary for a particular realization of another to occur (as in functional-
ist arguments that a state needs an army or army-like body). Sometimes 
one realization may be sufficient for another, or both necessary and suffi-
cient, though history is generally more complicated than this. Note that a 
relationship that is necessary or sufficient in one society might prove oth-
erwise in a different society (especially if the first society sets an example 
that others follow). In other cases, the effect may be positive or negative, 
but neither necessary nor sufficient. In still other cases the outcome may 
be probabilistic. When a family (system) of related links is studied, feed-
back may be positive or negative or unpredictable. Historians should be 
aware that causation occurs in different ways and that different theories 
and methods are best suited to different types of causation.
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Likewise, comparative historians can and should appreciate that a 
realization of a particular phenomenon can have quite different effects 
depending on the time frame studied. Technological innovation was 
a fairly imperceptible part of human life for most of the pre–Industrial 
Revolution period. Yet arguably it nevertheless supported a slow though 
irregular increase in average incomes and thus affected possibilities for 
urbanization, the pursuit of art, and a range of other developments. 
Notably, only historical research can trace these longer-term effects 
(and only if historians do not overspecialize by period). Sadly, there is a 
“tendency for scholars to be very casual about time in both quantitative 
and qualitative analyses”; scholars fail to carefully specify the time that 
elapses between cause and effect, and often thus provide inappropriate 
evidence for the sort of temporal behaviour they appear to posit (Jensen 
1997, 56). Comparative research can usefully identify and seek to explain 
differences in the amount of time a particular process takes to unfold in 
different places.
To what extent are historical processes contingent, such that what 
happens tomorrow depends on what happens today? Some degree of con-
tingency is inevitable, at least in the short run. Even in the long run it may 
well be that the innovations of today constrain the paths of future inno-
vation. However, many neoclassical economists would argue that in the 
long run societies would eventually achieve the most efficient technology 
or institutions. Early Marxists also envisioned inevitable historical pro-
cesses. Only empirical analysis of disparate cases can settle the question 
of how important path dependence is.
If a scholar posits an inevitable outcome, they will seek a very gener-
alizable theory. If a scholar is dealing with a highly contingent historical 
process, then they will seek a theory(s) that pays careful attention to the 
conditions necessary for certain causal chains to operate. Since both are 
possible, it would be a mistake to assume one type of theory at the outset 
(but not to test one against the other). Social scientists are often guilty 
of assuming generalizability and/or inevitability, while humanists are 
often guilty of the opposite. Comparative historians should eschew both 
extremes.
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Narrative Styles
Hayden White famously argued that narrative introduces an element of 
fiction into historical accounts, and proceeded to identify a handful of key 
narrative styles (romantic, tragic, and so on) that characterize historical 
writing. Munslow (1997) has urged historians to be reflective of the limita-
tions imposed by the narrative style they use. Ginzburg (1999) argues that 
the research that historians perform before they write puts strong limits 
on the narrative they can present. In urging historians to be explicit about 
causal arguments, this essay further limits narrative bias. Moreover, by 
emphasizing both links and comparisons, it reminds historians that every 
historical story overlaps with thousands of others. Elements of tragedy, 
romance, and comedy commingle in history. Historians should be dis-
couraged from constraining any historical episode to fit one narrative 
genre.
Summing Up
The approach suggested here can be embraced by historians across 
the methodological divide that characterizes the profession. This essay 
attacks the false dichotomies identified by Lloyd (1993): that history 
should be distinct from human science (or exactly like it), that historians 
should focus only on individuals (or alternatively on societal aggregates), 
that historians should focus exclusively on explaining events (or drawing 
generalizations), that historians should only pursue “understanding” as 
opposed to “explanation,” and that historians should emphasize change 
(or stability). This essay also disdains arguments for the superiority of 
any one theory or method. It has argued that historians should indeed 
test theories, but not exclusively. And it has argued that comparative and 
case-specific researches are complementary. Indeed, the only distinction 
that remains important in distinguishing good from bad history is that 
between historians who are clear about what they are doing and those 
who are not.
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philosophical and scientiFic inteRdisciplinaRit y
Interdisciplinarity in the humanities often lacks the problem/issue focus 
of interdisciplinary research in the social sciences. Interdisciplinarians 
may integrate across social sciences in order to address urban poverty, 
cultural transformation, or the causes of crime. Humanists are much more 
likely to focus on theory. This section will look at philosophical theory; 
the next section looks at scientific theory. Ironically, the philosophical 
theories championed by many humanists suggest that the sort of grand 
scientific theories championed by other humanists are misguided. We 
can again suggest a common ground between seemingly opposed views.9 
Postmodern (and related) concerns should not divert us from the pursuit 
of scholarly understanding but should make us keenly aware of the biases 
and errors that afflict scholarly (and especially disciplinary) research. 
Humanists do an important service in reminding us of these biases and 
errors, but these warnings should not stop them any more than they stop 
social scientists from trying to understand better how the world operates.
I have elsewhere (Szostak 2007a) suggested how interdisciplinar-
ity can best integrate “modernist” and “postmodernist” perspectives. 
Importantly, such an exercise forces interdisciplinarians to confront epis-
temological issues rarely addressed in the practically oriented literature 
on interdisciplinarity. Across a wide range of epistemological (and meta-
physical) and practical issues, interdisciplinarians need only to step back 
from the more pessimistic versions of postmodernist thought in order for 
the interdisciplinary project to be not only salvaged but enhanced. This 
essay thus backs away from such extremes in order to embrace instead 
“affirmative postmodernism” (see Rosenau 1992), which argues that 
human understanding is neither perfect nor impossible, and thus that it 
is important to perform scholarly research as clearly and openly as pos-
sible. Thus, the efforts of social science interdisciplinarians, as well as of 
those humanists pursuing scientific generalizations, need not be viewed 
as distinct from humanist speculations on the possibilities of scholarship 
but rather informed in important ways by these.
It is useful for the present exercise to reprise the “interdisciplinary 
positions” identified in that essay:
Valences of Interdisciplinarity.indd   175 28/02/2012   4:31:30 PM
176 RicK szostaK
 • Proof, and even disproof, is impossible. Nevertheless, 
supporting argument and evidence can be compiled such 
that one statement is reasonably judged more credible than 
another (though interdisciplinarians can and do disagree 
about criteria for judging credibility).
 • Science/scholarship is neither perfect nor impossible. 
Particular types of argument and evidence are especially 
valuable in enhancing scholarly confidence in a particular 
conclusion; scholars may achieve consensus. Bias is inevitable 
but strategies exist for combating this.
 • As with disciplines, it is possible to integrate across 
perspectives rooted in social divisions such as gender and 
ethnicity. These are not incommensurate.
 • There is an external reality, though humans are limited in their 
abilities to accurately and precisely perceive this.
 • The world is characterized by open systems (closed systems are 
not causally related to other phenomena). Nevertheless, it is 
possible to identify regularities, although (generally) not laws.
 • Most/all phenomena are causally connected with most/all 
others. Interdisciplinarians nevertheless believe that it is 
possible to identify (albeit imperfectly) distinct phenomena 
and causal regularities, though the latter will likely be 
influenced by realizations of many other phenomena. 
Causality does not threaten human free will.
 • The world is indeed complex and uncertain, but imperfect 
scholarly understanding is nevertheless possible.
 • Language is ambiguous, but ambiguity can be lessened. 
Integration is a powerful means of doing so.
 • Different communities are characterized by overarching 
perspectives that influence what is said and thought. While 
barriers to communication exist, these are surmountable to a 
considerable extent.
 • Texts are created within communities of scholars, and 
thus scholars reflect a perspective of which they are likely 
imperfectly aware. Nevertheless, texts reflect the views of this 
situated agent.
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 • Different scholarly communities develop incomplete and 
biased perspectives on reality. Yet these can be integrated 
into a more holistic and less biased (meta-paradigmatic) 
perspective. If this is true for every combination of 
perspectives, then consistency can be sought at the level of the 
scholarly enterprise as a whole. Yet this will occur not in the 
form of some grand theory (or theories) but in the form of a 
complementary set of theories each shedding light on different 
aspects of reality.
 • Interdisciplinarians believe that scholarly judgment is possible 
and indeed that they can critique disciplinary contributions in 
meaningful ways in order to arrive at holistic understanding. 
Implicitly, at least, they have doubted that there is one unique 
standard of judgment.
 • There are many methods, each with different strengths and 
weaknesses.
 • Both reason and intuition have a place in both the acquisition 
and evaluation of scholarly insights.
 • Causation runs in both directions between individuals and 
societal aggregates.
 • Understanding advances best through the integration of 
diverse types of theory.
 • Interdisciplinarians believe that it is both possible and 
desirable to integrate across different ethical perspectives.
In sum, then, postmodern skepticism—at least once shorn of the extreme 
skepticism of some regarding the very possibility of scholarly under-
standing—can support an interdisciplinary exploration of how the world 
actually works (and should work). It is quite consistent with the emphasis 
of interdisciplinarians on the limitations of discipline-based analysis. It 
supports a pluralist outlook: no discipline is perfect but all have some-
thing to contribute.
The points made above apply to the humanities just as well as to the 
social sciences. To be sure, there may be important differences of degree 
in certain respects: language is more ambiguous in poetry than in engi-
neering designs, and it may be harder to perceive accurately a work of art 
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than a rock. But once it is accepted that postmodern critiques provide no 
absolute barrier to enhanced understanding then this pursuit should be 
engaged as zealously in the humanities as elsewhere. And this is impor-
tant, for there are important questions that lie primarily within the scope 
of humanities inquiry.
In literary scholarship, postmodernism has squeezed out attention to 
the ways in which literature (and art and culture more generally) affects 
authors, readers, and the societies in which these are situated (and vice 
versa).10 The pendulum is hopefully beginning to swing back: these impor-
tant questions can again be engaged, though with enhanced appreciation 
of the difficulties scholars face in achieving an accurate understanding. 
Enhanced understanding here as elsewhere is most likely through the 
integration of insights from multiple disciplines. Literary theory can be 
integrated with insights from psychology and sociology. Textual analysis 
can likewise be integrated with insights from surveys, interviews, obser-
vation, and statistical analysis.
gRand veRsus integRated theoRy
Interdisciplinary studies in the humanities often occurs under the banner 
of some grand theory: Marxian, feminist, psychoanalytic, cultural theory, 
and so on. The impulse toward grand theory has hardly disappeared in 
social science (and legions of economists still seem to think that rational 
choice theory is the only theory), but it has weakened in recent decades as 
most attempts at the “theory of everything” are perceived to have failed. A 
few points made (or at least hinted at) above deserve to be repeated here:
 • No theory is perfect.11
 • Interdisciplinary understanding thus comes from the 
integration of insights from multiple theories.
 • The main goal of scholarship is to identify which theories 
are of greatest importance along particular causal links (and 
under different circumstances). That is, we should seek to 
identify the (overlapping) range of applicability of each theory. 
Natural scientists are much more devoted to this task than 
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either social scientists or humanists.
 • Communities of scholars organized around a theoretical 
outlook are likely to emphasize its power rather than its 
limitations. Disciplines are often guilty of this sin, of course, 
but interdisciplinary groupings devoted to a particular theory 
are perhaps even more prone to this.
 • This need not be the case. Such a community could recognize 
that its favoured theory is not perfect. Indeed such an attitude 
has strategic value. If a community argues (even implicitly) 
that its theory is powerful everywhere, then evidence that 
the theory is weak in any circumstance can be interpreted as 
evidence that the theory is wrong rather than just limited in 
scope.
 • Scholarship advances best when competing theories are 
compared, contrasted, and synthesized. This cannot occur if a 
community refuses to recognize the possibility that alternative 
theories may have merit.
 • Rule (1997) worried that a theory-driven research agenda was 
inferior to an explanation-driven agenda in two key ways. 
First, all research done in the name of that theory would be 
lost when the theory went out of vogue. Second, evidence that 
lies outside of the scope of the theory is simply ignored. I have 
used the Rule dichotomy myself to show how economists’ 
understanding of the Great Depression (among other things) 
is weaker than it could be because economists focused almost 
exclusively on testing macroeconomic theories; they thus 
ignored profound evidence that the time-path of technological 
innovation during the interwar period was highly unusual 
(Szostak 2005). Humanists should avoid this error.
Scholars should not be shy of seeking theoretical generalization. But they 
should not expect any one theory to have all the answers. A fairly simple 
change of attitude can thus lead to a more constructive and cumulative 
interdisciplinary scholarship.
We can briefly relate our discussion here back to our previous discus-
sion of historical scholarship. Some historians make little explicit use of 
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theory. Others draw on some of the better-known human science theories. 
Historians have tended to emphasize a few social science theories, such 
as psychoanalysis or feminist theory, while ignoring others (Gilderhus 
2002, chap. 3). Being explicit about theory, and investigating how differ-
ent theories fare along different causal links, will encourage historians to 
look for new theories when existing theories prove insufficient. Note that 
a typology of theory can be invaluable here. Since human science itself 
favours certain types of theory over others, historians may often need to 
develop their own theories. Note also that there is little reason to use a 
variety of theories or methods unless some attempt will be made to inte-
grate these (Smith 1996, 141–42).
Postmodernists warn in particular of the dangers of “meta-narra-
tives.” The approach taken here is consonant with that recommendation. 
Scholars have been urged to examine each causal link in its own right but 
to remain conscious that each link is related to other links and influenced 
by a host of other phenomena. Likewise, scholars should be aware of rel-
evant theories but not assume that a particular link is entirely determined 
by any theory. Historians are right to be skeptical of the meta-narratives 
of speculative historians such as Hegel, Marx, or Fukuyama. Yet rejecting 
these raises the question: What is the purpose of history if the detailed 
analyses of historians cannot someday be tied into a broader story? 
(Lemon 2003, 7–13). By emphasizing causal links, and embracing theo-
retical flexibility, historians can add to a coherent human understanding 
without embracing the simplifications of speculative history.12
gRand Method
What has been said regarding theory can also be said about method. I cel-
ebrate the inroads that (non-nihilistic versions of) textual analysis have 
made in the social sciences in recent decades. Yet it would be just as great 
an error to treat textual analysis as “the scholarly method” as it is to view 
experiments or statistical analysis in this way (as far too many psycholo-
gists and economists do respectively). The world may indeed be a text, but 
that does not mean that there is only one way to study it.
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Literary scholars, then, should be interdisciplinarians rather than 
methodological imperialists. They should celebrate the insights that tex-
tual analysis can provide across all fields while in turn appreciating that 
there are other methods that provide useful insights, even into literary 
studies. As with theories, there is a real danger that a community of schol-
ars organized around a particular method will be unable to perceive its 
limitations. As an economist I can attest to the sad inability of too many 
economists to understand an argument not expressed in the form of a 
mathematical model. I would not wish such a fate on literary studies.
Moreover, different methods turn out to be good at identifying differ-
ent types of theory. (I have elsewhere [2004] asked the same five questions 
of methods as of theories and am thus able to show in detail how particu-
lar methods will favour particular theory types.) Emphasizing only one 
method thus necessarily biases scholarly judgment toward certain types 
of theory.
tRavelling veRsus stable concep ts
Bal (2002) celebrates the ambiguity of “travelling” concepts in the human-
ities. Since concepts mean different things to different groups of scholars, 
they force novel appreciations as they migrate across communities. As 
they travel, their meaning and use change, stimulating new thoughts. Bal 
sees this ambiguity as a major source of creativity in the humanities.
I disagree with Bal, though the difference is likely one of degree. Scholarly 
understanding comes from clarity, not confusion. Of course, it is useful to 
appreciate the ambiguity of language (see above) and to interrogate how 
different people interpret a word. And we have celebrated textual analy-
sis above: careful analysis of texts often exposes hidden meanings. But 
there is a big difference between facing up to ambiguity and celebrating 
ambiguity. There is a host of better ways of stimulating our imaginations 
than simply not understanding what other people are saying. Notably, Bal 
herself appreciates that concepts to be useful must be “clear, explicit, and 
defined.” I would argue that we can have the advantages of stimulating 
new thinking without suffering the disadvantages of excessive ambiguity. 
My difference with Bal is likely (as is so often the case in interdisciplinary 
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analysis) a difference in degree rather than of kind. Bal sees both advan-
tages and disadvantages in ambiguity. I am much more conscious of the 
disadvantages, and thus—while conscious that some degree of ambiguity 
may not only be inevitable but desirable—suspect that in most cases we 
should push for greater clarity. There are several strategies for doing so:
 • The best concepts are those that refer to one phenomenon or a 
characteristic of one phenomenon. These can be defined quite 
precisely within a classification of phenomena. Classification 
and clarity go together: the act of placing a phenomenon 
within a classification tells us both what kind of thing it is and 
what kind of thing it is not. For example, I have defined culture 
precisely as a particular set of values and behaviours; my 
classification clearly distinguishes these from politics or art.
 • Other useful concepts refer to theories or methods or 
components thereof. Again, classification is the key to clarity.
 • It does not seem extreme to demand that all concepts be 
defined clearly in terms of what they are and are not, and thus 
all concepts should be tied to classifications.13
 • Concepts such as patriarchy or globalization or social 
capital that refer to some vague combination of phenomena, 
theoretical arguments, and/or methods, do not enhance 
scholarly understanding. These need to be broken into 
component parts that lend themselves to clarity. Only if it 
can be shown that there is a very tight relationship among 
components will it be useful to pursue analysis at the level of 
the overall concept rather than its components. If we wish to 
combat patriarchy or globalization we need to understand how 
these operate internally. We cannot just treat them as a black 
box or assume that they generate every evil in the world.14
 • In particular, note the importance of distinguishing concepts 
that refer to a particular phenomenon (such as gender) 
from concepts that refer to a particular realization of that 
phenomenon (such as the gender relations in a particular 
society). A statement beginning “Men will. . .” needs to be 
interrogated to see if its meaning is general or specific.
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 • Julie Klein raises the issue of “boundary work” elsewhere in 
this volume.. Of course when communities begin to interact 
it is invaluable for scholars to work at establishing common 
understandings so that conversation can proceed. My response 
was that this is a very time-intensive process, and many 
interdisciplinary ventures may be stillborn as a result of initial 
difficulties in communication. It would thus be better if we 
could achieve a core set of shared understandings across the 
academy of at least the phenomena we study and the theories 
and methods we use, and then each community carefully 
ground its core concepts in terms of these.
 • Several participants in the symposium suggested that the best 
path to understanding the varied meanings of a word is to 
research its history. This can be a useful strategy at times, to 
be sure. Yet human communication would be a troublesome 
process indeed if we needed to understand the historical 
origins of every word we use. Moreover, historical analysis 
inevitably suggests a variety of meanings. As scholars we 
need of course to beware that words may carry meanings 
quite different from those consciously intended. Yet, again, 
ambiguity need not be celebrated but rather opposed: we can 
strive to limit the present core meanings of a word to a subset 
(ideally one) of the meanings it has carried historically.
Humanists and social scientists should each pursue both clarity of termi-
nology and careful statement of argument, because these are simply good 
scholarly practice. The fact that clarity is a goal to strive for but never per-
fectly achieve should hardly dissuade us from the task, especially in an age 
when philosophers recognize that no scientific or ethical statement can be 
proved. It is likely the case that questions such as “How does art move us?” 
lend themselves to a poetic treatment (but note that ambiguity of word 
meanings suits the poet much better than the scholar), but this does not 
mean that the broad outlines of the argument cannot be stated clearly.15 
Likewise, analogies and metaphors may be more powerful in the humani-
ties than in the social sciences, but good scholarly practice requires that 
analogies be interrogated for potentially misleading associations.
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RevolutionaRy veRsus noRMal science
It is often thought, not without reason, that scholarship in the humani-
ties is more creative than scholarship in the social sciences. The latter at 
its best can be reproduced, the former perhaps not. As suggested above, 
the exploration of how poetry moves us may best be served by a more 
stylish treatment than an explication of how banking regulation affects 
economic activity. As such, humanists may be attracted to the idea that 
interdisciplinarity is inherently a creative, even revolutionary act. Social 
scientists in turn may shun interdisciplinarity if they see it as lacking a 
shared methodology that allows insights to be built upon through time.
Some have wondered if interdisciplinary research is revolutionary as 
opposed to normal science (see Szostak 2011). To be sure, scientific revo-
lutions more often than not reflect the integration of insights from mul-
tiple fields. Yet to believe that interdisciplinary research is definitionally 
revolutionary is to suggest that the vast bulk of scholars should attend to 
specialized research and only the rare creative genius should tackle inter-
disciplinary research. While interdisciplinary research may well be more 
creative on average than specialized research, it is critical that it not be (or 
be perceived to be) necessarily revolutionary.
The challenge, then, is to identify procedures for interdisciplinary 
research that can guide large numbers of researchers without limiting the 
creativity of interdisciplinary analysis. Since interdisciplinarity is an anti-
dote to disciplinary biases, it must itself not become narrowly focused. 
Must structure restrict freedom, or is it possible that “thinking outside the 
box” can be aided by knowing where the box is?
Interdisciplinary research can be guided by a set of (iterative) steps—
some straightforward, others more challenging—that nevertheless encour-
age researchers to engage the full range of scholarly theory and method. 
These processes developed by the author and others do not limit creativ-
ity within interdisciplinary research. As Repko (2008) has shown—in a 
path-breaking text on how to perform interdisciplinary research—they are 
as applicable in the humanities as in the social sciences (or indeed natu-
ral sciences).
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concluding ReMaRKs
We need to be careful about reifying observed practices in the humani-
ties and social sciences. These reflect complex historical processes. The 
world we see around us need not be the best of all possible worlds. Nor 
are the differences we observe across the humanities and social sciences 
inevitable.
Humanists and social scientists have much to learn from each other. 
Interdisciplinarians have much to learn from both. Rather than celebrat-
ing observed differences, interdisciplinarians should be guided to inte-
grate these. In particular, interdisciplinarians should urge all scholars 
toward clarity, causal analysis, comparative research, theoretical flex-
ibility, methodological flexibility, a constructive recognition of disciplin-
ary and other scholarly biases, and an appreciation of the possibility of a 
cumulative interdisciplinary scholarship that links all areas of the acad-
emy (and beyond).
notes
1 My first exposure to this distinction involved its application by James Welch iv and 
others to approaches to interdisciplinarity: see Newell et al. (2003). Nietzsche (1872) had 
popularized the distinction, arguing that tragedy depended on the integrative tension 
between the two. He at least implicitly argued that philosophy, and scholarship more 
generally, would also benefit from both. (It was pointed out to me at the symposium 
on which the present volume is based that Nietzsche occasionally spoke of a third 
disposition, in which case the Dionysian became a middle ground.) Benedict (1934) 
argued that the terms could be used to classify cultures. I am unaware of previous 
applications of the terms to historical methodology.
2 See my Classifying Science (2004), which provides both a typology of theory types and a 
list of the dozen scholarly methods. In both cases their key strengths and weaknesses are 
outlined.
3 The word “clarity” itself is not free from ambiguity. Clarity is defined here as a situation 
in which the communicator and the audience share a similar enough definition of key 
terms that they understand one another. Since understanding is never perfect, we must 
necessarily engage “degrees of clarity.” That is not a problem: the argument here is that 
scholars should always strive for clarity even if this can never be perfectly achieved. I 
have described elsewhere (2003) how the scholarly literature on culture is unnecessarily 
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vague but in fact involves the investigation of hundreds of distinct causal linkages 
involving distinct elements of the phenomenon of culture.
4 For Burke, Goody, and Daunton, see Pallares-Burke (2002, 154, 20–26, and 164, 
respectively).
5 Roehner and Syme (2002) follow the strategy of breaking events into component parts 
and comparing the parts across events using a variety of methods. They argue that this 
represents a “scientific” approach to history.
6 The argument is thus similar to Burke (2005), who advocates a Braudelian total history 
that integrates economic, political, social, cultural, and other forces.
7 Notably, the recent phenomenon of micro-narratives, in which historians engage events 
or processes of local interest, is grounded in a belief that general lessons can be drawn 
by comparison across such studies.
8 To be sure, a minority of phenomena, such as personality dimensions, cannot be 
identified without recourse to human science theory. Scholarly understanding of the 
nature of these may evolve through time. Cumulative historical understanding will still 
be possible in such instances as long as classifications are clearly specified.
9 Dow (2001, 61–76) makes a compelling argument that postmodernism is the antithesis 
of modernism and thus will inevitably be transcended by some synthesis of the two. 
(Jack Amariglio, in commenting on her paper, notes that this desire for a “third way” 
is widely felt and can be couched in language that eschews the intellectual baggage 
associated with thesis/antithesis/synthesis.) Dow argues that (skeptical) postmodernism 
as “anything goes” is unsustainable, for there is then no good reason to bother with 
scholarly argument; however, it has brought modernist precepts into question such that 
a return to modernism is impossible.
10 I have argued (2007b, 69–80) that the humanities are best defined in terms of an 
interest in the causal relations to/from the category of art (which includes literature). 
History and area studies have a more complex role to play: seeing whether the scholarly 
understanding of a diversity of causal relationships allows us to understand how 
different societies both work and change through time. And philosophy operates on a 
higher plane altogether. Humanists should use the same theories and methods as social 
scientists, though there will inevitably be differences in emphasis.
11 I have made this point elsewhere (2004) by placing theories within a five-dimensional 
typology of theory types: theories that excel in one way (as rational choice theory excels 
with respect to individuals making rational decisions) must necessarily be weak in 
others (group decisions, attitude formation, and non-rational decisions).
12 As for grand theories that purport to explain many/most/all causal links, a good working 
hypothesis is that each of these provides more insight into some links than others. For 
example, Mahoney and Rueuschemeyer (2003, 5) speak of major theoretical conflicts 
between structuralism and culturalism. If culturalist theory aids understanding of 
how cultural attitudes influence certain decisions, and structuralist theory shows how 
institutions affect those same decisions, why not integrate these approaches?
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13 It was noted at the symposium that there are many ‘bad’ classifications that fail to 
support clarity because they are organized illogically and/or omit important elements 
(in which case it is not clear if the elements classified are distinct from those not 
mentioned). I stress that I am making an empirical argument: that an exhaustive 
and logical classification can support clarity. The argument can only be evaluated 
in the context of a particular classification. I have elsewhere (2004) developed such 
classifications of phenomena, theories, and methods.
14 Halperin (1997, 71–72) argues that scholars must grapple with six types of relationships 
between concepts. One of these, “X causes Y,” would be reflected in causal links. A 
second, “X is part of Y,” is captured by classification. Two more, “X is a characteristic 
of Y” and “X is an example of Y,” would be important in defining phenomena or 
characterizing causal links. A fifth, “X is like Y,” might capture certain similarities. 
Finally, “X is evidence of Y” guides us to distinguish argument from evidence. In all 
six cases, clarity of the sorts advocated above supports scholarly understanding. See 
Szostak (2004, 41–45).
15 Note that when natural scientists are first studying a “new” phenomenon or process, 
such as genes or dna, there is perhaps inevitably a great degree of ambiguity in 
definition, though this tends to decrease over time.
WoRKs cited
Abbott, Andrew. 1994. “History and Sociology: The Lost Synthesis,” In The Uses of 
History Across the Social Sciences, edited by Eric H. Monkkonen, 77–112. Durham, 
nc: Duke University Press.
Ankersmit, F. R. 2001. Historical Representation. Stanford, ca: Stanford University Press.
Arnold, John H. 2000. History: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bal, Mieke. 2002. Travelling Concepts in the Humanities: A Rough Guide. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press.
Benedict, Ruth. 1934. Patterns of Culture. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
Burke, Paul. 2005. History and Social Theory. 2nd ed. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Dow, Sheila. 2001. “Modernism and Postmodernism: A Dialectical Analysis.” In 
Postmodernism, Economics and Knowledge, edited by Stephen Cullenberg, Jack 
Amariglio, and David F. Ruccio, 61–76. London: Routledge.
Gilderhus, Mark T. 2002. History and Historians: A Historiographic Introduction. 5th ed. 
Upper Saddle River, nJ: Prentice-Hall.
Ginzburg, Carlo. 1999. History, Rhetoric, and Proof. Hanover, nh: University Press of New 
England.
Halperin, Diane F. 1997. Critical Thinking Across the Curriculum. Mahwah, nJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum.
Valences of Interdisciplinarity.indd   187 28/02/2012   4:31:31 PM
188 RicK szostaK
Jensen, Gary F. 1997. “Time and Social History: Problems of Atemporality in Historical 
Analyses with Illustrations from Research on Early Modern Witch Hunts.” Historical 
Methods 30 (1): 46–57.
Lemon, Michael C. 2003. Philosophy of History: A Guide for Students. London: Routledge.
Lloyd, Christopher. 1993. The Structures of History. Cambridge: Blackwell.
Mahoney, James, and Dietrich Rueuschemeyer. 2003. “Comparative Historical Analysis: 
Achievements and Agendas.” In Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social 
Sciences, edited by James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueuschemeyer, 3–38. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Munslow, Alun. 1997. Deconstructing History. London: Routledge.
Newell, William H., James Hall, Steven Hutkins, Daniel Larner, Eric McGuckin, and 
Karen Oates. 2003. “Apollo Meets Dionysius: Interdisciplinarity in Long-standing 
Interdisciplinary Programs.” Issues in Integrative Studies 21: 9–42
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1872. The Birth of Tragedy. Repr. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999.
Pallares-Burke, Maria. 2002. The New History: Confessions and Conversations. London: 
Polity.
Repko, Allen F. 2008. Interdisciplinary Research: Process and Theory. Thousand Oaks, 
ca: Sage.
Roehner, Bertrand N., and Tony Syme. 2002. Pattern and Repertoire in History. 
Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press.
Rosenau, Pauline M. 1992. Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
Rule, James B. 1997. Theory and Progress in Social Science. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Smith, Rogers M. 1996. “Science, Non-Science, and Politics.” In The Historic Turn in the 
Human Sciences, edited by Terrence J. McDonald, 119–60. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press.
Szostak, Rick. 2003. A Schema for Unifying Human Science: Interdisciplinary Perspectives 
on Culture. Selinsgrove, pa: Susquehanna University Press.
———. 2004. Classifying Science: Phenomena, Data, Theory, Method, Practice. Dordrecht: 
Springer.
———. 2005. “Evaluating the Historiography of the Great Depression: Explanation or 
Single-Theory Driven?” Journal of Economic Methodology 12 (1): 35–61.
———. 2007a. “Modernism, Postmodernism, and Interdisciplinarity” Issues in Integrative 
Studies 25: 32–83.
———. 2007b. “How (and How Not) to Distinguish the Humanities from Social Science.” 
International Journal of the Humanities 5 (6): 69–80.
———. 2011. “The Interdisciplinary Research Process.” In Case Studies in Interdisciplinary 
Research, edited by Allen F. Repko, William H. Newell, and Rick Szostak, 3–19. 
Thousand Oaks, ca: Sage.
Valences of Interdisciplinarity.indd   188 28/02/2012   4:31:31 PM
paRt tWo  •  pRactIce
Valences of Interdisciplinarity.indd   189 28/02/2012   4:31:31 PM
Valences of Interdisciplinarity.indd   190 28/02/2012   4:31:31 PM
191
8
Ecological Thinking as Interdisciplinary Practice
Situation, Silence, and Skepticism
l o R R a I n e  c o d e 
ecological thinKing
My purpose here is to propose that an ecologically modelled approach to 
knowledge opens the way to more productive engagement with diverse 
kinds and objects of knowledge than the social-conceptual structures that 
the hegemonic social-epistemic imaginary of mastery and control make 
available.1 Ecological thinking is interdisciplinary, albeit in a troubled 
sense which I will address in the final section of this essay.
Ecological thinking works across and through a range of subject mat-
ters and disciplinary territories, often acting as a scavenger in its quest for 
viable epistemic sources and resources. It requires knowing the detail of 
place, population, and particularity, and thus requires reading, talking, 
thinking, studying widely, beyond the artificial boundaries of philosophy. 
It emerges from and addresses multiple interwoven, sometimes contra-
dictory social-epistemological positionings—feminist, classist, environ-
mental, postcolonial, racist, sexist—with the result that its detail and 
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implications require multi-faceted chartings. Yet ecological thinking is 
not simply thinking about ecology or about “the environment,” although 
these figure among its concerns. It is a revisioned mode of engagement 
with knowledge, subjectivity, politics, ethics, science, citizenship, and 
agency that pervades and reconfigures theory and practice at multiple 
levels. It does not reduce to a set of rules or methods; it may play out 
differently from location to location; but it is sufficiently coherent to be 
interpreted and enacted across widely diverse situations. As I conceive 
it, ecological thinking can generate responsible remappings of the epis-
temic and social-political terrains, animated by an attentiveness to diver-
sity and specificity and by a commitment to ideals of citizenship and the 
preservation of the public trust, all of which concerns are notably absent 
from putatively universal, a priori theories of knowledge and action. It 
proposes ways of engaging with the implications of patterns, places, and 
interconnections of lives and events in and across the human and other-
than-human world, in scientific and secular projects of inquiry where the 
traditional dividing line between the Naturwissenschaften (natural sci-
ences) and Geisteswissenschaften (human sciences) is blurred, and where 
epistemic and ethical-political matters are reciprocally informative. To 
show what these rather grandiose claims involve, in this essay I read 
Rachel Carson’s epistemic practice as exemplary, in a quasi-literal sense, 
of ecological thinking at work for her manner of engaging with the detail 
and wider implications of situation and secular testimony in her investi-
gations of how the once cacophonous North American spring was grow-
ing silent; and I show, metaphorically, how a specifically located health 
care system in Tanzania was reconstructed in ways whose success can be 
read as a consequence of notably ecological responsiveness to the detail 
of population and place.
Within this broad conceptual frame, I am interested in how doing epis-
temic justice to people silenced, ignored, or subjugated by received con-
ceptions of knowledge and to places, events, or circumstances that fall 
outside the purview of what is readily knowable in spectator epistemolo-
gies is complicated by patterns of incredulity, ignorance, and mistrust 
that operate through the discourses of white Western affluent societies. 
A curious politics of unknowing silently contributes to how people recog-
nize and respond to “difference”: to judgments about whose knowledge 
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matters or can claim a hearing, whose putative knowledge warrants or 
fails to claim acknowledgment in intransigent social structures of skepti-
cism and incredulity. It produces a certain epistemic inertia, a resistance 
to looking beyond the instituted imaginings that hold received views in 
place.
Philosophically, I call my position ecological naturalism, and situ-
ate it in the vicinity of W.V.O. Quine’s epistemology naturalized and its 
successors.2 Yet I resist Quineans’ adherence to a stringently scientistic 
conception of knowledge and methodology, and the “unnaturalness” of 
their conceptions of “the natural.” Quinean naturalism is inhospitable to 
the social-political critique of institutions of knowledge production which 
figures centrally in the approach I propose. Thus, working horizontally 
across the epistemic terrain while evaluating the knowledge-enhancing 
or knowledge-thwarting specificities of the terrain itself, eschewing prac-
tices of viewing evidence through top-down, superimposed theoretical 
frames, ecological naturalism aims to unsettle the hegemony of dislo-
cated instrumental reason—of “the view from nowhere”—and the insti-
tuted epistemic imaginary of mastery and control from which it emerges. 
Indebted methodologically and ideologically to the science of ecology, to 
environmentalism, and to the ethical-political impetus that inspired many 
of the new ecological and other social movements in the second half of the 
twentieth century, ecological naturalism offers more “natural” accounts 
of human epistemic practices and their products than formal epistemo-
logical analysis or Quinean naturalism can offer: it proposes richer, less 
reductive possibilities for transformative, emancipatory epistemology.
Looking to the knowledge ecological naturalism requires, my proposal 
applauds the successes of modern science in explaining and producing 
ways of “managing” the physical universe, and to the power of empirical 
inquiry. But it interrogates physical science’s hegemony in the academy, 
the marketplace, and other institutions of knowledge production, and its 
trickle-down effects into people’s daily lives, where it installs monolithic 
and monologic norms of epistemic practice. Physical science—and tech-
nology—are neither the only nor the only reliable forms of knowledge: 
physics-derived models and methods offer neither definitive nor appro-
priate exemplars for all scientific inquiry, or for knowledge “in general.” 
Hence, if science-derived models or regulative instances of knowledge are 
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required, ecological science provides more diversified, more “natural” 
exemplars than those that Quinean naturalists have employed.
Departing from the positivism of Anglo-American philosophy of 
science (whose traces linger in Quinean naturalism)—in which inter-
changeable observers leave their subjectivity and agency, interests and 
enthusiasms, actions and interactions, prejudices and hopes outside the 
laboratory door, isolating their disinterested epistemic practices from 
what Bruno Latour (2004) aptly calls “matters of concern”3—ecological 
naturalism looks to the new (by comparison with physics, chemistry, 
geology, astronomy) science of ecology. It is politically engaged inquiry, 
accountable for the knowledge it produces, often explicitly and unabash-
edly conducting its inquiries in the service of values, commitments, 
agendas, and political programs that have themselves to be kept open 
to critical, deliberative evaluation. Ecological naturalism regards scien-
tific and other discipline-specific knowing as continuous with modes of 
knowing that inform “everyday life” and are integral to developing and 
sustaining habitats and collectivities conducive to enabling people to live 
well together. It is contiguous with and makes common cause with some 
versions of social epistemology, and with many feminist and other post-
colonial knowledge projects (see Code 2010).
Ecological naturalism looks to sciences that are operative within 
and contributors to ecology as they circulate literally (in their scientific 
modes), and metaphorically (in more secular modes), within the insti-
tuted epistemic imaginary. Refusing to separate human knowers from 
the knowledge they produce or knowledge production from its constitu-
tive practices or from the social-moral-political effects of its circulation, it 
takes the peculiarities of subjectivity, cognitive agency, and geographical-
material-historical-cultural location seriously into account, not as deter-
mining, but as often inflecting knowledge and knowing. Thus, I suggest, 
ecological science affords a more plausible exemplar for knowledge pro-
duction than cognitive science, to which Quinean naturalists appeal. Its 
reliance on multiple and diverse field studies where knowers are, by defi-
nition, precisely situated as active participants in producing and testing 
knowledge claims makes it implausible to imagine them isolated from the 
knowledge they produce, even when they appeal to laboratory-derived 
experimental evidence for pieces of it. In these and other respects, too, 
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ecological thinking is continuous with and makes common cause with 
feminist theories of strong objectivity and situated knowledges.
As I have noted, in characterizing ecological thinking in my 2006 
book, I draw on the epistemic practices I find implicit in Rachel Carson’s 
methods of inquiry, working back and forth as she does from field stud-
ies to scientific analyses, explanations and experiments, specifically 
located experiential (anecdotal) evidence, and local (or larger) histories 
of the sites and species she studies. Self-consciously and proudly, Carson 
writes both for scientists and for the “general public,” in a language that 
often leaves the rhetoric of “normal science” behind. In consequence, like 
many practitioners who refuse the confines of disciplinarity, she forfeits a 
certain professional stature. Yet the result, for those who are prepared to 
go the distance with her, is to promote a more participatory, democratic 
epistemology than the uncontaminated purity of the discourses of mas-
tery can allow and to underscore the significance of remaining critically 
open to multiple and unexpected lines of inquiry. The place she accords 
to experiential—testimonial—evidence consolidates this claim, while at 
once exacerbating the tension that pervades her work and enhancing its 
productive import. I will illustrate my reasons for locating Carson’s prac-
tice as I do by appealing to an epistemology I find implicit in the case 
studies and methods operative in her Silent Spring (1962).
There, Carson displays ecological thinking at work across diverse 
modes of knowledge, domains of inquiry, and subject matters: bringing 
together scientific and experiential evidence to produce conclusions suf-
ficiently particular to address the distinctive character of precisely indi-
viduated local phenomena; sufficiently cognizant of wider patterns in 
nature to generate hypotheses for knowing other, relevantly analogous 
phenomena; and sufficiently informed and coherent to engage with the 
agendas of policy makers, the doubts of disbelievers, and the bewil-
derment of a public caught between “expert” scientific assurances and 
experiential incongruities. The very complexity of each separate subject 
matter requires her to be multiply literate and multilingual: to speak the 
language of laboratory science, wildlife organizations, government agen-
cies, chemical-producing companies, secular nature lovers, and many 
others; to understand the detail of scientific documents and the force of 
experiential reports; to work back and forth between variations on the 
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imagery of mastery and of ecology—sometimes, all for the sake of under-
standing something so very small as a beetle.
Nor does Carson conduct her research only in controlled observation 
conditions, although she is guided by and returns to laboratory research 
from the field where she studies living things in their habitat, studying 
the habitat itself just as systematically, in its detail and interactions with 
its inhabitants. In a language that Donna Haraway (1991) has made avail-
able, this is situated knowledge, elaborated to show that “situation” is not 
just a place from which to know, as the language of “perspectives” implies, 
indifferently available to anyone who chooses to stand there. Situation 
is itself a place to know whose intricacies have to be examined for how 
they “shape” knowing subjects and the objects of knowledge; how they 
legitimate and/or disqualify knowledge projects; how they are consti-
tuted by and constitutive of entrenched social imaginaries, together with 
the rhetoric that holds them in place. It is an achieved epistemic stance, 
knowledgeably chosen as a place that can be mapped to facilitate respon-
sible knowing.
Thus the working back and forth in which Carson engages partici-
pates, before its time, in challenging many of the dichotomies integral 
to the history of Western theory and practice, which feminist and other 
postcolonial epistemologists have also contested. Her work is bound nei-
ther by regulative contrasts between intellectual and emotional activity 
nor between mental and manual labour; it evinces no separation between 
abstract thought and concrete, sensuous activity, nor between the ideas 
and practices of “everyday life” and those that derive from formal institu-
tions of knowledge production. But neither does it descend into chaos or 
arbitrariness. It is no mere casual sampling, no undisciplined conglom-
erate. Carson’s practice exposes such entrenched dichotomies as artifi-
cial and coercive, and thus limiting, for knowledge gathering practices. 
Hence, she lives a pervasive yet productive tension, working back and 
forth between an instituted, rhetorically monitored scientific orthodoxy 
and an attentive respect for particularity that is subversive of many of the 
fundamental assumptions of scientific orthodoxy. In the public and in 
the scientific imagination, orthodox science is “hard” science, governed, 
in the going epistemic imaginary, by its allegiance to a deductive-nomo-
logical model whose purpose is to deduce monolithic, reliably predictive 
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laws. The working back and forth that makes Carson’s ecological practice 
possible, together with the contributions her craft and her training as a 
writer make to her work, moves the tension she lives into an ironic regis-
ter, for the fact of her directing her work, throughout her life, to a general 
and not solely to a specialized audience, “softens” it, further unsettling 
the rhetoric and subverting the aura of esotericism surrounding modern 
science and orthodox epistemology. (Parenthetically, gesturing toward a 
topic that falls outside the purview of this essay, there is little doubt that 
the many gendered attacks on Carson’s work and on her person had their 
source, at least partially, in this perceived subversiveness. See, for exam-
ple, Lytle 2007; Smith 2001.)
Ecological naturalism amounts neither to an a priori inquiry nor to 
an explicitly normative project, in the orthodox rule-following sense. It 
begins in and deliberates about situations and practices; its recommen-
dations are empirically-experientially informed, and self-confessedly 
fallible. These recommendations evince a certain pragmatism, albeit in 
an eclectic, secular sense which claims no precise allegiance to any spe-
cific pragmatist philosopher(s). In its manner of working back and forth 
between theory and practice, according to each a constitutive yet critical 
place in inquiry; in its tacit yet persistent commitment to addressing and 
intervening in perceived social-environmental-institutional wrongs—its 
concern with evaluating and transforming the situations where inquiry 
takes place—ecological thinking claims a place alongside the praxis of 
some of the leading American pragmatists. Ecological thinking often 
works by analogy from example to example, case to case, reaffirming a 
wariness of reductionism and premature closure, opening new deliber-
ative spaces for epistemic negotiation. It may appear to limit the range 
of justifiable, definitive knowledge claims, yet it maintains vigilance for 
irresponsible, careless, too-swift knowings that fail to do justice to their 
objects of study. It fosters a productive ideal of responsibility, rooted nei-
ther in individualism nor in an implausible voluntarism, yet attentive to 
the climatic conditions—both human and other-than-human—in which 
much scientific and other research in the twenty-first century takes place. 
It could more aptly be categorized as extra-disciplinary than as interdisci-
plinary in not being confined within disciplinary boundaries, seeking its 
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sources in events, experiences, circumstances: in the media, in literature, 
and in everyday lives.
Some might have difficulty imagining how ecological thinking could 
translate into wider issues of citizenship and politics, but the answer, at 
once simple and profound, is that ecological thinking is about imagin-
ing, crafting, articulating, endeavouring to enact principles of optimally 
viable cohabitation. Because it is so finely tuned an approach, it has the 
potential in its micro-practices to capture detail and nuance that slip 
through larger, discipline-specific evidence-sifting grids and precast tem-
plates, and thus to achieve linkages from location to location that could 
begin to close a gap that has held theories of knowledge and action at a 
distance from the experiences and practices they have sought to expli-
cate. In its macro-practices, it engages critically with the widespread 
implications of discourses and practices of mastery, and constructively 
with the transformative potential of ecological reconfigurations. Ecology, 
literally (as in Carson’s practice), looks to state-of-the-art ecological sci-
ence for some of the substance of its deliberations; yet it assumes neither 
that science has a direct line to “the truth” nor that it merits uncontested 
licence to intervene where it pleases. Ecology, metaphorically (as in the 
example I will now recount), draws situated inquiries together, maps 
their interrelations, consonances and contrasts, their mutually sustain-
ing or impoverishing consequences, from a commitment to generating a 
creatively interrogative, instituting social imaginary to denaturalize the 
imaginary of mastery that has represented itself as “the only natural way” 
of being and knowing. Thus it is not a single, hard-edged discipline, but a 
practice that enlists a range of disciplinary and extra-disciplinary exper-
tise and wisdom.
situation,  silence,  and sKep ticisM
In this section I offer a reading of a situation in which ecological thinking 
contributes to thinking well about circumstances under which local infor-
mants had been consigned to silence and their testimony discounted, 
denied acknowledgment as knowledgeable in a climate of pervasive, 
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stereotype-derived skepticism. (For a more complete analysis of the fol-
lowing example, see Code 2008.)
In the 1990s in Tanzania, for a per-capita annual cost of less than the 
price of a cup of coffee in North America, a Canadian idRc (International 
Development Research Centre)-funded project was instrumental in turn-
ing an entire health system around, moving it from ossified methods of 
gathering, evaluating, and circulating knowledge and tired old admin-
istrative practices and distributions of epistemic power and authority, 
toward a responsive, responsible, democratic complex of social-natural 
epistemic interactions. The reversal that came about moves from a top-
down epistemology of mastery—where knowledge also belongs to “the 
masters”—to what amounts to an extended enactment of ecological 
thinking, marked by a learned sensitivity to issues of local habitus and 
ethos and a redistribution of cognitive authority across a diverse geo-
graphic and epistemic terrain. Each stage required painstaking epis-
temic negotiations with intransigent bureaucratic administrations and 
efficiency-driven multinational funding agencies, en route to advocating 
reconfigured ways of knowing and acting, and working toward repairing 
lacunae in a received, intransigent, hermeneutical repertoire. Here I will 
sketch the project’s epistemic and moral-political trajectory.
Post-independence Tanzania from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s, 
under Julius Nyerere, had boasted an impressive health care system, 
based on a “unique social contract.” Citizens had—allegedly volun-
tarily—relocated to modern villages to become the beneficiaries of gov-
ernment programs which, for each village, provided a school, pumped 
water, access to a health clinic and teachers, health workers, drugs, and 
other medical supplies. Yet despite its striking initial successes, by the 
early 1990s the system was disintegrating. Among the central reasons for 
its disintegration, according to the World Bank’s 1993 Report, were the 
international debt crisis of the 1980s, the unresponsive inefficiency of 
the central management, and a consequent deterioration in village infra-
structures. Hence, Tanzanians endured a health crisis for most of a gen-
eration even as hiv/aids was sweeping across the country and recurrent 
infectious diseases were “brutally rearrang[ing] the social landscape.” 
Nor did new funding, administered centrally from Dar es Salaam, succeed 
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in providing a solution. The idRc’s Fixing Health Systems report exposes 
an entrenched and regulative epidemiological theory, based on statisti-
cally driven central planning and implemented from afar, as a major con-
tributor to the health care system’s decrepit state (see de Savigny et al. 
2008). The putative knowledge that informs this theory, and the epistemic 
injustices it produces, are the focus of my interest here.
The renewed success story that unfolds from the Tanzanian case is 
as epistemological as it is economic. Starting from a system in crisis, the 
idRc moved to unsettle the entrenched power of conventional wisdom 
and its practitioners in ways that are ecological in their responsiveness to 
the detail of place and demography and naturalized in a quintessentially 
down-on-the-ground fashion. Yet the very fact of the project’s success can 
have the effect of masking the part played by the intricate epistemic nego-
tiations and advocacy without which it could not have come about. Hence 
my aim is to make these processes visible.
Despite my contention that more money was not the solution, the 
reversal that came about did continue to require increased monetary 
investments in health care, but its astonishingly simple recommenda-
tion was that such investments should be based on evidence that would 
target the local “burden of disease . . . in a particular ecosystem.” (The 
remark recalls Rachel Carson: “It is impossible to understand man with-
out understanding his environment and the forces that have molded him 
physically and environmentally.”)4 In short, administering aid from on 
high, without such ecological understanding, was a principal source of 
the crisis. Established epistemic practice, in its relentless quasi-auto-
matic repetition and rarely contested hegemony, had installed a screen of 
unknowing and of not needing to know otherwise, between health care 
administrators and local practitioners, pathologies, and places.5 Hence, 
radically new ways of knowing local circumstances, sensitive to the detail 
of their specificity, were required. These included understanding the 
peculiarities of and interconnections among diseases, and learning how 
to hear, interpret, and act upon evidence from testimonial sources com-
monly not accorded authoritative voice as informants under the Western 
eyes of development agencies and their centralized bureaucracies. (Thus, 
in Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, Miranda Fricker 
notes that testimonial injustice can be “pre-emptive” when potential 
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interlocutors are ignored in situations where their testimony is not solic-
ited; hence a “speaker is silenced by the identity prejudice that under-
mines her credibility in advance” [2007, 130].)
In calling the outcome a reversal, I am suggesting that it was not only 
about acquiring more knowledge but about working to move past an out-
moded yet entrenched instituted epistemic imaginary, in which fixed ways 
of presuming to know relations of identity and power had created a situa-
tion in which members of the local population were unable to dissent from 
distorted understandings of their experiences and circumstances. One-
size-fits-all aid distribution practices had been in place in Tanzania before 
the idRc study began: practices that amounted to treating the population 
merely as a source of information, to be viewed through a Western lens, 
and hence failing to engage with them as informants “in their own right,” 
so to speak.6 Funds were paid into the central administrative structures, 
working from an unquestioned assumption that appropriate local alloca-
tions would follow as a matter of course. But here, precisely, was the prob-
lem. “Appropriateness” turned out in practice to mean dispatching equal 
sums of money and identical packages of drugs to each district, without 
taking the steps necessary to respond knowledgeably to the local specific-
ity of populations and health issues, which varied markedly across this 
vast country. People worked from a presumption of human sameness, and 
of the reliability of bureaucratic knowledge as a source of information, 
oblivious of any need to engage directly with people who knew their own 
situations and the obstacles they faced, yet who had no access to the dis-
course table, no status as knowledgeable testifiers.7
Practically speaking, all local clinics received precisely the same drugs, 
regardless of whether the district’s patterns of disease and death showed 
that those were the ones required there to maintain health and reduce 
mortality. Hence, for example, disproportionate amounts were spent “on 
comparably insignificant diseases, while the big killers were getting only 
a tiny slice of the funds” (Nolen 2005, A1, A10). (Peter Nkulila, a clinical 
officer on the new District Health Management Team comments: “We did 
things blindly.”) Thus, ignorance of the “fit” between local causes of mor-
tality and resource allocations saw non-malarious highland areas receiv-
ing a full complement of anti-malarial drugs more suited to an endemic 
area. Elsewhere in the country, a 1996 idRc study initiated before the 
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aids crisis had begun to sweep through the country found that drugs 
for malaria, responsible for 30 percent of life-years lost, were receiving 5 
percent of the district’s budget; and childhood diseases such as diarrhea, 
pneumonia, and malnutrition, responsible for 28 percent of deaths, were 
receiving 13 percent; but tuberculosis, at only 4 percent of the burden of 
disease, was being allocated 22 percent of the funds. People were sick and 
dying, and health care workers, who found themselves unable to offer 
appropriate treatment, were demoralized.
The idRc’s innovative proposal, surprising in its simplicity, was to 
study separate localities in their particularity, to see whether, in this one 
country, epidemiological detail varied sufficiently from one district to 
another to tell against a one-size-fits-all epistemic approach. This ecologi-
cal move toward determining the “burden of disease . . . in a particular 
ecosystem” selected two large and markedly contrasting rural districts as 
test sites: Rufiji, with a mostly dry, flat interior and a tidal delta on its 
coastline, and Morogoro, which is mountainous and lush. Mapping dis-
eases as they manifest similarly and differently across these geographi-
cally diverse regions was the first step toward “correlating health spending 
with the burden of disease.” Yet, maintaining an impressive—and indeed 
rare—level of local sensitivity, and reserving judgment, the investigators’ 
aim was not simply to “apply” locally achieved knowledge to other locali-
ties, but to work by analogy from district to district, testing conclusions 
reached in one region for their adaptability to other districts, “given the 
appropriate local statistical inputs” (de Savigny et al. 2008, 8, 14).
Strikingly, the proposed new “mapping model” is touted as “evidence-
based,” although in its implementation it diverges sharply from the evi-
dence-based medicine (ebM) that has generated debate in the United 
States and elsewhere. Standard textbooks praise ebM for its positivity, for 
eschewing such ineluctably “subjective” practices as interpretation and 
narrative: the very practices on which, in my view, so much responsible 
knowing relies. (See, for example, Goodman 2003; Sackett et al. 2000). 
But Tanzania had neither the statistical tools nor the scientistic approach 
at its disposal to do the evidence-based investigations orthodox ebM 
requires: nor could it rely on the random control trials (Rcts) integral to 
it. Moreover, even if Tanzanians had had access to such assumptions and 
tools, it is not clear that interpretation-free analysis could have succeeded 
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in filling the hermeneutical lacunae to which much of the crisis can be 
attributed. For a start, because 80 percent of Tanzanian deaths occur at 
home, they frequently fail to make their way into official documents or to 
appear in other reports. Thus it made no sense to rely exclusively or even 
primarily on clinical records to provide the evidence the new knowledge-
gathering approach required in documenting the “burden of disease”; 
yet without that evidence the project could not achieve its goals. So there 
were procedural and methodological problems.
In short, a statistically based model imported and administered from 
elsewhere, and a knowledge base accorded timeless, placeless credibil-
ity, but whose local pertinence was neither monitored nor contested, had 
been superimposed upon people and circumstances for whom/which 
such knowledge was, at best, minimally informative. It is not that they 
were simply wrong; nor is it a matter of correcting isolated errors, but 
rather of determining how outworn templates could be displaced to make 
room for ecosystem-specific evidence and ecologically responsive prac-
tices. The questions are as political and ethical as they are epistemologi-
cal: the power/knowledge inequalities that structure such interactions 
between ngos and their beneficiaries reinforce the “screen of unknow-
ing” I have mentioned, preventing ngo personnel from seeing—indeed, 
excusing their not-seeing—what their would-be beneficiaries need, in cir-
cumstances where their voices were rarely accorded the “standing in the 
discourse” owed to presumptively reliable informants. In consequence, 
what might look like plain instrumental irrationality amounts, rather, to 
a stereotype-generated refusal to acknowledge the cognitive authority 
of the disadvantaged: to a systemic failure of uptake.8 Working toward 
a solution required engaging with local villagers and clinicians, start-
ing from the assumption that they were credible informants. It required 
listening well, in sensitive, respectful evidence-gathering negotiations 
whose deliverances may have been less objectively “accurate” by first-
world standards than statistical analysis is imagined to be yet were capa-
ble of withstanding sustained epistemic and practical-political scrutiny. 
The idRc report confirms that “when communities are directly involved 
in identifying and solving their own problems . . . [their] members become 
a powerful force in programs of social improvement.”
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As an exercise in naturalized-social epistemology, with the pride of 
place it accords to testimony, the idRc’s new method was ingenious. After 
a death had occurred in a household, trained local researchers travelled 
by bicycle to conduct “verbal autopsies” with the survivors. A guiding 
principle in the endeavour was that the researchers had to be mind-
ful of the sensitivity that interviewing bereaved families requires. Thus 
the autopsies might take several hours to complete and might require 
repeated visits with the family and other members of the community. Yet 
their meticulous, respectful laboriousness is the source of their capacity 
to avoid or erase epistemic injustice. Such thorough interviews—rich in 
context and detail—can minimize the likelihood of misdiagnosis. Once 
the autopsies were gathered, findings were reviewed by three indepen-
dent physicians who produced an epidemiological picture by feeding 
the conclusions into a computer according to a “standardized interna-
tional format.” Although the investigators admit that they rely on “fairly 
accurate guesses,” which is exactly what ebM aims to avoid, subsequent 
analysis confirms that, in aggregate, verbal autopsies provide a markedly 
reliable picture of disease within the general population. Increasingly, 
such demographic surveillance systems (dsss) are used in Tanzania and 
elsewhere, not just to compile health information, but to monitor poverty 
levels, education, food security, and the environment.
Still, a further intransigent obstacle in the power/knowledge com-
plex these reversals and consequent “successes” encountered was an 
entrenched reliance on stereotypes embedded in the Western colonial- 
and postcolonial–instituted social imaginary—stereotypes notoriously 
resistant to counter-evidence, through which administrators and other 
outsiders had presumed to know local populations. Negotiating past such 
resilient “webs of belief,” with their thinly veiled racist-colonialist tenor, 
was challenging. Before the dss was established, “planning was being 
driven by . . . donor agencies’ agendas, bureaucratic inertia, and simple 
guesswork, not as a response to the burden of disease or with respect for . . . 
reasons behind sufferers’ decisions.” It was informed and shaped with tacit 
adherence to conventional (outsider) wisdom according to which death 
rates in Rufiji and Morogoro attested to Tanzanians’ “stubborn preference 
for traditional healers over modern health care,” although there can be no 
doubt that “stubborn” is neither a morally nor a politically neutral term or 
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that it is, at the very least, epistemically suspect. This assumption was rein-
forced by a further piece of conventional (= administrative) wisdom accord-
ing to which even more “enlightened” Tanzanians, who seek modern 
care for fever and malaria, persisted in associating the convulsions of 
late-stage, life-threatening malarial fever—known as degedege—with evil 
spirits and/or changes in weather, but not with malaria itself. To counter 
what they were thus casting as naïve innocence, administrators expended 
untold efforts, imperialistically and insensitively, in working to undermine 
local faith in traditional care, thereby compounding an already-virulent 
mix of epistemic injustice, animated by colonial contempt, at work in the 
established policy. Yet such injustice derived from practices of observing 
the local population from a distance, as standard spectator epistemologies 
tend to do (= treating them in aggregate as a source of information), and 
drawing conclusions from actions arbitrarily selected to confirm a preju-
dice-infused hypothesis established and kept alive by a long colonial his-
tory of attributing naïve innocence or irrationality to indigenous, putatively 
pre-scientific people. It combines with the injustices enacted in established 
practices of failing to—deeming it unnecessary to—work with, consult 
with, listen to, or engage with the indigenous population in their potential 
capacity as reliable informants. The epistemological reversal I have named 
gradually began to turn many of these practices and assumptions around.
The dss presents a different portrait of the burden of disease. Studying 
all known deaths—in households, health facilities, and elsewhere—
yields results that contest the intelligibility and highlight the epistemic 
and moral presumptuousness of these egregious and largely unwar-
ranted assaults on traditional healing. Testimonial evidence shows that 
Tanzanians who sought modern health care before death in fact greatly 
outnumbered those who did not; thus, it vindicates the skepticism many 
of the researchers had voiced about placing epistemic reliance only on 
clinical attendance and government-compiled cause-of-death statistics 
as the knowledge base of health planning. When researchers begin to 
learn from local informants that patterns of death point more frequently 
to problems of access to health care facilities and (often unavoidable) 
delay in responding to requests for treatment, or from the sheer inability 
of modern facilities to prevent some patients from dying, the emphasis 
shifts to trying to understand local circumstances and practices in and 
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where they are, and to work toward providing accessible medical care, 
responsive to local ecosystem specificity.
Centralized distribution practices whose knowledge base and govern-
ing demographic assumptions derived from a distanced approach had 
relied on “applying” information from above indiscriminately, without 
thinking to determine its relevance to the specificities of population and 
place. They had also—and this is a separate, if connected, point—sought 
to improve population health by treating diseases individually, sepa-
rately, one at a time. From a Western medical point of view, both practices 
tend to count as perfectly normal: hence their intransigence to contes-
tation and innovation. Yet the idRc team also contested the viability of 
these ways of approaching the situation, which were regaining momen-
tum as money again began to flow into international disease-control pro-
grams. Standard practice in Tanzanian clinics had been to see children 
in “factory line” processes where quick diagnostic assessment and rapid 
prescription of drugs were often based on a (not unreasonable) guess, per-
haps that the problem was diarrhea. Yet a radically different proposal, 
derived from the idRc’s research, suggests that symptoms may well be 
caused by several diseases at once, or that one condition may masquer-
ade as another. Based on these hypotheses, an integrated “syndromic” 
approach was initiated that would address the whole child, identifying 
and treating a range of possible common illnesses rather than focusing on 
diseases singly and separately. The results have been impressive. Again, 
my point is not that people working from the old approach had insuffi-
cient knowledge, but that their regulative assumptions about how a place 
and its inhabitants should be known, how diseases should be known, 
derive from belief-habits that subtly perpetuate stereotypes and epistemic 
injustices, which are more and other than mere failures to know. Under 
these sedimented assumptions, epistemic inertia had prompted practi-
tioners to resist undertaking the down-on-the-ground investigations that 
began to expose injustices enacted on the basis of fixed assumptions, and 
to prepare the way for a reversal. The case, as I read it, offers an exemplary 
illustration of ecological thinking at work.
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inteRdisciplinaRit y
I have suggested that ecological thinking is interdisciplinary, if in a trou-
bled sense. I am referring both to practices of thinking and working eco-
logically, and to interdisciplinarity as such, if it can be characterized as 
a single or singular practice. In the Tanzanian example and in my dis-
cussion of Carson’s knowledge-gathering practices, I have shown that 
multiple lines of inquiry and sources of knowledge work together to yield 
such conclusions as these disparate endeavours can permit. Both of these 
knowledge projects thus require reading across and through multiple 
disciplinary lines and reading away from established disciplinary terri-
toriality to acknowledge the epistemic significance of secular testimony 
and of other experiential evidence, across a range of—often unorthodox—
sources, situations, and subjectivities. Both require listening past and 
away from established practices in institutional inquiry and established 
sites of credibility and accreditation. Both, at their best, are character-
ized by a mix of circumspection, thoughtful practice, and commitment to 
epistemic responsibility (see Code 1987) and by resistance to premature 
closure. Both eschew the model of the monolithic, self-sufficient knower 
whose monologic, spectator-derived assertions are the stuff of which tra-
ditional knowledge claims are made. Thus both transgress the boundaries 
of traditional epistemic orthodoxy, much as Carson transgresses and sub-
verts the boundaries of orthodox scientific inquiry. But the question is, 
does this characterization amount to a declaration of interdisciplinarity?
My own work over the past twenty or more years in feminist epistemol-
ogy and the ethics-politics of knowledge has been marked by a realiza-
tion that the graduate seminar I teach can no longer legitimately be called 
“Feminist Critiques of Epistemology,” for feminism itself has evolved into 
a thoroughly mixed category that cannot stand apart from other forms 
of oppression, exclusion, and counter-hegemonic discourse, practices, 
and inquiries; nor does feminist inquiry count as a “discipline” except 
perhaps in Ian Hacking’s sense of requiring discipline for its enactment. 
Hence, I now call the course “Feminist and Post-Colonial Critiques of 
Epistemology,” and the “post-colonial” label in the title remains an inten-
tionally contested term. Feminist scholarship and practice now incorpo-
rates and addresses multiple modalities of marginalization, both together 
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and separately. Nor, once epistemology is socialized and naturalized, as 
much feminist epistemology is (and mine included), can epistemology 
“itself” proceed as a unified or an a priori normative theory, committed 
to setting out formal conditions for making and adjudicating knowledge 
claims in abstraction from particular events, disciplines, subject matters, 
and ethical-political urgencies. Unlike orthodox analytic epistemologists, 
feminist epistemologists rarely work with speculative analyses of “possi-
ble worlds,” nor do they concentrate on developing strategies for counter-
ing the skeptic or deriving formal, necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the existence of “knowledge in general.” The very idea of “knowledge in 
general” carries little meaning in feminist analyses, for such knowledge, 
if it were a meaningful concept, would have to transcend all specific con-
ditions and subjectivities to yield the “view from nowhere” most feminists 
eschew as an illusory goal. Feminist inquiry, and thus feminist epistemol-
ogy, often works down on the ground in the messier regions where knowl-
edge claims are derived, negotiated, contested, and lived; and guidelines 
develop and redevelop in practice and in communal deliberative projects. 
There, an analogue of Aristotelian virtue ethics and epistemology often 
plays a regulative part; there, it may be easier to determine what kinds 
of knowing will not contribute well to achieving a just measure of intel-
ligibility than what the universally right ones are. From this point of view, 
neither ecological thinking nor the questions I raise in my other books 
remain within the confines of disciplinary orthodoxy. But are these inqui-
ries interdisciplinary? The answer, I think, is to some extent yes, and to 
some extent no.
On the yes side, these inquiries are interdisciplinary in the sense that 
they challenge the disciplinary self-presentation of philosophy in its aloof-
ness from the specificities of human lives and situations, to study those 
specificities in situ, in diverse locations and in ways that draw on empirical 
observation and patterns of analysis more fitting to disciplines as diverse 
as literary analysis, anthropology, social science, and so-called “natural” 
science. In that sense, and thinking also of “subversive” charges levelled 
against Rachel Carson, these inquiries cross the artificial boundaries of 
fixed modes of inquiry both in the academy and in the “real” world. My 
earlier reference to the range of and variety of knowledge Carson requires, 
even for the sake of understanding something so small as a beetle, affirms 
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this point. Indeed, the very fact of such borrowings across artificial dis-
ciplinary boundaries underscores the extent to which such boundaries 
are themselves arbitrary, conventional, and porous. So although they are 
often zealously guarded and indeed policed—as in insistent challenges to 
the effect that the work feminist or anti-racist philosophers are doing “is 
not really philosophy”—such challenges also, if haltingly, may destabilize 
the boundaries to the extend that closed disciplinary structures begin to 
shift, in the process.
On the no side, I see this work less as explicitly interdisciplinary than 
as a mode of research and thinking that enlists the resources of a philo-
sophical training that spans the so-called “analytic/continental” divide. 
It thereby enables me to turn my attention, sometimes analytically, some-
times phenomenologically, sometimes drawing eclectically on other 
extra-philosophical resources, to a range of problems and puzzles about 
knowledge, subjectivity, intelligibility, and the politics of epistemic loca-
tion, as these play out in specific lives and circumstances, and illumine 
other analogous questions and issues.
notes
1 In the first sections of this essay I draw extensively on arguments set forth in greater 
detail in Code 2006.
2 See, for example, W.V.O. Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized” and “Natural Kinds,” in 
Quine 1969. Both essays are reprinted in Kornblith 1994.
3 Latour asks: “When will we be able not to reduce matters of concern . . . to matters of 
fact?” (2004, 51).
4 Quoted in Lear 1977, 219. The comment is from a speech Carson delivered at the National 
Book Award ceremonies, 29 January 1952 (Rachel Carson Papers, Yale University 
Collection of American Literature, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale 
University, New Haven, ct).
5 As Dr. Harun Machibya, the Morogoro District medical officer, recalled: “Before tehip 
[Tanzania Essential Health Interventions Project] we did not identify and prioritize our 
interventions. Rather, we implemented plans worked out centrally. Even in budgeting, 
the tendency was to add some percentages to previous years’ planned and budgeted 
activities” (de Savigny et al. 2008).
6 In making this distinction, I am drawing on Edward Craig’s Knowledge and the State of 
Nature (1990).
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7 I am borrowing here from Goldensohn 2006, 35.
8 Thanks to Elizabeth Anderson (personal communication) for this way of putting it.
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The Spectatorship of Self-RefleXivity 
and the Virtual Gaze in Benny’s Video and Caché
J a n  J a g o d z I n s K I
the selF-ReFlexive aRt oF Michael haneKe
Anyone who watches a film by Michael Haneke is eventually overwhelmed 
by a disturbing feeling that is impossible to avoid. His films leave one’s 
nerves unsettled long after they have ended. The effect is profoundly 
moving, but it is unlike that induced by a horror film; rather, ordinary 
life takes on a strangeness that cannot be easily articulated. I have chosen 
to discuss Haneke’s filmography as the best illustration, in cinema, of 
what I call self-refleXivity, written with a capital “X” to distinguish this 
as a form of machinic assemblage1 that departs from the naïve modernist 
notions of mirrored self-reflection and its postmodernist redefinition as 
self-reflexion, with a lowercase “x,” by Giddens, Latour, Foucault, Butler, 
and others who celebrate a poststructuralist subject of hermeneutical con-
sciousness, a subject of knowledge capable of positioning itself outside 
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itself as an objectified cultural object of discourse in order to assert a 
performative resistance to the Symbolic order, a resistance within a sado-
masochistic pact that perverts the law cynically, with self-reflexive irony.
In distinction, self-refleXivity with a capital “X” identifies a desiring 
machine, a new division of labour between humans and machines that 
attempts to deterritorialize the spectator’s steady voyeuristic consump-
tion of televised and cinematic media through an active engagement, by 
mobilizing a particular form of time-image (Deleuze 1989) and a neo-real-
ist style that parodies the melodramatic bourgeois form wherein the self-
containment of the personal has been stripped away (Peucker 2000). The 
spectator cannot enter the frame in Haneke’s anti-narratives but rather is 
forced to view the situation, usually through long camera takes of char-
acters who have been stripped, by and large, of their psychological inten-
tionality. He does not dwell so much on their faces as on partial objects 
that repeat and make possible the banality of their existence—like hands, 
feet, and arms that perform the mechanized rituals of everyday existence. 
Haneke mobilizes the spectator’s fears, desires, and fantasies, through 
Verfremdungseffekts (alienation effects) as evoked by Brecht, Eisenstein, 
and Walter Benjamin, to achieve a sense of astonishment and shock. 
Cinematic pleasure seems to turn in on itself in an uncanny way.
Much has been critically written on Haneke’s filmography.2 It seems 
every year a new book has emerged since his “discovery” by American 
audiences, with seven of his nine television features produced during his 
early career in the 1970s and 1980s now re-released with English subtitles.3 
Hence, I hope that this essay makes a unique contribution in maintaining 
that self-refleXivity, as defined with an uppercase “X,” changes the ques-
tion of desire from what cinegraphic pictures “want,” a question of desire 
as “lack,” to what they can “do,” a reorientation to a productive notion of 
(Haneke’s) desire when it comes to unhinging spectatorship within a soci-
ety of the synopticon.4 How might the machinic eye of the cinema as an 
event, “gaze” at the spectator from that unknowable vanishing point that 
all realism elides, the place of the Lacanian Real now understood as sin-
thome—an irrational void that is indifferent to the Symbolic so as to deliver 
an ethical import? Throughout Haneke’s filmo graphy, the vereisung (chill-
ing) effect of his camera (he calls his first trilogy Vergletscherungs-Trilogie) 
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carries with it the chill of death by suicide. It is an inhuman gaze, de-
anthropomorphized because no one can occupy it. The rays that ema-
nate from that impossible place freeze-frame reality like the long takes 
that characterize Haneke’s auteurship.5 The Seventh Continent (1989), his 
first feature film, ends in communal suicide by the mother, father, and 
daughter. In Benny’s Video (1992), his next production, there is the effec-
tive “death” and breakdown of the family when his parents are arrested 
as accomplices in Benny’s murder of one of his classmates, a young girl. 
Finally, in Fragments of Chronology of Chance (1994), the film ends in a 
shooting spree by a young university student who then takes his own life.
Haneke’s filmography is personally directed against Hollywood cinema 
and television production in general, disrupting two psychoanalytic sub-
ject positions that pervade the representational aesthetic of designer 
capitalism and its sustaining of the jouissance of the audience through the 
screen culture of structural violence: the sadomasochism of Hollywood 
film and the sadism of reality television (Haneke 2008; Metelmann 2003). 
Haneke’s filmography attempts to explicitly critique and undo these 
two subject positions through his mobilization of a particular refleXive 
machinic assemblage. Haneke, I argue, presents a way out between the 
standard accepted leftist position in psychoanalytic theory, beginning with 
Laura Mulvey (1975), in which the ideological effect of spectator fascination 
(pleasure) offered by mainstream (Hollywood) cinema must be destroyed 
or at least ruined,6 and the more recent view, initially articulated by Slavoj 
Žižek in various forms and brilliantly elaborated in Todd McGowan’s The 
Real Gaze (2007), wherein spectator fascination is encouraged so that the 
effects of the Real can then be pondered.
Haneke steers a path between these two positions through the mobi-
lization of a particular time-image, wherein the spectator’s fascination 
remains intact through the puzzle that his thought-image presents by 
withholding the unifying signifier of the narrative. The audience expects a 
satisfying, completed narrative, but Haneke’s anti-narratives thwart such 
an outcome. This doubles the game that is being played on the screen 
and in the spectator’s head, yet at the same time the punctum effect of 
the Real is constantly made available through the mimesis of a realistic 
form and involuntary memory associated with that form—a phenomenon 
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I call the virtual Real, which will be explained below. Following Deleuze 
(1989), Haneke’s films bring “the unconscious mechanisms of thought to 
consciousness” (160). Thought is brought face to face with its own impos-
sibility—as the unthought; the powerlessness of our thought in contrast 
with film thought is made evident.
How, then, is this self-refleXivity mobilized so as to be capable of dis-
turbing the accepted frame of spectatorship of television and Hollywood 
cinema? Haneke has stated that the audience he addresses is precisely 
the Hollywood crowd who are used to consumptive watching, which situ-
ates them most often in a sadomasochistic and sadistic viewing position. 
It is this viewer he wishes to disturb through his own manipulative neo-
realistic style, mobilizing various forms of the time-image of the virtual 
Real. If we consider the three Lacanian psychic registers—the symbolic, 
the imaginary, and the Real—it is possible to recognize how Haneke’s 
carefully staged editing, his use of the long take, and his confining of all 
sound diegetically, following the lead of Robert Bresson, whom he has 
studied and admires, is able to induce a puzzling uncertainty that cannot 
be resolved. The narrative, depending on the film, is carried by a move-
ment-image that, by and large, remains distant. Seldom does Haneke 
include the classic reverse-shot pattern that leads the spectator to identify 
with the characters. If he does so, it is used with great effect and purpose 
to alert the audience that something significant is being discussed.7 This 
movement-image that enables the viewer to seamlessly follow a narrative, 
however, is disrupted by the irrational or non-relational cut—the black 
screen—so all we are getting is fragments of characters’ lives, leaving us 
with a puzzle as to what is going on. These fragments speak to the con-
tingency of life itself, and hence the time-image that emerges presents 
us with shards of time, forming a crystal-image (as discussed below) in 
Deleuzian terms. One of the strong themes that continually emerges in 
Haneke’s films is the continued subversion of the audience’s construction 
of reality, the assumptions and evaluations that are made to rationalize 
what’s going on into a coherent story. A simple example is the telling of the 
so-called “dog” story in the middle of Caché when Anne and Georges are 
entertaining their friends. During the dinner party, Pierre relates a story 
about meeting an older woman with a dog, one that involves all sorts of 
improbable coincidences that seem far-fetched but not impossible. When 
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all are convinced of this seemingly absurd story, he tells the dinner guests 
that he was pulling their leg.
This questioning of hermeneutic assurances extends to psychoana-
lytic analysis as well, since Haneke offers us schizophrenic “unexplain-
able” behaviour that in some cases ends in suicide.8 In his first trilogy, 
both Seventh Continent and 71 Fragments rely on the irrational cut in 
which the anti-narrative comes together in both cases with an unexplain-
able suicide based on actual news stories. In Seventh Continent mother, 
father, and daughter commit suicide after demolishing their entire home 
and flushing all their savings down a toilet. Haneke gives us glimpses over 
a three-year period of their routinized existence and their inability to com-
municate with one another despite a life of commodified luxurious living. 
As spectators, we revisit the utter ordinariness and boredom of their lives, 
over and over, as these revisitations become memories for us, vivifying 
a nihilistic existence where everything has been drained of desire, even 
any hopes for their elementary school daughter, who is clearly disturbed. 
The implosion of the bourgeois upper-middle-class family indicates the 
inability to reach outside their walls—neither to their siblings, nor to their 
aging parents. In 71 Fragments, a university student appears unable to live 
up to the demands imposed by exams, by his coach’s expectations of him 
as a table-tennis champion, and by his parents’ expectations, leading to a 
psychotic break—the desire to be subjectivized by the big Other, to finally 
be seen and heard.
In Benny’s Video, the middle film of the trilogy, Haneke introduces the 
Deleuzian crystal-image by way of the video as a recording device. The 
crystal-image forms the cornerstone of Deleuze’s (1989) time-image. This 
is a shot that fuses the past of a recorded event with its viewing. The crys-
tal-image is the indivisible unity of the virtual image and the actual image. 
It is subjective, in the past, and recollected. As a “pure recollection” it 
exists outside of consciousness, in time. It remains in the temporal past, 
still alive and ready to be “recalled” by an actual image. We might say that 
it is an engrammatic image of time stored as memory, ready to intervene 
in actual events when called on. In contrast, the actual image remains 
objective, in the present and perceived, whereas the crystal-image lives at 
the limit of an indiscernible actual and virtual image—Deleuze hints that 
it is in the Lacanian register of the Real. The crystal-image shapes time as 
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a constant two-way mirror that splits the present into two heterogeneous 
directions, “one of which is launched towards the future while the other 
falls into the past.” David Rodowick (1997) maintains that the time-image 
fluctuates between actual and virtual, recording or dealing with memory, 
confusing mental and physical time, actual and virtual, and sometimes 
marked by incommensurable spatial and temporal links between shots. 
The twist Haneke gives to this formulation is that the machinic ability of 
video as a recording device enables him to skilfully disrupt the seemless/
seamless flow of the actual with the virtual—one might say producing 
moments when the crystal-image sends out a disruptive shock ray to the 
viewer, producing a sense of time that is out of joint. In Benny’s Video 
the boundary around the actual image—the diegesis as carried by the 
narrative—is disrupted by the virtual image that is charged with an ethi-
cal indictment. At this imaginary psychic register an Entfremdungseffekt 
(defamiliarization effect) takes place. For at least a moment, there is a 
“distancing,” an “estrangement” or “defamiliarization.”9 The viewer is 
startled as to what is the actual diegesis when it becomes confused with 
the virtual video recording. It is the video recording that disturbs our 
scopic looking, delivering its message in its distancing.10
In Lacanian terms there is a méconnaisance, a misrecognition, of the 
image, occurring when the symbolic is re-signified with new meaning. 
This is best exemplified when Benny’s parents, after speaking to him in 
his bedroom, have discovered that he has killed the girl and are discuss-
ing what now should be done about it. The scene is shot from within 
Benny’s dark room. Only a crack of brightly lit space is seen through the 
partly open door. This stock image (which hints at the materiality of the 
cinematic medium as light entering through the door that acts as a shut-
ter to create an image in the darkened chamber of the bedroom) is shown 
twice as the voices of the parents, primarily the father, discuss what to 
do and how to dispose of the body. It appears as if Benny is overhearing 
everything they are saying from his bedroom. The same shot is again seen 
toward the end of the film, when we hear the same conversation between 
the parents we heard and saw earlier through the actual diegetic image. 
The grain of the image has slightly changed and the voices are quieter, 
but no less distinct. Another Entfremdungseffekt takes place as specta-
tors soon come to realize that they are watching another one of Benny’s 
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videos. This time a voice-over conversation between Benny and a police-
man with whom he is viewing the video disturbs our viewing, and now 
this tape will serve to indict both of his parents as accessories after the 
fact for the murder that their son has committed.
Haneke, however, leaves us with the gaze of surveillance of the Law 
in the closing shots of Benny’s Video, as cold and impersonal multiple 
images in the police station spread over the monitors of a surveillance 
system of the parents entering the interrogation room to (supposedly) be 
questioned in pursuit of a confession. This camera position—the specta-
tor is watching this surveillance in a shot from above, the so-called “God 
shot”—transfers into the gaze of the Real, evoking its ethical self-refleXive 
stance as exemplified by his most successful film Caché. This gaze, placed 
in the vanishing point of the neo-realist structure, is marked at the end of 
Benny’s Video and produces a Verfremdungseffekt (an alienation effect, or 
shock) at the level of the Real, but it is perhaps not sustained long enough 
to register on the audience, although by placing it at the closing scene 
Haneke leaves the audience cold and shuddering, as he so often has in 
his previous films. There is redemption, but it is ever so slight and ever so 
fleeting and impossible to tell: has Benny finally “felt” something so that 
he has to confess from overriding guilt, or was this yet another ploy to “get 
even” with his parents?
Haneke’s film opens with Benny’s video documenting the killing of a 
pig directly in the spectator’s view; in the middle sections of the film he 
gives us the méconnaissance of the Imaginary register where the film’s 
narrative is disrupted by the crystal-image of Benny’s other videos; finally 
we come to a camera position—Haneke’s own gaze, placed in a nowhere 
place and space—where both Benny’s videos and the images produced 
by the surveillance cameras are themselves mastered by this impossible 
Real position, putting into question the Law itself by the spectator occu-
pying its place of (impossible in this case) judgment. It is this camera 
position that carries the import of an ethic of the Real in terms of the self-
refleXive spectator that forms the structure of Haneke’s neo-realism, what 
I call the virtual Real (a gaze that is masterfully explored in Caché), this 
time coming at the end of the film.11 We have been motivated by the film’s 
diegesis to raise the question: Just who then is responsible for Benny’s 
murder? Is it the parents, Benny, the spectacular social order, or perhaps 
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we viewers who are complicit in its structure? And, if it is all of the above, 
how are we to disassemble such a structure?
the gaze as viRtual Real:  CAChé
Caché opens with a three-minute long shot of the Laurent’s household. As 
spectators, we again experience a misrecognition of the Imaginary regis-
ter as we come to recognize that we are watching a video surveillance tape 
similar to the one at the end of Benny’s Video, but with a twist. It comes 
from an unknowable or impossible place of the Lacanian Real. It does 
not exist in the diegesis, only as an impossible place of the camera and, 
of course, with Haneke behind it. In the opening scene Georges (the pro-
tagonist) leaves the apartment to look for the place of the possible camera 
in Rue de Iris, the name an obvious hint by Haneke that no such surveil-
lance camera can be found. It is perhaps also Haneke’s way of dispelling 
the myth, first developed by André Bazin (1971) that the long (unedited 
sequence) camera take as introduced by Italian neo-realist cinema after 
World War ii somehow exposed the truth of reality (verisimilitude) within 
its frame—that it gave “ontological weight” to the film’s image. Here no 
“truth” is exposed in the frame but by the force of the frame, which holds 
Georges hostage to it through surveillance. The virtual Real of this gaze 
again carries with it an ethical import since it draws out France’s colonial 
past, notably the incident of 17 October 1961, when the political wing of 
the main Algerian anticolonial group—the French-based leaders of the 
Fln (Front de Libération Nationale)—having organized a peaceful dem-
onstration in Paris, was savagely repressed by the police under Maurice 
Papon for violating an 8:30 p.m. curfew that had been imposed on Muslim 
French Algerians. An undisclosed number of demonstrators (between 50 
and 350) were killed and thrown into the Seine.
In Caché, Haneke ups his game with the spectator by enabling the self-
refleXivity to manifest itself through the suturing of the extra-diegetic gaze 
of the camera position that finds its way indexically by way of the anony-
mously sent videotapes and child-like images that arrive at the Laurents’ 
doorstep, forcing viewers to puzzle-solve who is watching them and what 
they want. All along, Haneke appears to be asking, “What can this film do 
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through this gaze to unnerve the viewer in relation to Georges’s increas-
ing anxiety?” Haneke puts both the viewer and Georges into a societal 
tableau, placing them in the “picture” of the contemporary Symbolic 
order that only the gaze can render possible, which is why Georges seems 
oblivious to the place of such an impossible “hidden” camera in Majid’s 
apartment when he reviews with Anne the videotape that has “captured” 
his visit to Majid. Unlike his suspicion of the surveillance camera, he has 
no “suspicion” of the camera that “must” have been inside Majid’s apart-
ment that has rendered the videotape that he (with Anne) is viewing. A 
videotape of his second visit—when Majid commits suicide in front of 
him—is never seen by him or Anne; rather, it is presented to the viewers, 
presumably as a recording, from the same impossible position of the gaze.
Spectators viewing the tape of the suicide from the hidden camera 
position are faced with the way Georges relates to the Algerian Other. 
The virtual gaze in that room places both Majid and Georges in the tab-
leau of the relations between North African immigrants and the French 
bourgeoisie who own the culture industry. (Georges is a successful tv 
host—the character is presumably based on the long-standing Parisian 
tv literary host Bernard Pivot—and Anne is a successful book publisher.) 
This indeed is a virtual Real gaze, for it asks of Georges, “What does the 
Other want?” But it asks the question in a cold, voyeuristic way. This 
gaze is an “evil eye,” as Lacan speaks of it in Seminar xi. It has ethical 
import, and Georges is unable to “tame” it, screen off its effects. Georges 
slowly loses his control. His insensitivity to the Other emerges through-
out the unfolding of the gaze’s haunting. The Other (Majid and his son) 
want to be subjectivized by Georges (allegorically, France as a nation), 
but Georges refuses. I call this a “virtual gaze” here, since it already car-
ries the memory of France’s colonial past, and hence as a spectre it is a 
hauntology in Derridean (1994) terms or a hontology in Lacanian terms 
(as explained below). Indeed, this gaze is coveted by the look of Majid’s 
son, who (significantly) has no name. His look, capturing the cold power 
of this gaze, is most evident after Majid’s suicide, when his son confronts 
Georges at work but Georges ducks into an elevator. Haneke films Majid’s 
son staring at Georges over the crowded people in the elevator. As specta-
tors we see the exchange of reactions of both men in the elevator’s mirror, 
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constructed by Haneke in such a way that his camera is not visible, so that 
it is now carrying the symbolic diegesis.
The virtual hidden gaze in Caché that carries with it the object a as 
the cause of desire is not revealed until Georges must come clean to Anne 
as to what happened during his childhood, the incident between Majid 
and himself. But even here he fails to come to terms with this incident, 
and Anne (tellingly) dismisses it as frivolous. He has not been shamed 
into admitting his grievance, unable to relieve his guilt since there is no 
one to blame. There is no exculpation for Georges. There is no act he can 
undertake to purge himself of this memory. He knows unconsciously 
that he committed a grievous error but is unable to come to terms with 
it because the Other—Majid—will not let him take that subject position. 
Both Majid and his son insist that they did not send the videotapes and 
pictures. Initially Majid held no malice toward Georges, despite Georges’s 
provocations. Majid’s son also denies sending the tapes, leaving Georges 
broken—unable to come to grips with his (France’s) involvement in the 
treatment of the strangers in the land. Majid does not accuse Georges out-
right; rather, he commits suicide as a symbolic overrepresentation of the 
suicide that the Algerian French have suffered.
Time-Image
Haneke uses the time-image of Bergson’s involuntary memory, that is, 
“unsolicited” independent memories that are disengaged from the imme-
diate action or perception, to draw out a childhood memory of Georges’s 
relationship to Majid, an Algerian boy his parents adopted who was 
orphaned presumably during the 1961 suppression of the peaceful dem-
onstration. This return of the repressed or unwanted involuntary memory 
is furthered by the haunting of the virtual Real gaze that invades his bun-
kered house in the “flower district of Fleur that lies adjacent to Rue de 
Iris.” This virtual Real gaze of Haneke’s camera is mobilized quite differ-
ently than in Benny’s Video. It is no longer the Imaginary and Symbolic 
psychic registers that cause the méconnaissance of the actual and virtual, 
but the unknown gaze—the voyeuristic gaze of the unknown position 
of the camera that collapses the Real and the Imaginary registers to call 
on a repressed symbolic memory. However, this is not to show guilt, for 
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Georges cannot be called on for his guilt as a six-year-old for his act of self-
ishness. Like many single children of that age might do, Georges wanted 
to get rid of Majid so that he need not share his parental love and attention 
with him. Rather, it is the shame of that incident he is unable to come to 
grips with, which the ethical Real gaze demands.
Guilt and Shame
It is here that Lacanian psychoanalytic theory can be of some use in expli-
cating the ethical import of the virtual Real of Haneke’s camera, espe-
cially as developed by Copjec (2006), who explicates Lacan’s position in 
response to the students of May 1968, a moment of equally historic mag-
nitude, that the role of the analyst should end in the production of shame 
in the analysand! The videotapes that Georges receives on three occa-
sions are all wrapped in “childhood” memories; that is, they are childlike 
drawings in crayon of splattered blood and a decapitated chicken. These 
images, as well as the childlike writings and the surveillance tape, begin 
to affect Georges. As objects they begin to estrange his Symbolic world. 
They become overly saturated with associations and recollections to the 
point that his memory is moved and affected, eventually causing dreams 
and nightmares. As objects of anxiety these wrapped tapes begin to over-
stimulate his thought, get him thinking uncontrollably. They become 
what Freud called Vorstellungrepräsentanz, which designates “the sig-
nifier’s otherness to itself” (Copjec 2006, 95), estranging thought. When 
Georges’s thought begins to unravel, for Lacan (contra Sartre), the gaze of 
the virtual Real that looks at Georges is that of his own being; the sensible 
cause for Georges’s uncanny sense of being observed by another is found 
in his own surplus-jouissance. This jouissance, as the object-cause of our 
desire, singularizes who he is. Georges is uprooted from his sense of mas-
tery over the world by the sense of inescapable anxiety that these draw-
ings and tapes induce. “The confrontation with jouissance as the ‘origin of 
[our] own person’ confronts a doubled or forked time where who I am in 
the present converges with who I was in the past” (Copjec 2006, 104). The 
anxiety of these childhood images and videotapes touches that part of 
Georges’s unrealized past that might have caused his history to have been 
otherwise. He could have let Majid be his surrogate brother rather than 
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setting up an incident in which Majid is sent away to an orphanage. In 
one sense Georges is “riveted” to his French identity, his racial prejudices, 
and his upper-class intellectual indifference to the plight of Others from 
which he cannot escape.
To transform his anxiety into guilt, Lacan argues, is a “sham.” The 
disturbing enigma of Georges’s being, which jouissance poses, “van-
ishes in guilt in favour of a pursuit of knowledge,” such that “certainty 
is transformed not only into knowledge but also into the relentless pur-
suit of ever more knowledge” (Copjec 2006, 109). Guilt is a flight from 
the enigma of Georges’s jouissance-being, but not from jouissance as 
such. “The guilt-laden, anxiety-relieved subject still experiences jouis-
sance, but this jouissance is characterized by Lacan in Seminar xvii as 
a “sham,” as “counterfeit” (109). It is a “sham” because it gives the false 
sense that the core of one’s being can be knowable, possessed as an 
identifiable property. “All of our inherited, unchosen identities—racial, 
national, ethnic—[that] root us in an actual past that may be lost” now 
become accessible insofar as we can have knowledge about them and 
restore an ideal future. Georges is not even able to relieve his anxiety 
through the “sham” of guilt. He has no desire to take responsibility for his 
childish envy and make up for his narcissistic act to Majid in the future. 
What Georges fails to accept is the shame that the act in the past implies, 
now that he can look back on it with its full implications in relation to 
Algerian-French relations. In effect, Georges simply repeats the histori-
cal racism of his country’s past. Both Majid and his son are arrested by 
the police and taken in a paddy wagon to be interrogated as to whether 
they are involved in the harassment of Georges’s family. It is this incident 
that provokes Majid to commit suicide in front of Georges as a way not 
only to express his own self-hatred but hatred for Georges as well. Both 
men, as allegorically representing France and its diaspora, cancel each 
other out in a death struggle. There are no winners, only losers: this is a 
“lose-lose” scenario.
Guilt and shame are not alike. With guilt there is an identifiable Other, 
and the question is whether Georges’s generation can be blamed for the 
actions of the prefect of the Paris police, Maurice Papon, whose record 
of public service was marred by a sadistic, racist record of administra-
tive abuse. He was jailed for crimes against humanity and died there. 
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The symbolism of Majid chopping the head of the coq (the symbol of 
France) is precisely what Georges is unable to live with—the plight of 
the diaspora within the borders of France. He does not wish to live with 
the shame of his country’s past racism, unwilling to recognize the full 
weight of the Algerian conflict for the country’s history. This is a hontol-
ogy, as Lacan put it, a suturing of ontology and shame that his generation 
must come to terms with. Haneke’s attack on the bourgeois intellectual 
elite’s indifference (their insouciance) to the plight of immigrants and the 
steady stream of horrific news that anaestheticizes their ability to feel 
compassion, the postemotionality, as Stjepan Meštrovic (1997) has put 
it, that forces a “walled mentality” of living in their home as a fortress.
The gaze of the impossibly positioned camera is both virtual and ethi-
cal; it is virtual since its extra-diegetic position appears in the series of 
videotapes that are sent to him as surveillance of his home and as clues 
as to how to find Majid, his long-lost and vanquished Algerian childhood 
friend. It also accuses Georges of lying to his wife that he did not find 
Majid, as a videotape arrives from this impossible camera vantage point, 
which again fools the viewer into assuming that we are watching the 
narrative. The ethically virtual gaze carries with it the force that haunts 
the French cultured elite, calling upon them to admit to the shame of 
their past, to face up to their racial atrocities by no longer turning their 
backs, satiating their guilt through consumerist gratification and reduc-
ing family living to a banal existence—as in Benny’s Video, where par-
enting is carried out through Zettelerziehung (literally, a “slips of paper 
upbringing”): Benny’s parents leave him notes telling him what he is to 
do that day. Shame haunts, while guilt can be purged. Such a gaze is a 
force at the core of Georges’s being, his object-cause of desire. It has not 
been transformed into the power of a superego. For Georges there is no 
agent that exercises the power over his (presumed) guilt. There is only 
the exertion—the force of his jouissance that is eating at him, and that 
continues eating at him, unresolved, as he goes to bed toward the physi-
cal ending of the film after taking two sleeping pills (caché), indicating 
that what is “hidden” will remain unresolved.
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The Child Is Watching
The most controversial is the last scene of the virtual gaze as a long take, 
in which we see Pierrot and Majid’s son coming together, exchanging 
a conversation and going their own separate ways, leaving the entire 
“thriller” unresolved. It was never a “who done it” but a “no done it.” 
This last scene, again a time-image, can comfortably fit anywhere within 
the established narrative, conceivably once again enabling spectators to 
construe any number of scenarios: Were the boys in on it from the start? 
Do the boys have a homosexual relationship? Does the boys’ relationship 
give us hope for a new era of race relations? As in so many schools where 
ethnic minorities mix and mingle, the hope exists that a new understand-
ing can emerge. We see that Pierrot and Majid’s son talk. What they say 
and how they exchange is left self-refleXively to the viewer, who has been 
in the position to puzzle a “thought-image” in the best Deleuzian sense 
through the mobilization of a virtual Real gaze.
The very evocation of this scene also points once more to Haneke’s 
one hope: the child. He seems to offer an anamorphic perspective regard-
ing school and upbringing of children. As Mecchia (2007) argues, in many 
respects it is the “wounded” child (as a “child-director”) that has the last 
say in his films. As we saw, in Benny’s Video, parenting consists of the 
notes of instructions that Benny's parents leave behind for him to follow 
because they lead such busy lives—the so-called Zettelerziehung. In 
Caché, Pierre goes to a good school, so it is not a question of the quality of 
institution that the children of the well-off are sent to but rather of parents 
shirking their responsibility to raise their children to meet the “world” 
from the lessons they themselves have learnt. Haneke maintains that the 
bourgeois intellectual elite have shirked their responsibility to take a long 
hard look at those lessons that they might pass on to their children.
The film’s release in 2005 was both prophetic and poignant, as that 
very month saw race riots by second and third generation decolonized 
young people of North African and Arab descent in the suburbs of Paris, 
when Nicolas Sarkozy, then minister of the interior, enflamed the situa-
tion by calling them racaille (scum or rabble). It may well be critically said 
(Gilroy 2007) that Haneke, a white European director, does not have the 
right to represent the postcolonial condition in France. Majid, after all, 
has the judgment of history on his side, and in the film Georges simply 
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repeats that history. However, it was precisely a film such as this, one that 
offers no direct answers but calls up the question of France’s shame and 
guilt, that led to a number of television specials over the buried aspects of 
the Algerian War, which the French New Wave of filmmakers (1954–1962) 
could not directly tackle. Caché shows what a powerful force the virtual 
Real for refleXive spectatorship can be.
notes
1 Machinic assemblage follows the usage in Deleuze and Guattari (1977) as an ordering of 
the drives (Triebe) with, in this case, the cinematic apparatus.
2 In the German literature, the following three works present the most thorough reviews 
of Haneke’s filmography: Metelmann (2003); Wessely, Grabner, and Larcher (2008); 
and Assheuer and Haneke (2008). In English, Brigitte Peucker’s The Material Image: 
Art and the Real in Film offers a useful chapter on Haneke (Peucker 2007). See also After 
Postmodernism: Austrian Literature Film and in Transition (Riemer 2000c), in which 
essays by Peucker, Thomas Nadar, and Willy Riemer, as well as by Haneke himself, 
discuss his early work. Since the present essay was first written, a comprehensive work 
on Haneke’s films, A Companion to Michael Haneke, edited by Roy Grundmann (2010) 
has appeared.
3 All this has been made possible through French and German cultural support. Haneke’s 
filmography and televisual work were featured in a film festival held at the Museum 
of Modern Art in New York, 3–15 October 2007. The festival—titled Michael Haneke: 
A Cinema of Provocation—was organized by Joshua Siegel, assistant curator of the 
Department of Film, and based on an exhibition curated by Roy Grundmann, a professor 
of film studies at Boston University.
4 The synopticon reverses the panoptic machinery of the society of the discipline as 
developed by Michel Foucault. In a synoptic society, the many voyeuristically watch the 
few, and the few close the seer/seen circuit through their exhibitionism.
5 Auteurship seems to be an apt term to use here, since Haneke has gone on record as 
saying that he considers as artworks only films that he himself scripted, as opposed to 
those he adapted for film (such as La Pianiste [2001], which is based on Elfriede Jelinek’s 
novel Die Klavierspielerin).
6 An example of such a cinema of “displeasure” was attempted by Lizzie Borden’s Working 
Girls (1986), a “neo-realistic” look at a bordello in New York, where the “working girls,” 
all young women with their own hopes and desires, are oppressed by their madam, who 
is interested only in making money. The sex scenes are shot in such a manner that all 
voyeurism seems completely dissipated by the banality of the routines and the flaccid 
phalluses of the regular johns.
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7 In Caché (2005), this happens only once, in an exchange between mother (Anne) and 
son (Pierrot) over his suspicion that she is having an affair. The scene ends with Pierrot 
running away from her embrace.
8 Some of the best psychoanalytic interpretations are directed at La Pianiste, ironically not 
considered by Haneke to be part of his art but for which he was awarded the prestigious 
Grand Prize of the Jury at the 2001 Cannes Film Festival. It also received the Best Foreign 
Film in 2002. In this sense, Jean Wyatt’s (2005) study of Erika (played in the film by 
Isabelle Huppert) is quite brilliantly supplemented by Thakur’s (2007) rereading of 
her analysis to show how Huppert’s psychosis is grounded in the music of Haydn. It is 
interesting to note that no such psychoanalytic explanation can be so cleverly applied to 
the Seventh Continent or to 71 Fragments. There is danger, however, in always applying 
psychoanalytic concepts to “explain” or interpret the behaviour of characters about 
which so little is known, or to use generalized concepts, like the interdit to the “primal 
scene,” to explain why Haneke forbids close-ups, for example.
9 My point is thus to confine the Verfremdungseffekts of shock and alienation to the 
psychic register of the Real, while the Entfremdungseffekts, which produce a distancing 
or defamiliarization, are better understood at the Imaginary register. Finally, it can be 
said that the unheimlich, or uncanny, aspects emerge in the Symbolic register in the way 
that the bourgeois home becomes estranged.
10 Such an Entfremdungseffekt of the image was part of Magritte’s repertoire, as iconically 
illustrated by Le Viol [The Rape] (1934).
11 After La Pianiste (2001), Caché (2005) may well be Haneke’s best-known film. It won an 
astounding number of awards, among them: Best Director, the Prize of the Ecumenical 
Jury, and the “Competition” Prize from the Fédération Internationale de la Presse 
Cinématographique (FipResci), all three at the 2005 Cannes Film Festival; Best Film, 
Best Director, Best Editor, and the FipResci Prize at the 2005 European Film Awards; 
the Valladolid International Film Festival’s Fiftiieth Anniversary Prize, also in 2005; 
the Diagonale Grand Prize for Best Feature Film at the 2006 Diagonale Austrian Film 
Awards; Best Foreign Language Film at the 2006 Film Critics Circle of Australia Awards; 
Best Screenplay at both the 2006 Étoiles d’Or (in January) and at the Lumière Awards (in 
February); and Best Film and Best Director at the 2007 Chlotrudis Awards.
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Transdisciplinarity and Journal Publishing
g a R y  g e n o s K o
Interdisciplinary compromises give way in transdisciplinary experi-
mentation to new efforts to creatively grasp hypercomplex objects like 
the socio-economic effects of new information technologies in an era of 
planetary computerization. Transdisciplinarity announces the need to 
assemble methods adequate to the challenges posed by such objects, and 
in the process devises working relationships across and beyond tradi-
tional disciplinary boundaries. Rather than valorizing the spaces between 
disciplines, which is a form of enforced marginalization or, at best, the 
occasion to engage with ambivalence (Genosko 1998, 183-86), transdisci-
plinary thought is not a creature of the middle but undisciplinable to the 
extent that it organizes itself around the problem of how to build a micro-
institution through the creation of a technological infrastructure ade-
quate to its undertakings. Eschewing transcendent or given solutions, for 
example, in general pedagogies (Genosko 2003a, 135), transdisciplinary 
activity simultaneously gives shape to institutional microspaces and their 
interdependent assemblages as they are worked out in pages, meetings, 
projects, data, and cash flows. Such an institution is actualized through 
technological matters; typically, such matters are paper artifacts like jour-
nals or books, which today are more commonly web-based e-journals and 
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listservs. Journals have a good deal to teach us about transdiciplinary 
experimentation.
A journal can be the site in and around which the rituals of a microin-
stitution are enacted, where standing in the group is established, labour 
divided, access and control mediated, a public imagined and engaged. 
Technology is the site of a microinstitution’s auto-production and the 
engendering of certain kinds of subjectivities, geared toward a con-
strained self-management through continual creation, by a segmented 
collective, not unlike an editorial board, with designated powers, roles, 
and responsibilities with varying degrees of stability, and distance from 
a journal’s editorial and production team (the book reviews editor as 
opposed to the subscriber). The technologies involved in journal produc-
tion have changed significantly since the 1980s as computerization dema-
terializes the once collective process based on craft knowledge.
A collectively produced journal engenders microinstitutional sub-
stance and is not merely a product managed at arm’s length; a microinsti-
tution is the product of a group’s quasi-collective self-elaboration. There 
are provisos contained in the “quasi-” attached to this use of “collective,” 
since while it does valorize the metabolic and affective communion of 
group life in its privileged haunts, and all the ways that affect is gener-
ated, it does not always require this condition because the assemblage is 
less empirically demanding and replaces the group with the fluidity and 
relative consistencies of components irreducible to actual persons in one 
place at one time in face-to-face relations.
Such microinstitutions do not exist apart from self-constituting activi-
ties, both failures and successes. They are not somehow products alien-
ated from the group’s auto-production. Of course, it is possible to be 
alienated from the products of one’s collective labour if the editor or direc-
tor is especially difficult; yet this very difficulty provides another kind of 
traction. Much interesting reflection exists on the failures of transdisci-
plinary projects, although much of it concerns inadequate integrations 
(failed wholenesses like splitting of groups, reversion to unidisciplinary 
methods) and the tendency to view such projects as luxuries “appropriate 
only in affluent times” (Somerville 2000, 104).
These reflections on collective autoproduction and the formation of 
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microinsitutions, including well-formed substances and less well-formed 
activities that leave little or no trace, give to technologies a central role in 
an interpretive strategy that sees in journal print runs, editorial assem-
blages, off-centre centres, summer institutes, groups that splinter from 
professional bodies, and conferences, all of which are resources for the 
investigation of the processes of transdisciplinary institutionalization. 
Technology is here a substantially formed intermedium that encodes a 
microinstitution’s legacy and is the site and occasion for passages through 
its spaces, even if such movements include at both poles cognitive and 
geographic locations. Perhaps simply because they survive as concrete 
resources, publications (proceedings, event posters, cFps, internal com-
munications, notes in personal archives, and interviews with surviving 
members) are indispensable for thinking about transdisciplinarity in 
practice.
The question of transdisciplinarity mutually imbricates technology 
and microinstitutional auto-formation. One of the claims advanced in the 
“quest of transdiscipinarity” by Armand and Michèle Mattelart (1992) in 
Rethinking Media Theory firmly places the endeavour within a French uni-
versity space and in relation to a journal under the rubric of the study of 
mass communication. I want to begin with this example not because it 
is exemplary, but in order to generate several critical points of view on 
transdiciplinary practices. I will then turn to a contrasting example of 
a non-university, and still French, research assemblage created by Félix 
Guattari in the late 1960s and how it was modified by a changing political 
and research policy landscape, while still clinging to a vestige of trans-
disciplinarity after losing its capacity to generate and support its original 
microinstitution.
Further, I want to report on some of the work I have done on Canadian 
journals, specifically Arthur and Marilouise Kroker’s Canadian Journal 
of Political and Social Theory (CJPST), and the “Canadian” content, if 
you will, or better, crossovers from Paul Piccone’s political theory jour-
nal Telos. These two examples will provide more detailed looks into the 
life of editorial assemblages and the significance of the Telos editorial 
diaspora for the invention of Canadian microspaces of transdisciplinary 
experimentation.
Valences of Interdisciplinarity.indd   233 28/02/2012   4:31:35 PM
234 gaRy genosKo
centRe FoR the study oF Mass coMMunications
In Rethinking Media Theory, the Mattelarts focus on the foundational work 
of Georges Friedmann in the creation of the Centre d’études des commu-
nications de masse (Centre for the Study of Mass Communications) at the 
École pratique des hautes études in 1960 and describe his “resolutely trans-
disciplinary perspective” (Mattelart and Mattelart 1992, 20). An unsigned 
editorial statement about the founding of the centre, published in 1961 in 
the first issue of its journal, Communications, explains that Friedmann 
saw the “organic” link between technology and mass culture as the object 
of the centre, and reflected on the inadequacy of the term “mass commu-
nications.” Moreover, the centre would not “choose its doctrine in an a 
priori fashion: we hope that its work will serve to define things and not 
words” (21). The Mattelarts end the quotation at this point, but if one reads 
a little further in the editorial note, the role of the journal becomes clear: 
“and it is precisely to this effort of real elucidation that the Centre will 
dedicate an annual publication of which this is the first issue” (Editors of 
Communications 1961, 1). The centre and its journal are born through ques-
tions about contemporary massification, the socio-semiological effects 
of which will be worked out in the journal’s pages. The journal is charac-
terized by a remarkable modesty, a hesitancy about its objects and meth-
ods which makes it impossible “to pretend to an immediate theory of its 
[contingent] object,” and thus it will be shaped by the critical cognizance 
of the limits and the originality of the task at hand. This is all the more 
remarkable given the competing master discourses of semiology, wielded 
by Roland Barthes, and a sociology of the present (whose object would be 
“events”), by Edgar Morin.
Two points are worth noting. Guattari picks up on this attitudinal 
positioning in a report that he co-wrote in 1992 for unesco on transdis-
ciplinary research: the adoption of a humble attitude in the face of the 
complexity of the fields under consideration; and a willingness to sacri-
fice something, that is, to suffer “amputations” or put in “parentheses” 
the certainties of specialist knowledge and established ways of work-
ing (Guattari and Vilar 1992, 9). The centre’s very existence is a kind of 
response, think the Mattelarts, to American-style content analysis pop-
ularized by Bernard Berelson in the early 1950s in the nascent area of 
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communications research, which spread from analysis of text to audio-
visual materials, Friedmann’s main concern according to one of his col-
leagues, Violette Morin (Mattelart and Mattelart 1992, 21). One is reminded 
of similar motivations of differentiation cited by Stuart Hall: behaviour-
ist assumptions (cause and effect) that ignore the character of the televi-
sual sign and the dimensionality of visual messages. These criticisms are 
thought to be direct rejoinders to the emphasis of “Leicester School” mass 
communications researchers who treat the communicative process as 
transparent, misread signification, apolitically analyze the medium, and 
present an un-nuanced view of the audience (Hall 1994, 261). However, 
even these kinds of adjustments could not mask the fact that the centre 
was chained until its reorientation in 1974 to “universal themes,” ahis-
torical questioning, and aneconomic theories—rhetoric, semiology, theo-
ries of texts, psychoanalysis, and leisure and consumption—with only an 
occasional glance at actual changes in communications technologies like 
cable television and computerization, which the Mattelarts correctly diag-
nose as an indifference to encoding pragmatics (1992, 23–24).
My question concerns the character of the centre itself. Each issue of 
Communications contains an activities report of the centre, which showed 
the fragmented yearly results. The positions of participants, other than 
directors of studies, are rarely noted at this point in the centre’s history. 
The seminars directed by leading figures at the École pratique are listed 
and described (listing those who lectured in them), research projects, 
attendance and participation at colloquia, conferences and learned soci-
eties, principal publications, media appearances, and so on—in short, a 
fairly typical academic annual report including all and sundry. This lack 
of coordination and paper participation beyond the journal itself was 
eventually manifested in 1972–73 by a change in name to the Centre for 
Transdisciplinary Studies (announced in 1974 in the twenty-first issue of 
Communications) and the division into three dominant streams accord-
ing to the interests of the co-directors (Sociologie [Morin], Anthropologie 
[Friedmann], Sémiologie [Barthes]). So, the move to transdisciplinarity 
betrayed the transdisciplinary goals of 1960 for the sake of specialist multi-
plicity. The explanation of the name change outlined three tasks: assemble 
researchers from varied disciplines; give priority to research that engages 
multiple methods, languages, and practices; deploy transdisciplinary 
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work in an attempt to bring to light new objects of research (Editors of 
Communications 1974, 213). From 1973 to 1977, under the tri-directorship 
of the second incarnation of the centre, as the École pratique became the 
École des hautes études en sciences sociales, Communications came under 
the sway of the masters of structuralism (the consanguinity of Todorov, 
Kristeva, Metz, Genette; following Barthes’s self-exile from structure and 
elevation to the Collège de France). The challenge of the original hyper-
complex object, mass communications, receded into the background. The 
deaths of Friedmann in 1978 and Barthes in 1980 would rob the centre of 
its early champions. Like many such centres, the animating spirit of its 
founder would be invoked. “Ah! The remarkable courage of his telephone 
calls, so full of reasons and resonance, before 8 o’clock in the morning,” 
wrote Violette Morin of Friedmann, the philosopher (1978, 2).
By 1979 the buzzword had become “diversification,” but not for its 
own sake; rather, diversification is not “dispersion” but “the occasion for 
theoretical and epistemological communications by and for the Centre” 
(Editors of Communications 1979, 211). At the end of the 1970s, the centre’s 
annual reports were partitioned by area of specialist contribution—bio-
anthropo-sociology; contemporary sociology; politics; cinema; literary 
semiology; socio-semiotics of discourse. The streams signified the diver-
sity of undertakings, yet seemed more noun-like than verb-like, and 
became less and less object-focused and more and more dependent on 
the journal to hold the intellectual project between its covers, rather than 
allowing its loose leaves to scatter. At this point all members of the centre 
are listed by name, position, school, and often role in the case of techni-
cians and administrators.
Transdisciplinarity confronts its institutional substances at every turn. 
Commonly, it is in the form of a journal that the question of the “working 
example” is raised, but equally pertinent is the academic “centre” and 
its institutional dependencies (the Centre for Transdisciplinary Studies 
would be thoroughly integrated with the Centre national de la recher-
che scientifique [cnRs], especially as Edgar Morin rose in its ranks), the 
degree of consensuality at play, personality clashes, funding challenges, 
real administrative support, and so on. For every director who believes 
they have to keep their centre—citing Margaret Somerville (2002, 102) with 
regard to McGill’s Centre for Medicine, Ethics and Law—from succumbing 
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to the devil of dangerousness and/or falling into the deep blue sea of flaki-
ness, there is another director who does not have togetherness as a goal, 
who chooses dissensus over consensus and can tolerate the proliferation 
of singularities without a transcendent unity. However, this too can be a 
kind of terror.
study centRe FoR ReseaRch into institutional 
FoRMation
I now want to turn to a different kind of example in a non-academic 
setting. The journal is a choice matter formed by editorial assemblages 
seeking to collectively realize their microinstitutional ambitions in con-
crete projects and in the process create new worlds of reference, fabri-
cate and share affects in the manner of artists, and summon a readership 
and participants yet to come. The journal Recherches catalyzed the col-
lective self-production of the microinstitution Study Centre for Research 
into Institutional Formation, Centre d’études de recherches sur le fonc-
tionnement des institutions (ceRFi), which brought together an incred-
ible array of psychiatrists, architects, town planners, philosophers, film 
makers, and educators of all stripes and statuses.
ceRFi may be described as a freelance research group that managed 
to solidify a core membership in affective communion around the pro-
duction of collective objects, primarily funded research projects leading 
to special topics journal issues. It was created by Guattari in 1967 and 
replaced the two-year-old predecessor organization that began by pub-
lishing Recherches at the psychiatric Clinique de La Borde. ceRFi also 
enjoyed a community of experiences through the work of many of its 
members at La Borde as stagiaires, or trainees. Its natural milieu was psy-
chiatry. ceRFi was an extra-academic assemblage that was funded by the 
civil research contracts under the budget of the Ministry of Research. It 
provided salaries to its members and financed its projects. These were not 
individual contracts, as François Fourquet recalls, but covered the entire 
group of twenty core members for four or five years (2007, 2, 4). Eventually 
it was edged out by professional academic bodies as budgets shrank, gov-
ernments changed, and research became more university-focused. To put 
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it bluntly, centres like Friedmann’s got the money and ceRFi did not. This 
began to occur around 1975. Eventually, the state’s strategy was to inte-
grate or co-opt some of the core ceRFi researchers, a move that failed, 
whereas with the groups at the École des hautes études this was very suc-
cessful in building a stable of preferred applicants.
The lack of funding—the failure of what Anne Querrien called “a min-
isterial godsend”—became an issue for ceRFi and caused internal strife 
and protective restructuring (1999, 35). Eventually, by the end of the 1970s, 
ceRFi turned its back on the radicals who had prepared its most noto-
rious issue, Recherches number 12, “Trois milliards de pervers: Grande 
encyclopédie des homosexualités” (1973), and the blending of affective 
and political dimensions imploded (Dosse 2007, 34–35).
In the early 1970s, ceRFi legitimated its outsider status through the 
participation of leading intellectuals in its research groups; thus, Foucault 
was research director of the Généalogie de équipements collectives 
stream, which resulted in a number of mid-1970s issues of Recherches on a 
variety of topics ranging from architecture, psychiatric hospital planning, 
safeguarding vernacular languages, and power. This was a period during 
which ceRFi had as its hypercomplex object of study the State, which it 
approached without constructing a “homogeneous doctrine” (Fourquet 
2007, 2). ceRFi also collaborated with other independent groups, nota-
bly Guy Hocquenghem’s FhaR (Front homosexuel d’action révolutionan-
naire), which opened up pathways for the explorations of its members, 
and invited other groups to occupy its space. Although Guattari sometimes 
makes light of his many criminal and other charges (Guattari and Rolnick 
2008, 380), he never ceased mentioning the “Three Billion Perverts” issue 
and his fine of six hundred francs for affronting public decency (Guattari 
1996, 192). Indeed, it is an irreplaceable discussion point for anyone inter-
ested in the history of ceRFi (Mozère 2004).
It was 1973 and ceRFi was at its “zenith”—flush with cash, full of the 
success of Anti-Oedipus, published the previous year, flirting with the pros-
pects of communal life in the Parisian suburbs (buying a house and start-
ing a commune), drawing the brightest-burning intellectual stars into its 
orbit, not merely in its pages but in its living, editorial auto-productions 
(Dosse 2007, 319–24). Then issue number 12 appeared. By the late 1970s, 
ceRFi had changed fundamentally under a variety of pressures, and 
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Guattari began to distance himself at the moment when ceRFi took off in 
the direction of professional publishing (developing the “Encres” series 
of books, re-editing Trois milliards de pervers, joining forces with Editions 
10/18 to reprint issues of Recherches as stand-alone books, abandoning 
under pressure from new members an older set of radical causes), finally 
ceding his directorship in 1981 (Dosse 2007, 332–35).
Publishing machines, like all machines, break down yet continue to 
function in failing to integrate their parts. This is merely one dimension 
of their process of microinstitutional production. Parts of broken-down 
machines may be cobbled together to produce wonderful devices, as Rube 
Goldberg demonstrated in his comic drawings.
It was the institutional task of ceRFi to ameliorate its situation by 
engaging not only the expressive desires of FhaR but also those of 
the MlF (Mouvement de libération des femmes); in fact, ceRFi put at 
Hocquenghem’s disposal its infrastructural resources and the assistance 
of Querrien. Overall, ceRFi managed to interrupt its state cash flow in the 
process, but as a flow itself connected with other entities like the FhaR and 
MlF and gip (Groupe information prison, in which Foucault was active), 
from which post-1973 ceRFi professional editor and publisher Florence 
Pétry came, eventually tapped a new energy source through three synthe-
ses: connecting with book publishing, and disjunctively subdividing into 
specialty and regional groups (music, film; ceRFi Southeast); introduc-
ing difference in connective repetitions (the burden of serials publishing) 
by means of renewal and breakage (learning how to distribute itself and 
its products); and finally, conjunctively extruding a collective subjectivity 
about which histories may be written: “So that’s what it was?” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1977, 18).
editoRial asseMbl ages and cRoss-boRdeR acadeMic 
tRaFFic
My study of Canadian cultural theory in historical and theoretical context 
focuses on two examples. These are primarily publishing projects with 
relevance to the development of Canadian intellectual life in the humani-
ties and social sciences, specifically in the broad field of cultural theory, 
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encompassing critical, postmodern, and transdisciplinary social and 
political thought. The examples that interest me belong to the 1970s and 
1980s: first, the late Paul Piccone’s political theory journal Telos; second, 
Arthur Kroker’s Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory; and 
third would be, if space permitted, the first cultural studies magazine in 
Canada, Border/lines, closely associated with the late Ioan Davies.
Even the salutary, but now dated, efforts of draft-dodging sociologist 
Ray Morrow to analyze the “relative absence of overt obstacles to novel 
research orientations” for critical social thought in Canada in the 1970s 
(1985, 715), presupposing university environments and the conservatism 
of the major presses, leaves only a weak idea of what a Canadian criti-
cal theory would look like. I am proposing something different. The mic-
ropolitical textures of my examples show us the significance not of names 
but of matters—artifacts and events and fields of reference—emerging 
through collective self-invention not amenable to capture by empiri-
cal sociology or through the reward systems of our tri-council funding 
agency, as well as the importance of maintaining a flexible relationship to 
dominant institutional formations while engaging in microinstitutional 
experimentation and provocation. Such microinstitutions are not closed 
in on themselves like hedgehogs. Rather, they consist in a transversal 
matrix, a mobile intersection of detachable heterogeneous components 
achieving a certain stability with realized projects but whose consistency 
is always in process.
I sense a certain nationalist grumbling: isn’t Telos an American jour-
nal, and who reads it today, anyway? It was an ostensibly American phi-
losophy journal founded in 1968 at suny-Buffalo by Piccone and, despite 
the youthful posturing against copyright, brushing away the cobwebs 
of Anglo-American philosophy departments, and its notorious inter-
nal brawling, became the destination of choice for scholars of Western 
Marxism and European thought—introducing many of us to luminaries 
like Negri, Baudrillard, and the rest. A swerve occurred in the mid-1980s 
that saw the journal tarry with New Right politics in Europe and later in 
Canada, advocating a clearly xenophobic brand of populist federalism 
with one foot firmly planted in the work of Carl Schmidt and the other in 
Jeffersonian meditations on the organicity of communities and their right 
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to mind their own affairs. Piccone even flirted with the ideologues of the 
Reform Party.
Many Canadas circulated through Telos. Waterloo is, in fact, the 
cradle of Canadian Telos. The first annual Telos conference was held at 
the University of Waterloo in 1970. The conference displayed all of the 
warts and bristles of Telosian events to come; it was uneasy about where 
it was—in but not of Canada and anxious about this context. There was 
not one session on the new Marxism in Canada in a conference largely 
organized by local undergraduate students (including Ian Angus and 
Cyril Levitt), attended by graduate students still trying to make sense of 
Canadian nationalism (like Andrew Wernick), and many others with close 
ties to various strands of the student movement whose fatal fracturing 
was only underlined at the conference. The classic dramaturgy of Telos 
was established there as activists belittled cop-out academics and the 
latter tossed recriminations against mindless activists. Henceforth all the 
rehearsals of this divide went more or less according to plan.
It would not be until a few years later that Telos situated itself in Canada 
through the emergence of the Toronto Telos Group (ttg), the model for 
the many editorial assemblages that defined the journal throughout the 
1970s. This is a microinstitutional style that is completely original. Toronto 
Telos was also the longest standing of the editorial groups, appearing for 
the first time on the masthead in the winter issue of 1974–75 and thence-
forth for most of the remainder of the decade until winter 1978–79, and 
for the final time three issues later in the fall of the same year. But even 
then, while no longer constituted as the  and listed as such, its distinc-
tive matter—the Short Journal Reviews—continued under the direction 
of coordinating editor John Fekete, with the assistance of many “former” 
ttg members, for several more years until Fall 1981 before petering out. 
Over the course of some twenty-five issues, Toronto Telos members, with 
material contributed by the Kansas and Carbondale groups, provided 
a staple of the journal’s back pages. Unlike other long-standing groups 
such as St. Louis Telos, members of the Toronto contingent had a regu-
lar presence in the pages of the journal and occupied key positions on 
the production staff and editorial associate posts. During a year spent in 
Toronto on a teaching contract (1974–75), Piccone himself was listed as a 
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member of the Toronto group for three issues, testimony to his attachment 
to the city and the affective dimensions of the group of young scholars 
(he put to work his two assistants, Brian Singer and Janet Lum, not on 
his courses, but on his journal). During this period (and for some years 
later), the journal was produced in St. Louis, and members of the produc-
tion team, composed mostly of graduate students in sociology and politi-
cal science at University of Toronto and the Social and Political Thought 
Program at York University, would make the long drive to St. Louis with 
Piccone to produce it. The energy, enthusiasm, and collective sense of the 
project’s urgency that marked these junkets should not be underplayed. 
Some of the former members of the ttg are still in Toronto (Singer and 
Steve Levine at York; Lum at Ryerson; Wodek Szemberg at tv Ontario) or 
nearby (John Fekete and Andrew Wernick at Trent). Other former mem-
bers have become well-known, even notorious, figures in political theory 
and intellectual history in the uK and the United States (John Keane at 
Westminster; Richard Wolin at cuny, respectively). Toronto was not the 
only Canadian Telos editorial grouping. In the Summer 1980 issue (Telos 
44), the second Canadian Telos group appeared in Montreal, built around 
Eileen Manion, Mary Papke, and Charles Levin (whose translation of 
Baudrillard’s For A Critique was published by Telos Press), but it was 
short-lived, lasting for only four issues until Spring 1981 (Telos 47).
It is important to note that the practice of reviewing journals in Telos 
only appeared with the constitution of Toronto Telos. Singer underlined 
this point in response to questions about the model for this practice, which 
he did not provide, but nevertheless reflected: “It didn’t really happen 
until there was a Telos group constituted.” The practice was produced by 
the group and allowed for the group’s reproduction: “We were looking 
for things that would help the group cohere. There was a certain amount 
of enthusiasm” (Genosko 2001b). The Short Journal Reviews displayed 
from the outset an extraordinary international and multilingual outlook, 
covering publications in Italian, French, German, and Hungarian, among 
others. By the Fall 1975 issue the ttg had a mailing address at York. In 
1976–77, John Fekete would appear as the editor of the Short Journal 
Reviews. This is also the moment when Telos groups proliferate, in the us 
at least, after the Toronto model.
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What made the Toronto Group successful was the close proximity of 
graduate students with compatible particularities who all managed to get 
along. Piccone’s explanation of the groups is a fascinating piece of socio-
logical speculation that situates investment of energy and talent in net-
works of friendship and focused projects. After graduation, “they spread 
all over the place” (Genosko and Gandesha 2005, 166) and, among those 
who became professors, most gave up the life of a political journal on the 
edge of academe.
What made the formation of Toronto Telos possible in Piccone’s 
memory was, at least on the surface, the pre-existing social and affec-
tive infrastructure among a richly talented pool of graduate students, 
the manageable neighbourhoods of the once-affordable, pre-gentrified 
downtown, and the fact that the group had a specific task to perform, that 
is, the production of the transdisciplinary Short Journal Reviews, which 
reflected the reading, interests, and language skills of each of the members. 
Indeed, it was not uncommon for ttg members to have only publications 
in Telos when they found their first academic posts. Toronto permitted 
experimentation with microinstitutions in which extra- academic assem-
blages could be, to borrow a term suggested by John Fekete, self-instituting 
(Genosko 2003b) yet retreat into subsidized university spaces when neces-
sary. York’s then fledgling Social and Political Thought Program provided 
either a roof or a floor for an otherwise unprotected project, depending on 
whom you talked to.
The ttg was a completely original formation, and its specific task 
directed its autoproduction and the kind of opportunities for subjectifica-
tion it afforded and institutional matters it formed. The formation of insti-
tutional matters is sensitive to the technologies of production that marked 
the pre-computerized era of journal publishing. As Fekete reflected some 
thirty years after the fact, he is still struck by the “cogent creativity of the 
enterprise.” It is remarkable that the Toronto group cohered in ways that 
only the St Louis group approximated, but for different reasons. Yet the 
transversality of Telos editorial assemblages was restricted by Piccone’s 
ownership of the journal, not to mention the high-handedness of his 
politics. Although he was willing to experiment with ways of height-
ening the journal’s transversality—its internal flows and potential for 
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communication and collaboration through intensely participatory events 
like annual conferences, book publishing, internal communiqués, and 
blendings of junior and senior academics—these strategies bumped up 
against his own inflexible authority, examples of which would be the 
summary removal of Charles Levin from the editorial collective after the 
Baudrillard translation of 1981 (discussed in Genosko 2004a); and his 
“Tony Soprano approach to editing” (Genosko 2001a).
In order to better appreciate the transversal matrix of microinstitutions 
of Canadian cultural theory, some consideration needs to be given to the 
mobility of bodies in the form of what I call the Telos diaspora. This flow of 
personnel is evident in the passages of former Telosians; many members 
of the Toronto group moved, in fact, from Piccone’s project to the CJPST. 
The drift began toward the “Canadian Telos” as early as 1977 when Ben 
Agger (briefly a ttg member in 1974–75 but not well-treated by Piccone, 
and later a CJPST reviews editor) and Ray Morrow (a stalwart of ttg for 
most of the 1970s and long-standing CJPST editorial board member, who 
began his career at the University of Manitoba), who joined the CJPST in 
Winnipeg as review editor and advisory committee member respectively. 
The transits are notable: John Fekete (as a visitor to Montreal), Russell 
Jacoby (his Canadian years in Vancouver date from the early to mid-
1980s), and John Keane as a “name” editorial correspondent, and contrib-
uting board members Andrew Wernick, Charles Levin, and Eileen Manion 
from the Mtg. Kroker underlines that while he was a reader of Telos, his 
journal had no relationship with it—a not wholly convincing claim. For 
Kroker, Telos was a European journal, while CJPST was fundamentally a 
Canadian journal, both in its intellectuality and its self-presentation of 
Canadian thought to the outside world (Genosko 2004b).
Yet the two journals were also critical projects, and for Kroker what 
this meant was that European theoretical traditions needed to be “rubbed 
against the facticity of our historical and political situation.” The com-
monality of critical orientation and background did not entail canonical 
thought, as issue after issue of the CJPST restlessly explored emerging 
ideas in postmodern thought, feminism, male hysteria, dependency 
theory, psychoanalysis, and Hollywood. Can the same be said of Telos? 
While the diversity of Telos is also remarkable, especially the multina-
tional and multi-disciplinary commitments within the context of Western 
Valences of Interdisciplinarity.indd   244 28/02/2012   4:31:36 PM
 Transdisciplinarity and Journal Publishing 245
Marxism and the ingenuities of its rejection, efforts to integrate feminist 
thought were piecemeal at best; this was one of the reasons Mark Poster 
gave for leaving the journal (Genosko 2004). To be sure, reviews of impor-
tant books in feminist theory were certainly published and debates initi-
ated in a regular succession in the early 1980s through the efforts of former 
Mtg members Manion and Mary Papke. But these were mostly confined to 
reviews and not lead articles, and engagement with feminist theory even-
tually disappeared from Telos’s pages. As well, despite the quality of con-
tributors in cultural and communicational theory (Poster, Stuart Ewen, 
Martin Jay), this work was downplayed, with the exception of Christopher 
Lasch’s writing on narcissism.
Telos’s Canadian orientations and episodes facilitated its self-institu-
tion and the auto-unfolding of its editorial assemblages; the most com-
pelling example of this autoproduction is in the activities of the Toronto 
Telos Group. Moreover, the transversal matrix of critical journal projects 
involves not so much the actual transport of key personnel across bor-
ders as an opening of pathways of communication, as individuals coming 
into their own seek avenues for subjectification in which they can find 
the means, as Fekete put it, to “express their own developing sense of 
the world or political commitment” in intellectual exercises, such as the 
Short Journal Reviews, undertaking translations, and getting involved in 
the related tangle of practices in journal publishing in or on the margins 
of academic professional life.
What is most remarkable about the CJPST is the diversity of institutional 
matters made available through, for example, the “Theory Workshops” 
it sponsored during the 1980s at the Learned Societies that ran paral-
lel to the large, national professional- association–sponsored meeting, 
and the pamphlets it published under the rubric of “CultureTexts.” This 
experiment in pamphleteering was short-lived but grew out of the con-
tact between Kroker and former ttg member Kermit Hummel (active in 
Toronto between 1976 and 1978), who was then an academic editor at 
St. Martin’s Press in New York. Certainly, quite unlike Telos, CJPST made 
space available for artists and designers, and the print medium itself was 
explored to the breaking point as production changed and the journal 
went online under a new guise, regardless of what one believes about the 
continuity of CJPST and Ctheory.org.
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The physical production of the CJPST was made possible in the first 
instance by a grant from the Bronfman Family Foundation that helped 
it through the trial period, before it became eligible for federal funding 
through the Canada Council and sshRc. Telos did not enjoy this level of 
subsidization. But like Telos, CJPST was produced by a couple, with several 
new spouses in the case of Piccone. The partnership involved in acquir-
ing craft knowledge, and the physical labour of production, together 
with the demands of the review process and editorial tasks, in addition 
to distribution, accounting, and negotiating with the press, strains more 
than just backs and eyes. By placing the couple, the private and domes-
tic, at the heart of production, a myriad of additional stratifications may 
become visible and complexify interactions within editorial assemblages, 
changing the consistency of the project. Couple issues, financial strain 
(especially in Canada with the introduction of the gst), the physicality of 
production and the hand-mailing of issues, right down to the briefcases 
of heavy manuscripts that editors regularly dragged around, all bear upon 
what I am calling microinstitutional autoproduction.
conclusion
My ceRFi example recounts the inglorious breakdowns and evolutionary 
strands along the way in creating a microinstitution around the journal 
Recherches. This example stands in rather stark contrast with the extended 
life that Communications would enjoy through the beneficence of the 
French National Centre for Scientific Research. As the cnRs came to con-
trol a large portion of the annual research budgets of a number of minis-
tries, Guattari fulminated against the “cnRsization of research” in France 
(Guattari 1980, 156), by which he meant state-sponsored “social science” 
research brokered by providing training, directed grants, sponsoring labs, 
and so on. Under the cnRs, interdisciplinary research is heavily encour-
aged, especially in the area of information-communication-knowledge. 
Today, the cnRs funds the Edgar Morin Centre within the Institute for the 
Anthropology of Contemporary Societies in the École des hautes études, a 
transdisciplinary research space for training graduate students that super-
sedes Freidmann’s centre. And it still publishes Communications. Around 
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1980, a “rescue” of Recherches was attempted by Lion Murard and Patrick 
Zylberman, who severed all ties with what they considered to be the navel-
gazing radicalism of the old ceRFi and recommended the erasure of the 
microinstitution altogether, including Guattari. By 1981 neither ceRFi nor 
Guattari was in the picture (Dosse 2007, 334–35). Nonetheless the journal 
soldiered on for some time without generating the glowing constellations 
of its original microinstitution commitments. This does not mean that it no 
longer exuded any microinstitutional matters whatsoever. Rather, a well-
formed substance like an ongoing journal is an archive of such a moment of 
change and scattering of personnel, and its newly constituted board, con-
tributors, and revised inter-institutional publishing relations are reshaped 
in and through contractions and new delineations. Journals outlive their 
editors in some respects.
The problem is that such a project loses its living, organic relation 
to its microinstitutional commitments and becomes more like a product 
disembedded from the vision of transdiscipinarity that gave it shape and 
guided it. Changes in funding, political change at the level of the state and 
in terms of a retrenchment against the excesses of the soixante-huitards 
by the “new philosophers,” the inevitable diasporic wanderings of mem-
bers, and professionalization within publishing culture reshaped the 
project. Obviously, microinstitutional matter is still generated by writing 
histories of and reflecting on the lessons of ceRFi, and studying the desti-
nies of Telos and CJPST on the web. But the loss of a living collective project 
which found expression through the journal format, the very technology 
that served as the “common good” (Histoire du ceRFi, 3), is irreplaceable. 
Still, the survival of microinstitutional spaces organized non-collectively 
around state-directed knowledge mobilization and great (wo)men or the 
survivors of academic political battles (like Morin, not to mention Kroker), 
also underscores the poverty of victory when the terms are set elsewhere—
autoproduction becoming reproduction without dialogue—and which 
turns transdisciplinarity into the rhetorics and practices internal to the 
entrepreneurial research university. What this brief study of journals sug-
gests is that transdisciplinarity has a tendency to work itself out betwixt 
and between journal publishing on the margins of academe, or at least in 
its interstices, while relying upon the conviviality of an intellectual com-
munity that can only hold together for a short time, and that the research 
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arms of government, which enjoy playing favourites, and are peculiar to 
national traditions (France and Canada), produce ambivalent results.
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11 
Gender, Women’s Rights, and Religion 
An Interdisciplinary Case Study 
M o R n y  J o y 
This essay is an exploration of the field of religious studies and the pos-
sible contribution it can make to interdisciplinary studies.1 I describe 
religious studies as a field rather a discipline because it is inherently inter-
disciplinary in its orientation. That is, there are many disciplines that are 
included in the study of religion—anthropology, history, literary theory, 
psychology, sociology, and philosophy, to name the most prominent. Yet, 
interestingly, religious studies is rarely mentioned in any discussion of 
interdisciplinarity. The orientation that religious studies follows at the 
University of Calgary, where I teach, is that of a non-normative and non-
apologetic one, grounded in the same roots from which other disciplines 
in the human sciences emerged. Thus I believe that it has much to offer 
on topics where an interdisciplinary approach helps to clarify and refine 
certain problematic cases and questions. From this perspective, this essay 
is a case study of sorts, in that it illustrates how religious studies can 
contribute to present debate on the contentious subject of religion and 
human rights or, more specifically, women’s rights. One of the principal 
difficulties in approaching this particular issue is that it is usually pre-
sented as a strict dichotomy, where religion and rights are regarded as 
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mutually exclusive, along similar lines to those of the private and public 
domains of existence. Another related opposition is that between the 
individual and his or her community. I think that there is a need to move 
this debate beyond the simplistic dualisms that frame the issue so that 
a more nuanced discussion can occur. This is not to say that I think the 
public/private distinction should be totally abolished but that, in certain 
instances, the basic binary structure needs to be adjusted. Often such 
binaries only serve to exacerbate the situation rather than lead to a more 
informed awareness.
To state the problem starkly, there are many secular thinkers today 
who profess that no one in their right mind would have anything to do 
with religion. On the other side, there are fundamentalists from various 
religions who wish to allow religious attitudes and doctrine not only to 
encroach on the public domain, but even to dominate it. It is unfortu-
nate that the public treatment of the two sides seems to allow these two 
extremes to control the coverage in much of the popular media. It would 
seem that it is time to move beyond these stereotypes and examine what 
other possibilities could be proposed from a moderate point of view, so 
that not every woman who wears a veil is regarded as a fundamentalist, 
nor every secularist is assumed to be a dogmatic atheist.
So where to begin? The situation with regard to women’s rights and 
religion today is a somewhat complicated and troubling one. This is 
because such rights are opposed not only by fundamentalists, but also by 
traditionalists, as well as by postcolonial thinkers and by critical social 
theorists who think that rights as a concept is just another facet of late 
capitalistic American imperialism, or globalization. It is thus difficult to 
address all of these aspects at once in order to clarify the beginnings of 
a more constructive approach, but I think they all need to be addressed. 
This can only be done, I believe, by taking an interdisciplinary approach 
where religious studies features as one of the contributors.
By way of introduction, so as to illustrate further complexities of the 
issue, I would like to turn to two Canadian situations that are extremely 
instructive. One is the long-standing ignominious treatment of the 
Indigenous women2 in Canada and their struggle for recognition, and the 
other is the recent case of the proposal to adopt Shari‘a law in Ontario and 
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its consequences. I will not go into great detail in either of these cases, as 
I have written on them at length elsewhere (Joy 2008), but what is most of 
interest is the way that they are played out in the media and also within 
their respective jurisdictions.
t Wo canadian exaMples
Many narratives written by the Aboriginal women of Canada testify to 
injustices suffered not only because of prejudices resulting from per-
ceived differences of pigmentation or genetic inheritance, but specifically 
because of gender difference. This is evident in an ongoing failure to rec-
ognize Aboriginal women’s rights in many parts of Canada to community 
or band membership and to respect their position as trusted guard-
ians of the tradition. It is also manifested in the disproportionate rates 
of Aboriginal women subjected to judicial procedures and subsequent 
incarceration. But, most especially and tragically, it is all too obvious in 
the very numerous acts of violence and murder that are inflicted upon 
them.3 These are forms of discrimination that contemporary justice has 
failed to rectify, and their continuation indicates a pattern of enduring 
injustice and racial prejudice. As if to emphasize the seriousness of this 
situation, in 2004 Amnesty International issued a report entitled “‘Stolen 
Sisters: A Human Rights Response to Discrimination and Violence against 
Indigenous Women in Canada” (Amnesty International 2004).
The president of the Native Women’s Association of Canada (here-
after nWac) at that time, Beverly Jacobs, a Mohawk member of the Six 
Nations of the Grand River, wrote one of the reports presented to Amnesty. 
In documenting the untold instances of violence against the Indigenous 
women of Canada, Amnesty states: “The social and economic marginal-
ization of Indigenous women, along with a history of government policies 
that have torn apart Indigenous families and communities, have pushed a 
disproportionate number of Indigenous women into dangerous situations 
that include extreme poverty, homelessness and prostitution.” The report 
also states: “Despite assurances to the contrary, police in Canada have 
often failed to provide Indigenous women with an adequate standard of 
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protection” (Amnesty International 2004, 2). This stands in sharp contrast 
to Indigenous women’s status in precolonial days when they were held in 
respect and honoured as guardians of their traditions.4 In their world, it 
needs to be stressed, religion was not regarded as a separate sphere from 
other domains of life, as it tends to be in modern, liberal societies.
One specific case which provides graphic evidence of Aboriginal wom-
en’s diminished status is that of Sandra Lovelace, a Maliseet woman from 
the Tobique First Nation in New Brunswick. Sandra married a non-Indian 
man and as a result was no longer regarded as a status Indian under the 
provisions of the Indian Act of 1876. When she subsequently divorced this 
man, she was barred from returning to the reservation, which meant that 
she and her sons had no shelter or means of support. (No Indian man who 
marries a white woman loses his status.) After her legal appeals were dis-
regarded in Canada, Lovelace took her case to the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee. In July 1981, the committee judged in her favour, 
decreeing that:
Sandra Lovelace, because she is denied the legal right to reside on the 
Tobique Reserve, has by that fact been denied the right guaranteed by 
Article 27 to persons belonging to minorities, to enjoy their own culture 
and to use their language in community with other members of the 
group. (Lovelace v. Canada, 2 H.R.L.J. 158 [U.N.H.R.C.], 1981, para. 13.2, 
quoted in Jacobs [2005, 183])
In contemporary Canada, since the inclusion of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms in the Constitution Act in 1982, Aboriginal women 
such as Teressa Nahanee, a lawyer and member of the Squamish Nation, 
think that the status and rights of Indigenous women would be better 
protected under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms rather than 
the Indian Act (Nahanee 1997). Today, then, certain Aboriginal women are 
demanding that recognition of their previous status be restored in terms 
of the Charter. At the same time they also wish to be free from discrimina-
tory practices and have access to basic human rights, such as freedom 
from violence, and adequate protection under the law.
Yet this strategy has not been welcomed in some communities. Joyce 
Green, a Métis scholar, has described the negative reaction to Aboriginal 
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women who adopt this position: “Women advocating the explicit protec-
tion of women’s equality rights were attacked for undermining the greater 
cause of Aboriginal rights” (Green 1993, 114). Nahanee also understands 
the situation to be particularly fraught, but she refuses to allow the situa-
tion to be framed as an opposition in terms of rights versus the Indigenous 
community, which she understands to be counterproductive. “As long as 
the dominant forces within the Canadian and Aboriginal patriarchy con-
tinue to use the prison of collective rights to denigrate the Aboriginal 
women’s struggle for sexual equality rights as a dichotomy of individual/
collective, women will be unable to capture popular support inside and 
outside the community” (Nahanee 1993, 370). Both Nahanee and Green 
consider the individual rights/community issue to be a false dichotomy. 
Nahanee declares: “Each and every individual comprises the collective; 
there is no collective without them” (370). She believes that individuals 
are inextricably interconnected with their community in extremely com-
plicated ways that are not always in accord with the dominant view.
What needs to be stressed in this case is that in asking that their 
previous status be restored, Aboriginal women insist that their former 
religious status of parity be included. This, then, is a particular set of cir-
cumstances, where in contrast to the debate in Canadian society at large, 
human rights and religious rights are not at variance but actually, in fact, 
coincide. Unfortunately, however, the issue of the individual versus the 
community looms large.
This situation can be contrasted with the terms of the debate in 
Ontario concerning the recommended adoption of Shari‘a in Family 
Arbitration courts to settle family disputes.5 (Since the Arbitration Act of 
1991, such courts had existed for Jews and certain other religious groups. 
This arrangement was viewed as a way of alleviating heavy caseloads in 
the civil courts.) After further consultation, with strong protests being reg-
istered by many women’s groups—including those of Muslim women—
and sensationalist coverage by the media, the premier, Dalton McGinty, 
decided not to allow this recommendation to be put into effect, and all 
such courts were disbanded. What was both fascinating and alarming 
about the whole procedure was the language of polarization that domi-
nated the popular terms of the debate. And it is this aspect on which I 
would now like to focus.
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A Canadian professor of law, Natasha Bakht, has commented on the 
situation. She is worried that the move to arbitration reflects an attitude 
on the part of the government to wash its hands of dealing adequately 
with the status of women in religions—particularly in a time when fun-
damentalism is increasing. This mirrors the fact that courts seem to be 
increasingly unwilling to make decisions on matters of religion. The 
state seems to be reluctant to take responsibility for matters that are 
considered private. In her article, Bakht invokes the words of Nicola 
Lacey: “The ideology of the public/private dichotomy allows govern-
ment to clean its hands of any responsibility for the state of the ‘private’ 
world and depoliticizes the disadvantages which inevitably spill over the 
alleged divide by affecting the position of the ‘privately’ disadvantaged 
in the ‘public’ world” (Lacey 1993, 97; emphasis in the original). Bakht 
notes that Lacey views such non-regulation by government as amount-
ing to a maintenance of the status quo, that is, “support of pre-existing 
power relations and distributions of goods within the ‘private’ sphere” 
(Bakht 2004, 23). Bakht arrives at this conclusion because, in Canadian 
law, the burden of proof for a breach of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms falls on the person who is making a charge of such a breach. 
Such an onus places women in a difficult and demanding position.
Bakht also makes an intervention, however, on behalf of Muslim 
women who may want to accept arbitration by Shari‘a. She states that 
one cannot automatically presume that such women are either ignorant 
or oppressed in making such a choice. To do so would be to “infantilize” 
Muslim women in discriminatory ways. She further declares: “In fact, 
making an overly generalized argument regarding women’s capacities or 
experiences homogenizes women and potentially eliminates important 
differences based on intersecting grounds of oppression” (22). In sup-
port of her stance she quotes Farida Shaheed of the network “Women 
Living Under Muslim Law” (WluMl): “WluMl recognizes that living 
in different circumstances and situations, women will have different 
strategies and priorities. We believe that each woman knowing her own 
situation is best placed to decide what is the right strategy and choice 
for her” (Bakht 2004, 22).6
Another feminist scholar, Sherene Razack, who is a professor of 
sociology and equity studies in education at the Ontario Institute for 
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Studies in Education of the University of Toronto, and whose principal 
areas of scholarship concern race and gender issues in the law, warns 
against a strategy that she believes was all too prominent in the debate. 
Though she concedes that something positive may have resulted from 
this exercise, in that the “plans of a small conservative religious faction 
may have been upset,” she believes that there has certainly been a nar-
rowing of focus and attitudes that she understands as damaging for all 
concerned. This is because of the harmful dualisms that have been rein-
forced. These dualisms are: “Women’s rights versus multiculturalism; 
West versus Muslims; enlightened Western feminists versus imperiled 
Muslim women” (2007, 29). From her perspective, such divisions have 
rather pernicious consequences, especially as they concern feminism. 
“I argue that in their concern to curtail the conservative and patriarchal 
forces within the Muslim community, Canadian feminists (both Muslim 
and non-Muslim) utilized frameworks that installed a secular/religious 
divide that functions as a colour line, marking the difference between 
the white, modern, enlightened West, and people of colour, and in par-
ticular, Muslims” (6). In a post–9/11 climate, such a facile distinction 
serves to “keep in line Muslim communities at the same time that it 
defuses more radical feminist and anti-racist critique of conservative 
religious forces” (6). It also does not leave any space for negotiation 
with Muslims who hold moderate faith-based views. Such discussion 
could have resulted in a more productive public and governmental inter-
change, rather than allowing only extreme and exclusionary voices to 
dominate.
As is evident from this review of the process as it has developed in 
Ontario, where there was a clash of rights, the decision was made in 
favour of women’s rights to freedom of expression rather than freedom 
of religious practice. Nonetheless, there remain vastly differing evalua-
tions of the decision, and many of the issues remain unresolved, so the 
debate will no doubt continue. The hope is that, in further reflection, the 
opinions of Bakht and Razack will prevail, so that the discussion will 
not necessarily continue in such a markedly dualistic format.
Valences of Interdisciplinarity.indd   257 28/02/2012   4:31:37 PM
258 MoRny Joy
FuRtheR coMplications
One of the refrains that is particularly noticeable in the above descrip-
tions is the prevalence of dualisms in place of mediation or dialogue. 
This is particularly problematic because it is occurring at a time when 
human rights, and specifically women’s rights, are under attack from a 
number of other quarters. I would now like to survey these instances and 
the additional complications that they could cause. The different propo-
nents of these criticisms consist of a number of disparate groups. One is 
a fluctuating coalition of fundamentalist religions whose members focus 
principally on the topic of reproductive issues. Another group consists 
of postcolonial critics of the Eurocentric heritage of human rights. The 
members of a third group are women critical theorists who take to task 
globalizing, us-oriented interests, including what they view as a cynical 
exploitation of human rights.7 Nevertheless, I believe that to characterize 
the debate as one where it is basically political liberalism and secularism 
that are positioned in opposition to fundamentalism is to opt to continue 
with the present impasse.
First, then, a quick overview of fundamentalisms is needed.8 
Fundamentalist religions, during the early 1990s, became aware of, and 
began to interfere in, the progress that women had been making on 
human rights as women’s rights at the United Nations during the previous 
decades.9 Coalitions were then formed by reactionary movements from 
different religions to counter the advances made. Judith Butler describes 
her astonishment when she learned of the manoeuvrings on the part 
of the Vatican in the lead-up to the Beijing conference on the status of 
women that took place in 1995: “The Vatican not only denounced the term 
‘gender’ as a code for homosexuality, but insisted that the platform lan-
guage [of the conference] return to using the notion of sex” (2001, 423), in 
an apparent effort to secure a link between femininity and maternity as a 
naturally and divinely ordained necessity. Joan Scott, a noted historian 
and theorist of gender, also reports on another occurrence in the United 
States around the same time, when a subcommittee of the us House of 
Representatives entertained submissions warning that morality and 
family values were under attack by “gender feminists” (Scott 1999, ix). 
Both the Vatican and the neo-conservative groups in the United States 
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had seemingly been informed of Butler’s work questioning traditional 
gender roles in the book Gender Trouble (1990). In their depiction of this 
threatening situation, the opponents of “gender” insisted that “gender 
feminists” regarded manhood and womanhood, motherhood and father-
hood, heterosexuality, marriage and family, as “culturally created, and 
originated by men to oppress women” (Scott 1999, ix).
The resultant interventions at the un, however, marked the begin-
ning of a backlash against any further progress on women’s rights at the 
un.10 In another move, fundamentalist elements of a number of religions 
are using an evasive ploy, resorting to terms such as “tradition” or “cul-
ture,” which are code words for religion,11 to challenge the enactment of 
new declarations by the un.12 From their viewpoint, women’s increasing 
demands for self-determination are seen as nothing more than attempts 
at selfish self-fulfillment. As a result, struggles continue to restrict the 
expansion of women’s rights in various un committees. Some scholars 
are beginning to wonder if it is even worth continuing the struggle for 
women’s rights at the un, so effectively organized has the opposition 
become (Posadskaya-Vanderbeck 2004). Courtney Howland, a lawyer, 
has documented this movement well in her article “The Challenge of 
Religious Fundamentalisms”:
Religious Fundamentalism is premised on the notion that religious 
law takes precedence over all other law and defines, inter alia, rela-
tions between different religions and between men and women. Thus, 
some states have argued, in the context of human rights treaties, that 
religious law takes precedence over international human rights even 
when the state has not entered reservations to the treaty on this basis. 
(1997, 371)
Again, but coming from the other direction this time, religion and rights 
are posed in a binary that appears to situate them as mutually exclu-
sive. Here religion triumphs over rights.13 Another exacerbating factor, 
however, that is working against women’s rights concerns the views of 
certain contemporary postcolonial theorists, who criticize the human 
rights movement insofar as it assumes certain universals or even essen-
tialist claims on behalf of all the women of the world. Speaking from a 
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postcolonial perspective, Inderpal Grewal, who teaches in women’s, 
gender, and sexuality studies at Yale University, has strong reservations 
about the development of women’s rights. She charges that, what with 
their emphasis on individual rights, “the hegemonic forms of Western 
feminisms have been able, through universalizing the discourse, to pro-
pose the notion of common agendas for all women globally, and to mobi-
lize such discourses through the transnational culture of international 
law that can serve the interests of women globally” (Grewal 1999, 340). 
At the same time, however, Grewal will concede that, while “human 
rights may remain Eurocentric in many of its assumptions and goals,” 
they may be “one of the very few tools to struggle for the rights of the 
disenfranchised” (341). Basically, Grewal’s view is that the language of 
women’s rights fosters an essentialism that takes as a basis the Western 
understanding of the individual as the subject of human rights. They 
charge that this understanding is then applied in all contexts, without 
any consideration of the divergent views and values in specific regions 
of the world. Another problematic position often voiced in this connec-
tion is that by thus assuming a commonality among all women, specific 
local structural anomalies are overlooked. On this score, Grewal draws 
attention to the fact that the “discourse of rights has been more popular 
in struggles for civil and political liberties by elites, whereas the strug-
gle for social justice has been the discourse of more mass based move-
ments,” such as ngos (339). Postcolonial critics such as Grewal are also 
mindful of the fact that human rights also depend for implementation on 
international law and tribunals. They view these institutions, as well as 
their national equivalents, as biased in favour of the male of the species, 
situated as they are within the purview of nation-states. This is because 
they also view the founding impulses and subsequent concerns of such 
institutions as being predominantly masculinist in tone. (A graphic illus-
tration of such bias was the difficulty encountered in getting the case 
of rape as a war crime to be added to the agenda of the International 
Court.) Another concern often expressed is that, in some countries, the 
institutions or agencies to which women must appeal for redress are the 
very bodies that are responsible for the activities that have violated their 
rights.
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A final and telling postcolonial complaint by Grewal is that “human 
rights is based on linear notions of progress and relies on notions of 
the south as Other—utilizing North/South inequalities to claim that the 
North has human rights (with a few aberrations) and the South needs to 
achieve them” (338). What she recommends instead is that careful atten-
tion be paid to the regional variations and the particular socio-economic, 
political, and cultural conditions that are inevitably always interrelated 
in unique combinations. As a result, human rights and their violations 
can never be solely defined or implemented only in accordance with a 
Northern-generated model—or with any unreconstructed universal for-
mula, for that matter.
Finally, Wendy Brown, a professor in political science and wom-
en’s studies at University of California at Berkeley, has certain misgiv-
ings about human rights, especially as they have featured in the recent 
American political landscape. Brown’s Marxist-inspired radical critique 
does not recommend the elimination of human rights, but she believes 
that their purview is limited. In one sense, they have been tarnished by 
their implication in the Bush political platform—albeit misinterpreted or 
cynically manipulated. She quotes Donald Rumsfeld’s declaration that 
“the war on Terrorism is a war for human rights” (2004, 460). Secondly, in 
an earlier essay, Brown had enumerated her qualifications of the value of 
human rights language for women. She appreciates that there are certain 
paradoxes involved in the deployment of human rights. One of the most 
prominent is “that rights that entail some specification of our [women’s] 
suffering, injury, or inequality lock us into the identity identified by our 
subordination, and rights that eschew this specificity not only sustain the 
invisibility of our subordination but potentially even enhance it” (2002, 
423). Nonetheless, similarly to Grewal, Brown concedes that though 
flawed, rights talk and action are necessary. As a result of her reflec-
tions on the dilemmas involved, she concludes with a vision—posed in 
a number of rhetorical questions—that evoke their yet (or maybe never)-
to-be-achieved ideals. Such a vision helps to prevent premature closure. 
Perhaps the most compelling of these questions is: “How might attention 
to paradox help formulate a political struggle for rights in which they are 
conceived neither as instruments nor ends, but as articulating through 
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their instantiation what equality and freedom might consist in?” (2002, 
432).
One scholar who is particularly helpful as a respondent to these 
various criticisms is Uma Narayan, a professor of philosophy at Vassar 
College. She is extremely suspicious of any essentialized definitions 
of culture and tradition in the interests of religion and in opposition to 
rights, be they “East” or “West.” In her book Dislocating Cultures, Narayan 
issues a warning: “We need to be wary about all ideals of ‘cultural authen-
ticity’ that portray ‘authenticity’ as constituted by lack of criticism and 
lack of change. We need to insist that there are many ways to inhabit 
nations and cultures critically and creatively” (1997, 33). From this per-
spective, Narayan first takes issue with Western colonial impositions in 
India, where she was born, especially with misleading gender analyses by 
Western feminists, such as Mary Daly, who falsely oversimplify by decon-
textualizing certain Indian practices, such as satī.14 Narayan, however, 
also takes to task India’s own attempts to invoke essentialist categories 
in connection with idealized projections of a “national and cultural iden-
tity,” particularly as has been done in the Hindu form of fundamental-
ism (or Hindutva). She is particularly articulate about the exploitation of 
exalted depictions of women as central components of “cultural identity.” 
She describes how, in consequence, women who stray from such models, 
specifically those who support the notion of human rights, are labelled 
as cultural betrayers. Narayan expands on this: “Third-World feminist 
criticisms of practices and ways of life that are harmful and oppressive 
to women are depicted as mere symptoms of an antinationalist cultural 
disloyalty and as forms of ‘cultural inauthenticity’ rooted in an adoption 
of ‘Western’ ways and values” (20).
Narayan takes a strong stance against any idealized forms of cultural 
and religious essentialism and the inevitable dualisms that they entail. 
One such manifestation, a hallmark of many fundamentalist religious 
movements, is a manipulation of history in order to promote a glorious 
past from which contemporary society has sadly fallen and which needs to 
be re-established. It is women’s deviance from the ideals of this past that 
is largely held responsible for the supposed decline. As a result, women 
need to be rescued from their fallen ways and returned to male supervision 
and appropriate forms of “femininity.” Narayan will have none of this. In 
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drawing her own conclusions about such directives, she states that just as 
there can be no one essential description of the female gender, so there is 
no authentic cultural identity, let alone religion. In expanding this posi-
tion, Narayan’s finally rejects not only the idea that there is anything that 
can be regarded as quintessentially “Indian culture” but also the notion 
of “Western culture” (187–88), especially in connection with religion. Yet 
Narayan is not completely dismissive of religion, allowing: “Many reli-
gious traditions are in fact more capacious than fundamentalist adher-
ents allow. Insisting on humane and inclusive interpretations of religious 
traditions might, in many contexts, be crucial components in countering 
the deployment of religious discourses to problematic nationalist ends” 
(35). Narayan’s critiques of both “gender” and “culture,” including their 
faulty appropriation by religion, help to counteract the effects of their 
being invoked in idealized and inflexible formulas that promote duality 
and prevent constructive exchange between feminist thinkers from differ-
ent backgrounds.
Such a critical perspective, which debunks idealized or unqualified 
statements, would appear to be extremely relevant to the problematic 
definitions and applications of universal women’s human rights. Yet, in 
my view, this does not mean that the concept itself needs to be abandoned 
or dismantled as beyond repair, as it has had a definite positive impact, 
as even some of its fiercest critics, such as Grewal, allow. In one sense, to 
abandon the idea of human rights for women would, to a degree, allow 
the fundamentalists to emerge triumphant. So, it then becomes neces-
sary to survey some of the potential solutions that are being proposed 
by various scholars to the dangers implied by universal applications that 
tend to distort issues, by reification or essentialism, and lead to inevitable 
bifurcations.
A major part of the problem, as I described it in this essay, has been 
that the argument concerning women’s human rights has been conducted 
along the all-too-predictable lines of a binary opposition. It may not neces-
sarily be the case, however, that an “all-or-nothing” solution is the appro-
priate response. A number of contemporary women thinkers, who belong 
to different religions and yet support human rights, would agree. And it is 
in relation to this development that I believe that the overall strategy has 
to change from the stand-off between the traditional secular, liberal camp 
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and the fundamentalist one. It is not necessarily the case that a political 
person, advocating for human rights for women, is anti-religious. Terms 
such as anti-dogmatic and/or anti-essentialist may be better qualifiers. 
Such terms would definitely apply to the many women, from different reli-
gions and regions of the world, who have been active on women’s behalf 
at the un during the past thirty years, as Devaki Jain (2005) has wonder-
fully described them.
To develop this position, I would now like to turn to some of the solutions 
that are being presented by such women who do not think of religion and 
women’s rights as needing to remain separated.
a tentative Response to the challenges to 
WoMen’s Rights and Religion
One approach, taken by Madhavi Sunder, a professor of law at the University 
of California at Davis, advises women to claim their rights against reli-
gious oppression. She terms this approach “the new Enlightenment.” Her 
description of those who participate in the movement is as follows:
These individuals reject the binary approach of the Enlightenment, 
which forces individuals to choose between religious liberty (on lead-
ers’ terms) in the private sphere and equality (without a normative 
community) in the public sphere. Rather, they articulate a vision of 
human flourishing that requires freedom within the context of religious 
and cultural community. This vision includes not only a right to equal 
treatment in one’s cultural or religious community, but also a right to 
engage in those communities on one’s own terms. (2005, 268)
In the present context, I cannot develop her ideas in detail and comment 
on them, but I see in her position a place for a renegotiation for women 
who find themselves in traditions that are resorting to fundamentalist 
dictates and trying to silence progressive voices. Sunder then refers to 
an earlier article she wrote: “Cultural dissenters, or ‘individuals within a 
community [who seek] to modernize, or broaden, the traditional terms of 
cultural membership,’ challenge the traditional liberal understandings 
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of liberty and equality as premised on a ‘thin’ theory of the self” (268 
[2001, 551]). She then continues:
Their claims suggest that traditional liberalism takes too lightly the 
ease of exit from one’s community and the desirability of culture; I read 
in the rise of cultural dissent that human flourishing requires not only a 
liberty right to normative community, but access to a community free of 
the fear of discrimination within it. (268)
Such a development challenges the Western traditional public/private 
distinction, especially the assignment of human rights as belonging to 
the public sphere while religion is delegated to the private. It is in this 
private sphere, indeed, that much violence against women takes place 
and has been, until very recently, outside the reach of either law or rights.
Other women scholars are moving in similar directions, though they 
state the problematics of the situation differently. In her article “Will 
Dualisms Tear Us Apart? The Challenges of Fragmentation in Identity 
Politics for Young Feminists in the New Global Order,” Suzan Pritchett, a 
young America scholar, describes the problem eloquently:
When I speak of the New Global Order, I am referring to a world 
illustrated by the powerful forces of war and militarization, religious 
fundamentalisms and the spread of globalization and free-market [or 
late-capitalistic] democracy. I speak of my personal national landscape 
coping with the traumatic upheaval of the events surrounding 11 
September 2001 and the subsequent re-masculinization of foreign and 
domestic policy. I am reflecting on an international climate character-
ized by increasing disparities between nations and between people, 
and continuing inequality between men and women. At every turn in 
this tumultuous climate, young women are being faced with dualistic 
politics and polarized identity politics. (2005, 9)
Perhaps what saddens Pritchett most is the fact that “the neutral middle 
ground where ideas and politics could once be contested has turned into 
an ideological battlefield where the consequences of militarization, fun-
damentalism and globalization are most felt” (15). Her recommendations 
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are of a more general nature, and not specifically directed at the rights 
and religion debate, but are nonetheless telling. She proposes that there 
must a movement of dialogue that seeks not to allow these ideological 
forces to dictate the dualistic terms of reference, and that dialogue rather 
than confrontation be pursued so that the difference of others is not 
allowed to be demonized in the way that it has been by the present lethal 
combination of politics and religious fundamentalism.
Mahnaz Afkhami, a former minister of state for women’s affairs in Iran 
and an international activist now in exile in the United States, addresses 
another form of duality that needs to be dismantled. This is the one that 
pits individual rights against the community and views them as mutually 
exclusive:
We must move beyond the theory of women’s human rights as a theory 
of equality before the law, of women’s individual space, or a “room of 
one’s own,” to the theory of the architecture of the future society where 
the universality of rights and relativity of means merge to operational-
ize an optimally successful coexistence of community and individuality. 
This architectural theory will point to a dynamic design where broadly 
conceived human relations evolve with the requirements of the times as 
they satisfy the needs of both community and individuality. (2004, 66)
It is worth noting that this development does contain certain provisos 
deemed necessary for its success:
We must insist that no one, man or woman, may claim a right to a 
monopoly of interpretation of God to human beings or a right to force 
others to accept a particular ruling about any religion. The upshot of 
this position is that women ought not to be forced to choose between 
freedom and God. The same applies on the part of tradition. (65)
Finally, there has been a remarkable change of attitude on this issue in the 
work of that grand critical thinker and debunker of all false pretensions to 
essentialisms of any variety, Judith Butler. I have discussed this develop-
ment elsewhere (Joy 2006), but I shall repeat it here, for I do think it has 
a particular relevance for the issue at hand. Butler has rejected those who 
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have associated her with an easy relativism and who blame Foucault’s 
influence on her. One of the influences on her change of approach was no 
doubt the machinations of the Vatican and other conservative religious 
groups prior to the World Congress of Women mentioned earlier.
In an interview in 2001, entitled “The End of Sexual Difference,” 
Butler admits that in her earlier work, Gender Trouble (1990), she may 
have played too fast and loose with the notion of gender as performance, 
as an optional mode of identity that just is up for grabs, at the expense 
of recognizing the physical body and claims that could be made on its 
behalf for protection from abuse and violence. She acknowledges that 
gender will always remain a contentious site and needs to be constantly 
questioned—because certain societies, groups and religions in particular 
will continue to employ it not only in a regulative manner, but even as 
invariable and non-negotiable. Aware of the gains that have been made by 
fundamentalists, however, and the contemporary inroads that have been 
made to reframe, restrain, and even cancel many of the rights that had 
been hard-won by former generations of women, she allows: “Although 
many feminists have come to the conclusion that the universal is always 
a cover for a certain epistemological imperialism, insensitive to cultural 
texture and difference, the rhetorical power of claiming universality for, 
say, rights of sexual autonomy and related rights of sexual orientation 
within the human rights domain appears indisputable” (2001, 423).
conclusion
There ae no easy answers or quick solutions to the complex and seemingly 
irrevocable dynamics of the present world situation and its deadening 
effects on both the minds and bodies of many innocent people. Human 
rights, conceived in terms of respect and recognition of the other as a 
person with the same rights and entitlements as I have, and violations of 
such rights in the continued neglect, even refutation, of such respect and 
recognition, however, is an issue that I believe is situated at the very heart 
of the problem. Women’s rights are but one dimension of this overriding 
problem. There is a dire need, as the women contributors in this essay 
have articulated, to question, from an interdisciplinary perspective, the 
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prevailing world view and the simplistic dualisms that continue to domi-
nate and perpetuate the universalisms and essentialisms that dictate the 
terms of engagement with the world.
From this perspective, it seems appropriate that the language of rights 
itself has to move beyond the notion of irreducible individual entitlement 
to one that is more diverse and nuanced in its appreciation of communal 
diversity and yet also founded on a solidarity resulting from a dialogue 
and communication that goes beyond a perfunctory theoretical nod in the 
direction of difference. Religious studies is strategically situated to con-
tribute to these developments—both because of its hermeneutic study of 
texts that can weed out dubious claims to authenticity and because of the 
finely wrought examinations of fundamentalisms and their attempts to 
undermine a human and women’s rights’ agenda.
notes
1 Parts of this essay are revised versions of material that originally appeared in “Women’s 
Rights in the Context of Religion,” Svensk religionshistorisk arsskrift [Swedish Yearbook 
of the History of Religions], April 2008: 181–200, and in “Gender and Religion: A Volatile 
Mixture,” Temenos 42, no. 1 (2006): 7–30.
2 The term “First Nations” is the preferred phrase used today by Indian bands who have 
status in terms of the Indian Act. In this paper, various words, such as “Indigenous,” 
“Native,” “Aboriginal” are also used, usually in connection with a specific writer’s 
preference. Each of these words has varying levels of acceptance among the Indigenous 
peoples of Canada. The Indigenous peoples of Canada—Indians, Inuit and Métis—are 
named in the Indian Act, which was enacted in 1876 by the Parliament of Canada 
under the provisions of s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act of 1867. It gave the Canadian 
government sole authority to legislate in regard to “Indians and Lands Reserved for 
Indians.”
3 See the “Sisters in Spirit” webpage at http://www.amnesty.ca/campaigns/sisters_
overview.php. This page was set up by the Native Women’s Association of Canada 
(nWac). They launched the national Sisters in Spirit Campaign in March 2004 to raise 
public awareness of the alarmingly high rates of violence against Aboriginal women in 
Canada. nWac believes there continues to be an urgent state of affairs with regard to the 
safety of Aboriginal women in Canada.
4 Cora Voyageur describes the position of women prior to the European settlement: “Prior 
to colonization, women were a strong force in many Aboriginal societies. . . . In a number 
of North American Indian tribes, women traditionally selected male chiefs as political 
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chiefs and could remove them. . . . Also, in many tribes, women owned substantial 
property, including the marital home, and exercised exclusive dominion over the means 
of production and the products of major subsistence activities. . . . Women in many tribes 
held the power to initiate or to call off war” (2000, 86).
5 On 17 January 2005, a former Ontario Attorney General, Marion Boyd, who had been 
appointed by the provincial government to evaluate the situation, recommended that 
Islamic tribunals also be allowed to use Shari‘a law to settle such disputes in that 
province. Boyd’s recommendation was not binding, however, and both it and the 
Arbitration Act itself were then submitted to review.
6 Bakht quotes from “Asian Women in Muslim Societies: Perspectives and Struggles,” 
Shaheed’s keynote address at the Asia-Pacific ngo Forum on Beijing+10 (Mahidol 
University, Nakorn Pathom, Thailand, 30 June to 3 July 2004): see http://www.wluml.org/
node/1557.
7 Zillah Eisenstein, for instance, would argue that the former Bush administration 
perpetrated a cynical and superficial manipulation of human rights when, in their efforts 
to free Afghani women from subjugation, they portrayed them both simplistically and 
unproblematically. They did this at the same time as circulating images of their view of 
ideal (conservative) American womanhood and condoning violations of the rights of 
American citizens (2005, 110–17, 124–27).
8 I use this term in the plural because I do not believe fundamentalism manifests itself in 
the same way in different religions. See Marty and Appleby (1991).
9 As Amrita Basu comments in “Women’s Movements and the Challenge of 
Transnationalism”: “Parallel to the evolution of transnational women’s movements, 
and equally important, has been the phenomenal growth of transnational networks 
of the religious right. We saw this in the 1994 Cairo conference on population and 
development, and again in the Beijing [women’s] conference of 1995. In both these 
contexts one found a thoroughly transnational alliance of groups on the religious 
right, not only official state organizations but also members of non-state organizations, 
including religious bodies like the Catholic Church” (Basu n.d.).
10 The Vatican again has been particularly active. It has attempted to influence members of 
the Catholic communities from a number of countries (especially in Central and South 
America) (Stein 2001). In addition, it has made strategic coalitions between Catholic 
and Islamist countries to support its own position. Part of its strategy is to argue that 
the idea of human rights for women, especially in the context of gender, is a “Western,” 
i.e., colonialist, imposition. This alignment by the Vatican with the colonized and 
underprivileged of this world, as well as with a non-exploitative stance, would seem to 
rest on a patently manipulative, if not ironic, interpretation of the concept.
11 On the side of tradition, religion is ironically posited as an endangered species of culture. 
Such an understanding of “tradition” and the “culture” that accompanies it, posits them 
both as pristine and transparent in their originary impulse, untainted by history.
12 This was especially apparent in the recent failure by signatory nations to pass a 
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resolution on the implementation of the Declaration of Elimination of Violence against 
Women, ostensibly on these grounds of protecting religious traditions. (Certain member 
nations were allowed to register reservations that meant, in effect, that they were not 
full signatories to these agreements.) Technically speaking, these reservations mean that 
such nations are in violation of certain articles of the un Charter.
13 Further exploratory essays on these issues can be found in Bayes and Tohidi (2001) and 
Hawley (1994).
14 Narayan expresses her objections to Daly’s approach eloquently: “Thus, while Daly-
type accounts of ‘tradition’ provide room to politically challenge such practices on the 
grounds of their harmfulness and oppressiveness to women, challenges that are not 
unimportant, they do not provide the tools additionally required to challenge the status 
of these practices as ‘indigenous traditions.’ . . . Western feminist work that forecloses 
the second type of challenge by buying into misleading views of the nature of Third-
World ‘traditions’ might, with good reason, appear both inadequate and dangerous to 
Third-World feminists politically engaged in challenging these traditions” (1997, 78).
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Literacy Studies and Interdisciplinary Studies 
Reflections on History and Theory
h a R v e y  J .  g R a F F
One of the sleights of hand of interdisciplinarity is that it deludes us into 
the belief that we’ve escaped our disciplinary boundaries. But that delu-
sion also allows us freedom from interdisciplinary longing. Such freedom 
and our now more comfortable habitation in disciplinary mobility are 
well suited to the spatial and geographic paradigms we currently inhabit. 
We think of ourselves as global: rather than defy boundaries, we leap 
over them, less disciplined, perhaps, but also less frustrated by imaginary 
constraints. Worrying less about how to find something real on the other 
side of the interdisciplinary divide, we have more room to think about the 
consequences of interdisciplinary tourism, to ponder the new terms we’ve 
erected as touchstone of our common project, and to offer richer readings 
of those real (and sometimes hyperreal) objects of our study.
Julie Stone Peters, “Law, Literature, and the Vanishing Real: On the 
Future of an Interdisciplinary Illusion” (2005), 451.
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liteRacy studies
Claims about literacies, and their lack, surround us, multiplying like met-
aphorical insects. Different observers see either an abundance of litera-
cies forming foundations for flowing multimodalities or a crisis rooted in 
the presumed absence or inadequacy of appropriate literacies threatening 
the foundations of our civilization and polity (Graff and Duffy 2007; Graff 
1995a).1 Reflecting more than he acknowledges of the historical legacies 
of literacy and certain powerful literacy narratives, Leon Lederman (2008, 
36), director emeritus of the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, writes 
in an editorial in Science News: “In a world in which illiteracy is the shame 
of societies where it is found, science illiteracy is increasingly disastrous. 
And wherever it is measured, this illiteracy rate is 90 to 95 percent.” 
“Science literacy” is only one of many examples, yet its implicit signifi-
cance and presumed trajectory need no extended argument or explana-
tion. In itself, it constitutes a narrative, an interdisciplinarity narrative.
In this typical formulation, literacy studies embraces two more-or-less 
opposing positions: that of “many literacies” and that of dangerously low 
levels of literacy, their causes, and their consequences. When conceptual-
ized complexly—not the most common practice—their contradictory rela-
tionships form part of our subject of inquiry and part of the challenge for 
explication and explanation.2
The difficulties and the potentialities attendant upon literacy gave rise 
to a field of literacy studies during the last one-third to one-quarter of 
the twentieth century.3 As sociolinguist David Barton recently commented 
(2007, 23): “The meaning of the word literacy is to be found not just by 
examining dictionary entries. It has become a unifying term across a 
range of disciplines for changing views of reading and writing; there has 
been such a growth of study in the area that is now referred to as Literacy 
Studies or the New Literacy Studies.”4
Literacy studies developed as an interdisciplinary field of study and 
knowledge, the theme of this exploratory essay. As Barton further notes 
(2001, 93): “In many ways Literacy Studies grew out of a dissatisfaction 
with conceptions of reading and writing which were prevalent in education 
in all areas, from early childhood reading to adult literacy programmes: 
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these were conceptions of reading and writing which were based on over-
simplistic psychological models. The critique has been made from a range 
of disciplinary vantage points and in a range of ways.”5 From “dissatisfac-
tion” and “over-simplistic models” to criticism from multiple disciplin-
ary “vantage points” and “ways”: This is one of the principal paths to 
the development of areas of interdisciplinary study and interdisciplines. 
Exploring the strengths and weaknesses of this path to interdisciplinarity 
within the context of both literacy studies and interdisciplinary studies 
constitutes the fundamental task of this essay.
Not surprisingly, tensions between the principal disciplines and their 
contributions to an interdiscipline mark the dynamics of change and 
development. The most common and perhaps most notorious is the clash 
between the cognitive/psychological approaches used in psychology (and 
sometimes also in literature, history, linguistics, or philosophy) and the 
social/contextual approaches of anthropology, sociology, linguistics, and 
history. These differences often parallel the conflicts between “strong” 
or “great divide” theories and contextual understandings/practice. More 
practically but no less important is the long struggle between departments 
of English and colleges of education over institutional “ownership” of lit-
eracy. These recognitions remind us that efforts at interdisciplinarity are 
inseparably part of the processes of disciplinary formation, maintenance, 
and shifts themselves, not a later or separate movement.6
The perspective outlined here also highlights key factors among the 
critical elements that contributed to the decline of an earlier consensus. 
That understanding–indeed, faith—was rooted in an integrative and 
“over-simplistic psychological” narrative that promulgated the universal 
unmediated and transformative, epoch-making power of writing and/or 
reading—literacy—(what Brian Street calls “the autonomous model” of lit-
eracy) and stimulated the search for alternatives. Brockmeier, Wang, and 
Olson (2002, 6–7) summarize this model evocatively:
A theory of literacy was outlined that made strong claims for the 
cultural and cognitive implications of writing. It was argued that alpha-
betic literacy is an unique technology of representation and communi-
cation which has been of fundamental importance for the development 
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of Western culture. According to this theory, oral language and written 
language are intellectual technologies which are causally responsible 
for two different types of culture, cultures of orality and of literacy. 
Some critics of the “literacy hypothesis” thus spoke of a “great-divide 
theory” (Finnegan). The watershed, to stick to the metaphor, between 
speech and writing, oral and literate culture was the invention (or, once 
it was invented, the introduction) of the alphabet.
According to this version of the “received wisdom,” the consequences 
were epochal and without limits. “Patently, the domain of culture upon 
which literacy was expected to have its impact was exceedingly broad.”
Literacy was claimed to impinge upon the entire gamut of cultural 
phenomena from the intellectual to the aesthetic and political, includ-
ing the production of science, philosophy, history, literature, art, and 
religion, as well as the institutions of education, documented law, and 
democratic forms of social organization. Further, literacy was seen as 
having an impact on the individualism of modern Western thought 
along with forms of mentality (rational and logical), cognition (concep-
tual and analytical), memory (objective and accumulative), as well as 
forms of communication (decontextualized and emotionally distanced) 
and grammar (reflective and prescriptive). Here, the vision of culture 
that unfolded with literacy, printing, and the alphabet, merged with the 
idea of civilization in general. (6–7)7
Alternatives that arose to counter this understanding include Barton’s 
Literacy Studies or New Literacy Studies, or Brian Street’s “ideological 
model” of literacy, claiming authority in part by the act of naming. How 
often do incipient interdisciplines proclaim or identify themselves as 
“new”? It is no coincidence that the earlier dominance of “strong theo-
ries,” “great divides,” or dichotomous understandings of literacy had no 
need for a nominal cover like “literacy studies.” Literacy was unreflect-
ingly incorporated into the principal narratives of the rise of the West and 
the triumph of democracy, modernization, and progress. Indeed, literacy 
was equated with those qualities, each seemingly the cause of the other 
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in confused causal order. Regardless of confusion, the qualities presumed 
for modern civilization and for literacy became interchangeable.8
No less coincidental is that the search for confirmation of grand theories 
of literacy and their “consequences,” in Goody’s and Watt’s original for-
mula (Goody and Watt 1968), ironically did more to fuel skepticism and 
the search for more specific and documented contextual interpretations. 
(In response to criticism, Goody [1968] revised “consequences” to “impli-
cations” in the title of his introduction to Literacy in Traditional Societies.) 
That shift, in turn, led to new and different findings, and orientations, 
that contributed to bringing literacy studies explicitly into the realm of 
interdisciplinarity research.9
Interdisciplinary literacy studies thus developed from different meth-
ods and sources, and different presuppositions and expectations. As sug-
gested by Brockmeier and Olson, “over-simplistic psychological” notions 
were often rooted in reductive great leaps across relatively rarefied cog-
nitive and philosophical artifacts. Radical dichotomies substituted for 
dynamics of social and cultural change. Generalizations without qualifi-
cation were applied without hesitation to large numbers of persons. And 
the dynamics of literacy itself were reduced to cartoonish images of lit-
eracy versus orality and print versus manuscript.
In contrast, across the sweep of the twentieth century, empirical and 
critical studies in oral literature, folklore, psychology, anthropology and 
archaeology, linguistics, philosophy, sociology, classics, and history 
began to tell different and more variegated stories. They turned to more 
direct evidence of literacy’s development, distribution, and uses via case 
studies, ethnographies, and histories that gave more attention to matters 
of practice and social context. Sources and subjects were approached and 
read more carefully and critically. Ironically, “New Literacy Studies” schol-
ars over the past three or four decades only slowly rediscovered the truly 
groundbreaking work earlier in the century of oral literature researchers 
who climbed mountains in eastern Europe to record performances, con-
structing “singers of tales,” as Milman Parry and Albert Lord famously 
dubbed them, and comparing oral narratives (Lord [1960] 2000; Parry 
1971). No less momentous but often neglected is the dynamic activism of 
the cultural-historical psychology of Lev Vygotsky, Alexander Luria, and 
their colleagues from the 1930s.10 So much richer than the modernization 
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studies of American sociologists after World War ii, this work seems des-
tined for repeated rediscovery. That phenomenon may also be a stop on 
paths to interdisciplinarity, constituting a step forward accompanied by a 
constraining half-step backward.11
By and large, these approaches and their appropriation for literacy 
studies derived from several distinct disciplines, in particular anthro-
pology, linguistics, and cognitive psychology. Through these origins or 
sources, literacy studies represents a search for a different but common 
or shared place amid the disciplines, and often outside the walls of col-
leges and departments of education and/or psychology. More implicitly, 
that place ideally should be outside the blinders of Western civilization. 
Literacy studies turned toward anthropology, linguistics, and cognitive 
(psychology) studies, with strong assistance from history, classics, and, 
most recently, cultural studies.
Brian Street (1993, 1) articulates a credo and point of origin for the New 
Literacy Studies:
The field of literacy studies has expanded considerably in recent 
years and new, more anthropological and cross-cultural frameworks 
have been developed to replace those of a previous era, in which psy-
chologistic and culturally narrow approaches predominated (as they 
arguably still do in much educational and developmental literature). 
Where, for instance, educationalists and psychologists have focused 
on discrete elements of reading and writing skills, anthropologists 
and sociolinguists concentrate on literacies—the social practices and 
conceptions of reading and writing. The rich cultural variation in these 
practices and conceptions leads us to rethink what we mean by them 
and to be very wary of assuming a single literacy where we may simply 
be imposing assumptions derived from our own cultural practice onto 
other people’s literacies. Research in cultures that have newly acquired 
reading and writing draws our attention to the creative and original 
ways in which people transform literacy to their own cultural concerns 
and interests.12
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David Barton (2007, 24) speaks more specifically to certain central 
threads of interdisciplinary literacy studies and the making of an interdis-
cipline of literacy studies:
A key to new views of literacy is situating reading and writing in its 
social context. . . . People in different disciplines have been moving in 
the same direction. . . . Three important academic studies, the work of 
Sylvia Scribner and Michael Cole, Brian Street, and Shirley Brice Heath 
. . . in their different ways . . . provide three threads to weave together 
to represent the beginnings of literacy studies and they have become 
classics in the field.
Psychologists Scribner and Cole wrote The Psychology of Literacy (1981); 
anthropologist Street, Literacy in Theory and Practice (1984); and socio-
linguist Heath, Ways with Words: Language, Life and Work in Communities 
and Classrooms (1983). As classics, they became powerful signposts and 
markers. Barton (2007, 24) elaborates:
They are part of different research traditions but they actually have a 
great deal in common. All three academic studies looked at particular 
societies in detail, examining different groups within a society and 
how they use literacy. They start from everyday life and what people 
read and write. They observe closely and they are willing to make use 
of a wide range of evidence. . . . Part of what comes with these studies 
is a recognition of the complexity of the idea of literacy and the fact 
that much of our understanding of it is not obvious. This leads to new 
definitions of literacy.
History, represented by my The Literacy Myth: Literacy and Social 
Structure in the Nineteenth-Century City ([1979] 1991), is one missing link.
In these charter statements, there is no room for precedents or longer-term 
perspectives. Nevertheless, these are important observations. Implicit in 
Barton’s words are both the possibilities and the complications for literacy 
studies’ turn (necessarily incompletely) toward interdisciplinary studies. 
The impact of both similarities and differences in “research traditions” 
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demands more attention, especially with respect to the institutions and 
traditions of disciplinarity and changing socio-cultural currents regarding 
literacy and its imperatives. Ironic as it may seem, literacy studies lacks a 
memory and a sense of its own history or genealogy. Neither Barton nor 
Street casts his gaze much before the recent past, not even to the middle 
decades of the twentieth century, let alone earlier. Neither Street nor 
Barton is much concerned with the institutional, intellectual, or cultural 
context of either older or more recent literacy studies. Interdisciplinary 
studies of literacy would benefit from knowledge of, at least, the history 
of specific fields, disciplines, and interdisciplines.13
Regardless, literacy studies simultaneously seeks to distinguish and 
differentiate itself in an effort to integrate, synthesize within clearer 
limits, and re-bound major components of the “new” field. Along with 
other interdisciplines, literacy studies developed and grew both within 
disciplines and across them, sometimes building toward interdisciplinar-
ity, sometimes developing separately.14 Both efforts influenced interdis-
ciplinary movements, together constituting contradictory influences on 
the field’s integration and differentiation. This mode of inter/disciplinary 
development can risk a linear, progressive, or almost teleological episte-
mology and explanation for the rise and effects of literacy itself as well as 
interdisciplinary literacy studies. For example, the more one looks, the 
more literacy, or literacy practices, one finds, often in complex cultural 
and communicative contexts. This may be accompanied by a tendency to 
see “more” literacy leading to more and greater effects, in part by blurring 
distinctions between individual, collective, and societal impacts, shifting 
ideologies, causes and effects, and expectations. Developments within 
several disciplines at once only exacerbate these complications.15
Theories of modernity and postmodernity create anticipations of 
soaring needs for literacy/literacies that sometimes exceed those that 
can be estimated or measured empirically, or attained popularly. At 
times the opposite—the limits of literacy—seems at least as compelling. 
Modernization models do this in part by projecting incomplete or errone-
ous narratives (and images) of the past onto the future.16 Ironically, con-
structing a separate, recognized field of literacy studies runs the risk of 
reifying Street’s “autonomous model” of transformative unmediated lit-
eracy. Yet when literacy studies initially sought confirmation of “strong 
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theories” and “great divides,” more was learned about the specific con-
texts of literacy’s uses and influences. There is also a danger of exaggerat-
ing the import of a new field of study striving for and promoting its case 
for recognition and institutional place. This, too, is a common component 
of paths to interdisciplinarity.
inteRdisciplinaRy studies
My approach to, and strong presumptions about, the social history of inter-
disciplinarity in my current research project, Undisciplining Knowledge: 
Pursuing the Dream of Interdisciplinarity, contrasts with most writing in 
this area. It begins with the argument that interdisciplinarity is a cen-
tral part of the historical process of the making and ongoing reshaping 
of modern disciplines since at least the mid- to late nineteenth century. 
Contrary to many notions, interdisciplinarity is inseparable from the dis-
ciplines, neither a rejection nor an opposition or circumvention, neither 
an end run nor an end point or end game. Nor is it primarily a post–World 
War ii or more recent development as implied by Barton, Street, or many 
others. Undisciplining Knowledge seeks to demonstrate historically that 
the organization, structures, production, and dissemination of knowl-
edge around universities, disciplinary departments, and research insti-
tutes, especially in the United States and the modern West more generally, 
give rise to interdisciplinary efforts and movements across the expanse of 
fields over time. Interdisciplinarity is a (historical) construct that varies by 
field and also by time, place, relationships, and circumstances. As edu-
cational and research institutions have changed over time and space, so 
too have interdisciplines and disciplines in various ways that demand to 
be charted comparatively. Literacy studies’ relatively recent rise and race 
for recognition is a case in point. But so too are the important historical 
developments that are often obscured. Among the many contributions 
from recent studies in the history of literacy are important lessons for the 
present and future (Graff 1995a, 1995b).
Although their presentation requires a lengthy critical discussion, even 
a short listing of the variety of major explanations/descriptions found in 
the literature, ascribed for the construction of interdisciplines, suggests 
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the breadth, depth, and complicated, contradictory nature of the process, 
structures, dynamics, and narratives. They include evolutionary progres-
sive, functional, structure and process, market-driven, specialization, 
novelty, fission or fusion, collective movement, boundary-making and 
maintaining, conflict, internalist and externalist, among other models 
or approaches. They are suggestive, but none is particularly historical or 
comparative.
Literacy studies, and interdisciplinary studies, can be better under-
stood with more attention to a longer chronological span of intellectual 
and socio-cultural development and a broader, more dynamic focus on its 
place and play among a wide array of disciplines and institutional loca-
tions. (Subfields in disciplines or interdisciplines that deal with literacy 
include reading, writing, child and human development, cognitive stud-
ies, comparative and development studies, and communication or media 
studies.) “External” factors and developments (social, cultural, politi-
cal, economic)—that is, external to the normal workings of a discipline 
or field, such as wartime needs, consequences of global cross-cultural 
contacts and colonialism, “discovery” of new social problems—combine, 
often contradictorily, with shifting currents within and across disciplines. 
They may then stimulate changing views that, in the context of univer-
sities and their organization of knowledge, lead to criticism, different 
assertions, and sometimes institutional articulations both within and 
outside the “boundaries” of departments or divisions that take the name 
of interdisciplinarity.17
A more complete and useful approach to literacy studies, one that also 
deepens our understanding of interdisciplinarity, begins no later than the 
1920s and 1930s (as above). It looks back carefully to the period spanning 
the mid-eighteenth century through the early twentieth century. Ideally, 
it embraces a longer (if briefer) glance back to the Renaissance and also 
classical antiquity. There it locates in historical context the dynamic 
building blocks for our expectations, understandings (including theories 
and policies), and institutions that culminate in modern literacy(ies) and 
their travails, and literacy studies.
Modern arrangements and judgments grew from the foundational (if 
sometimes contradictory) currents of Enlightenment emphases on human 
malleability, perfectionism, learning capabilities, environmentalism, and 
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institutionalism. They were partly reinterpreted by Romanticism’s deeply 
divided recognition of the power and significance of the “other,” the alien 
or primitive within ourselves and in “strangers,” both within the modern-
izing West and in “newly discovered” regions. Questions about language 
and order lay at the core of both. The beginnings and foundations of liter-
acy studies also lay in “civilization’s” confronting many “Wild Child[ren]” 
(enfants savage), noble or savage; South Sea islanders who confronted 
explorers; missionaries (whose work in creating alphabets and written 
languages initially to “translate” the Bible in aid of their proselytizing is 
fundamentally a part of literacy studies and linguistics); colonizers and 
colonists. They all deployed early (and later) modern notions of Western 
literacy and its expected influences in their efforts at expansion, “con-
quest,” and domesticating and elevating the primitive and different.
Charles Dickens and Henry Mayhew taught that the “other” was also 
close at home, especially in the swelling cities of the “modernizing West,” 
sharing the difference, deviance, and deficiency of those much further 
away. Those nearby could be more threatening than those farther afield. 
In anthropology and the arts, the primitive and the oral were grounds 
for celebration at times, compromising wholly positive associations of 
literacy and negative associations of illiteracy. Strong currents from the 
Enlightenment and Romanticism intertwined, sometimes contradict-
ing but sometimes supporting expectations about progress and modern 
development.18
From earlier eras, including the Renaissance and classical antiquity, 
came, haltingly at first, the conviction that writing, and the reading of it, 
were, at least in some circumstances, superior to other means of commu-
nication, especially the oral. On one hand, this was a functional develop-
ment, but, on the other hand, personal and eventually collective cognitive 
change might follow, some persons of influence thought. So commenced 
early literacy studies. The first general uses derived from the needs of reli-
gion, government, and commerce. That was followed slowly by a faith 
in the powers of formal instruction in places called schools, initially for 
the relatively few, primarily boys. Some agendas stressed socialization 
for citizenship and its correlates; others emphasized literacy in terms of 
useful or necessary practices or abilities. Over time, places for instruction 
expanded to include many more and to focus especially on the young. In 
Valences of Interdisciplinarity.indd   283 28/02/2012   4:31:40 PM
284 haRvey J.  gRaFF
these formulations, literacy stood at the centre of training that embraced 
social attitudes and control, and civic morality, along with at least rudi-
mentary intellectual practice, and training in skills for productive contri-
butions to economy, polity, and society. The tools began with simplified 
alphabets that helped to link signs and sounds to words and sentences, 
and expanded to include paper, pens, and various means of reproducing 
and circulating texts that were first handwritten and later printed. The 
superiority of technology and the inferiority of the “unlettered” stood 
as certainties, framing constructions of literacy. Literacy’s story, right or 
wrong, came to occupy the centre (though often implicitly) of the rise of 
civilization and progress in the West.
These elements became inseparable as they joined capitalism’s relent-
less efforts to remake the world—and the word, written or printed—in the 
image of the marketplace and its institutions (with other images), and to 
remake the young, in particular, for the strange new world. They mark, and 
also serve as representations of, literacy in the traditions that emerged to 
study and understand literacy from the Renaissance (or earlier) forward. 
Not surprisingly, the development and institutionalization of disciplines 
in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century Western university incorporated 
the understandings of literacy to which they were the heirs, especially 
but not only in the social sciences—anthropology, linguistics, psychol-
ogy—and the humanities—classics, history, literature, philosophy, poli-
tics. Early relationships resist efforts at change. The resulting disciplinary 
fragmentation, as discussed in this essay, not only contributes to efforts 
to build interdisciplinary literacy studies, but also limits them. They also 
underwrote the many contradictions—what I call “the literacy myth,” for 
one—in the place of literacy in Western cultures, and the lives of many 
persons yesterday and today.
Interdisciplinary possibilities and limits on opportunities stem from 
the interplay within and across what I call “disciplinary clusters.” (The 
humanities, arts, social sciences, and basic sciences constitute major dis-
ciplinary clusters.) No less important is the sometimes very dynamic inter-
play—critical and complementary—between disciplines. Of this, the key 
disciplines of anthropology, linguistics, and psychology provide powerful 
examples. Among them, orality and oral literature, everyday and privi-
leged writing practices, the ubiquity of “reading” across multiple media, 
Valences of Interdisciplinarity.indd   284 28/02/2012   4:31:40 PM
 Literacy Studies and Interdisciplinary Studies 285
and the search for cognitive and noncognitive “implications” of literacy 
are telling. So, too, is literacy’s active presence as values, ideology, and 
both cultural and political capital. Destabilizing times can become oppor-
tunities to advance or to fall from favour for disciplinary approaches, and 
moments for interdisciplinary movements.19
For literacy studies, across the past two centuries at least, one of 
the most powerful forces has been the fear, and often the certainty, that 
literacy is declining (or not rising), and that with it, families, morality, 
social order, progress, and socio-economic development are also declin-
ing. This accompanied one of the most momentous transformations in the 
history of literacy and its study: from a “pre-modern” order in which lit-
eracy was feared and (partly) restricted, to a more modern order in which 
illiteracy (or literacy gained outside of formal institutional controls) is 
feared. When taken comparatively, and further heightened by interna-
tional conflict or competition (most famously perhaps in France’s defeat 
by Prussia in the 1870 Franco-Prussian War), social disorder and division, 
international migration of “aliens,” declining fertility and rising mortal-
ity, failure for “human capital” to grow, and similar circumstances, liter-
acy levels become flashpoints for study and action to reverse the dreaded 
tide. Schools and popular culture attract attention which has in turn 
the potential to propel disciplinary action and conflict, and, sometimes, 
interdisciplinary efforts. The apparently endless “crisis” of literacy in the 
mid- to late twentieth century is inseparable from Cold War anxieties, 
global economic restructuring and collateral social and cultural change, 
communicative and media transformation, and both new and persist-
ing inequalities. Seemingly unprecedented “social problems” become 
calls for and stimulants of interdisciplinary “solutions.” Literacy’s role as 
either or both cause or consequence is very tricky to unravel, a complica-
tion in literacy studies’ development.
For literacy studies, these complications often impinge on one or 
another of the “great divides” prominent among approaches that see lit-
eracy—almost by its very “nature”—as universal, unmediated, and trans-
formative in its impact. Often cited are reading or writing as “technology 
of the intellect,” the power of the Greek alphabet, the impact of print, 
cognitive shifts from writing or reading, and the like. Constructing this 
tradition of study and understanding was relatively uncomplicated.20 
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In recent decades, however, others have emphasized increasingly the 
socio-cultural influences and contextual effects from literacy. Among the 
elements stressed are psychological theories, schools and other environ-
ments, families and communities, cultures of practice, and practice and 
use of reading and writing.
In the second half of the twentieth century, in conjunction with other 
disciplines and interdisciplines, literacy studies has taken social, contex-
tual, cognitive, linguistic, and historical, among other “turns.” With the 
turns came the adoption of signifying French theorist “godfathers” from 
Lévi-Bruhl and Lévi-Strauss to Pierre Bourdieu and Bruno Latour. These 
developments at times interact with and deepen conflicts among disci-
plines and promote interest in interdisciplinary resolution.21
Literacy studies’ paths are revealing. Recent years witness an empha-
sis on the everyday and the practical, including the concept of practice 
itself. This has led to an effort at overturning the dominance of grand the-
ories that stressed the universal importance of the written over the oral, 
the printed over the written, the literate over the unlettered and untu-
tored. Practice and context, explored in a variety of contexts and tradi-
tions, replaced presumptions of the unmediated powers and advantages 
of literacy. In part, literacy studies’ emerging interdisciplinarity stemmed 
from perceptions of the inadequacy of earlier conceptualizations and pre-
sumptions, the search for new methods and sources on which to base a 
major revision, and reactions to it.
Successful construction of recognized interdisciplines is not the most 
common consequence of developments and changes in the disciplinary 
process. Although success or failure can be hard to determine, literacy 
studies is no exception. Some observers refuse the interdisciplinary 
mantle to literacy studies because of a general absence of departments 
of literacy studies, despite many centres and programs.22 Adding to the 
complexity and grounds for confusion is the fact, on the one hand, that 
interdisciplinarity can be strikingly different, say, in the sciences or tech-
nology fields than in the humanities or social sciences.23 On the other 
hand, disciplines and interdisciplines are not synonymous forms of orga-
nization or production. They differ considerably from each other, both 
within and across disciplinary clusters, from history to physics or the 
arts. Consequently, while most programs and the occasional department 
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of literacy studies are often in colleges of education, there are also pro-
grams, concentrations, or definite interests in the social sciences and 
humanities, with either or both institutional location or intellectual foun-
dation. A few programs reach for the mantle of science.24 In other words, 
understanding literacy studies calls for a critical perspective derived from 
interdisciplinary studies along with a comparative and historical view. At 
the same time, literacy studies provides a valuable case study that tests 
our understanding of interdisciplinarity.
Claims and conflicts about interdisciplinarity are almost as frequent 
and strong as those about literacy(ies). In a mix of recurring and current 
issues, intellectual and professional issues associated with the organiza-
tion and production of knowledge prompt periodic debates over the prom-
ises and perils, including the faddishness and, of course, the definitions 
of interdisciplinarity. The spectrum is wide but not straight. It embodies 
both light and darkness.25 For example, Guy Michaud (1972, 285) asserts 
that interdisciplinarity “is a way of life. It is basically a mental outlook 
which combines curiosity with open-mindedness and a spirit of adven-
ture and discovery,” while Georges Gusdorf (1977, 580) declares: “The 
appeal to interdisciplinarity is seen as a kind of epistemological panacea, 
designed to cure all the ills the scientific consciousness of our age is heir 
to . . . [although] even those who advocate this new image of knowledge 
would find it hard to define.” On the other hand, Marc De Mey (1982, 140) 
states: “Interdisciplinarity is an ambivalent term in science. . . . For prac-
tical problems it is considered valid and unavoidable but for theoretical 
purposes in science, interdisciplinarity is handled with great caution and 
even with suspicion.” Others see an affinity between the sciences and 
interdisciplinarity (Weingart and Stehr 2000).
Neil Smelser (2004, 52) writes more expansively:
My own sense is that this positive aura—which has a staying power 
even though the positive consequences of interdisciplinary activity 
remain unknown—retains its appeal on account of its connection with 
quasireligious and quasicommunal imagery. Interdisciplinarity is 
powerful because it promises to be an antidote to the disenchantment 
with specialization and fragmentation of knowledge, and because it 
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evokes an unspoken but persistent romance with the idea of the unity 
of knowledge. . . . Interdisciplinary thus bears some of the marks of a 
utopian ideology and social movement.
Smelser continues, “On closer examination, moreover, interdisciplinarity 
reveals a darker, more negative side. We smile on it in principle and frown 
on it in practice. Our reward system discourages it.”
Then, there is the evangelical chapel of transdisciplinarity. The First 
World Congress of Transdisciplinarity (Portugal 1994) adopted a charter 
with fifteen articles “which comprises the fundamental principles of the 
community of transdisciplinary researchers, and constitutes a personal 
moral commitment, without any legal or institutional constraint.” The 
charter (Charter of Transdisciplinarity 1998) enunciated a “transdisci-
plinary vision.”
Claiming a high middle (if slightly evasive) ground, Marianna De 
Marco Torgovnick (1996, 282) avers: “Interdisciplinarity has no promises 
to keep and none to break. It is not a mantra or a magic potion. Work that 
cuts across areas of study is as good or as bad as the individual books and 
articles that do it. Certainly, working across disciplines is not the only or 
even always the best way to do scholarly work.” Whereas some see it as 
the easy way out of hard problems, English and sometimes law professor 
Stanley Fish (1989) famously declared, “Being Interdisciplinary Is So Very 
Hard to Do.”26 Across the steep discursive mountains and deep canyons 
between disciplines and interdisciplines, there is room to play, including 
the spaces occupied by literacy studies. That is another part of the paths 
to and from interdisciplinarity.
That literacy studies and interdisciplinary studies have a number of attri-
butes in common raises important questions about these distinctive fields 
and their relationships. Both stimulate strong sentiments of allegiance 
and dissent. Both are linked inextricably with disciplinary “boundary 
issues.”27 Arguments for and against interdisciplinary programs mirror 
the sometimes utopian or otherwise extraordinary dreams that interdisci-
plinarity represents to many inside and outside the academy, but to others 
the dystopian nightmares. Paralleling claims about the powers of literacy 
and imperatives of literacy studies, they are long on repetition of strong 
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claims, or their denial. They are short on focus, key distinctions and quali-
fications, and historical, temporal, and institutional context. Despite sig-
nificant and sometimes urgent questions and issues, and an identifiable 
body of writing (often either polemical or technical), interdisciplinarity is 
poorly grasped and often misunderstood. So too is literacy studies. What 
at first appear to be substantial literatures, on closer inspection reveal 
themselves riven by a distorting, disorienting, and exaggerating positive 
or negative discourse about multi-, pluri-, inter-, and transdisciplinarity, 
even anti- or adisciplinarity.28
Magnifying and denying myths mark both interdisciplinary studies 
and literacy studies.29 Conceptual, evidentiary, and interpretive contra-
dictions complicate efforts to understand them. Most views are also trun-
cated chronologically to a constricting association with the post–World 
War ii era, often later for literacy studies, the 1970s to 1980s, which is too 
late.
Barton’s and Street’s emphasis on “over-simplistic psychological 
models” shifts attention away from the rediscovery of frequent illiteracy 
among soldiers in the West, and its powerful relationship to social class, 
race, and geography in the United States and elsewhere. It also distracts 
from observing how the understanding and promotion of literacy for 
development became a weapon in the Cold War between the Western 
and Eastern blocs, regarding the foundations of democracy, international 
competition, and both the theories and data to support the presumed 
relationships.
At issue was the reconstruction of postwar Germany, Japan, and the 
Soviet Union as more (or less) democratic, and the roles that education 
and print—textbooks and beyond—should play. The future of democracy 
in the West itself was also at stake, threatened by “the authoritarian per-
sonality” and more. No less important was the future of the lesser-devel-
oped, or underdeveloping nations, as they were represented. Political 
ideology and attitudes mattered, and literacy and schooling commanded 
attention as vehicles. The search for modern personality types helped 
to shift ostensible attention away from the Western and especially the 
American need for markets and materials, inseparable from political alle-
giance. Modernization theory became the banner for Western democracies 
in their struggles with communism. Consequently, they strove to export 
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plans for literacy and attitudes—including school systems and print mate-
rials—along with other goods and services. Studies like Daniel Lerner’s 
(1965) The Passing of Traditional Society or the more statistically oriented 
Becoming Modern by Inkeles and Smith (1974) used literacy among their 
key variables. Their measures were weak; findings and arguments were 
often unpersuasive. They also confused attitudes with skills, much as they 
did with their concepts of development, including political development. 
Literacy studies was socially relevant and worth a struggle, as literacy 
took its place in a privileged list along with democracy, communications, 
economic productivity, cultural development, social mobility, and social 
order and stability, in sometimes contradictory connections. For literacy 
studies, these relationships were not new; nor were perceptions that lit-
eracy was at issue in threats to civilization in the West. Although a boost 
to literacy studies, interdisciplinary literacy studies lacked, and still need, 
a historical foundation.
For interdisciplinary studies in general, the biological or physical 
sciences or the behavioural sciences or cognitive science stand on top, 
slighting the humanities, historical and social sciences, and many pro-
fessional programs.30 For literacy studies, emphasis and a struggle for 
dominance come from anthropology, psychology, and linguistics, amid 
confusion over the proper disciplinary (or interdisciplinary) place for the 
critical (re)consideration of reading and writing to occupy. The search 
for understanding and applications to the contemporary literacy scene 
within the domain of Education has mixed results and raises other issues 
regarding location and disciplinary status or power.
The lines between disciplines and across them are less clear than we 
are trained to expect. Perceived overlap leads to competition as well as col-
laboration. There are linguists, for example, in anthropology, psychology, 
English, and education departments. English has long claimed (if some-
what incompletely and inconsistently) a special relationship with reading 
and writing via tutelage and practice, but more formally through subdis-
ciplines like Rhetoric and Composition. During the past five to ten years, 
Rc programs, as they are called, began to rename and sometimes reframe 
themselves as Rcl—“l” for literacy. This act represented what I call “the 
lure of literacy” for currency and relevance, and enrolments and funding. 
English and literature departments are also (at least sometimes) home to 
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other elements of interdisciplinary literacy studies, including oral litera-
ture, folklore, popular culture, graphic literature, film, and linguistics, as 
well as variations along the lines of writing and reading. Seldom do they 
work closely together or build interdisciplinarity within their space.
At Ohio State University, since 2004, my own work focuses on con-
structing what I call the LiteracyStudies@osu initiative, an experiment in 
campus-wide interdisciplinary program development in theory and prac-
tice.31 (See Graff 2011, chap. 8.) The program’s multi-level and multi-centred 
hallmarks are historical, comparative, and critical. These building blocks 
integrate a series of public programs, faculty and graduate student semi-
nars in literacy and the history of the book, a Graduate Interdisciplinary 
Specialization or minor open to all graduate students, and other student, 
faculty, and staff activities. Our cross-university breadth, with primarily 
horizontal connections, is unprecedented and path-breaking. Faculty, 
staff, and students across osu’s eighteen colleges (with more than ninety 
graduate programs) have participated in one or more programs. Informal 
and formal linkages dot the huge campus. Worthy of attention in its own 
right, both the successes and the constraints on interdisciplinary devel-
opment are provocative.32
liteRacy studies and inteRdisciplinaRy studies
Interdisciplinary literacy studies continues to struggle with foundational 
dichotomies—the making of myths—between oral and literate, writ-
ing and print, print and electronic, and literacy as transformative—that 
continue to guide and divide opinion and orient studies. Consequently, 
the long-standing neglect of rich research on orality and oral literature 
is almost as much a mark of the limits of many interdisciplinary endeav-
ours as of the power of disciplines. The proponents of the New Literacy 
Studies have not reclaimed Lord or Parry or Vygotsky. The persistence and 
importance of orality is regularly rediscovered across disciplines. The het-
erogeneity of constructions of the cognitive domain also plagues literacy 
studies, another instructive matter of connections.
More generally, we confront the antimonies of interdisciplinary stud-
ies. They are mirrored in literacy studies. To begin, there is the swamp of 
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confusing, conflicting, contradictory definitions. They come in many ver-
sions, including disciplinary, multidisciplinary, pluridisciplinary, inter-
disciplinary, and transdisciplinary; indiscriminate interdisciplinarity 
(hodge-podge, cafeteria-style), pseudo-interdisciplinarity, auxiliary inter-
disciplinarity, composite interdisciplinarity, supplementary interdiscipli-
narity, and unifying interdisciplinarity. Or non-disciplinary, adisciplinary, 
antidisciplinary. metadisciplinary. supra-interdisciplinary, omnidisci-
plinary, trans-specialization, and postdisciplinary. Leaving aside the 
transcendent disciplinarities (that is, those beyond interdisciplinarity), 
the distinctions between interdisciplinary and non- or adisciplinary blur 
disturbingly. The unceasing proliferation of hyphenated-disciplinaries is 
silly, even funny, but its negative impacts do not stop there. To too many 
persons, the number of disciplines somehow brought together is the 
magic potion, rather than such alternatives as the nature of the inquiry, 
the elements of disciplines brought together, or the questions asked.33 
(See appendix.)
For many interested people, interdisciplinarity represents synthetic 
and integrative general education (sometimes called ids, for interdisci-
plinary studies) in major clusters of the curriculum or the search for uni-
fication across broad realms of knowledge, This is especially but not only 
the case for those who claim the mantle of science as a foundation for 
interdisciplinarity (to a lesser extent in philosophy or literature) (Klein 
1990, 1996, 2005). At the same time, interdisciplinarity to other observ-
ers and practitioners is basic and foundational, while to yet others it is 
specialized and advanced (sometimes termed idR, for interdisciplinary 
research). For the first group, instruction in general education takes a 
higher priority; to the second, sophisticated research and the difficult 
interpretation of its results rules. Literacy studies at times seems to aspire 
to the former. One traditional narrative of (Western) civilization is logos-
centric, with literacy as engine of modernizing changes. But literacy’s 
study and understanding tends to contribute more to the latter, however 
ironically or contradictorily. This is the advanced track, more closely 
aligned to specialization or fragmentation of knowledge, not general edu-
cation or unification. Claims of interdisciplinary synthesis or integration 
are often asserted, yet they need to be read within specialized research 
areas.
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Striving for recognition, literacy studies occupies ambiguous ground, 
both disciplinarily and interdisciplinarily. In part, this is a question of 
location. But it is also a question of status. The “rise” of literacy stud-
ies, part of its generally successful emergence and development (within 
limits), contributes to its presence in many academic departments and 
disciplines. This holds for education, the social sciences, and the humani-
ties, but usually to a lesser extent also in the sciences, medicine, public 
health, the law, and business.34 This pattern is problematic in some criti-
cal respects. In the pantheon of disciplines, centres of interest in literacy 
studies do not usually rank highly.35 That the study of literacy, for good 
reasons, is often seen as basic or elementary does not boost its standing. 
By reputation, it is often viewed as inseparable from schools or colleges 
of education.
Mainly in such schools has literacy studies achieved institutionaliza-
tion as an interdisciplinary unit, in the form of departments, degree pro-
grams, or areas of concentration often under the name/rubric of “Literacy, 
Language, and Culture,” sometimes complemented with a research, out-
reach, or service centre.36 Both “literacy” and “interdisciplinary” at times 
become promotional labels: new, relevant, sexy—in academic terms—and 
appealing for applied and practical reasons to citizens, governments, and 
corporations. Perceptions of crises or at least serious problems with popu-
lar literacy abilities add to this mix. Such promotion, which is less prob-
lematic in professional schools, aims to benefit programs and their home 
departments, colleges, or universities. It also can provoke negative reac-
tions from more traditional faculty in the arts and sciences. A sometimes 
unstable mix of sexiness, practicality, and applied “science” paves certain 
paths to interdisciplinarity, with ambivalent (or negative) responses by 
others within universities.
Of course, literacy studies is often an active presence in departments 
that are home to the disciplines most often identified as predominant con-
tributors to the New Literacy Studies or literacy studies more generally. 
These are the social sciences of anthropology, linguistics, and psychology. 
At one time or another, each of these disciplines has claimed the status of 
a science, applied if not always “pure” or “basic.” Psychology, followed by 
linguistics, exhibits the greatest ambitions, with strong interests in read-
ing, writing, development, and cognition. All three stress contemporary 
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and sometimes comparative relevance, usually reserving the strongest 
claims for the perspectives, methods, and theories of their own disci-
pline, even when also proclaiming their interdisciplinarity. Practitioners 
in these fields often occupy central places in interdisciplinary literacy 
centres, programs, or concentrations in Education.
That interdisciplinarity is often deemed best-suited to “solving problems” 
that fall outside the domain, traditions, or intellectual resources of any 
given discipline is commendable to some but damning to others. This is 
no less true for literacy studies, with its strong affinities to the practical 
and applied. While the interdiscipline has serious interests in theory and 
knowledge generation about the uses and influences of literacy, social 
and geographic variation, or multiple literacies, practice, problem, and 
applied studies are very common. Barton (2001, 93) observes, “Within 
education, Literacy Studies sometimes supports particular pedagogical 
practices.”
In Chaos of Disciplines (2001, 134), sociologist Andrew Abbott argues 
that “interdisciplinarism has generally been problem driven, and prob-
lems . . . have their own life cycle. There is ample evidence that prob-
lem-oriented empirical work does not create enduring, self-reproducing 
communities like disciplines, except in areas with stable and strongly 
institutionalized external clienteles like criminology.” Abbott points 
toward one perspective on paths toward interdisciplinarity for literacy 
studies. Perhaps only with respect to Education does literacy studies 
have a “strongly institutionalized external clientele.” Perhaps others 
remain to be developed. The field of play is potentially broad. On the 
one hand, if Abbott is correct, there are opportunities for literacy studies 
to develop as interdisciplinary, within limits. This would build upon its 
dimensions that are “problem-driven.” They in turn may include larger 
questions of theory, comparison, connections, and even history, in addi-
tion to matters of contemporary relevance or application. On the other 
hand, such interdisciplines are likely to be shorter-lived, not “enduring, 
self-reproducing communities.” That might be a very useful, potentially 
liberating path.
Likening interdisciplines to disciplines, and to each other, in search of 
similarities, our common, even reflexive practice, may mislead more than 
Valences of Interdisciplinarity.indd   294 28/02/2012   4:31:41 PM
 Literacy Studies and Interdisciplinary Studies 295
clarify. Interdisciplinary developments follow different paths toward a 
variety of institutional, intellectual, and societal ends, different timelines 
and lifetimes. They may prove influential without attaining the niche and 
continuity of disciplines. That is one of their strengths whose understand-
ing may carry benefits. If this is, in fact, the case, it may carry powerful 
implications for literacy studies and for interdisciplinary studies.37
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notes
1 The subject of this essay, it should be clear, is literacy studies, not literacy itself. 
Although they are inseparable, they are not the same. My own definition of literacy 
emphasizes literacy as the ability to read—to make and take meaning—and the ability to 
write—to express understanding and make other communications—and their metaphors 
and analogies across distinct media and modes of communication.
For me, interdisciplinarity is defined by questions and problems and the means 
developed to answer them in new and different ways that are constructed or built on 
or from elements from different disciplines. This might involve approaches, methods, 
theories, orientations, comparisons, understandings, or interpretations. I emphasize 
the former—questions and problems, not the disciplines. . . . Or, to put it another 
way, interdisciplinary defined or realized comes from fashioning interdisciplinarity 
via method, theory, and conceptualization to form a new and distinct approach or 
understanding derived from or based on aspects of different disciplines. This will differ 
by discipline and disciplinary clusters. Interdisciplinarity is not a matter of the number 
of disciplines. Therefore, there is no need to “master” two or more disciplines, as more 
than a few pundits have asserted.
2 See the literature on New Literacy Studies, including Bartlett (2003b); Barton (2001, 
2007; Collins and Blot (2003); Gee (2007); Lankshear (1999); Stephens (2000); Street 
(1984, 1993, 1998); and Street and Besnier (2004); see also Graff (1995a, 1995b).
3 Scott Frickel (2004, 269): “Interdisciplines are hybridized knowledge fields situated 
between and within existing disciplines. Like disciplines, interdisciplines are sites of 
institutional conflict. Their formation involves disputes over access to organizational, 
technical, financial, and symbolic resources, and their stabilization reflects a reordering 
of theoretical loyalties, epistemic assumptions, research practices, standards of 
evidence, and professional credibility and identity. But unlike disciplines, whose 
‘maturity,’ coherence, or status within the broader academic field is often judged in 
terms of the strength or hardness of professional boundaries, interdisciplines maintain 
themselves through interactions with other fields and thus require boundaries that are 
intentionally permeable.”
4 Barton (2007) himself examines dictionary definitions of literacy. See also Barton (2001); 
Brockmeier, Wang, and Olson (2002); Collins and Blot (2003); Olson (1988, 1994); and 
Street (1984, 1993, 1998).
5 Compare with Street (1984) and with Collins and Blot (2003); see also Graff (1995a, 
1995b); Lankshear (1999); and Olson (1988, 1994).
6 This occurs in a variety of forms and locations. In general, see Klein (1990, 1996, 2005) 
and Messer-Davidow, Shumway, and Sylvan (1993). For literacy studies, compare the 
work, cited below, of Goody and Olson with that of Street, Graff, and Barton.
7 See also Goody (1968, 1979, 1986, 1987); Goody and Watt (1968); Havelock (1976a, 1976b, 
1982); Brockmeier, Wang, and Olson (2002); Greenfield (1972); McLuhan (1962); Olson 
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(1988, 1994); Ong (1982); Tannen (1981); Cole (1996); Scribner and Cole (1981); Halverson 
(1991, 1992); Heath (1983); Lord ([1960] 2000); and Parry (1971).
8 See Goody (1968, 1979, 1986, 1987) and Havelock (1976a, 1976b, 1982); and compare with 
Harris (1989) and Clanchy ([1979] 1993). In addition, see Clark (2007). Post–World War ii 
studies include Lerner (1965) and Inkeles and Smith (1974). See also Olson (1994).
9 Goody and Watt’s “The Consequences of Literacy” was first published in 1963 and was 
subsequently included in Literacy in Traditional Societies (1968). Goody’s introduction to 
this volume was titled rather vaguely, “The Implications of Literacy.” For tensions in the 
field, see Goody (1968) and Halverson (1991, 1992); on New Literacy Studies in general, 
see Graff (1979, 1987, 1995a, 1995b).
10 See Cole (1996) and Wertsch (1985). Steve Witte also worked for their rediscovery.
11 Lerner (1965); Inkeles and Smith (1974). Among others, see Scribner and Cole (1981); 
Heath (1983); and Street (1984). See also McLuhan (1962) and Ong (1982).
12 See Street and his critics, namely Bartlett (2003); Brandt and Clinton (2002); Collins and 
Blot (2003); Collins (1995); Maddox (2007); Reder and Davila (2005); Stephens (2000). 
Neither Barton nor Street provides a historical perspective on the relevant fields; their 
focus can be very narrow—a sign of striving for distinction as interdisciplinary. At times, 
they seem to presume the dominance of linguistics or anthropology that is implied.
13 See, for example, the syllabus for eng 750, “Introduction to Graduate Studies in 
Literacy.” This is a required core source in the Graduate Interdisciplinary Specialization 
at Ohio State University. For studies of disciplines, see Klein (1990, 1996, 2005) and 
Messer-Davidow, Shumway, and Sylvan (1993); see also Abbott (2001); Allen (1975); 
Cole (1996); Dogan and Pahre (1990); Frank (1988); Frickel (2004); Kaestle et al. (1991); 
Lankshear (1999); Lenoir (1997); Peters (2005); Smelser (2004); Smith (2006); and 
Weingart and Stehr (2000).
14 See Graff (1995b). There are excellent examples in history, economics, education, and 
rhetoric and composition.
15 See, for example, Clanchy ([1979] 1993); Heath (1983); Barton et al. (2007); and Barton 
and Hamilton (1998).
16 See Pattison (1982); see also Graff (1991, 2010), and some of the responses to that work.
17 Not discussed here but important are issues of interdisciplinary activity and 
establishment before interdisciplinary is recognized and at least struggles to be 
institutionalized within universities. The accepted narrative of origins takes a 
supposedly early use of the word “interdisciplinary” at a meeting at the Social Science 
Research Council in New York in the late 1920s as the initiation of its arrival on the 
academic scene. See Frank (1988).
While being aware of the dangers of anachronism, we need not wait so long to look 
for and find recognizable interdisciplinarity at play. Important examples include the 
fields of biology, genetics, biochemistry, and efforts, say, in sociology in the nineteenth 
century and the mid-twentieth. We must beware of romanticizing pre-modern university 
organization of knowledge as interdisciplinary or “before the fall.” Non-disciplinary 
does not equal interdisciplinary.
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18 On non-literate and preliterate, see Duffy (2007).
19 Good examples are the field of education, and the long-standing and persistent conflicts 
among those who endorse reading’s and writing’s special affinities with cognitive 
development and “cultures” of reading and/or writing, as opposed to those who 
emphasize social context and practice. For recent efforts to go beyond a dichotomy, see 
Brandt and Clinton (2002) and Collins and Blot (2003).
20 For more complications, see Brockmeier, Wang, and Olson (2002); Olson (1988, 1994); 
Goody after the 1970s; Halverson (1991, 1992); Kaestle et al. (1991); Graff (1995a, 1995b); 
and Graff and Duffy (2007).
21 See and compare, for example, the work of Goody and Olson with that of Cole and Street. 
See also Brandt and Clinton (2002).
22 Alternative locations for literacy studies include departments—disciplinary and 
interdisciplinary—centres, programs, committees, degrees, subgroups in departments 
or colleges, and so on. phd programs include Language, Literacy and Culture at uc 
Berkeley in the Graduate School of Education; Language and Literacy Studies in 
Education at uc Santa Cruz; phd in Literacy Studies in the Department of Literacy 
Studies, Education, Hofstra University; phd in Language, Literacy, and Culture, 
Education, University of Iowa; phd, Department of Counseling, Leadership, Literacy, 
and Special Education, Lehman College, cuny (with a link to disabilities); Language 
and Literacy Education Concentration, Rutgers Graduate School of Education; phd in 
Culture, Literacy, and Language, Division of Bicultural-Bilingual Studies, College of 
Education and Human Development, ut San Antonio; Graduate Program Area of Study, 
Literacy Studies, Department of Curriculum and Instruction, School of Education, 
University of Wisconsin–Madison.
In addition, graduate minor in literacy and rhetorical studies, University of 
Minnesota; Graduate Studies in Composition, Rhetoric, and Literacy Studies, Ma and 
phd, University of Oklahoma; phd in Rhetoric, Composition, and Literacy, Ohio State 
University; also at osu, a Graduate Interdisciplinary Specialization in Literacy Studies 
open to all graduate students at osu. For this program, see Graff (2011), ch. 8.
Examples in detail:
Reading/Writing/Literacy, in Language and Literacy in Education Division: 
University of Pennsylvania. “The RWl Program is guided by four principles. First, it is 
interdisciplinary because literacy, language and culture are studied from sociocultural, 
cultural, psychological, historical, linguistic, and literary perspectives. Second, the 
program is inquiry-based, intended to raise questions about the relationships among 
theory, research, policy and practice. Third, it focuses on diversity and on urban settings, 
and the contexts of different schools, communities, families and cultures. Fourth, 
educational institutions are sites to work for social justice, transformation and equity.”
A new Interdisciplinary phd in Literacy Studies, 2008, Middle Tennessee State 
University, claims interdisciplinary breadth and basis in science. According to an 30 
April 2008, press release: “School psychologists, speech-language pathologists, reading 
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teachers, classroom teachers and school administrators at all levels will be among those 
enrolling at Mtsu’s new phd in Literacy Studies degree. The program will come face to 
face with why the National Assessment of Education Progress consistently shows that an 
average of four out of ten children fail to read at grade level by fourth grade.”
“The interdisciplinary doctorate is based on the idea that narrow expertise in a 
single area does not equip graduates to understand the many factors that support 
successful literacy. The new doctorate is a first-of-its-kind partnership that has emerged 
from the Center for the Study and Treatment of Dyslexia at Mtsu, a hands on learning 
lab that may be the only one of its kind in the nation. The Dyslexia Center is a unit within 
the School of Education and Behavioral Science where professionals with different 
backgrounds work together to improve educational outcomes for children with dyslexia. 
The doctorate has been shaped and will be governed by faculty representing several 
academic departments: educational leadership, elementary and special education, 
dyslexic studies, psychology, sociology, English (linguistics) and communication 
disorders.”
Some are research, some are teaching; some are other practitioners.
23 In the humanities and social sciences, there is nothing like the hybridity or conjoint 
compounding of biochemistry and other compounds linking biology, chemistry, physics, 
for example, or the development of technical fields across or between science and 
engineering.
24 The Middle Tennessee State University doctoral movement is based on shifting from 
dyslexia to Literacy Studies, with the claim to science both implicit and explicit.
25 For example, see Klein (1990, 1996, 2005); Messer-Davidow, Shumway, and Sylvan (1993); 
and Weingart and Stehr (2000).
26 See also the quotation from Julie Stone Peters that begins this essay.
27 Increasingly, I have doubts and discomfort about the usefulness of the notion of 
“crossing boundaries” as a guideline, a mode of discourse, or a governing metaphor. 
There may be a necessary amount of permeability on the edges or perimeter of most 
disciplines, and that may well be part of the nature or order of disciplinarity itself. 
Boundaries are so slippery that caution is the best practice. To focus on boundaries 
perhaps also unduly limits the interactions and relationships open to interdisciplinarity.
28 There is a need for a sophisticated and comparative study of the discourse of 
interdisciplinarity. Many of us comment on it but there is little deep probing. This is a 
trickier problematic than it is often expected to be.
29 See Graff and Duffy (2007). See also, on the one hand, Goody in general and Olson 
(1994); and, on the other hand, Street, Barton, and also Halverson. More or less in 
between are Collins and Blot (2003); Brandt and Clinton (2002); and Graff (1995b).
30 This is a complicated issue and well worth study in its own right.
31 For LiteracyStudies@osu, see http://literacystudies.osu.edu/. See also my essay 
“Literacy Studies@osu in Theory and Practice,” presented to the Conference on College 
Composition and Communication annual meeting, New Orleans, 2008; Graff (2011), 
chap. 8.
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32 That ls@osu resides in the English department (within the College of Humanities, and 
also in the Institute for Collaborative Research and Public Humanities) is partly a matter 
of chance and partly one of strategic thinking. It is not an outgrowth of disciplinary 
attributes or affinities. (No more, that is, than that our only major public conflicts are 
with the College of Education and Human Development, who claimed “ownership” 
of literacy.) Appropriately, the Office of Academic Affairs declared that literacy is a 
university-wide matter. The lessons for interdisciplinary literacy studies are ambiguous. 
A stable base with sufficient resources, wide-ranging goals, good advisors, interested 
and varied audiences and potential participants, and lots of energy may be more 
important than which disciplines lead and which ones follow. That ls@osu is led by a 
social historian is probably more important. See Graff (2011), chap. 8, 141–78.
33 See above, Fish (1989); Smelser (2004); and Dogan and Pahre (1990).
34 Science seems to have its own path(s) to interdisciplinarity. See Smith (2006) and 
Weingart and Stehr (2000), among others. As suggested by the statements in support 
of or in opposition to interdisciplinarity quoted earlier, some see science as allied 
closely, even fundamentally connected, with at least some forms of interdisciplinary. 
Others find it firmly opposed or resistant. The contradictions evoke the antimonies of 
interdisciplinarity as they relate to disciplinary clusters. Natural science is also home to 
such conjointly constructed or compounded interdisciplines as biochemistry and other 
compounds linking biology, chemistry, physics, and, recently, technology fields. The 
social or human sciences lack that kind of compound.
Interdisciplinarity in biology, for example, looks and proceeds, and has contributed 
historically, very differently than interdisciplinarity in history or anthropology or 
geography. Historian of biology Garland Allen (1975) suggestively calls twentieth-century 
biology itself “a convergence of disciplines.” On disciplines in science, see Lenoir (1997). 
Similarly, when social scientists and natural scientists talk about laboratories and 
experiments, what they have in mind and what they expect to happen there is likely 
to differ greatly. Replication in the social sciences shares more metaphorically than 
materially with replication in natural science. This is part of common confusion with 
respect to interdisciplinarity, and perhaps disciplinarity practice, meaning, discourse, 
location, and evaluation across clusters.
35 The sense of an implicit contradiction here is very real.
In addition, the accurate measurement of literacy levels with “hard” data is a 
perennial quest but probably an impossible dream. That, of course, doesn’t limit 
generalizations or judgments. Research in different dimensions of literacy studies 
proceeds very differently. Psychologists, including “cognitive scientists,” and 
economists, in particular, seek the status of science within the domains of reading and 
writing as cognition for the former, and “human capital” for the latter. They design 
their research to construct numerical data, often conducting experiments. Disability 
researchers increasingly join them. Discourse studies, ethnographies, and case studies 
of literacy practices, written or recorded testimonies including life histories, and 
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other studies of the acquisition, uses and value, impact, or ideologies of reading and 
writing, quantitative or qualitative, occupy other researchers across the human and 
social sciences, including education and professional studies. Each of the two divisions 
constructs its vision of interdisciplinarity in accord with these distinctions.
The imprecision of literacy’s definitions and measures adds a certain vagueness that 
may facilitate its general appropriation for many incommensurate ends (for example, 
as one of a number of factors in a statistical manipulation, say, to explain economic 
growth or fertility levels). At the same time it counters efforts to gain higher marks for the 
field when compared to other research of a more scientific or prestigious bent. Literacy 
studies has seen limited development in neuroscience and the more experimental 
domains of cognitive science, despite proclamations of their great value. Studies of 
disabilities and deficits are more common.
Another sign of literacy studies’ emergence with limits on its status follows from 
the ubiquity of literacy as a factor—a “variable,” independent or dependent—commonly 
employed in a wide range of studies across disciplines. Imprecision combines with a 
general but typically vague sense of its actual importance to simultaneously encourage 
the use of literacy data inconsistently, sometimes as indicators of schooling, training, or 
skills, but also with respect to attitudes, values, morality, or experience, symbolically or 
materially. Sometimes expressed in terms of “human capital,” the answer to the basic 
question “What does it mean to be literate?” is seldom satisfying. Yet, the simple fact 
that both notions and theories of civilization, progress, development, modernization, 
and so on, include literacy among their ingredients enhances its appeal despite the 
limitations. See Graff (1991, 1995a, 1995b, 2011) and Graff and Duffy (2007).
36 The order of the terms Literacy, Language, and Culture and the acronyms varies from 
program to program, regarding the place, for example, of anthropology, linguistics, or 
psychology.
37 That this constructive consequence is not literacy’s alone is suggested by the history of 
nanotechnology and perhaps materials science more broadly. I plan to consider that in 
Undisciplining Knowledge.
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13 
Teaching and Enjoyment 
A Lacanian Encounter with the Master Signifier
p a u l  n o n n e K e s 
I will begin with a particular claim, namely, that teaching should pro-
duce enjoyment and not pleasure. Why this distinction? Allow me to start 
with a personal anecdote. Before I came to teach in the Ma program in 
Integrated Studies at Athabasca University I taught undergraduate sociol-
ogy for many years. One of my tasks was to teach theory to second-year 
undergraduates. And after having taught theory to hundreds of students, 
I have come to the conclusion that you tend to have two very different 
types of students enter your theory classroom.
As I am sure you are aware, second-year undergrads have a difficult 
time reading theory. The students divide, though, on how they orient 
themselves to this difficulty. One group of students does not find this 
reading experience enjoyable at all. They liked their introductory sociol-
ogy textbook, where knowledge was simply laid out for them, where all 
the work of interpretation was already performed and explained in easily 
digestible forms. In short, they viewed their textbook as a type of security 
blanket, protecting them from the confusing and bewildering world of 
knowledge. They expect that kind of textbook in their theory class as well, 
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and are quite annoyed if it is not provided them and they instead have to 
read, undigested, a primary source from Marx or from Hegel.
In my view, this student is oriented toward what I am calling pleasure. 
In psychoanalytic terms, this is the pleasure of the imaginary ego, whose 
existence is predicated on taking any tension in experience and reducing it 
so that what is produced is a feeling of harmony and a sense of continuity. 
Freud calls this the pleasure principle, but it has also been referred to as the 
constancy principle. Thus, the student seeking pleasure is seeking to reduce 
the confusion and difficulty he or she is having in reading Marx or Hegel to 
something manageable and easily comprehendible. So they demand that 
either you provide them with a secondary source that does that managing 
for them or you perform the task of management in the classroom.
There is another group of students, though, perhaps not as large in 
number as the first group but still significant, who find reading complex, 
difficult texts enjoyable. They find it stimulating and interesting that things 
don’t make sense right away. They are excited when, after having gone 
through the selection of theory three times (and you say again and again to 
students that they probably have to read it three times) that certain insights 
and intuitions of meaning start coming their way in relation to the text. In 
short, these students are, to my mind, oriented toward enjoyment.
It is the topic of enjoyment and teaching that I want to address here. I 
want to work through some sections of Lacan’s Seminar xvii (1969–70), 
L'envers de la psychanalyse (The Other Side of Psychoanalysis), in order to 
gain some understanding of enjoyment as opposed to pleasure. This will 
involve, first of all, working with Lacan’s four discourses.
the FouR discouRses
The Positions
There are four positions:
(1) agent – someone acting
(2) other – who one is acting with
(3) product – that which is produced from the action
(4) truth – the driving force of the action
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      agent        other
       truth            //     product
The Terms
The four positions always stay the same in the four discourses. The differ-
ence occurs in the terms (specifically, in the rotation of the terms):
(1) S1 – the master signifier, the signifier that tries to fill up the lack
(2) S2 – the network of other signifiers that constitute knowledge
(3) $ – the divided subject, the subject that can never experience 
fulfilled desire
(4) a – the lost object that is the object of the subject’s desire and 
lies beyond the signifier
the discouRse oF the MasteR
The first discourse that is relevant to university teaching, and the one that 
sets up a movement to other discourses, is the discourse of the master. 
This discourse represents, for Lacan, the foundation of the Symbolic Order 
and is a discourse that exists prior to the launching of the discourse of the 
university, which is a step backward from the discourse of the master.
The agent who initiates the quest for knowledge in this discourse is the 
master signifier, what Lacan refers to as S1. Here, the desire of the master 
is to engage in an elaborate pretend game that he is one and undivided. 
Yet this desire of the master to be one and undivided soon encounters 
a problem, because, as we know from Hegel’s master-slave parable, the 
master realizes that he needs the slave in order to enact, in real time and 
space, his quest for mastery. The slave in the discourse of the master is 
knowledge, what Lacan refers to as S2, so that, in formal terms, S1 must 
try to link up with S2.
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         S1           S2
          $               //           a
Lacan tells us that “the slave’s own field is knowledge, S2.” The slave 
is “the one who is the support of knowledge . . . because he is the one 
who has the know-how” (2007, 21). And the design of the discourse of the 
master is all about finding how it is possible for knowledge, the slave’s 
knowledge, to become the master’s knowledge.
What the relationship between the master signifier and knowledge 
produces is a division between S1 and S2. Yet because there will always be 
a division between the quest for the master to be one and undivided and 
knowledge as an answer to that desire, what is produced by the discourse 
of the master is the lost object, what Lacan calls the object a. The object of 
knowledge that might produce oneness and undividedness is impossible 
because the very craving of the master is insatiable and can never be ful-
filled. As Paul Verhaeghe explains, “The result of his impossible craving 
to be one and undivided through signifiers is a mere paradox: it ends in 
the ever-increasing production of object a, the lost object” (1995, 9).
The conclusion that the master draws from this is that he needs 
another strategy in order to fulfill his desire for mastery, and here he turns 
to the university.
the discouRse oF the univeRsit y
Lacan believes that there is a very distinctive discourse that rules the con-
temporary university. As I mentioned already, for Lacan, the discourse of 
the university represents a regression of the discourse of the master and, 
as we shall see later, is the inverse of the discourse of the hysteric.
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         S2            a
          S1           //           $
In the discourse of the university, knowledge, the signifying chain, or 
S2, is put in the place of the agent and is thus the driving force of the whole 
process. If knowledge is the agent, the other that knowledge reaches out 
to is the lost object, object a, the object that knowledge would just love 
to get hold of and understand completely. Yet, as was the case with the 
discourse of the master, the relationship between knowledge and the lost 
object is an impossible one. The object a has its basis in what Lacan refers 
to as the Real, a realm that is beyond signification. Thus, the signifying 
chain of knowledge can never reach the object in the Real.
The really interesting thing about the discourse of the university is 
that the relationship between S1, the master signifier, and S2, knowledge, 
consists of, according to Lacan, “wishing that an absolute sense corre-
sponds to language.” There is only one signifier that can answer to this 
wish, and “it is the I . . . the I insofar as it is transcendental, but, equally, 
insofar as it is illusory. This is the ultimate root operation . . . an elabora-
tion that the university discourse guarantees for itself” (2007, 62). Thus, 
in the discourse of the university, it is the transcendental I that occupies 
the position of truth.
For Lacan, the agent of knowledge, or S2, is extremely powerful 
because it has usurped the role the master had before. For Lacan, knowl-
edge now occupies the dominant place in the form of an order, a com-
mand, or commandment. As he says, we now have in the discourse of the 
university a “pure knowledge of the master, ruled by his command” (104).
the discouRse oF the hysteRic
The discourse of the university is a regressive move in relation to the 
discourse of the master. However, there is a way to move forward from 
the discourse of the master and that is by turning to the discourse of the 
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hysteric. And so I would like to propose, in a fairly provocative way, that 
the university move away from the regressive position of the command 
of knowledge and hystericize itself. This is a necessary move, and it is a 
move that leads us forward on the path to a truly critical form of analysis.
The first thing that needs to happen for us in the university to hystericize 
our discourse is to put the divided subject, or what Lacan gives by the 
notation $, in the position of agent.
          $           S1
          a             //          S2
The discourse of the hysteric puts the impossibility of desire right at the 
beginning, in the position originally held by the master. In other words, 
the moment that we, as teachers and students in the university, begin to 
speak and write, we are divided between and among signifiers. The result 
is an always already unstable identity that persists and a desire that 
insists, a desire that can never be satisfied. Now desire, experienced as 
impossible and as a primary loss, turns into a demand that is directed to 
the other. The divided subject turns to the master, or S1, to get an answer. 
The question the hysteric puts to the master is: “Who am I? What is my 
desire?”
The master is the one who is supposed to know and to give the hys-
teric an answer. That is why S2, namely, knowledge, is the product here. 
The answer that the master gives, however, is not, in the last instance, all 
that significant, because the true answer lies in the object a, the ever-lost 
object, and this answer cannot be expressed in words. What is ultimately 
revealed in the discourse of the hysteric—and this is such a useful lesson—
is the impossibility of the signifying chain expressing any final truth, thus 
bringing about the failure of the master and marking what Lacan refers to 
as his symbolic castration.
The most important aspect of the discourse of the hysteric with respect 
to knowledge and knowing, and what differentiates it from the classic dis-
course of the university, is “the detour, the zigzag lines” (33). Lacan tells 
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us that “what hysterics ultimately want to know is that language runs off 
the rails.” Thus, what lies at the core of analysis, in its hystericized form, 
is that it turns the professor or the student “into this subject who is asked 
to produce signifiers” (34)—signifiers that take detours, that go on zigzag 
lines, that go off the rails.
For Lacan, then, the solution to the failure of the master to answer 
the question of knowledge is simply to produce even more signifiers that 
fly off in every direction. However, the problem that the discourse of the 
hysteric presents to us is that it does not focus its attention on the lost 
object itself. For the hysteric, it is all about producing more signifiers in 
a frenetic and rhizomatic way, and the pathway to the Real and the lost 
object are lost sight of. That is why we need to move to the discourse of 
the analyst.
the discouRse oF the analyst
The important move we need to consider in rethinking our understand-
ing of the university has to do with the priority we need to give to the lost 
object, object a, as the agent behind the quest for knowledge and truth.
Lacan tells us that it is “the analyst who is the master . . . in the form 
of object a” (35). The analyst’s position is that of object a “insofar as this 
object a designates precisely what presents itself as the most opaque in 
the effects of discourse” (42). We need “to represent, in some way, the 
discourse’s reject-producing effect” (44). What I am proposing, then, is 
that if we as university teachers are to turn ourselves into analysts, in the 
Lacanian sense, we would do well to take the position of object a.
          a            $
          S2               //          S1
As lost object, as representative of all that is opaque and rejected, we 
as university teachers oblige our students to take their own divided being 
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into account. The relationship of lost object as agent to the other is thus 
one in which the student as other becomes self-conscious of his or her 
own dividedness, his or her own position as $. This relationship between 
agent and other, between teacher and student, is, of course, an impos-
sible one, and therefore, in a very important sense, it is impossible to be 
a teacher.
Now the interesting thing about the discourse of the analyst is that the 
product of the interchange between teacher as lost object and student as 
divided subject is the master signifier, S1. It may seem strange to say this, 
but, from a Lacanian viewpoint, the teacher-student relationship always 
yields, in the student, one master signifier, one S1. However, in Lacan’s 
understanding, this master signifier is “radical” in the sense that it brings 
into self-consciousness the fact that each one of us will need to choose 
our own distinctive master signifier. We will return to this insight later 
when we get to Lacan’s concept of the sinthome.
One of the most remarkable things is the place that knowledge, or S2, 
has in the discourse of the analyst. What does it mean to place knowledge 
in the position of truth? We should note that this conception of knowledge 
differs radically from the way that the classic discourse of the university 
understands things. Lacan puts it like this: “How can we know without 
knowing?” (36).
This knowing without knowing can be characterized as an “enigma,” 
an enigma that can only be “a half-said” (36). In Lacan’s view, when we 
as university teachers offer an interpretation in a class, it needs to be pre-
sented as an enigma. In other words, for Lacan, “the only way in which 
to evoke the truth is by indicating that it is only accessible through a 
half-saying (mi-dire), that it cannot be said completely for the reason that 
beyond this half there is nothing to say” (37). The question we would do 
well to ask ourselves as university teachers is the following: What would it 
be like for us to only speak enigmatically and through half-sayings?
It is true that, in Lacanian terms, the university teacher needs to have 
his knowledge function in terms of truth. However, the truth arrives only 
when it “flies off” or when it “drops.” For Lacan, the truth “has scarcely 
crossed our field before it has already departed on the other side.” It is 
structured by a “not-without.” Lacan tells us that “we are not without a 
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relationship to truth.” Our truth “seems to be foreign to us . . . we are not 
without it” (55).
the MasteR signiFieR and enJoyMent
From the position of the hysteric and the analyst, I want now to focus our 
attention specifically on the role of the master signifier in university teach-
ing. The first thing to tackle, especially with respect to Lacan’s thinking 
in Seminar xvii, is the association between the master signifier and the 
father. If we are going to work with the master signifier in university teach-
ing, such that the master signifier circulates in a productive way, how do 
we deal with the strong traditional association between the master signi-
fier and the father?
Once we move to the discourse of the hysteric, which, as we have seen, 
is an important move for us to make as university teachers, we begin to 
appreciate the symbolic role that the father plays. This may surprise some, 
but according to Lacan, the father is primarily a deficient agent in the eyes 
of the hysteric. In trying to understand this, reference to the Oedipus com-
plex is of some use, as long as we move from myth to structure and from 
story to symbolic function. This means that, although we originally start 
with a story or narrative in which figures such as father, mother, and child 
play out a drama, we need to move from that to structure and then on to 
something else yet again. To put this in a teaching context, although there 
is much traditional language that sees the university teacher as a father 
who fosters a strong identification from the student as child, our under-
standing changes somewhat when we move the analysis to structure and 
symbolic function.
Lacan’s early theory, which already took things beyond Freud, main-
tains that the father intervenes not in relation to the child but to the 
mother. Yet this early theory is still a patriarchal interpretation, in which 
the father takes the role of a kind of saviour who must free the child from 
the mother and her threatening desire.
Lacan’s position on the father undergoes a significant transformation 
in Seminar xvii, and this has centrally to do with how he reworks his 
understanding of enjoyment, or jouissance. According to Paul Verhaeghe, 
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in Seminar xvii we have the following formulation: “We are the way we 
(don’t) enjoy” (2006, 37). So, here, in talking about the father, we have 
finally come back to the issue of enjoyment.
Lacan believes that if we were to experience nothing but enjoyment, 
we could not exist as a subject. Our existence as subject requires that we 
take a divided stance toward enjoyment. Enjoyment poses a threat to 
life itself in that the path that leads to enjoyment is also the path that 
leads to death. There is thus a need for a kind of brake on enjoyment that 
exists prior to the onset of subjective identity. This brake has tradition-
ally and conventionally produced a gendered distribution of roles, where 
the woman-mother acquires the part of enjoyment and the man-father 
acquires the part of the brake and its subsequent function of prohibition.
For Lacan, enjoyment comes directly from the Real. However, enjoy-
ment cannot be experienced directly but can only be experienced through 
what he refers to as inscriptive repetitions. The signifier that inscribes 
enjoyment comes from the Other, and this produces textual marks that 
subsequently become the object of enjoyment. To put it slightly differ-
ently, the subject receives his or her enjoyment in the form of textual 
marks that need to be interpreted.
The inscriptive repetitions are an attempt both to attain enjoyment and 
not to attain enjoyment. In this context, the signifier is both the means for 
arriving at enjoyment and the cause of its loss. This divided stance toward 
enjoyment, which seeks to slow down the road to death, is displaced onto 
the Other. It is thus the Other who carries enjoyment within “her,” and it 
is on “her” that any prohibition of enjoyment is placed.
Lacan thinks of this as a “cunning” transition, which replaces the 
impossibility of enjoyment with the prohibition on enjoyment. In this 
sense, Freud’s Oedipus complex is none other than a mechanism whereby 
impossibility is replaced by prohibition. The cunning transition involves 
taking an original impossibility of enjoyment that is located at the level 
of the Real and displacing it onto the Other. The paths to enjoyment are 
available to the subject as long as he or she renounces the enjoyment that 
is associated with the Other. There is a social complicity in this, according 
to Lacan, and this is because in our society we have traditionally associ-
ated the Other with the mother and the woman, and thus she becomes the 
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site of the prohibitions that allow the subject to avoid the overwhelming 
experience of enjoyment.
Lacan argues that men and woman are placed in certain positions 
because of the impossibility of enjoyment. Thus, Lacan takes Freud’s 
father and gives the figure a structural interpretation, with a very impor-
tant change. Instead of Freud’s castrating primal father, Lacan presents 
us with the castrated father, one who must pass on this castration to the 
next generation. Yet this castrated father is not biologically based but 
functions instead as an operator in the form of S1, the master signifier.
This passing on of castration or lack takes place initially through a pri-
mary identification with the master signifier. The movement from S1 to S2, 
from master signifier to knowledge, however, brings about a division in 
the subject, which Lacan calls castration but which fundamentally refers 
to the impossibility of enjoyment. Thus, from the moment he enters the 
discourse of the master, the father, as structural operator, faces castration 
and impossibility.
What we need to do, then, is turn the father into an agent, where agent 
is understood, in Verhaeghe’s words, as an “executive . . . paid to do a 
certain function” (2006, 44). The job that the executive is paid to do is 
pass on a lack, an impossibility. Symbolic castration is bound up with the 
introduction of the master signifier. The introduction of this signifier is the 
viable means for attaining enjoyment. But what is attained is what Lacan 
calls a surplus enjoyment that registers both the loss of enjoyment and its 
gain at another level.
Lacan adds something to this analysis that is very important and that 
moves his theory well beyond his earlier deliberations. He says that the 
master signifier can be any signifier whatsoever so long as it takes the 
position of S1, or the master. This means that it is not a question of the 
specific content of the signifier but rather of its function, which is to trans-
form total enjoyment into surplus enjoyment.
We can think of ourselves as university teachers in this regard. Our 
goal in teaching would be to appeal to master signifiers that, with respect 
to knowledge, pass lack on. Or, to put it differently, our task is to pass on 
the impossibility of knowledge. And in the encounter with the master sig-
nifier, the student experiences enjoyment, or, more precisely, enjoyment 
transformed into surplus enjoyment.
Valences of Interdisciplinarity.indd   321 28/02/2012   4:31:45 PM
322 paul nonneKes
Yet, in Lacan’s view, there is still something unsatisfying about the 
experience of surplus enjoyment. By the end of his teaching, he argues 
that we need to take the analysis of the master signifier in relation to 
enjoyment yet one step further. In his R.S.I. (Real, Symbolic, Imaginary) 
seminar (Seminar xxii, 1974–75), Lacan proposes the idea of a specific 
master signifier for each subject. And this specific master signifier will 
now be understood through the notion of the symptom. Lacan suggests 
that we approach enjoyment through a self-fashioned symptom, what he 
calls a sinthome.
I believe this move to the sinthome changes the situation of univer-
sity teaching somewhat because with it there is a more direct and central 
encounter with the Real. The classic symptom is a product of the Symbolic, 
but this symptom rests on top of an enjoyment based in the Real. What 
Lacan would seem to be proposing is that the university teacher encour-
age the student to re-create himself or herself by making a choice to iden-
tify with the kernel of his or her symptom, which is in the Real.
Now, according to Lacan, having symptoms is part and parcel of being 
human and is not something that we can or wish to cure through knowl-
edge. Thus, there is no subject without a symptom. However, according 
to Verhaeghe and Frédéric Declercq, in his final conceptualization Lacan 
advocates a “purified symptom, that is, one that is stripped of its sym-
bolic components—of what ex-ists outside the unconscious structuration 
of language: object a or the drive in its pure form” (2002, 8).
Lacan refers to the Real part of the symptom as the “letter.” And he 
makes a contrast between the signifier in the Symbolic and the letter that 
comes from the Real. As Verhaeghe and Declercq explain, “The letter is 
the drive-related kernel of the signifier, the substance fixating the Real 
jouissance. The signifier, by contrast, is a letter that has acquired a lin-
guistic value. In the case of the signifier, the Real of the drive is already 
absorbed in the Symbolic” (9). In the teaching situation, the decision that 
the student makes with respect to his or her knowledge is one that takes 
place in the tension between the signifier and the letter as components of 
the symptom. In essence, as university teachers we would encourage our 
students to find a way of working not only with the symbolic component of 
the signifier but also with the letter as the core drive-based kernel coming 
from the Real. This brings us back to the contrast between pleasure and 
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enjoyment that I mentioned at the outset of this essay and the issue of 
inscription and marking that we looked at in relation to the master signi-
fier. When students “read” texts, their enjoyment (as an approximation to 
the Real), as opposed to their pleasure (as ego mastery), will come when 
they are able to orient themselves to the “letters” of the text.
This kind of reading would involve, for Lacan, an identification with 
the symptom. Identification with the symptom occurs when the student 
chooses to make active use of the letter in the text as the Real kernel of the 
signifier. This would bring about an important shift in the student’s rela-
tionship to enjoyment. The student would orient himself or herself to the 
enjoyment that more directly hits the Real. This is surely a more radical 
and perhaps unsettling move for students to take in their learning, more 
radical than the somewhat measured articulation of surplus enjoyment 
that I described earlier. And I have no illusions about the difficulty of the 
task, because it involves an increasingly individualized form of reading 
and interpretation on the part of the student that allows him or her to 
move beyond the Symbolic component of the text and arrive at a some-
what frightening yet exhilarating encounter with the letter as Real.
The sinthome represents a modification on the theory of surplus enjoy-
ment and suggests another way we might use surplus enjoyment in teach-
ing. For the emphasis is now even more radically on the students, in their 
quest for knowledge, for which they must carefully choose a master signi-
fier that allows a more direct identification with the symptomatic core of 
their being. And from that point the student gains an enjoyment that is as 
close as possible to the Real of his or her desire to know and discover the 
truth.1
note
1 As a result of the sudden onset of his illness, Paul Nonnekes was unable to complete 
revisions to this paper. He had planned a concluding section on the interdisciplinary 
application in the classroom of his reflections on the Lacanian sinthome.—R.F.
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14 
“One code to rule them all . . .”
s u z a n n e  d e  c a s t e l l
One code to rule them all,
One code to find them,
One code to bring them all,
And in convergence bind them.
(with apologies to J.R.R. Tolkien)
This essay is about the doing of interdisciplinary work, and it simply offers 
some illustrations, some discussion, and a few implications drawn from 
one particular approach to the “doing” of that work. I have no doubts 
that the age of grand, all-encompassing theories is long over; however, 
what I will argue here, and this by no means original, is that the unprec-
edented possibilities for representing knowledge of any and all kinds by 
means of the “one [digital] code” afford us ways of doing interdisciplinary 
work that promise to bridge qualitative and quantitative methods, human 
and physical sciences, philosophy, art and mathematics, work and play, 
leisure and learning, and even, I sincerely believe, what we have come 
to understand as “body” and “mind.” I’ll end with some thoughts about 
reconceptualizing what we mean by evidence. A modest scope for a short 
essay, I realize.
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Let me start, then, with a bit of computer game play, in this case drawn 
from one small game development project we completed for Toronto’s 
Tafelmusik baroque orchestra, called “Arundo donax: A Baroque 
Adventure.”1 The question motivating this essay is, “How can we ever 
more fully engage with and make innovative and inventive uses of emerg-
ing digital systems, codes, and tools without relinquishing the deep and 
rich fields and forms of mastery thus far evolved from the cultural logics 
of print?” This question is, I think, to some extent illustrated in that proj-
ect, which uses online flash-based computer games as a medium to con-
nect young people with a set of traditions, knowledge, and experiences 
that are largely lost to all but a few of them in the present day. In preparing 
this work, we did of course do considerable research, listened to great 
lashings of baroque recordings, and also attended live performances by 
Tafelmusik, trying to find bridging points from which we could convey, in 
this digital game-based form, generative connections between what these 
skilled musicians understood, could do, valued, and wanted to share with 
a new, yet increasingly distant, generation of potential audience mem-
bers, in a form of “serious play” (de Castell and Jenson 2003) that would 
be fun, irreverent, and yet also engaging and challenging for young play-
ers, building bridges between these two worlds that might encourage 
players to learn about baroque music and culture.
Beginning with the larger context, the main game screen, or game 
“shell,” is a full-screen stylized map of Europe (see figure 14.1). On the 
map, narratively salient points of interest are clearly marked. At the play-
er’s first login, the point that marks London, England, is highlighted, and 
players can click there or on any other point on the map that is not grey 
(three mini-games are greyed out until the narrative is introduced by click-
ing on London). Once a player has clicked on London, the game begins, 
in the court of Queen Anne in the year 1704. Henry Purcell, the former 
composer for Queen Anne’s court, is dead, and his two children, Frances 
and Edward Purcell, are summoned by the Queen. A brief, sparsely ani-
mated cut-scene introduces the narrative and gives players their quest—to 
play the mini-games, fill out the musical score on the map (representing 
their progress through the games), and find the elusive Arundo donax 
plant—no longer available now that England is at war with France—so 
that the English bassoon and oboe players will be able to make new reeds. 
Valences of Interdisciplinarity.indd   326 28/02/2012   4:31:45 PM
327
After the narrative has been introduced, players are invited to choose their 
“travelling costume” and are taken back to the map, from which they can 
navigate to other mini-games and content. The “incentive” for overall 
game play is to fill in the musical score, unlocking Tafelmusik tracks that 
can be downloaded and replayed.
Figure 14.1. The main game screen, http://tafelmusik.org
The first game I’ll draw on is a musical inscription game, and the 
second a baroque dancing game. (Incredibly enough, we envisage adoles-
cents in schoolyards all over Canada fighting over who is the best baroque 
dancer. . . .) To be noticed in these examples are two things: first, how 
digital game-based work poses the challenges I emphasized of holding on 
to traditional knowledge even as we embrace new formations—whether 
cultural, disciplinary, or other—and second, how working on these games 
engages us as well in interdisciplinary theory formation, specifically, 
in this case, epistemic inquiries into media and learning and the ques-
tion of how game-based technologies for learning and emergent digital 
epistemologies reform and re-forge relations between learning and play. 
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It is within this constellation of questions about media and knowledge 
that our team has been trying to develop what we call, following game 
designer Raph Koster’s suggestion, a “ludic epistemology” (Koster 2006).
a theoRetical aside
The term “ludic epistemology” references the need explicitly to remediate 
traditional linguistically mediated epistemologies. Its guiding questions 
are about what it means to encode knowledge in the form of a game and 
about coming to know as a process of playing. A theory of ludic episte-
mology is concerned with the distinctive demands of—and the particu-
lar constraints upon—knowledge representation in the development of 
computer-supported game-based learning environments. For people who 
work in education, as I do, its primary theoretical questions concern the 
re-mediation of educational knowledge and its representation.
Educational games, by comparison with popular entertainment-ori-
ented games, have in the past tended to steer in directions away from play, 
pleasure, and genuine enjoyment toward curriculum-driven exercises 
that leave less, not more, room for playful engagement with ideas than 
traditional print-based educational media. In games of this order, “cur-
riculum content” is largely derived, ironically enough, from the very same 
epistemic framework that ludic pedagogy seeks to supersede. The con-
ception of “educational content,” in educational games like this, derives 
from, depends upon, and develops text-based views of knowledge, teach-
ing, and learning driven, understandably enough, by print literacy’s par-
ticular regulations and constraints for knowledge representation. But this 
is far away indeed from the kinds of digital literacies that have propelled 
commercially successful video games. What does knowledge represen-
tation in general, and school knowledge in particular, look like, once it 
becomes digitally re-mediated, encoded in games and developed through 
play?
Issues of knowledge representation, although they have not (yet) 
received much attention, are central to an educational understanding and 
use of digital media in general, and digital games specifically.2 The role 
and status of the “virtual” (de Castell and Jenson 2003, 9), the relative 
Valences of Interdisciplinarity.indd   328 28/02/2012   4:31:47 PM
 “One code to rule them all . . .” 329
weighting of “content/information” over “pedagogy” when education is 
delivered at a distance (Taylor 1996, 10), the novel intellectual affordances 
for teaching and learning that digital toolsets are making thinkable and 
doable (Murray 1998, 11)—each of these and more current trajectories of 
inquiry are helping us to understand the contours of a culturally and his-
torically unprecedented space in which we are challenged to educate, not 
through coercion, stratification, and failure (Illich 1983, 12) but through 
volition, engagement, interest and mastery.
Any rule-bound, game-based environment requires, we argue, that 
knowledge be reconceived in a play-based digital form. Traditional 
demands for specified “learning outcomes” frustrate the efforts of edu-
catorsm who are increasingly being urged to look to computer games 
and play for pedagogical models and instructional tools, since digital 
games do not invite, and rarely tolerate, the kinds of extended, propo-
sitional, and analytical statements that text-based knowledge enables. 
Understanding more about how the constraints and affordances of digital 
games work against traditional, text-driven forms of knowledge represen-
tation, envisaging what they might work toward, and coming seriously 
to terms with a “ludic epistemology”—a theory of play-based learning 
and knowledge—is, we argue, fundamental for transforming and refining 
emerging conceptions and practices of education.
bacK to the gaMe
The first two tasks that Frances and Edward Purcell must complete involve 
establishing their knowledge of the baroque orchestra (see figure 14.2). 
Next they must demonstrate their skill at writing baroque musical scores. 
The main objective of this three-level musical inscription mini-game is to 
introduce the sections of a baroque orchestra in an interactive way and 
to acquaint players with musical scores from this period. Inspired by the 
popularity of rhythm-based games, this mini-game is designed so that the 
player sees a moving horizontal timeline of an original baroque score, in 
which some notes have been made “active.” The player has to click each 
“active” note as it passes between two bar lines on the left side of the 
screen (see figure 14.3).
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AT LA PIETA, VIVAlDI IS CONDUCTING THE
ORPHANS ORCHESTRA...
Figure 14.2. Vivaldi introduces the orchestra game
Figure 14.3. Level one of the musical inscription game
The primary concept and mechanics of this game share a lineage with 
several commercial titles, including Guitar Hero and Rock Band, two pop-
ular examples. Its “backstory” is an assignment to rewrite notes faded by 
the sunlight on Bach’s original score. Musically, it introduces structural 
elements of baroque orchestration in larger formations than the indi-
vidual baroque instruments that we introduced in the immediately prior 
orchestra game. We wanted to help players both to hear and to carefully 
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attend to both the key “voices” in baroque orchestration, and, in particu-
lar, to notice the central role of the continuo part. Our goal was to have 
players both “hear” and then “see” these musical elements by, in effect, 
writing parts of the score and, using effective game forms (what Koster, in 
A Theory of Fun for Game Design [2004], terms “ludemes”), to engender 
something suggestive of the skilled “automaticity” that musicians must 
develop, albeit not, of course, of the same level or kind. Nevertheless, we 
think, the fact that there is a developmental, well-paced, challenging ele-
ment of skill development in play here that is intimately related to and 
bound up with an authentic aspect of musical competence makes this 
game an effective illustration of bridging disciplinary educational work 
using digital technologies. So, in this game, players listen to and follow 
along with classical music excerpts, closely attending to a horizontally 
scrolling timeline featuring musical notes that they have to catch accu-
rately with a keypress or with a movement of the mouse, in the case of 
connected “legato” passages.
the gigue is  up:  a  digital baRoque dance gaMe
After completing the mini-games described above, players unlock the last 
challenge, which takes place in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles—the court 
of Louis xiv, the “Sun King”. Here, the game’s narrative reaches its con-
clusion, as players must literally dance their way into the king’s favour so 
that he will grant them a supply of Arundo donax to bring back to England.
As with the orchestration and inscription mini-games described 
above, play mechanics are modelled after a popular “music game,” in this 
case, Dance Dance Revolution (ddR). As with ddR and its multiple pc- 
or web-based spinoffs (such as Stepmania and Flash Flash Revolution), 
arrow icons move vertically across the screen, and the player must press 
the corresponding arrow keys at the appropriate time. Unlike other web-
based games emulating ddR, however, where the action plays out across 
backgrounds of abstract visuals, our game has characters actually dance 
around the screen in time with the music, so that players are actually “per-
forming” a digitally mediated Baroque dance choreography. Arrow keys 
move the characters to the left, right, up or down, in a bending and rising 
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motion (in dance, the plié and élevé), while combinations of arrow keys 
and the W, a, s, and d keys will move the character in the indicated direc-
tion to execute either a pas assemblé, pas coupé, demi-coupé, or pirouette.
Button prompts are synchronized to the downbeats of the musical 
tracks, so that, as with real baroque dance, characters perform a step 
with every beat. We enact different difficulty levels through different 
types of dances, each with its accompanying audio track: the relatively 
slow Menuet for the first difficulty level, the more up-tempo Gigue for 
the second, and the fast-paced Bourrée for the last and most challenging 
level.
Well-timed keystrokes result in characters moving fluidly in place; the 
constraints of time and budget did not allow us to develop more “realis-
tic” movement in 3d virtual space. “Misses”—pressing the wrong key, or 
mistiming a keystroke—cause the character to stumble, but in contrast 
wth ddR (and music-based games generally), characters do not get booed 
off stage for missing too many steps (though a humorously stylized Louis 
ix grimaces at flaws and smiles approvingly at successful steps, with an 
“approval meter” to register his ongoing reactions), and players are evalu-
ated on their cumulative performance after the dance is completed.
As with our other mini-games, this dancing game privileges a kind of 
play, which actually engages players in a form of baroque cultural expres-
sion, rather than with an exposition of historical facts about baroque 
dance. This is accomplished through the amplification of player input, 
which Poole (2000, 17), among others, describes as one of the central 
pleasures digital games afford. With minimal, but timely input, the play-
er’s character executes complex and fluid movements imitative of the 
grace, decorum, and precision that were upheld as virtues of formal court 
dance (and dancers) of the time. Historical fidelity is achieved through 
representation and play: the stage is modelled after the Hall of Mirrors 
in Versailles, the characters’ motions around the floor invoke historically 
authentic baroque dance patterns, the audio tracks are representative of 
the kinds of dance music favoured by Louis xiv’s court, and the character 
animations themselves are modelled after videos of actual baroque dance 
enthusiasts performing particular dances and steps.
As with other parts of the game, there was significant negotiation 
during this game’s development between our design team and the content 
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experts we brought in as consultants. At issue was the level of technical 
sophistication and historical fidelity that ought to be included in a game 
meant to teach children the fundamentals of baroque dance. Should we 
be concerned, for instance, whether our game conveys the fact that musi-
cians count the phrasing for a Menuet using two-bar mini-phrases with 
three beats in each bar, whereas dancers count in units of six? And how 
would such a concern—which is deeply important to those who perform 
and/or dance to baroque music—be represented in the game?
This small example illustrates the kinds of considerations we had to 
balance when designing a game that was ostensibly for children but was 
received and supervised by baroque music experts: two groups for whom 
what “counts” as useful or engaging knowledge may not always converge. 
There was also some concern around whether to allow players who had 
selected the girl character, Frances, to perform the dancing game in her 
“travelling” costume, which features pants, instead of the more histori-
cally accurate corset and broad dress motif of the other three costumes we 
designed for that character. Here, our ongoing concern with generating 
non–gender-normative character representations in educational games 
(discussed more fully in a separate account of the design for a health edu-
cation game: see de Castell et. al., 2007) came into tension with a per-
ceived need for historical fidelity: women wore dresses at court, and that’s 
that.
The last project I would like to draw on to illustrate “the scope of inter-
disciplinarity” is quite different and not at all game-based—but, we hope, 
no less engaging.
MultiModal analysis  pRogRaM: “digital 
heRMeneutics” in theoRy and pRac tice
Qualitative research based on audiovisual field recordings has tradition-
ally been represented using a text-based notation system and reported 
through an argument-driven essayist text, a limited, reductive form of 
data representation and analysis. This concluding section describes a 
research tool we have developed that supports multimodally convergent 
annotations of complex interactions, generating “semiotic scores” to 
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draw attention to significant instances of gestural, verbal, and physical 
exchanges. This visual mapping of multimedia data supports an inter-
pretative analysis based on shared, objective, publicly accessible digital 
artifacts: this enables a “digital hermeneutics” that begins to bridge quali-
tative and quantitative analysis.
In the literate past, knowledge was encoded in primarily textual form, 
and while this is certainly still the case, text is losing its privilege as the 
dominant medium of representation, communication, and expression. 
David Olson remarked some time ago on the ease with which we mistake 
linguistic fluency for cognitive competence, noting that “we often see 
as intellectual accomplishment what is in fact merely mastery of a par-
ticular form of language” (Olson 1994). The technological developments 
of the past two decades—during which time digital technologies have 
become increasingly ubiquitous, mundane, and intertwined with almost 
all aspects our daily lives—have brought about a fundamental epistemic 
shift, a transformation not only in our notions of what constitutes work, 
play, learning and sociality, and what separates these activities (if they 
remain separate at all: see de Castell and Jenson 2003), but also in our 
notions of what counts as knowledge.
This shift was not unanticipated: Marshall McLuhan, whose own work 
across media modelled a reflexive appreciation of and responsible engage-
ment with theoretical studies of media forms and functions, helped to 
wake us up from what he described as “the habits of rigid perspective 
induced by three centuries of print hypnosis” (McLuhan 1955). Today’s 
diverse forms of mediation effect transformations of what knowledge is, 
what knowledge is of most worth, what constitute legitimate processes of 
coming to know, and who can legitimately assume the identity of knower 
(Lankshear and Knobel 2003). Once we discover the changes that can be 
made to knowledge, knowing, and knowers by the forms in which and 
the tools through which human understandings are mediated, we con-
front a new kind of imperative: that of “rhetorical responsibility,” that is 
to say, responsibility for the means we deploy to achieve our knowledge-
building and knowledge-sharing purposes, as well as the validity claims 
we make for such knowledge.
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the MAP pRogRaM
The methodological affordances of digital audiovisual technologies sup-
port a retooling that draws qualitative research into closer alignment with 
the broader epistemic transformations brought about by the widespread 
integration of digital technologies into our everyday lives. In a world 
where print is only one of many modes through which meaning is pro-
duced, communicated, and shared, we are invited to rethink the notion 
that our means of mapping and understanding the social must “always 
be writing” and instead pursue research methods of inscribing, analyz-
ing, and sharing ethnographic knowledge that are similarly multimodal.
A software tool for the multimodal analysis and coding of verbal and non-
verbal communications preserved in audiovisual data, Map (Multimodal 
Analysis Program) enables users to mount and play a selected audiovisual 
clip presented above a series of channels, similar in look (and, by exten-
sion, in the way it is read) to a musical score. Each user-defined channel 
in the score represents a distinctive communicative mode and/or hypoth-
esized source of significance in the clip: for example, one participant’s 
immobility, another participant’s laughter, episodes of group laughter, 
sudden or sustained instances of quiet, or shifting physical proximity 
between participants.
The beauty of this tool is in fact its meaninglessness, or, more pre-
cisely, its semantic arbitrariness: there is no content to this instrument. In 
itself, it is completely empty, evacuated of any significance, a set of func-
tions, a bit like zeros and ones or, before that, the alphabet. That means 
that whatever meanings it can convey are entirely at the discretion of the 
user, and it also means that its ability to convey meanings is not limited. 
As users add events to each (differently coloured) channel each time that 
channel is activated, a semiotic score emerges that charts communica-
tive actions across the various semiotic layers that users have identified 
as significant. Using Map, researchers can annotate complex interac-
tions among participants and draw attention to significant instances of 
gestural, verbal, and physical exchanges and to otherwise unobservable 
interrelations between and among them. Researchers using the Map tool 
create “semiotic scores,” as shown in figure 14.4. This multimodal coding 
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of video data means researchers can attend not only to a range of com-
municative modes,\ but also to how these communicative modes are coor-
dinated across a period of time. Map also allows for, and indeed invites, 
multiple interpretations of the same interaction by differently positioned 
observers. In the clip illustrated in figure 14.4, for example, tracking atten-
tion based on gaze both “captures” and preserves an instance for more 
detailed scrutiny in greater multimodality than text can afford, which 
both exceeds the profound epistemic shifts enabled by the stability of 
print relative to the impermanence of embodied speech (Goody 1978) and 
suggests particular new hypotheses (in this case, we think, about gender 
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Figure 14.4. The current MAP interface
In making visible the ways we conceptually organize and make mean-
ing of audiovisual data, Map affords degrees and kinds of researcher 
reflexivity not readily available through primarily textual techniques of 
analyzing and reporting on ethnographic research. A means not only for 
coding an interaction but for representing the coder’s own process of 
attending to what she or he deems significant in that interaction, Map 
allows researchers to work toward a critical understanding of not only 
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what but how they read and “code” meaning. The iterative and intensive 
process required to “map” an audiovisual clip, of identifying channels 
and then plotting instances across these channels, thus becomes a pro-
cess of “mapping” not only ethnographic meaning but the meaning-mak-
ing process itself in ways that enable researchers to “reflect on their own 
subjectivity” (Pink 2001, 10). Using Map, our attention can be better paid 
to the possibility, central to the very idea of a humane social science, of 
systematic, relatively well-structured variations in the objective perspec-
tives of differently located interpreters of a shared perceptual event. Map 
thus provides an exceedingly useful tool for visualizing, sharing, and ana-
lyzing data that supports a profound and long-overdue reconception and 
representation of validity in ethnographic research.
Map offers a robust, refined, and comprehensive tool not only for 
conducting but also for organizing and, crucially, sharing and objectively 
comparing multimodal analyses of audiovisual research—both between 
members of a particular research team and among researchers from dif-
ferent disciplines, projects, and institutions. Its efficacy as a tool for pro-
ducing nuanced analyses of multimodal communications in educational 
settings has been illustrated in studies of computer game play and in 
informal learning environments (Taylor and de Castell 2005; Taylor 2007; 
de Castell et al. 2007).
evidence,  validit y,  and RhetoRical Responsibilit y: 
expanding the scope oF inteRdisciplinaRit y
Our main goals in developing Map are, first, to enable us to generate 
nuanced and fine-grained analyses of audiovisually recorded micro-
interactions, with the capacity to integrate textual as well as audiovisual 
data, convergently, in a way that makes evident, public, and calculable 
the functional relationship among multiple modes of expression. Digital 
technologies have provided us, for the first time in human history, with 
a master code, a code of all codes, capable of representing phenomena 
hitherto necessarily conceived as different in kind. This has meant that 
until now, researchers have invariably been unable to perceive the ways 
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in which and the extents to which multiple modes of communication and 
expression work together, co-constituting human communication and 
interaction in ways far more complex than our research tools have thus 
far allowed us to see. The second goal is to create a comprehensive online 
database where a global community of social scientists engaged in audio-
visual research can store, organize, code, and share their Map-based anal-
yses. A third goal is to chip away at conceptions of validity that have not 
served humanities and social sciences well at all and that have systemati-
cally undermined our abilities to generate the kinds of relational analyses 
upon which human social scientific work depends. This benefit does not 
emerge despite the generation of competing accounts of phenomena but 
rather precisely because of that, in our ability to demonstrate patterns and 
regularities in the ways that identity, content, interests, and positionality 
shape and constrain perception and interpretation—and to show that this 
inter-rater dis-agreement does not make alternative interpretations any 
less objective or any less valid. Qualitative researchers have long needed 
a way to make both objective and, at the same time, relational the phe-
nomena they examine. Map allows us to do this. These goals, we argue, 
collectively bring about a technologically driven means of re-mediating 
conceptions, criteria, and practices of “evidence-based” research and of 
fostering a “rhetorical responsibility” among researchers interested and/
or currently engaged in audiovisual social science research. It combines 
visual representation of multimodal data with well-structured, computer-
supported researcher interaction and interpretation techniques to enable 
an integration of “situated” (and thus context-relative) human judgment 
with objective, quantifiable, and fully comparable accounts (“semiotic 
scores”) of publicly shareable data taking the form of audiovisual docu-
mentation of social-interactional events.
As a tool for charting and visually representing the coordination of mul-
tiple modes of communicative action across short periods of time—liter-
ally “mapping” audiovisually recorded micro-interactions—Map requires 
its users to confront and work through their own meaning-making pro-
cesses: to become accountable for what and how they see, and what sense 
they make, of the same piece of audiovisual data. With the Map tool as a 
central component of a broader online infrastructure whereby researchers 
can store, organize, and code their own project’s audiovisual data, as well 
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as collaborate with other researchers across institutions and disciplines 
through sharing their analyses of and insights into audiovisual research, 
Map creates grounds for a profound reconstruction of our conceptions 
of evidence and associated practices of “inter-rater reliability,” informing 
our conceptions and practices of how “evidence-based research” is re-
mediated by new and emerging digital tools. Reflexively, moreover, Map 
is a tool for informing and advancing rhetorical responsibility, not only on 
the part of researchers toward their data but across and within communi-
ties of practitioners.
In developing what we are calling a new digital hermeneutics, research-
ers using Map can readily access and compare diverse interpretations of 
data, bringing qualitative research into closer alignment with the broader 
epistemic transformations that digital technologies have ubiquitously 
wrought in our lives, and recognize that both research and its objects are, 
necessarily, multimodal.
To the extent that it cultivates rhetorical responsibility on behalf of 
its users to their research data and also, potentially, to a global audi-
ence of fellow practitioners, Map can become a means of working toward 
what Donna Haraway some time ago called “accountable positioning” 
(Haraway 1988): a mode of scientific exploration in which the researcher 
confronts and makes public her own meaning-making processes, rather 
than assuming the “view of everything, from nowhere” that, Haraway 
says, has to its detriment characterized Western science for centuries.
By enacting these epistemological and ethical considerations around 
the “doing” of interdisciplinary work, then, our aims are not simply to 
integrate new media into conventional approaches to knowledge build-
ing but to actually challenge our commonly received notions of what 
counts as “knowledge,” “facts,” and “evidence” as more and more social 
practices at work, home, play, and school become mediated by tech-
nologies that fundamentally displace the monological authority of text, 
through privileging different and multiple modes of communication. 
And these examples demonstrate, we hope, something of “the scope of 
interdisciplinarity.”
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notes
1 For an index of the Tafelmusik games, see http://contagion.edu.yorku.ca/Tafelmusik/
games/. The research team contributing to this work consists of Jennifer Jenson, at 
York University, and phd students Nick Taylor (at York) and Milena Droumeva, Lorna 
Boschman, and Nis Bojin (at Simon Fraser University). All of our work, including the 
present paper, is collaborative. We are deeply indebted to the Tafelmusik Baroque 
Orchestra and Choir (www.tafelmusik.org) both for the opportunity to take on this 
wonderful project with them and for their patience, their support, and all the many 
kinds of tremendous assistance—and education—they gave us in the course of the 
project.
2 Games theorist Espen Aarseth (2003) has argued persuasively that, in a pervasively 
remediated digital culture, the term “digital” no longer designates anything distinctive, 
so “digital games” is really now just a very imprecise use of language to designate 
“computer-supported games and play.”
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15
Decolonizing Teaching and Learning 
Through Embodied Learning
Toward an Integrated Approach
R o x a n a  n g 
the aRguMent FoR an eMbodied pedagogy
This essay is, first and foremost, about teaching and learning. It is a 
critique of current modes of teaching that do not treat the learner as 
an embodied subject and an exploration of a more holistic pedagogical 
endeavour that explicitly acknowledges the interconnectedness of mind, 
body, emotion, and spirit in the construction and pursuit of knowledge. 
To explore this interconnection, I argue, we need to disturb the existing 
boundaries of educational discourse and turn to and incorporate other 
epistemological and philosophical traditions. But the present essay also 
forms part of a volume on interdisciplinary studies. Thus, in begin-
ning, I pose the questions: What are the boundaries of interdisciplin-
ary studies, and can an integrative approach to pedagogy be considered 
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interdisciplinary? I invite the reader to keep these questions in mind, and 
I will return to them in closing.
As I have argued elsewhere (e.g., Ng 1998, 2005), contemporary 
Western liberal and critical education is built on a profound division: 
the privileging of the mind-intellect over the body-spirit.1 By and large, 
educators, including critical educators, have focused their educational 
efforts on developing students’ intellect and capacity for critical reason-
ing. The body is relevant only as a vessel that houses the brain, which 
is regarded as the organ responsible for the mind/intellect. Although 
there have been attempts to rescue the body and restore its agency, both 
in social theory (e.g., Shilling 1993: Turner 1991) and in cultural theory 
(e.g., McLaren 1995), most of the writings focus on how the body is repre-
sented and instrumentalized in postmodernity (what I call the outside-in 
approach). This attempt to incorporate the body into social and cultural 
theories, however, does not include the spirit, which is relegated to the 
domain of religion. The spirit “belongs” to theology and religious studies, 
not to other disciplines; this indicates the depth to which our thinking is 
circumscribed by existing disciplinary boundaries. Much of critical teach-
ing is implicated in the mind-intellect versus body-spirit divide.
When I talk about the spirit, which I call the body-spirit, I do not 
mean “spiritual” in the common, Western, religious sense. I use this 
hyphenated term to indicate that we cannot talk about body, mind, and 
spirit (which includes our emotion and psyche) as if they were sepa-
rate entities. I am aware that this topic has provided both Western and 
Eastern philosophical traditions with a long history of intellectual and 
theoretical debates too complicated to discuss here. In contrast to the 
other contributions in this volume, I am invoking an understanding, 
based in Chinese medical theory, that treats the mind, spirit or soul, 
and body as completely interrelated. Thus, nothing can happen in one 
sphere without having an effect on the others. I came to the realization 
of this inextricable connectedness during my doctoral study. The pains, 
discomfort, and other persistent, though not serious, ailments I experi-
enced during this intense period of intellectual concentration not only 
reminded me of the body’s inevitable presence in our every endeavour; 
it also awakened me to the fact that if we ignore its presence, there 
can be consequences. However, it wasn’t until I began teaching that a 
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drastic shift in my consciousness occurred, informed by my experience 
as a minority in the professoriate. This, in turn, led to my subsequent 
journey toward discovering and incorporating the connection between 
body, mind, and spirit in my teaching and praxis.
It is not easy to be a minority, a woman, and an immigrant living in 
a society that upholds white male supremacy. As a nation colonized by 
Europeans, notably the English and the French, we live with the legacy of 
colonialism in Canada, which began with the subordination of Aboriginal 
peoples. This subordination is extended to other groups that are seen 
to be different—physically, linguistically, culturally, ideologically—and 
hence inferior. As we move up in the power hierarchy, this inferiorization 
of the “other” becomes much more entrenched and difficult to disrupt. 
As part of the institutional structure created historically to preserve the 
privilege of certain classes of men, the academy is no exception to the 
entrenchment of white male privilege, values, and knowledge based on 
men’s experience of the world. The fact that women and racial minorities 
have made inroads into this bastion of patriarchal power does not mean 
that they are now fully accepted within the academy. Indeed, there is a 
burgeoning literature that exposes the barriers that minorities encounter 
in the university, be they teachers or students, both because their presence 
challenges the once homogeneous makeup of the university and because 
they challenge the process of knowledge production based on white, male 
assumptions (e.g., de Castell and Bryson 1997; Roman and Eyre 1997).
The exercise and maintenance of power takes multiple and compli-
cated forms. Elsewhere (Ng 1993, 1995), I have identified three major 
power axes in the university: that between the classroom and the larger 
academic institution; that between the teacher and the students; and that 
among the students. Thus, although a faculty member has formal author-
ity as a representative of the university, this authority can be challenged 
by students in the classroom. For example, a minority woman faculty 
member may be challenged more often than her (white) male colleagues 
simply because she is relatively powerless in the larger society. Faculty 
members whose teaching does not conform to the expected conventions 
in terms of content and style are likewise apt to be challenged more often. 
Sexism, racism, a sense of class privilege, and other such biased attitudes 
are operative in interactions among students as well.
Valences of Interdisciplinarity.indd   345 28/02/2012   4:31:50 PM
346 Roxana ng
What is important to point out is that relationships of power are 
never enacted merely in the form of intellectual encounters. Most intel-
lectual encounters entail a confrontation of bodies, which are differently 
inscribed. Power plays are both enacted and absorbed by people physi-
cally, as they assert or challenge authority, and the marks of such confron-
tations are stored in the body. Each time I stand in front of a classroom I 
embody the historical sexualization and racialization of an Asian female, 
who is thought to be docile, subservient, and sexually compliant, even as 
my class privilege, formal authority, and academic qualifications amelio-
rate some of the effects of this stereotype. My presence is a moment in the 
crystallization of the historical and contemporary contestation of ideas and 
practices that are constantly changing. That is, my physical presence in 
the academy, in turn, challenges the sexist and racist construction of the 
archetype of an Asian female.2 It is indeed the encounter of bodies, not only 
of intellect, that gives dynamism to the process of teaching and learning. 
As we engage in critical teaching and bring our activism to the university 
and to our classrooms, this dynamism is what excites us, at the same time 
that going against the grain can make us physically ill (Ng 1998).
Yet despite feminist scholarship’s insistence that “the personal is 
political,” we have no language to speak of how we embody our politi-
cal and intellectual struggles. We wage these struggles in our professional 
and public lives, but when we get sick, we see and treat our illness as 
a personal and private problem that is not to be openly discussed. This 
bifurcation points to how fundamentally we have been influenced by 
Cartesian thinking, which posits a separation between the body and the 
mind (Bordo 1987, especially chap. 5), and by the privileging of mental 
over manual labour (Marx and Engels 1970). It goes beyond compartmen-
talizing our lives into two spheres, the public/professional and the pri-
vate/personal; it also extends beyond a simple theory-practice split and 
the contradiction between what we think and how we act. It has to do 
with the more fundamental way in which ruling ideas have become taken-
for-granted practices, and it affects how we are—our being—in the world. 
These practices are embodied; they have become habitual ways in which 
we conduct our business and, more importantly, ourselves.
The opportunity for me to integrate my personal explorations of health 
and illness and my teaching, and thereby develop a mode of teaching that 
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honours both the mind and body-spirit, came in 1991. I took over a col-
league’s course, “Health, Illness, and Knowledge of the Body: Education 
and Self-learning Processes,” when he moved into another field of study. 
(My experience developing this course was documented in Ng 2000.) 
Since that time, I have experimented with different ways of (a) insisting 
that embodiment be an essential part of my classroom encounters with 
students, and (b) remaining truthful to the traditions of critical education 
central to my training and writing. The method of teaching, which I will 
describe later, has gone through numerous iterations and name changes, 
from “Health and Illness” to “Integrative Approach to Equity.” The pres-
ent iteration is reflected in the title of this essay—an integrative critical 
embodied pedagogy, or embodied learning (el), for short. I incorporate 
el into most of my teaching at a graduate program of education, with dif-
ferent degrees of success and popularity. Notably, starting in 2001 I devel-
oped a course called “Embodied Learning and Qi Gong” that places el 
front and centre. Central to el are two interconnected elements: I insist 
that physical and contemplative activities are part not only of the course 
content but also of the students’ everyday life. Qi Gong, a meditative and 
breathing practice that originated in ancient China as early as five thou-
sand years ago, is the primary tool I use to promote the interconnection of 
the body, mind, and spirit.
disRup ting the body-Mind binaRy thRough qi  gong
Simply translated, Qi Gong is a generic term for any exercises that involve 
the breath—the art of cultivating qi, qi in this context referring to the 
breath. It is one of the healing and martial arts. According to scholars of 
Qi Gong, this form of exercise was developed by people of an agrarian 
society who watched and mimicked the movements of animals in rela-
tion to cycles of planting and harvesting, life, and death. It was practised 
originally as a form of therapeutic dance to cure rheumatism and ward 
off other symptoms of excess Damp Evil in the flood-prone Yellow River 
basin (Reid 1994, chap. 13). It has been known by many different names 
throughout Chinese history. In fact, the term Qi Gong is fairly recent. 
According to Ken Cohen, a scholar and practitioner of Qi Gong, while 
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the term was first mentioned in Taoist (or Daoist)3 texts during the Ming 
Dynasty (1368–1644), it was not used in its present specialized sense until 
the twentieth century (Cohen 1997, chap. 2). While there are many forms of 
Qi Gong, developed and guarded by families who practised Chinese heal-
ing arts, most are based on Taoist principles and theory similar to those 
of Chinese medicine.
Chinese medical theory, or tcM (Traditional Chinese Medicine), is 
based on the central Taoist principle of the unity of opposites—yin and 
yang. According to Chinese creation myths, the universe was an undif-
ferentiated whole in the beginning. Out of this emerged yin-yang: the 
world in its infinite forms. In both Taoism and tcM, yin-yang is a sym-
bolic representation of universal process (including health, in the case 
of tcM) that portrays a changing rather than a static process (Kaptchuk 
2000, chap. 1). The important thing to understand is that the two opposite 
states are not mutually exclusive or independent of each other. They are 
mutually dependent, and they change into each other. Therefore extreme 
yang becomes yin, and vice versa. The theory of yin and yang has been 
mistakenly represented in the West as a dualist philosophy. Chinese medi-
cal scholars such as Kaptchuk, however, argue that it is a form of dia-
lectic that is both similar to and different from Hegelian dialectics (see 
Kaptchuk 2000, 174–76).
Health is considered to be the balance of yin-yang aspects of the body, 
and disease is the imbalance between these aspects. This is a form of dia-
lectical thinking radically different from the causal linear thinking and 
logic of allopathy and positivist science. The body in tcM is understood to 
be in a state of dynamic interaction of yin and yang; it is constantly chang-
ing and fluctuating. On the basis of this fundamental understanding of 
the nature of yin-yang and health as balance, tcM views illness not so 
much in terms of discrete diseases as in terms of disharmony. Thus, tcM 
outlines eight guiding principles for determining these patterns of dis-
harmony. According to Beinfield and Korngold (1991), the eight principles 
are four sets of polar categories that distinguish between and interpret 
the data gathered by examination: yin-yang, cold-heat, deficiency-excess, 
and interior-exterior. Again, these are not mutually exclusive but can co-
exist in a person.
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A major difference between biomedicine and tcM theory is the way 
in which the body is conceptualized. The Chinese view of the body does 
not correspond to that of Western anatomy. For example, Chinese medi-
cal theory does not have the concept of a nervous system, yet it can treat 
neurological disorders. It does not speak of an endocrine system, yet it is 
capable of correcting what allopathy calls endocrine disorders. Although 
language makes reference to what the West recognizes as organs such as 
lungs, liver, stomach, and so on, these are not conceptualized as discrete 
physical structures and entities located in specific areas within the body. 
Rather, the term “organ” is used to identify specific functions. Furthermore, 
tcM does not make a distinction between physical functions and the 
emotional and spiritual dimensions governed by the “organ” in question. 
It describes an organ not only in terms of its physiological processes and 
functions but also in terms of its orb—its sphere of influence (Kaptchuk 
2000; Beinfield and Korngold 1991).
For example, in tcM the Spleen is the primary organ of digestion.4 It 
extracts the nutrients from food digested by the stomach and transforms 
them into what will become “Qi” and “Blood.” The Spleen is thus respon-
sible for making Blood, whereas the Liver is responsible for storing and 
spreading Blood. As such, the Spleen is responsible for transformation, 
transmutation, and transportation, and these functions apply to physical 
as well as mental and emotional processes. At the somatic level, “weak-
ness” in the Spleen means that food cannot be transformed properly into 
nutrients that nourish the body. At the emotional and psycho-spiritual 
level, a weak Spleen diminishes our awareness of possibilities and our 
ability to transform possibilities into appropriate courses of action, which 
leads to worry and confusion. Ultimately, it affects our trustworthiness 
and dependability (Kaptchuk 2000, 59–66).
The body, then, is conceptualized not so much in terms of distinct 
parts and components as in terms of energy flow (qi). Qi, a fundamental 
concept in tcM and Chinese thinking, is frequently translated as “energy” 
or “vital energy” but in fact has no precise conceptual correspondence in 
the West. Qi is what animates life. Thus, while there is Qi, there is life; 
when there is no Qi, life ceases. It is both material and immaterial. Qi is 
present in the universe in the air we breathe and in the breaths we take. 
It is the quality we share with all things, thus connecting the macrocosm 
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with the microcosm. Qi circulates in the body along lines of energy flow 
called meridians or organ networks. Another way of conceptualizing dis-
ease is to say that it arises when Qi is not flowing smoothly. This leads to 
blockage and stagnation, which, if persistent, will lead to disease (that is, 
pathological changes in the body). Thus, an important part of the healing 
process is to unblock and facilitate the free flow of Qi. Different thera-
pies (massage, acupuncture, and herbology) are aimed at promoting the 
smooth flow of Qi and rebalancing disharmony.
Together with these notions of health and the body, the Chinese have 
developed exercise forms called Qi Gong aimed at optimizing health 
and balance. These are exercises or movements aimed at regulating the 
breath, the mind, and the body simultaneously. Daniel Reid identifies 
four basic applications of Qi Gong: health, longevity, martial power, and 
spiritual enlightenment (Reid 1994, 175). There are literally thousands of 
forms of Qi Gong, from sitting postures similar to what the West recog-
nizes as postures conducive to meditation to Tai Ji Juan, which at its most 
advanced is a form of martial art aimed at honing the body, mind, and 
spirit to respond to external attack without the use of force. Practitioners 
of Qi Gong believe that by disciplining, activating, and regulating the nor-
mally automatic, involuntary way of breathing, they are able to regulate 
and alter other functions of the body such as heartbeat, blood flow, and 
other physical and emotional functions. Thus, Qi Gong is not simply a 
physical exercise. Nancy Zi, a professional vocalist who studies Qi Gong 
to enhance her operatic singing, puts it concisely, “The practice of chi kung 
. . . encompasses the ancient Chinese understanding of disciplined breathing as 
a means of acquiring total control over body and mind. It gives us physiologi-
cal and psychological balance and the balance of yin and yang” (Zi 1986, 3). Qi 
Gong is thus based on the same principles as tcM; they are complemen-
tary. It is a recommended exercise form in tcM and is taught widely as a 
healing art in China.
It is precisely the way tcM and Qi Gong conceptualize the intercon-
nectedness of body, mind, and spirit that I found useful in my attempt 
to restore the centrality of the body in teaching and learning. Since 1991, 
I have been experimenting with using Qi Gong as a tool for cultivating 
critical inquiry that is at once embodied and reflexive—a mode of inquiry 
that is contemplative and dialogic and that acknowledges the equal 
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participation of body, mind, emotion, and spirit in scholarly pursuit and 
in knowledge construction. This understanding underpins embodied 
learning (el).
theoRizing and pRac tising eMbodied leaRning
In addition to Qi Gong theory and practice, I draw on Frantz Fanon’s 
(1963, 1967) analysis of the psychology of the colonized and on Antonio 
Gramsci’s (1971) notions of hegemony and common sense. Fanon’s work 
is groundbreaking because he was one of the first social scientists to 
attempt to understand colonization as more than just a direct oppressive 
force. More profoundly, it is an attitude internalized by the colonized, 
so that she adopts the ideas and behaviour of the colonizer and acts, or 
regulates herself, according to the norms of colonial society. Similarly, 
Gramsci uses the term hegemony to explain how ruling ideas are shared 
by the dominant and working classes. He asserts that once a ruling idea 
becomes hegemonic, it becomes common sense. Commonsense thinking 
is uncritical, episodic, and disjointed, but it is also powerful because it is 
taken for granted (Gramsci 1971, 321–43). Applying Gramsci’s historical 
discussion to racism in contemporary British society, Stuart Hall notes:
[Ideologies] work most effectively when we are not aware that how we 
formulate and construct a statement about the world is underpinned by 
ideological premises; when our formulations seem to be simply descrip-
tive statements about how things are (i.e., must be), or of what we can 
“take-for-granted.” (Hall, quoted in Lawrence 1982, 46)
Colin Leys suggests that when an ideology becomes completely normal-
ized, it is embedded in language.5 But ideology is not merely a set of ideas; 
it is a practice in that it shapes how we act, as well as how we think. 
I would extend Leys’s observation to argue that once hegemonic ideas 
become common sense, they are condensed in our emotional and physi-
cal beings—in how we relate to women and minority groups, for example, 
and in how we see and relate to ourselves.6 In short, they become pat-
terns of behaviour.
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Elsewhere (Ng 2004), I have used my babysitter’s attitude toward 
eating as an example to illustrate this force of habit. The example is worth 
repeating because it is clear and non-threatening; its power as a message 
lies in its simplicity. My “babysitter,” who looks after my animals when I 
am away, was eighty-two, going on eighty-three, when I first wrote about 
her. She doesn’t cook, so I cook for her. She gulps down her food as soon 
as I put it in front of her, frequently finishing a whole dinner before I have 
a chance to sit down. When I asked her to eat more slowly, she would say: 
“I always had to eat fast when I worked at the hospital. We were only given 
half an hour for lunch.” When I remind her that she has been retired since 
she was sixty-five, her rebuttal is inevitably: “I can’t help it.” It is the belief 
that “I can’t help it” that locks people into fixed patterns of behaviour. So 
it is that my babysitter has developed a “habit” of eating quickly because 
of years of working in a place where she had to hurry or else her pay 
would be docked or she would be reprimanded. Gulping down her dinner 
is “natural” for her, taken for granted, not to be questioned. Thus, change 
is only possible if we can develop the capacity to examine our patterns of 
behaviour objectively, without attachment, in order to determine whether 
and how to change. This requires that we be reflexively critical, that we be 
open to examining the integrity of our being without guilt and judgment.
Using insights from Fanon, Gramsci, and Foucault, we can see how 
dominant and subordinate power relations are played out interactionally 
in “normal” and “natural” ways. Feminists have drawn attention to how 
patriarchy works in practice: men are listened to when they speak; women 
and minorities are not heard. My notion of el, which I am calling an “inte-
grative embodied critical pedagogy” here, seeks to help us develop the 
capacity not only to reason critically but to see dispassionately and to 
alter actions that contribute to the reproduction of dominant-subordinate 
relations. It is an attempt to close the gap between progressive theory 
and practice. To illustrate, I will describe briefly what I do in “Embodied 
Learning and Qi Gong.” This course consists of three basic components.
First, in addition to introducing students to tcM and Qi Gong, I assign 
readings on different ways in which the body is conceptualized in differ-
ent disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, and psychotherapy. The 
goal here is to expose students to the centrality of the body in academic 
and other writings—including what some sociologists have identified as 
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the absent body in social theory (Shilling 1993; Turner 1991)—and to dras-
tically different ways of constructing the body. Thus, they come to see that 
the boundaries of the body are by no means fixed; they are malleable. 
Understanding the diverse ways of perceiving and describing bodily expe-
rience raises questions about knowledge and power: about who has the 
power to define what constitutes illness, for example.
Second, at least one hour of this four-hour-per-week course is devoted 
to the practice of Qi Gong as a form of mindfulness exercise. There are 
at least two objectives for this component of the course. Insisting that 
exercises be part of the curriculum reinforces the fact that we are embod-
ied learners, that learning does not only involve the mind. It draws our 
attention to how the body, emotion, and spirit are involved in the learn-
ing process: what we embrace and resist, and why. Moreover, in many 
Eastern traditions, meditation is used as a discipline that focuses the 
mind, enhancing our capacity to reflect on our thoughts and actions 
without judging them—what Buddhism refers to as non-attachment, as 
opposed to detachment. An attitude of detachment is characterized by the 
absence of emotion when we are presented or confronted with something. 
In contrast, non-attachment consists in refraining from passing judgment 
on something in the first instance. It is a state of dispassionate observa-
tion, one that enables us to consider, objectively, how to interpret or act 
on something and to do so with understanding and compassion. The fol-
lowing journal description, written by one of my students, serves as an 
illustration:
I felt my feet rooted to the floor. I sensed the movement of my limbs 
located in relation to the space I occupied. I sensed the tension and 
relaxation of my muscles as a physical experience of my tissues. I felt 
the flow of breath that was at one moment a part of me, inside my 
lungs, and at the next moment, a part of the air that surrounded me. I 
experienced these things with my body, that physical part of my self.
There were times when I was so involved in the physicality of the 
experience that my surroundings faded from my vision. I was aware 
of the professor’s verbal instructions and my efforts to translate those 
instructions into coordinated physical movement. I was aware of 
concentrating on the cycle of my breathing. I knew these and other 
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things from the cognitive part of my being. At times it was as if I were 
an outside observer watching the experience of my body. My mind, my 
body, and my breath were connected yet separate entities engaged in qi 
gong. It was like a revelation that day I was able to articulate a sense of 
body—my body from those oppositional and interdependent positions. 
Through repetition of body movement which replicates the cycles of 
breath I was echoing the rhythms of life and nature. . . . Qi-gong train-
ing was embodied exploration of the invisible process of constructing 
knowledge of the body. (Gustafson 1998, 53)
While initially I took up Qi Gong practice as a way of reducing stress 
and promoting health, with time and practice I came to understand and 
appreciate how it is that Qi Gong and other forms of meditation are spiri-
tual, as distinguished from merely religious, practices. These practices 
enable one to develop the capacity to be mindful of one’s thought and 
action, so that one does not go about one’s daily business thoughtlessly 
and automatically as a matter of habit. They enable one to see how one’s 
actions affect others, and whether and how one should change. They 
therefore give us the means, albeit not the only ones, to interrogate how 
our consciousness is developed and changed. The assumption here is that 
consciousness has both a mind-intellect and a body-spirit dimension. It is 
tangible because it is embodied. Understanding and analyzing the devel-
opment of consciousness thus necessitates an interrogation of our being 
as sensuous living individuals, of the material conditions that enable and 
limit our bodily existence, and hence of knowledge construction itself 
(which is accomplished by embodied subjects). Much like the call for 
starting with people’s lived experience proposed by critical and feminist 
pedagogy, it is a mode of learning that grounds the knower in time and 
space and provides an anchor enabling us to see that thought processes 
are inevitably historically and spatially specific. This in turn allows us 
to see that indeed consciousness can be changed, as we confront it and 
understand how it comes about.
The third component is journalling, which is included as part of the 
course requirement and as an accompaniment to the mindfulness exer-
cises. Journalling has three purposes. First, as with many courses that 
require students to keep a reading journal, I ask students to summarize 
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the major argument(s) of an assigned piece of reading to develop their 
comprehension and summary skills. Reviewing this part of the journal 
gives me a sense of whether students understand the materials and, if 
not, what remedial action I and they should take. Second, journalling 
is another tool that enables students to reflect on their reactions (feel-
ings and emotions) to the course materials. I ask students to record and 
analyze their reactions, to trace how these feelings are triggered by what 
they’ve read, thus enabling them to use reactions as a starting point for 
reflection and analysis. Finally, students are required to keep a Qi Gong 
journal, preferably on a daily basis, that describes their practice of and 
reaction to the practice of Qi Gong.7 The purpose here is to treat the body 
as a site for knowledge construction.
RisKs and possibilities oF eMbodied leaRning
Practising el by incorporating Qi Gong in the university curriculum 
presents an invaluable and promising opportunity for me to interrogate 
Western knowledge construction with like-minded, or at least curious, 
students. Not only have I learned tremendously from teaching el, but 
I have also changed my own praxis over time, to the point where I am 
now convinced that integrating body, mind, and spirit is not only disrup-
tive to established educational conventions in North America but is a 
method of decolonizing—undoing—ways in which we have come to be in 
the world. Similarly, Deborah Orr has theorized and advocated for the use 
of mindfulness as part of anti-oppressive pedagogy in higher education. 
She claims that mindfulness practice is “a proven technique to address 
the non-cognitive forms of attachment to ideation that may remain in 
force despite the most thorough-going intellectual change” (2002, 477). In 
working with Aboriginal women who have experienced tremendous abuse 
and violence, Alannah Young and Denise Nadeau argue strenuously for 
a multi-dimensional approach that uses songs, meditation, ceremonies, 
and other forms of embodied spiritual practice. In their view, “the trans-
formation of the impacts of sexual, racial and colonial violence requires 
unlearning ways of thinking and being that have been etched onto the 
body” (2005, 13), and thus one must decolonize the body in order to heal.
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But what about the students? What do they get out of el in the class-
room? Here, I want to report on three students’ written reflections on el. 
These women took courses with me during different periods in my own 
development of el. Although my overall approach has remained fairly 
constant over the years, my own thinking, and the course title, contents, 
and format have undergone many modifications. However, what can be 
gleaned from their writing is how they take up the notion of embodiment 
creatively in their own lives, thereby demonstrating the risks and possi-
bilities of el. Their experience and work will be described in chronologi-
cal order below. As much as possible, I will quote from their own writing, 
in order to let them speak.8 But even with that, I vastly simplify the depth 
and poignancy of their analyses and narratives.
Si Transken was a student when I first offered the course titled “Health, 
Illness and Knowledge of the Body.” I was both excited and apprehensive 
about introducing unconventional, specifically physical, movements in a 
graduate class. In retrospect, I had vastly underestimated the power of 
engaging the body explicitly in intellectual pursuit and what this might 
open up. Thus, Si’s paper, titled “Reclaiming Body Territory” (not to men-
tion the journal I required her to keep), took me completely by surprise. 
In it, she detailed, for the first time, her experience of being sexually and 
physically abused for over a decade by her father and his friends, and 
her subsequent healing journey. The work she did in the course was part 
of this healing process, which involved a tremendous amount of emo-
tional pain and physical discomfort. In the paper, she disclosed that she 
could not do the movement exercises because her method of survival 
throughout the abuse was to detach from her body, but she also wrote 
succinctly and movingly about how she reclaimed her body during the 
course, which culminated in the writing of her final term paper. Below 
are excerpts from the conclusion of her paper, which was published in the 
Canadian Research Institute for the Advancement of Women’s Feminist 
Perspectives series:
I spent the first half of my life barely existing in my body. I have spent 
an equal number of years reclaiming my body. The remaining years of 
life I have available to me will, hopefully, be spent experiencing joy and 
peace in my body. I am attempting to be an active and vocal reclaimer 
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and maintainer of my territory. One of the horrors of incest is the isola-
tion and sense of aloneness in the world that the victim experiences.
I am trying to reclaim all of my stolen self/body. While daring and 
reclaiming, I am also bearing witness and offering my testimony as a 
political act as well as a therapeutic act.
The writing and the sharing of this story has been both excruciating 
and delightful and it has been an important part of that process of 
reclaiming. (Transken 1995, 28–29)
I remember clearly one of the questions posed by students in that 
course: “Are experiences always stored in the body?” My answer was, “I 
think so.” Since that time, I have learned a lot about embodiment and 
el. Now my answer would be, “Absolutely,” even when we have no active 
memory of the experience or event. In offering courses of this nature, I 
now warn participants about the risks of engaging the body in the learn-
ing process and provide resources for counselling and other help should 
painful memories arise for which they need support. If participants per-
sist and work through their discomfort, the rewards can be satisfying, as 
Si Transken and Carrie Butcher discovered.
Carrie came into our program as a part-time mature student who 
had been active in the anti-racism movement. She described herself as 
a “45 year old woman of Hakka Chinese, African and Scottish descent” 
who “was born in the former British colony of Trinidad” (Butcher 2009, 
2). While she originally returned to school to improve her professional 
knowledge and skills in organizational change and anti-racism efforts, 
she found herself drawn to courses that focused around health, wellness, 
and creativity, including the “Embodied Learning and Qi Gong” course. 
After taking that course, she went on to enrol in my doctoral-level spe-
cial topics course “Applications of Embodied Learning.” In the beginning. 
her academic goal was to explore issues of resilience and decolonization 
of her body. Soon after the course began, her focus became much more 
practical and immediate: after doctors discovered fast-growing fibroids, 
she had to decide whether to have a complete hysterectomy. Her class pre-
sentation and her journal, which she continued to keep during her fairly 
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lengthy hospitalization, documented her struggle with the decision. Her 
term paper (submitted two terms later because she did undergo surgery) 
was an examination of how she applied embodied learning processes 
to prepare for the surgery and to aid in her recovery. In it, she reviewed 
various tcM, biomedical, and women-centred perspectives on uterine 
fibroids based on medical and popular writings and touchingly and can-
didly explored the connection between resistance, traumas, and illness, 
and healing. She began the paper with her resistance to writing for an 
academic grade:
Reviewing my journal entry helped me to acknowledge and accept 
my resistance to writing about my surgery. . . . I came to see that my 
resistance to writing was a visceral message that it was time to care 
for myself before seeking to care for the world (through working with 
racialized communities). (Butcher 2009, 5)
She quoted from her journal to indicate how she worked through her 
resistance with the tools she learned from the class:
Looking within—by this I mean bringing my attention, my consciousness, 
to my bodily feelings—I became aware of a feeling of resistance to writing 
followed by judgment of myself for not being able to write, and then a 
sense of panic. I gently brought my awareness to this energetic pattern of 
resistance, judgment and panic that had emerged within me. Employing 
the mindfulness practice of unattached observation, I was able to stand 
back in my observer self, and simply look at this energetic pattern. In so 
doing I was able to reframe my embodied inquiry. I reframed the judge-
mental question “why can’t I just write?” to a more compassionate and 
simply curious question. It became “what is this resistance about?” This 
was an important shift, and one which finally allowed me to look at my 
resistance to writing. (7; emphasis in the original).
Through journalling and drawing, she transformed fear and resistance 
into yielding and acceptance, thereby laying the foundation for her pro-
cess of healing:
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In the two days before my surgery I reflected on the transformational 
possibilities that severing ties with my fibroids and losing my uterus 
might hold. The image that follows is of a sketch from my new journal, 
created as I lay in my hospital bed about two days before my surgery. 
The sketch . . . [developed] into an abstract flower, to my surprise . . . 
[with] three distinct parts—root system, stalk and petals. (16)
These parts signified different things to Carrie: the root system repre-
sented stuck creativity, which was informed by some of the feminist spiri-
tual writing on fibroids (see Northrup 1994) and by her African heritage, 
among other things. The “vine-like” stalk symbolized letting go, transfor-
mation, and “the body saying no to unhealthy patterns,” in addition to 
ten other attributes (Butcher 2009, 18). At the centre of the petals is the 
word “possibility.” For Carrie, they represent a number of “possibilities 
offered by the image of the flower head, located at the culmination of a 
period of illness” (19).
In her integrative paper for “Embodied Learning and Qi Gong,” Carly 
Stasko recounted her resistance to the dominant definition and treatment 
of cancer and described how she applied the insights gained in the course 
to her work as a media literacy educator. Several years before she enrolled 
in the Ma program in Holistic Education and took my course, Carly was 
diagnosed with Hodgkin’s lymphoma, a form of cancer that affects young 
people. She wrote about how she survived the diagnosis and treatment 
process:
I began to resist what I saw as oppressive in the language and 
metaphors of cancer and reclaimed a place of authority for my own 
embodied wisdom. . . . I did not want to energetically claim the cancer. I 
saw it instead as a blockage that needed to transform and pass through 
me. . . . I saw healing in a way that more closely resembled the under-
standings of Traditional Chinese Medicine, tcM—such that energy 
flowed through my body in various patterns and that all “things are 
imbued with interactive qualities and dynamics in their relationships to 
the things around them” (Kaptchuk and Croucher 1986, p. 17). Through 
a form of daily mindfulness mediation I was able to . . . “develop an 
awareness of the corporeal and emotional responses that accompany 
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ideas, opening up the possibility to more completely address their 
effects” in my life (Orr 2002, p. 492).9 (Stasko 2009, unpaged).
The course and the work she did for it enabled her to name her experi-
ence of recovery and healing, and reinvigorated her already creative work 
in media literacy.
Through my own process of embodied learning I’ve had to tune into 
my inner felt sense of power, energy and wellness, to have the courage 
to subvert a dominant narrative, and the creativity to generate a new 
narrative in which I had voice and could feel engaged in a meaningful 
and empowered way. This experience has reinvigorated my passion 
for embodied media literacy education because it showed me that pro-
cesses learned in one context could be applied in unanticipated future 
ways. . . .
By integrating embodied ways of knowing into media literacy 
pedagogy new ways of relating to learning and understanding can be 
established such that wisdom becomes rooted in the felt sense of the 
body so as to ground a critical awareness of the concepts that shape our 
ways of knowing. In this way the two forms of wisdom can become inte-
grated through engaged and embodied action in the world. (Emphasis 
in the original)
While not all of these authors use the term “decolonization” explicitly, I 
argue that their analysis and narration of their experience are concrete 
examples of decolonization that involves at least four elements: resis-
tance, questioning, reclamation, and transformation (from negative to 
positive and from margin to centre). This progression in turn engages two 
critical acts: deep reflection and some form of embodied mindfulness 
practice that (re)integrates body, mind, and spirit.
Increasingly, therefore, I see el as a form of decolonizing pedagogy 
(see also Tejeda, Espinosa, and Gutierrez 2003). This contrasts with the 
commonsense use of the concept of “decolonization” to refer to a political 
and intellectual project having to do with the reclamation and reformu-
lation of nationhood (see, for example, Duara 2004). For me, the notion 
of decolonization dissolves the boundaries between self and collectivity, 
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between the individual and the system. It interrogates how we, as individ-
uals living within and being part of collectivities, reproduce and sustain 
systems of oppression—the questions addressed by Fanon and Gramsci. 
Understanding the dissonance between body, mind, and spirit leads me 
to see that, regardless of whether we are the oppressor or the oppressed, 
the perpetrator or victim, we reproduce oppression through normalized 
patterns of behaviour that have developed over time and have become 
“natural,” automatic, and unconscious actions and ways of being in the 
world. Thus, I use the notion of decolonization to indicate the practices 
in which we can engage to free us from ideas and ideology, on the one 
hand, and action and behavior, on the other, that serve as sources of sepa-
ration. A mindful and reflexive practice such as the incorporation of Qi 
Gong into the classroom not only has the potential to extend the bound-
aries of Western knowledge construction but also helps us develop the 
capacity to transform our own bifurcated and compartmentalized way of 
being. It therefore holds the promise of facilitating personal as well as 
social transformation.
Final question:  is  EL inteRdisciplinaRy?
As commonly used, the term “interdisciplinary” refers to studies between 
or among disciplines as they emerged historically in the academy in 
Western societies. Strictly speaking, then, because tcM and Qi Gong fall 
outside the disciplinary boundaries of the Euro-American construction 
of knowledge, my work on el is not interdisciplinary. However, if one 
adopts an expanded notion of interdisciplinarity as a crossing of bound-
aries (e.g., Klein in this volume), then one can say that my notion of an 
embodied critical pedagogy that combines Eastern mindfulness methods 
and Western critical analysis falls within the domain of interdisciplinary 
studies.10 However, we are still left with the issue of how to distinguish 
between interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary, and integrated studies (see, 
for example, Angus, Briton, Graff, Kisner, Klein, and Szostak, in this 
volume). The boundaries of interdisciplinary studies are still indetermi-
nate and contested, and it is finally up to the reader to decide how she or 
he wishes to take up the ideas shared here.
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notes
1 By critical education I mean critical pedagogy, feminist pedagogy, and anti-racist 
education, in Canada, and critical, emancipatory, or revolutionary multicultural 
education, in the United States (see McCarthy 1995). Although the two have different 
roots and traditions, they do share a common goal: to expose existing inequalities and 
instill critical consciousness in students.
2 I am using the term “archetype” here simply to refer to the fact that it is out of an 
archetype that stereotypes are developed. It is not to be confused with the way in which 
the term is used in Jungian psychoanalysis, where it refers to primordial, inherited, 
innate, and a priori modes of perception (Hyde and McGuinness 1992).
3 Daoism, or Taoism, is one of the oldest and most prominent Chinese philosophies. The 
way in which the term is spelled depends on the system of romanization. The older 
spelling, “Taoism,” is still widely in use, although the pinyin spelling, Daoism, is the one 
preferred by the People’s Republic of China. Similarly, “Chi Kung” and “Qi Gong” refer to 
the same form of exercise, with the latter spelling (the pinyin) now becoming the more 
prevalent.
4 Following the convention of scholars of Chinese medicine, I am capitalizing terms such 
as “Spleen” and “Blood” when they are used in the Chinese way, to distinguish them 
from Western usages.
5 Leys made this observation in a seminar at oise on 21 March 1993. The seminar, which 
Leys led, was organized by Tuula Lindholm on behalf of a Gramsci study group. I thank 
Tuula for inviting me to the seminar.
6 My characterization here resonates with Foucault’s understanding of how the 
panopticon leads to self-regulation oon the part of prisoners (Foucault 1977).
7 Indeed, students have to practise Qi Gong and meditation for at least five minutes each 
day as part of the course requirement. The rationale is to make el part of their everyday 
lives so that mindfulness becomes a habit. From students’ discussions, I have discovered 
that this is one of the most difficult aspects of the curriculum.
8 As we will see, the final term paper of one of these students, Si Transken, was 
subsequently published, and I am able to quote from that. I have the permission of the 
two students to use their names and to quote from their work.
9 The references are to Ted Kaptchuk and Michael Croucher, The Healing Arts: A Journal 
Through the Faces of Medicine (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1986) and to 
Deborah Orr’s “The Use of Mindfulness in Anti-oppressive Pedagogies” (Orr 2000).
10 All the same, during the symposium at which this essay was first presented, Julie Klein 
commented that el is a form of integrative study, rather than interdisciplinary study.
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From Integrated to Interstitial Studies
d e R e K  B R I t o n
To do something interdisciplinary it’s not enough to choose a subject 
(a theme) and gather round it two or three sciences. Interdisciplinarity 
consists in creating a new object that belongs to no one.
Roland Barthes, The Rustle of Language (1986, 26)
inteRdisciplinaRit y as integRated studies
When academic scholarship extends beyond the parameters of a single 
discipline, it tends to follow one of four trajectories: (i) multidisciplinar-
ity—drawing upon a range of disciplines to apply them individually; (ii) 
interdisciplinarity—engaging the disciplines in collaborative forms of 
inquiry; (iii) crossdisciplinarity—employing the disciplines to illuminate 
aspects of one another; or (iv) transdisciplinarity—transgressing and 
undermining disciplinary boundaries (Pollock 2004).1 This essay intro-
duces a fifth term and proposes a sixth. The fifth term, “integrated stud-
ies,” emerged with the establishment of Athabasca University (au)’s first 
master of arts degree in 2001: the Ma–Integrated Studies. By avoiding 
all reference to previous variants of disciplinarity (multi-, inter-, cross-, 
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trans-), the integrated studies approach seeks to bring various avenues 
of inquiry together in such a way that they constitute new interpretive 
frameworks and new objects of knowledge. In this respect, the integrated 
model aspires to Barthes’s propagative vision of interdisciplinarity. It has 
certainly proven a popular mode of inquiry with students, facilitating the 
production of numerous student projects, but it has failed to generate 
a truly original object of knowledge, even from among the ranks of the 
most inspired and capable students. In this respect, the integrated stud-
ies model, even though it has moved many students closer to Barthes’s 
vision, has inspired none to realize it. Although innovative and inspir-
ing in its own right, the integrated studies approach is simply unsuited to 
producing “a new object that belongs to no one.” The remainder of this 
essay is devoted to explaining why, exactly, this is the case and how this 
impasse can be remedied.
the genesis  oF the MA–integRated studies
Since its inception in 1970, au’s mandate has been to remove the bar-
riers that limit educational opportunities. To this end, a policy of open 
access is employed to minimize academic barriers, and provision at-a-
distance is used to reduce geographic and economic barriers. Academic 
excellence is prized, but au’s unique student demographic (74 percent of 
au graduates are the first in their family to earn a degree), requires that 
equal emphasis be placed upon academic success. Open access, provi-
sion at-a-distance, and dedication to facilitating student success have 
come to define au, and the very same principles informed the launch 
of its first and later graduate offerings. In 1994, an executive masters in 
business education (Mba) and a masters in distance education (Mde) 
paved the way for other graduate programs, including a master’s degree 
in the arts, humanities, and social sciences. (For the vast majority of 
au students, their degree is terminal, so programming leans toward the 
pragmatic rather than preparation for advanced studies, and this has 
undoubtedly contributed to the success of au’s undergraduate and grad-
uate programs. That said, the graduate programming is flexible enough 
that it can be made sufficiently challenging to support students who wish 
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to pursue advanced degrees, evidenced by the fact that a number are 
now pursuing phds at some of Canada’s premier universities.) Following 
two years of discussion and debate, the decision was made to launch a 
masters in integrated studies (Ma-is), for logistical as well as curricu-
lar reasons: au graduate programs exist on a cost recovery basis, so a 
potential for growth over time was essential, and since other universi-
ties were closing single-discipline master’s programs owing to shrinking 
enrolments, a degree that integrated the disciplines rather than placed 
them in competition made greater sense; furthermore, an integration of 
scholarly domains solved the problem of how au, a small institution with 
insufficient faculty to support Mas in every discipline (fewer than 140 
full-time faculty at the time), could provide students with an opportunity 
to pursue an Ma in the liberal arts and social sciences. To ensure a range 
of curricular choices, only nine of the degree’s thirty-three credits are 
mandatory: two core courses (one theory-based, one method-based) and 
a final capstone project. Program development was organic, allowing 
faculty with a desire to teach at the graduate level to propose courses, 
within some curricular constraints (courses had to involve more than one 
disciplinary approach and had to promote a critically reflective attitude in 
students).2 As the complement of courses grew, affinities became appar-
ent and several arenas of inquiry emerged: adult education, community 
studies, cultural studies, educational studies, equity studies, global 
change, historical studies, information studies, and work, organization, 
and leadership. The program opened in 2001, and students were required 
to declare at least one of these arenas of inquiry—initially designated 
specializations—as a focus area. More recently, a specialization in liter-
ary studies was added. Students are required to complete at least four 
courses in their designated focus area. A further, less structured focus 
area, Independent Track, is available to students with sufficient prior 
preparation, allowing them to create their own arena of inquiry, in con-
sultation with and under the guidance of a faculty supervisor. The model 
proved both programmatically and economically viable, and extremely 
popular with students—so much so that enrolments mushroomed from 
27 in 2001 to over 1200 in 2008.
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integRated studies in context
Somewhat ironically, the Ma–Integrated Studies proved a victim of its 
own success. Rapid growth and high enrolments placed increasing stress 
on its organic model of development and integrative notion of inter-
disciplinarity, compromising its sustainability: pastoral and academic 
counselling, teaching, and supervising large numbers of students meant 
faculty had little time to reflect on how well the program was meeting its 
prescribed goals. In 2007, faced with an impending external review, it was 
time for a thorough reassessment of the program’s premises, processes, 
and purpose: hence the hosting of the 2008 symposium that served as 
the basis for this collection of essays on interdisciplinarity. The goal was 
to widen the scope of the program’s reassessment process to include the 
larger, international debate on the nature and practice of interdisciplin-
ary studies, allowing the program’s “integrated” model of inquiry to be 
situated in relation to new and emergent models of interdisciplinarity, 
affording an opportunity for the program not only to benefit from but also 
to contribute to the international dialogue on the theory and practice of 
interdisciplinarity. The symposium had three central aims: (i) to consoli-
date reflection upon and reassessment of the integrated studies approach 
to interdisciplinary teaching and research; (ii) to initiate a substantive dia-
logue among au faculty and members of the national/international inter-
disciplinary community; and (iii) to make a contribution to the national/
international debate on the theory and practice of interdisciplinarity in 
the form of a volume of essays that captured the debate’s current state, 
identified future trajectories, and served as a resource for practitioners, 
researchers, and students of interdisciplinarity. To that end, the sympo-
sium brought together leading interdisciplinary researchers and practi-
tioners to debate the nature and scope of interdisciplinary studies in the 
twenty-first century, providing participants and observers an opportunity 
to explore and debate a range of topics of central importance to the prac-
tice of interdisciplinary teaching and research. This essay outlines one 
of the contributions to that debate: a call for a new model of interdisci-
plinary inquiry that expands the parameters of disciplinary thinking but 
retains its promise and purpose to further the pursuit of knowledge and 
distinguish opinion from truth. In this respect, interstitial studies, or at 
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least the model proposed herein, differs markedly from postmodern and 
post-structuralist “solutions” that throw the proverbial baby, the scien-
tific world view,3 out with the bathwater, “scientism.”4
FRoM integRated to inteRstitial studies
During the planning stages of au’s Ma–Integrated Studies, the descrip-
tors multi-, inter-, cross-, and transdisciplinary were explicitly rejected, 
in an effort to avoid the simple adoption of another set of predetermined 
practices, the “discipline” of multidisciplinarity or transdisciplinarity, for 
instance. In choosing the term “integrated,” au sought to acknowledge 
the interrelated complexities of the given, of an increasingly globalized 
world of interacting, evolving, and proliferating phenomena. Recognizing 
the given, as such, requires study not only through single-, multi-, inter-, 
cross-, and transdisciplinary lenses, but also with a view to its function-
ality as a field of activity/experience. The integrated studies model was 
intended to facilitate this end, and it clearly enjoyed successes in this 
area,5 but the greater challenge lies in how to build upon and further those 
successes. Reflection suggests that the task of constituting new modes of 
inquiry and new objects of knowledge demands that the given’s complexi-
ties be not only acknowledged but also radically reassessed. Heinz Insu 
Fenkl, former director of suny New Paltz’s Interstitial Studies Institute, 
takes the first steps toward such a reassessment in his essay “Towards a 
Theory of the Interstitial” (2003).
It was the publication of Fenkl’s first book, Memories of My Ghost 
Brother, that first alerted him to the ubiquitous presence of scientism, to 
“the power of binary oppositions in the world of publishing.” Fenkl, an 
author and associate professor of English and Asian studies, recounts the 
either/or logic that resulted in his book, which straddled the genres of 
“memoir” and “novel,” being assigned to the latter category. The pub-
lisher’s reasoning was unequivocal: the empirical evidence indicated 
that “memoirs by people who were not already famous did not sell well,” 
and since the book “had to be one thing or another . . . they made it a 
novel.” Fenkl later realized his publisher’s deference to scientism was “a 
general reflection of the way people think in western cultures” and that 
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such thinking holds sway far beyond the confines of the publishing indus-
try, extending even into the realm of literary theory, even though it “is 
inadequate for dealing with an entire class of works” (Fenkl 2003).6 Fenkl 
labels this class of works “the Interstitial,” and sets out to reveal how 
these objects emerge into and recede from the reader’s consciousness, 
transforming the reader in the process. Fenkl realizes his insights into 
interstitial literary works have broader application, but their truly radical 
potential seems to escape him, and by choosing to limit the evidence he 
musters in support of his observations to anecdotes drawn from the realm 
of writing, he further reduces their critical impact. The implications of the 
interstitial, in fact, extend far beyond the realm of writing and, if general-
ized and fully substantiated, provide the basis for a revolutionary mode of 
scholarly inquiry—interstitial studies.
the (un)natuRal oRdeR
Fenkl (2003) begins his reflections on the interstitial by recounting how 
“the word ‘interstice’ comes from the Latin roots inter (between) and sistere 
(to stand). Literally, it means to ‘stand between’ or ‘stand in the middle.’” 
The interstitial, Fenkl notes, differs from other states of betweenness such 
as “liminality” and “hybridity” because the “inter” of the liminal and 
hybrid refers to a transitory state, whereas that of the interstitial signi-
fies a prevailing state. The distinction is important, especially if Fenkl’s 
findings are to be extrapolated, because while liminality and hybridity 
argue for an alternative perspective on the existing world view (interpre-
tive framework), the interstitial presses for its complete reconceptualiza-
tion: “An interstitial work does not require reintegration—it already has 
its own being in a willfully transgressive or noncategorical way” (emphasis 
added). Interstitial objects, by refusing either to be one thing or another,7 
alert us to the fact that we are inescapably implicated in our choice of 
world view, and that world views are ineluctably value-based as opposed 
to fact-based, something Jorges Luis Borges demonstrates with alacrity in 
his brief essay, “The Analytical Language of John Wilkins” (1942).8
Borges reveals that, in an attempt to construct a universal language 
along the lines first envisaged by René Descartes, John Wilkins (1614–1672), 
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founder of the Royal Society and Bishop of Chester, first divided the uni-
verse into forty categories, subdivided those categories based on differ-
ences, and then further subdivided them into species, assigning “to each 
class a monosyllable of two letters; to each difference, a consonant; to 
each species, a vowel.” What Wilkins overlooks, however, is “a problem 
that is impossible or at least difficult to postpone: the value of the forty 
genera which are the basis of the language” (emphasis added). Why, for 
example, does Wilkins choose such categories as “stones,” “metals,” 
and “viviparous oblong fish”? To demonstrate Wilkins’s implication in 
his choice of categories and subdivisions, Borges contrasts the bishop’s 
schema with that of a mythical Chinese encyclopaedia:
These ambiguities, redundancies and deficiencies remind us of those 
which doctor Franz Kuhn attributes to a certain Chinese encyclopaedia 
entitled “Celestial Empire of Benevolent Knowledge.” In its remote 
pages it is written that the animals are divided into: (a) belonging to 
the emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) Tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) 
fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) 
frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, 
(l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a 
long way off look like flies.9
That the realm of “animals” could be categorized in this manner rather 
than according to the Linnaean system (kingdom, phylum, class, order, 
family, genus, and species) draws our attention to the fact that taxono-
mies are a reflection of what the inquirer judges important, or values, as 
opposed to some invariable, natural order. For Borges, “it is clear that 
there is no classification of the Universe not being arbitrary and full of 
conjectures, and that the reason for this is very simple: we do not know 
what thing the universe is.” Of course, as Borges notes: “The impossi-
bility of penetrating the divine pattern of the universe cannot stop us 
from planning human patterns, even though we are conscious they are 
not definitive.” Questions of conscious awareness aside, the scientific 
world view has proven of great value to natural scientists, but its appli-
cation in politics, economics, and ethics limits and constrains inquiry 
in these domains to what science values: objectivity, measurability, and 
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predictability. The challenge, then, since we can never know “what thing 
the universe is” but are compelled to create “human patterns” in accord 
with our interests, formulations that structure and shape our perceptions 
of the universe, is to find an alternative scholarly mode of inquiry that 
furthers our understanding of the universe without denying our impli-
cation in our choice of world view, the subjective underpinnings of our 
formulations. This pursuit, to avoid the pitfall of scientism, must accom-
modate more than just the empirically and/or logically demonstrable, 
what we can know directly; it must also include what we can know only 
indirectly—the interstitial. More importantly, it is to acknowledge that the 
defining characteristic of whatever we know is necessarily unknown to 
us.
In a now (in)famous us Department of Defense news briefing, deliv-
ered 12 February 2002, Donald Rumsfeld, then Secretary of Defense, flirts 
with this relation between the known and unknown but fails to push it to 
its logical conclusion:
Reports that say that something hasn’t happened are always interesting 
to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things 
we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to 
say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also 
unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know. And if 
one looks throughout the history of our country and other free coun-
tries, it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones.10
What Rumsfeld leaves unsaid, but the interstitial makes clear, is that, 
in addition to being cognizant of (i) what we know (“known knowns”), 
(ii) what we don’t know (“known unknowns”), and (iii) what we don’t 
know we don’t know (“unknown unknowns”), we can (and must if we’re 
to avoid the trap of scientism) become cognizant of (iv) knowledge that 
is unknown to us (“unknown knowns”). This is imperative because the 
“unknown knowns” comprise our own implication in our formulations: 
“the disavowed beliefs, suppositions and obscene practices we pretend 
not to know about, even though they form the background of our public 
values” (Žižek 2004).11 In other words, for what we know to be more than 
mere conjecture, we must remain ignorant of the lens (values/interests) 
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we use to bring determinacy to the indeterminate. This entails becom-
ing (a) fully cognizant of, and (b) completely embracing the interstitial. 
Fenkl’s observations of the interstitial move us closer to the first require-
ment but lack the evidentiary and persuasive force to bring about the 
latter. An account of the interstitial, to displace scientism, must be at least 
as compelling, explain scientism’s failings, and offer a non-prescriptive 
path to the extension of knowledge and pursuit of truth. The demands 
and scope of this task are beyond Fenkl, as the inclusion of “toward” in 
the title of his essay suggests, but his observations do, indeed, provide 
the mise en scène for a solution.
the inteRstitial
What intrigues Fenkl about an interstitial mode of inquiry, and what 
should be of tantamount interest to educators, is its potential to trans-
form the inquirer: “What the Interstitial does, actually, is transform the 
reader’s consciousness. . . . In transforming the perceptions of the reader, 
interstitial works make the reader (or listener, or viewer) more perceptive 
and more attentive; in doing so, they make the reader’s world larger, more 
interesting, more meaningful, and perhaps even more comprehensible” 
(Fenkl 2003). A desire to foster a transformation of this nature certainly 
inspired au’s choice of an integrated model of interdisciplinarity, but the 
results, although encouraging,12 have proven limited, demonstrating the 
need for an interdisciplinary mode of inquiry with a greater transforma-
tory potential. Fenkl likens the transformational effect of the interstitial, 
a “phenomenon of illumination and (re)discovery,” to “the moment of 
‘epiphany’ in a story,” when “the reader’s consciousness of the story is 
transformed,” and notes that “while all this happens in the reader’s ‘pres-
ent,’ the more important effect is that the reader’s memory of the ‘past’ of 
the story is significantly altered.” He compares this “epiphanic moment” 
to the sudden and gradual processes of enlightenment practised by the 
Rinzai and Sōtō schools of Zen, respectively. But this anecdotal account 
falls short of an explanation, much as his description of marginal works 
that evolve into full-fledged genres (William Gibson’s Neuromancer and 
the genre of cyberpunk, for instance)13 falls short of explaining how 
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interstitial objects create “a retroactive historical trajectory” that erases 
them from consciousness. If we turn to the work of Jacques Lacan and his 
commentators, however, we find, grounded in an extensive conceptual 
framework, an explicit account of why an encounter with the interstitial 
transforms consciousness, and how its objects coalesce on the periphery 
of consciousness only to (re)posit their origin and return to its shadows. 
In this respect, Lacan’s work stands as an exemplar of an interstitial mode 
of inquiry.
l acan’s thought
Lacan’s reconceptualization of the given is the antithesis of all previous 
systems of thought, and provides a compelling account of not only the 
existing world view (the formal/symbolic and effectual/cultured of sci-
entism), but also of the interstitial (affectual/instinctual). Reformulated 
as the Symbolic, Imaginary, and Real, respectively, this ternary structure 
serves as the hub of Lacan’s thought. Concepts at the heart of scientism 
and the Western tradition (the subject, knowledge, consciousness, and 
truth) are retained but radically reconfigured in keeping with the intri-
cately knotted topography of Symbolic, Imaginary, and Real. The effects 
are jarring, but only a rupture of this magnitude holds the promise of a 
break from scientism, as Audre Lorde astutely notes: “The master’s tools 
will never dismantle the master’s house. They may allow us temporar-
ily to beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring 
about genuine change” (1984, 112). Lacan, in fact, devoted his career to 
dismantling the master’s house, building upon the work of his intellec-
tual progenitor, Sigmund Freud, and introducing changes, revisions, and 
modifications as his thinking progressed. He remained singular, however, 
in his insistence that his oeuvre not be distilled into a system that lends 
itself to mechanical and indiscriminate application:
If it is true that what I teach represents a body of thought, I will not 
leave behind me any of those handles, which will enable you to append 
a suffix in the form of an “-ism.” In other words, none of the terms that 
I have made use of here one after the other—none of which, I am glad 
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to see from your confusion, has yet managed to impress itself on you as 
the essential term, whether it be the symbolic, the signifier or desire—
none of the terms will in the end enable any one of you to turn into an 
intellectual cricket on my account. ([1986] 1992, 251–52)
Far from unintentional, Lacan’s enigmatic and oftentimes vexing 
style is, according to Richard Boothby, “calculated to frustrate facile 
understanding”:
His aim in part is to replicate for his readers and listeners something of 
the essential opacity and disconnectedness of the analytic experience. 
Often what is required of the reader in the encounter with Lacan’s 
dense and recalcitrant discourse, as with that of the discourse of the 
patient in analysis, is less an effort to clarify and systematize than a 
sort of unknowing mindfulness. We are called upon less to close over 
the gaps and discontinuities in the discourse than to remain attentive 
to its very lack of coherence, allowing its breaches and disalignments 
to become the jumping-off points for new movements of thought. (1991, 
15–16)
l acan’s Reconcep tualizations
Issues of composition notwithstanding, Lacan proposes a revolutionary 
conception of knowledge and learning: “Proceeding not through linear 
progression but through breakthroughs, leaps, discontinuities, regres-
sions and deferred action, the analytic learning process puts in ques-
tion the traditional pedagogical belief in intellectual perfectibility, the 
progressist view of learning as a simple one-way road from ignorance 
to knowledge” (Felman 1987, 76). Knowledge is desanctified and mobi-
lized, as that which cannot be exchanged, transmitted, or “acquired (or 
possessed) once and for all: each case, each text, has its own specific, 
singular symbolic functioning and requires a different interpretation” 
(Felman 1987, 81). Truth, likewise, is preserved, but its meaning inverted 
from necessity to contingency, from certainty to misrecognition. The con-
cept of “subject,” too, is retained, but reconceptualized in keeping with 
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the ternary structure of Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary as the foundation 
of truth.
the decentRed subJec t
Building upon Freud’s discovery of the unconscious, Lacan rejects sci-
entism’s conception of the subject, its “fundamental master signifier—
that of an ‘I’ that is identical to itself and transcendental” (Bracher 1988, 
40)—and posits the subject as irredeemably decentred, declaring of his 
own subjectivity that “what is realized in my history is not the past defi-
nite of what was, since it is no more, or even the present perfect of what 
has been in what I am, but the future anterior of what I shall have been in 
the process of becoming” (Lacan, quoted in Macey 1988, 105; emphasis 
added). For Lacan, as for a number of his contemporaries, the subject is 
a product neither of intro- nor retro- but of extro-spection, of a looking 
outside and forward:
As a being-in-the-world, man has a project, that is, a sense of the 
future, something he wants to do. Thus, he projects his life from the 
point he is at into the future. Heidegger originated the very important 
existentialist concept of the “project.” I am here physically, but I project 
myself into the future, and I conceive of what I want to do. It is on the 
basis of what I want to do that I can experience difficulties and obsta-
cles. Sartre developed this point at length: things are not obstacles in 
and of themselves, they are only obstacles if you want something. It is 
because you want something to happen further along that retroactively 
things are experienced as obstacles. (Miller 1988, 10)
the FutuRe anteRioR
For Lacan, the subject is a being-in-process, not something that was or is. 
Bruce Fink, for instance, notes how Lacan “never pinpoints the subject’s 
chronological appearance: he or she is always either about to arrive—is on 
the verge of arriving—or will have already arrived by some later moment 
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in time” (Fink 1995, 63). Thus, when Lacan speaks of the subject, he uses 
either the imperfect tense (which tends to be ambiguous in French) or 
the future anterior (also known as the future perfect). Lacan, however, 
as Nestor Braunstein points out, tends to favour “the anterior future of 
the verb: what will have been” (1988, 53). Unfortunately (or, perhaps 
intentionally), Lacan’s future anterior constructions often obscure their 
meaning, so much so, according to David Macey, that “the opacity of the 
terminology masks the relative ease with which this temporality can be 
applied” (1988, 105). By way of illustration, Macey offers the following 
anecdote:
Freud writes to Fleiss and expresses the hope or phantasy that “some-
day” a marble tablet will be mounted on the wall of the house where 
he discovered the secret of dreams, he identifies with the great man he 
will have been. The history of his recollection of that hope or desire is 
neither the history of what he has been nor that of what he is, but the 
history of what he will have been when his discovery will have been 
publicly acknowledged. (1988, 106; emphasis added)
the concRete univeRsal
This unsettling temporality explains perfectly the paradoxical nature 
and path of interstitial objects: they are either on the verge of arriving 
(hovering on the periphery of consciousness) or they have already arrived 
(having always been present), their glaring presence obscuring all traces 
of their instantiation. This is exactly how Gibson’s Neuromancer, a novel 
without a genre, actualized not only its own being as an exemplar of the 
genre of cyberpunk, but also that of earlier novels that failed to actual-
ize theirs. The transition from potential/contingent (what will have been) 
to actual/necessary (what has always been) involves two coterminous 
events: (i) a reconfiguration of the subject’s world view (Symbolic) to 
accommodate the interstitial object, and (ii) the establishment of a new 
chain of meaning that situates the object as the culmination of a series of 
previous instances; each determines the other’s success and requires the 
interstitial object to function as both a type (genus) and instance (species) 
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of itself—as a concrete universal.14 But the interstitial’s transformation 
of consciousness erases all trace of the subject’s implication in the pro-
cess, creating the impression that its “discovery” was inevitable. This is 
the process that allows Neuromancer to appear as a later instance of the 
very genre it creates, the dialectical dance of particular and universal that 
strips necessity of the mantle of truth and places it squarely on the shoul-
ders of contingency, standing the “law” of cause and effect on its head in 
the process.15
the subJec t and tRuth
From Lacan, we learn that truth is neither a function of language (the 
Symbolic) nor nature (the Imaginary) but of the subject that submits to 
the world view (signifying network) it will have been integrated into. For, 
as Slavoj Žižek notes, “meaning is not discovered, excavated from the 
hidden depth of the past, but constructed retroactively—the analysis pro-
duces the truth; that is the signifying frame which gives the symptoms 
their symbolic place and meaning” (1997, 56). It is the process of inquiry, 
then, the transformation of the inquirer’s consciousness (the analysis) 
that determines, rather than discovers, the “cause” of the circumstances 
(symptoms) under scrutiny. Žižek’s point is that “as soon as we enter the 
symbolic order, the past is always present in the form of historical tradi-
tion and the meaning of these traces is not given; it changes continually 
with the transformations of the signifier’s network”; consequently, “every 
historical rupture, every advent of a new master-signifier, changes ret-
roactively the meaning of all tradition, restructures the narration of the 
past, makes it readable in another, new way” (1997, 57; emphasis added). 
This enigmatic temporality of the subject should not, however, be con-
flated with its demise or “death,” for Lacan is neither a postmodernist 
nor a post-structuralist, since he abandons neither the subject nor mean-
ing. Žižek, in fact, targets such misconceptions in The Sublime Object of 
Ideology: “Against the distorted picture of Lacan as belonging to the field 
of ‘post-structuralism,’ the book articulates his radical break with ‘post-
structuralism’; against the distorted picture of Lacan’s obscurantism, it 
locates him in the lineage of rationalism” (1997, 7).
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With respect to meaning, Jacques-Alain Miller notes how Lacan 
“stressed the importance of seeking the laws of meaning. He didn’t con-
sider meaning to be some kind of dainty thing floating in the air here and 
there which alights on something, gives it a meaning, and then disap-
pears.” For Lacan, “the fact that meaning is grounded in the subject—
the fact that meaning is not a thing—does not imply that there are no 
laws of meaning.” The subject is central to Lacan’s work, but Lacan, like 
Heidegger, “defines the existence of man not as interiority, an inner some-
thing like ideas or feelings, but rather as a constant projecting outside” 
(1988, 10–12). It is because Lacan grounds meaning in the subject that 
truth, as the subject, is a function neither of what was nor of what is, but 
of what will have been, hence Žižek’s paradoxical but characteristically 
Lacanian response to the question:
From where does the repressed return? . . . From the future. Symptoms 
are meaningless traces, their meaning is not discovered, excavated from 
the hidden depth of the past, but constructed retroactively—the analysis 
produces the truth; that is, the signifying frame that gives the symptoms 
their symbolic place and meaning. (1997, 55–56; emphasis added)
tRuth as RedeMp tion
This redemptive conception of truth is not unlike that sketched out by 
Benjamin in his unfinished Passagen-Werk. In her ovarian study of 
Benjamin, The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades 
Project, Susan Buck-Morss notes how Benjamin resolves a lacuna in Marx 
(how, exactly, the transition to socialism would take place, which sub-
sequently conjured the spectre of economic determinism) by attributing 
the transition to changes in the superstructure, as opposed to the eco-
nomic base, to “a separate (and relatively autonomous) dialectical pro-
cess, ‘no less noticeable . . . than in the economy,’ but proceeding ‘far 
more slowly.’ It is this dialectic that makes possible the transition to a 
socialist society” (Buck-Morss 1989, 124). Not only does this dialectic 
unfold in a space highly reminiscent of the unconscious, Žižek’s “signify-
ing frame” (“it plays itself out between the collective imagination and the 
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productive potential of the new nature that human beings have brought 
into being, but do not yet consciously comprehend”), it is also “developed 
not by burying the dead past, but by revitalizing it” (124). It was clear 
to Benjamin that “if future history is not determined and thus its forms 
are still unknown, if consciousness cannot transcend the horizons of its 
sociohistorical context, then where else but to the dead past can imagi-
nation turn to conceptualize a world that is ‘not-yet’?” This redemptive 
inversion, moreover, “satisfies a utopian wish: the desire (manifested in 
the religious myth of awakening the dead) ‘to make (past) suffering into 
something incomplete, to make good an unfulfilled past that has been 
irretrievably lost” (124). Thus:
The socialist transformation of the superstructure, which begins within 
capitalism under the impact of industrial technology, includes redeem-
ing the past, in a process that is tenuous, undetermined, and largely 
unconscious. As a result of the distortions of capitalist social relations, 
the progressive and retrogressive moments of this process are not easily 
discerned. One of the tasks that Benjamin believed to be his own in 
the Passagen-Werk was to make both tendencies of the process visible 
retrospectively. (124; emphasis added)
Benjamin’s redemption of the past, wherein for instance, all previous 
attempts at revolution (1789, 1830, 1848, 1871, 1917) may be redeemed 
by a subsequent successful revolutionary act, should not be conflated 
with the more commonplace notion that the victors get to write history. 
Benjamin, as Lacan, recognizes that redemption involves much more 
than simply constructing a supplementary account of what occurred 
previously. Even when a single account suppresses all others, as is often 
the case when totalitarian regimes accede to power and a single, “offi-
cial” version of history emerges, the past is not redeemed. Redemption 
involves replacing the very ground, the fantasy space, the signifying net-
work, or screen upon which the various accounts are foregrounded and 
compete for supremacy. This is the truly ideological space, the ground 
that determines the very terms upon which competition can take place, 
the very parameters of meaning. It entails much more than a simple shift 
in perspective.
Valences of Interdisciplinarity.indd   382 28/02/2012   4:31:54 PM
 From Integrated to Interstitial Studies 383
inteRstitial veRsus Mundane obJec ts
At first glance, the adoption of a new world view or symbolic order 
appears to differ little from the adoption of a new perspective. But the 
shift from one signifying frame to another involves something far more 
radical than a simple change of perspective. Take, for instance, the infa-
mous “shower scene” from the once-popular television series Dallas. In 
the opening scene of a new season, the meaning of the whole previous 
season was “rewritten” as nothing more than a figment of the imagina-
tion, a dream, of one of the central characters. This ingenuous inversion, 
which involved a simple change of perspective, proved not only unsat-
isfying but also unconvincing to most viewers, since it left far too many 
issues unresolved. But let us suppose the whole previous season had been 
written with the idea of later depicting it as a dream. There would cer-
tainly have been fewer inconsistencies, perhaps none, in fact. The inver-
sion, nonetheless, would have remained unsatisfying and unconvincing 
to many. Why? Because such a guileless inversion does nothing more than 
add another perspective to those that already exist, to those created by 
viewers themselves and representatives of the popular media. To be truly 
convincing, to be truly persuasive, a new reading must do much more 
than simply offer an alternative account. This is what distinguishes a 
shift in perspective from a shift in the signifying framework, and explains 
why those works of cyberpunk that “preceded” Gibson’s Neuromancer 
remained as particular instances of novels without a genre (alternative 
perspectives) until the genre of cyberpunk emerged with Neuromancer to 
redeem them as precursors to a new present. A rather telling comment 
accompanies a Wikipedia listing of cyberpunk novels: “These works 
could be labeled cyberpunk’s ‘precursors,’ but a causal connection is not 
always clear” (emphasis added).
A shift in the signifying framework only occurs when one perspec-
tive, one interpretation among many, begins to function as the only pos-
sible interpretation—when, for example, one species among many begins 
to function as its own genus, when a Particular assumes the role of the 
Universal. Once that interpretation is adopted, every perspective that pre-
ceded it is reinterpreted, recoloured, as an instance in a chain of inevi-
table events leading up to that interpretation’s ineluctable emergence. A 
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perfect example of this retroactive effect is the manner in which capital-
ism, once it was firmly established, reinterpreted all previous modes of 
production as moments in its own process of development:
In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which 
predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influ-
ence to the others. It is a general illumination which bathes all the other 
colours and modifies their particularity. It is a particular ether which 
determines the specific gravity of every being which has materialized 
within it. (Marx [1857–58] 1973, 106–7)
Marx, according to Žižek, understood the retroactive effect of meaning 
fully, looking not to the historical origins of capitalism for its truth but to 
its fully developed form. Thus Žižek remarks “of the famous proposition 
from Marx’s Grundrisse according to which ‘the anatomy of man offers us 
a key to the anatomy of monkey’” that “we should not forget for a single 
moment that we do not ‘derive man from monkey’: all we effectively do 
is reconstruct the process backwards, from the standpoint of the finished 
result” (2008, 209). Michel Foucault falls prey to this very trap when he 
tries to trace the origins of modern sexuality to some event in the past; 
this is why he is forced to the very origins of Western society in ancient 
Greece, where the cause still eludes him. The paradox Foucault fails to 
come to terms with is that meaning is a function of past events being 
incorporated into a signifying network at a later date—of what will have 
been—not of something inherent in the context or nature of past events 
themselves.
FRoM contingency to tRuth
The psychoanalytic term for the condition that makes the emergence of a 
new world view possible is “transference,” and even an understanding of 
how the process works is no protection against its effect—les non-dupes 
errent. An analysand, for instance, who succeeds in catching his or her 
analyst in an inconsistency, who is in-the-know, so to speak, does nothing 
more than prove that transference has already taken place; otherwise he 
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or she would have no interest in proving the analyst wrong or mistaken. 
Žižek suggests that the theologian Pascal exhibits at least an implicit 
understanding of transference when he bids those unable to accede to 
his rational proof of God to overcome their reluctant passions by submit-
ting themselves to blind ritual, to simply act as if they believe: “Pascal’s 
final answer, then, is: leave rational argumentation and submit yourself 
simply to ideological ritual, stupefy yourself by repeating the meaning-
less gestures, act as if you already believe, and the belief will come by 
itself” (1997, 39).
This Pascalian method of conversion can be witnessed in millions of 
recovery groups around the world. Just as Pascal’s reluctant converts to 
Catholicism were urged to overcome their reluctant passions by confess-
ing their impotence and inability to believe, so too are neophyte recover-
ing substance abusers bid to admit their powerlessness over alcohol or 
drugs and to place their trust in a “higher power”—something other than 
their own reason (often the group or an individual sponsor for atheists 
and agnostics). Simply by not drinking or using, attending meetings, and 
following the lead of recovered abusers, struggling substance abusers 
find themselves, suddenly, believing not only what they could not believe 
but also that their newfound belief is something they believed even before 
they believed it! “What distinguishes this Pascalian ‘custom’ from insipid 
behaviorist wisdom (‘the content of your belief is conditioned by your fac-
tual behavior’) is the paradoxical status of a belief before belief: by fol-
lowing a custom, the subject believes without knowing it, so that the final 
conversion is merely a formal act by means of which we recognize what 
we have already believed in” (Žižek 1997, 40).
This is exactly why an integrated model of interdisciplinarity, no 
matter how critically engaged with the given, is not up to the task of cre-
ating new interpretive frameworks and new objects of knowledge with-
out abandoning meaning and the promise of truth. Only an interstitial 
mode of inquiry such as that proposed by Lacan is up to that task. This 
is why it is necessary to replace au’s integrated model of interdisciplin-
arity with an interstitial mode. An interstitial mode of inquiry redirects 
the inquirer’s gaze from the lure of the given to the grounds for its very 
possibility, identifying the subject as the location and origin of truth, as 
opposed to nature or ideas—realism or idealism, in all their variants. Only 
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an interstitial mode of inquiry has the potential to truly transform the 
inquirer by alerting her or him to how knowledge is created through the 
pursuit of truth. It is imperative that students of interdisciplinarity appre-
ciate their own role in producing the knowledge they seek, and that their 
pursuit of truth open new pathways to knowledge rather than reinforce 
preconceived convictions. This is an unending task, for whatever world 
view eventually displaces scientism will attempt to maintain its own order 
by masking the grounds of its own possibility; such is the nature and force 
of the Symbolic. This is why Žižek concludes:
The duty of the critical intellectual—if, in today’s “postmodern” uni-
verse, this syntagm has any meaning left—is precisely to occupy all the 
time, even when the new order (the “new harmony”) stabilizes itself 
and again renders invisible the hole as such, the place of this hole, i.e., 
to maintain a distance toward every reigning Master Signifier. (1993, 2)
Lacan invested much time and effort into learning how best to bring 
others to this realization, but recounting that process is, unfortunately, 
beyond the scope of this essay.
notes
1 Julie Thompson Klein proposes a very similar tripartite taxonomy: (i) “Multidisciplinary 
approaches juxtapose disciplines, adding breadth and available knowledge, 
information, and methods”; (ii) “Interdisciplinary designs go further . . . subjects and 
disciplines become tools for studying a theme, a problem, a question, or an idea”; 
and (iii) “with ‘transdisciplinary’ approaches . . . disciplinary and subject boundaries 
are blurred and connections magnified in a new organizational framework that . . . 
transcend[s] the narrow scope of disciplinary worldviews through an overarching 
synthesis” (2006, 13–14).
2 In her essay in this volume, Julie Thompson Klein describes this critically reflective 
attitude in terms of a new rhetoric of interdisciplinarity that emerged toward the end of 
the twentieth century: “The new rhetoric in humanities signalled the evolution of a form 
of ‘critical interdisciplinarity’ that countered ‘instrumental’ goals aligned with ‘strategic,’ 
‘pragmatic,’ and ‘opportunistic’ motivations. Instrumental goals are prominent in 
economic, technological, and scientific problem solving, especially in science-based 
areas of international economic competition such as computers, biotechnology, 
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manufacturing, and industry. In this instance, interdisciplinarity serves the needs of 
the market and national priorities without regard for questions of epistemology or 
institutional structure. In contrast, ‘critical interdisciplinarity’ interrogates the existing 
structure of knowledge and education, raising questions of value and purpose that are 
silent in instrumental forms lacking reflexivity.”
3 In brief, the scientific world view holds that the world comprises insentient and 
sentient objects, that the existence of the former can be validated by the latter through 
passive observation and the exercise of analytic reason, that the actions of said objects 
conform to universal laws, and that the veracity of claims regarding those actions be 
judged in terms of their predictability and falsifiability. This world view continues to 
facilitate remarkable advances in the realm of science but has permeated and come to 
dominate Western thought to such an extent that “scientism” has become a synonym for 
thinking, whether scientific, economic, political, or moral. It is typically scientism that 
postmodernists and post-structuralists abhor, but the scientific world view bears the 
brunt of their vitriol.
4 “‘Scientism’ means science’s belief in itself: that is, the conviction that we can no longer 
understand science as one form of knowledge, but rather must identify knowledge with 
science”: Jürgen Habermas ([1968] 1981, 4).
5 As Michael Welton notes in “Master of Arts–Integrated Studies Self-Assessment” (2006), 
part of an internal program review commissioned in 2005: “The Mais program makes 
indelible impressions on its participants, even though it leaves a few of them exhausted 
at the end! Several students have found Mais to be life changing. One student expressed 
this sentiment dramatically: ‘I realized that I was a different person after I finished 
Mais; exhausted but looking through many new lens [sic] than four years previous. I 
thought differently, considered the world differently, approached problems differently; 
I was a much more critical thinker. I wasn’t ready to stop . . . I wanted to learn more . . 
. and missed the program for a long while after I graduated.’ Another student thought 
that Mais had ‘changed me—it’s mainly about the kind of person I am—I’m on a self-
improvement project lifelong and I found that what I learned I incorporated into my 
life (praxis)—the “being” piece. Leadership was a big one for me as was transformatory 
organizing—helping people locate their power, find their voice—bringing out the leader 
in others.’
 “Some students identified specific dimensions of the life-changing experience. One 
commented: ‘It has confirmed in me that this is my orientation in life and that it is a 
respectful, considerate and intelligent one.’”
6 Regarding literary theory, Fenkl (2003) comments: “I had been familiar with various 
(now popular) theoretical approaches to texts, which examine their ‘liminality’ or 
‘hybridity,’ often applying terms with the prefixes ‘inter’ or ‘trans’ (‘intertextuality’ and 
‘transnationality’ to give two examples), but these approaches all rely on an implicit 
notion of dichotomy combined with the idea of moving from one state to another or 
combining (intersecting) one thing with another.”
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7 It’s challenging for Westerners to think outside the either/or “box,” so Warren Senders, 
in his essay “Music and Categories,” draws on a “lightbulb” joke to illustrate the 
paradoxical nature of such (interstitial) objects: “Remember the Zen Buddhist lightbulb 
joke? The punchline (not particularly funny, but pretty accurate) goes: ‘Three. One to 
screw it in, one to not screw it in, and one to neither screw it in or not screw it in.’”
8 See http://www.crockford.com/wrrrld/wilkins.html. Subsequent quotations of Borges 
are from this translation of the essay.
9 This is the section of Borges’s essay on Wilkins’s universal language that Michel 
Foucault famously quotes, without attribution, in The Order of Things: An Archeology 
of the Human Sciences ([1966] 1994, xv). To reinforce his point on the arbitrary nature of 
taxonomies, Borges further notes: “The Bibliographic Institute of Brussels exerts chaos 
too: it has divided the universe into 1000 subdivisions, from which number 262 is the 
pope; number 282 the Roman Catholic Church; 263, the Day of the Lord; 268 Sunday 
schools; 298, mormonism; and number 294, brahmanism, buddhism, shintoism and 
taoism.”
10 “DoD News Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers. February 12, 2002, 
11:30am est,” available at http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.
aspx?TranscriptID=2636.
11 “If Rumsfeld thinks that the main dangers in the confrontation with Iraq were the 
‘unknown unknowns,’ that is, the threats from Saddam whose nature we cannot even 
suspect, then the Abu Ghraib scandal shows that the main dangers lie in the “unknown 
knowns”—the disavowed beliefs, suppositions and obscene practices we pretend not to 
know about, even though they form the background of our public values”: Slavoj Žižek 
(2004).
12 Welton notes in “Master of Arts–Integrated Studies Self-Assessment”: “The Mais 
experience does work for many: their outlooks appear to expand, they don’t take so 
much for granted in their everyday lives, they often become more acutely aware of 
injustice in the world” (3–4).
13 As Fenkl (2003) observes: “Interstitial works are also self-negating. That is, if they 
become successful to the degree that they engender imitations or tributes to themselves, 
or, if they spark a movement which results in like-minded works, then they are no longer 
truly interstitial, having spawned their own genre, subgenre, or even form. . . . They may 
emerge, like William Gibson’s Neuromancer, as something sui generis (ironically within 
a genre) but then their very success creates a category—cyberpunk—that becomes its 
own genre and retroactively, in the midst of controversy, quickly manifests a historical 
trajectory that precedes Neuromancer itself.”
14 “A term introduced by Hegel to correct the traditional view that a universal is abstract 
through referring to the common nature of a kind of entity by abstraction. Hegel held 
that a universal is concrete rather than an abstract form. A true universal is not a mere 
sum of features common to several things, but is self-particularizing or self-specifying”: 
“Concrete Universal,” Blackwell Reference Online, http://www.blackwellreference.com/
public/.
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15 Žižek, following Fredric Jameson, labels interstitial objects “vanishing mediators” 
because they mediate “the transition between two opposed concepts and thereafter 
disappear. . . . Zizek sees in this process evidence of Hegel’s ‘negation of the negation,’ 
the third moment of the dialectic. The first negation is the mutation of the content within 
and in the name of the old form. The second negation is the obsolescence of the form 
itself. In this way, something becomes the opposite of itself, paradoxically, by seeming to 
strengthen itself”: “Slavoj Žižek—Key Ideas,” http://www.lacan.com/zizekchro1.htm. The 
article draws on Tony Myers, Slavoj Žižek (London: Routledge, 2003).
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